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This dissertation applies a religious studies perspective to the topic of neospirituality in the iconic 
post-Fordist workplaces of symbolic analysts. Despite a voluminous business literature on the im-
portance of spirituality, this topic is underexplored by scholars of religion. Using secondary sources, I 
address this neglect by relating the themes of religious modernization and the changing structures of 
capitalism to this phenomenon. This dissertation outlines the important similarities between the basic 
beliefs and practices of the neospirituals and the culture, skill-set and worldview of symbolic analysts, 
dictated by work`s team and networking forms. Like Weber––but for a different class and economy––
I analyzed a social stratum that acts as a carrier of a “practical ethic” reflective of a specific religious 
orientation. To understand this process, I explored neospiritual holism, the corporation as a psytopia, 
and the dematerialization and second privatization of religion. In relation to post-Fordism, I explored 
macroeconomic changes, labour-force recomposition, workplace restructuring since the 1970s and the 
culture of work. 
Anecdotal evidence and research suggest that neospirituality helps symbolic analysts reconcile them-
selves to the particular demands and concomitant lifestyle pressures of their creative labour. Five ways 
are proposed: Neospirituality`s holism supports the transition of early interest in genuine worker em-
powerment into a neoliberal anti-government sentiment that unites workers and their managers; ne-
ospirituality imaginatively collapses the modernist self/other distinction into a unitary world, helping 
assimilate individual-corporate interests; expensive neospiritual well-being commodities insulate from 
community relations and direct personal service use, maintaining while denying symbolic analysts 
superior social status; neospiritual prosumption posits the factory of the self––applied to work, 
self-production makes workers “owners;” and neospiritual preference for energy over matter mirrors 
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Chapter One: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
Commonly, contemporary religion scholars look for reasons for the widespread adoption of spiritualities 
divorced from religion in a variety of broad trends in late modern societies, such as modernity, seculariza-
tion, commodity culture and globalism. After having studied this phenomenon for some five decades, 
scholars continue to engage its nature and prospects. In this dissertation, I establish that contemporary 
workplaces are important sites for the promotion and shaping of this new spirituality ethos that has emerged 
so pervasively amongst late twentieth-century citizens of advanced capitalist societies.  
Certainly, spirituality and its cognates are pervasive elements of the culture of new workplaces. The 
“spirituality” of employees and managers is a discursive motif and preoccupation there and is actively 
promoted by their superiors and human resources (HR) staff. This is particularly true of global corporations 
and pre-eminently of new-economy businesses (Cruz 2016). It is now normalized as an important concern 
for managers; its enhancement is a legitimate pursuit within corporations. Corporate research into spiritu-
ality’s effectiveness ever expands and intensifies (Biberman 2014). The issue is considered in business 
school curricula and is a major business conference theme. Indeed, a torrent of business journals and con-
ferences are devoted to the topic. About this industry literature, Jeremy Carrette and Richard King (2005, 
128-29) confirm that “in the late 1990s, there has been an explosion of literature on business and spirituality 
and a celebration of spirituality as enhancing work performance.” Marking its acceptance in the wider 
business culture, “renowned business magazines, such as ‘People Management’, ‘Industry Week’, and 
‘Sloan Management Review’ published articles on the opportunities of spirituality for business life on a 
regular basis” (Aupers and Houtman 2010, 148). 
Spirituality has had this presence in workplaces for decades. The 1990 prognostication, Mega-Trends 2000 
(1990, 273), by John Naisbitt and Patricia Aburdene, revealed that of the 500 American companies sur-
veyed, half had offered consciousness-raising techniques to their employees. These companies were esti-
mated to have spent at least $4 billion on New Age consultants annually, which was more than ten percent 
of the money devoted to company training courses each year. Now, “wellness” is a legitimate pursuit of 
new-industry workers, a pursuit often subsidized in the multinational companies where “technical and 
creative workers… receive wellness benefits” (Cruz 2016, 53).  
“Mindfulness” training is currently one of the most common approaches to achieving it. Characteristically, 
trade books addressed to workers on the topic of mindfulness “cluster around two poles: highly stressful 
jobs, and jobs in the helping professions” (Wilson 2014, 126). In other words, mindfulness is touted to those 
2 
 
in stressful jobs as “a way to deal with the pressures of work,” and towards those in the service professions 
“as a way to deliver one’s services in a smoother, more compassionate and effective fashion—but both 
approaches tend to be mixed to some degree” (Wilson 2014, 126). Mindfulness tracts are also pitched to 
particular professions, such as lawyers, doctors and social workers, and very often to corporate managers 
(Wilson 2014, 125-6).  
Within companies, this form of meditation is hoped to help employees temper the effects of overwork. 
Human resources departments are now concerned about “presenteeism,” the practice of employees coming 
in to work despite being physically or mentally ill. Mindfulness practice is understood “to allow workers to 
disengage long enough to recuperate” (Gregg 2011).
1
  
As mindfulness and other such programs intensify in worksites, other “secular” workplace cultural training 
becomes less distinctive from it (Stone 2004). To add to this, corporate leaders aspire to have their com-
panies recognized as “spiritual” or “soulful” (Chappell 1993; Demerath and Hall 1998; and Siddiqui 2005). 
In their report on workplace spirituality, much-discussed by organizational scholars, A Spiritual Audit of 
Corporate America: A Hard Look at Spirituality, Religion, and Values in the Workplace, Ian L. Mitroff and 
Elizabeth A. Denton (1999, 91) assert that “we need to integrate spirituality into management. No organ-
ization can survive for long without spirituality and soul.”  
Over time, the labels for workplace spirituality exercises have fluctuated between the most provoca-
tive—“New Age”—through “spirituality” to, recently, the most innocuous—“personal potential” (Horn-
borg 2013). Programs have been reborn and renamed. For example, Werner Erhart’s 1970s program est, 
became The Forum (Melton 1992). By “the millenium-crazed 1990s, decision-making ha[d] gone decid-
edly New Age, with recent books by so-called ‘intuitive consultants telling [managers] to enroll in the Jedi 
Knight School of Management” (Goldschmidt-Salamon 2001, 155). Now, such florid manifestations have 
been largely eliminated from corporate discourse, in favour of allusions to a rationalized spiritual presence. 
As in society in general, the New Age nomenclature is suppressed; “spirituality” has been stripped of New 
Age esotericisms, such as crystal healing (unacceptable in hospitals) and Tarot cards (same, in workplaces). 
Terminology has been made more palatable to corporate clients. Where methods still retain a measure of 






 Cited in Cruz 2016, 56 
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 Nonetheless, “many of these new [coaching] practices would be referred to as New Age, and especially a number of 
hybrid forms of East-West practices are popular and marketed as Ayurveda, Qi Gong, Mindfulness, Reiki, and so on. 
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The early New Age association with the counterculture and their common anti-capitalism has also been 
suppressed. As workplace spirituality became normalized in the 1990s, revived consultancies and peda-
gogies took a different political tone than had their predecessors. In contrast to their earlier an-
ti-establishment stance, “today, we have New Age leaders praising capitalism and teaching that it is fine to 
work and succeed with the system..., and providing trainings to enhance managerial... efficacy” (Heelas 
1996, 68). Now, corporations have retreated from the more marked, or esoteric, expressions of the New 
Age teachings. They use the simple (and undefined) terms of “the spiritual,” and “soul” in company pro-
grams and policies. New Age spirituality is no longer “the other,” no longer merely invited into corpora-
tions, but embraced or even—as per Carrette and King (2005)––owned by them. 
Despite spirituality’s pervasive presence in workplaces, to which the volume of industry literature attests, 
spirituality in the production phase of the economic process is a theme neglected by scholars of religion. 
True, the corpus of religious studies now contains much about how new forms of commodification have 
affected changes in religion. However, an economy survives on more than just its commodification func-
tion. Self-evidently, production is a basic element too, and analysts of political-economic change––stellar 
examples of which are Karl Marx and Max Weber––regularly argue that work stamps an indelible face on 
culture. In this dissertation, then, I return discussion to the domain of Max Weber’s famous project (1983), 
which relates the early expansion of capitalism to “the Protestant ethic.” This sociologist was concerned 
“with production values, rather than religion and consumption” (Martikainen and Gauthier 2013, 8). 
Aupers and Houtman (2010, 148) acknowledge the “rarity of studies of spirituality in the workplace” by 
religion scholars. They ruefully add that “notwithstanding common claims to the contrary, it is difficult to 
deny that spirituality has in fact entered the public domain of work organizations.” 
When the phenomenon is observed by other scholars, few doubt that the embrace of spirituality in work-
places relates to the changes in capitalism in the last half of the twentieth century (Rose, 1999). Scholars of 
religion note the tendency for New Age celebrants to be part of the new technical or knowledge worker 
category (Roof 2001; Aupers and Houtman 2010) as well as spirituality’s particular presence in the typi-
cally-insecure workplaces that engage these types of workers (A. Dawson 2007; Aupers and Houtman 
2010; Heelas 2006). 
 
 
These East-West hybrid practices are often classified as a technique, said to be detached from religious dogma and 
marketed as such” (Hornborg 2013, 191).   
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Indeed, the organization and contents of many jobs took on new forms as nation-based industrial economies 
evolved into a global system of production. The industrial factory still functions in Western economies, but 
is of lesser importance than before. The economy that emphasizes information, cultural products and ser-
vices is different in many ways than that classic industrial economy. Equally so are workplaces. The new 
“immaterial” orientation, spurred by the globalization of capital and other factors, has led to new ways of 
managing labour and new skill-requirements for workers. It has generally eroded the security of workers 
and the balance of power between workers, and owners and managers; integrated consumption into pro-
duction so that consumers trouble-shoot, improve, or add content to products; created a greater range of 
organizational forms than formerly, with more emphasis on networking and the vertical disintegration of 
corporations; accelerated the speed of circulation of products, many with shortened shelf-lives due to their 
fashion-inflected appeal; and introduced other changes. In the midst of these new conditions, a common 
(though not universal) way of organizing workers—as team-members on projects—has become iconic of 
all contemporary work.  
A segment of the new workforce is particularly familiar with the new ways of organizing production. In 
fact, the old industrial and the new information economies are both supported by a variety of types of 
workers. However, the mix is different in each period, and some types of work have disappeared while new 
forms have arisen. I call those who do the indispensable work in the main growth sector of each economic 
epoch its “iconic workers.” In the post-WWII era, for a generation, these were industrial assembly-line 
labourers. In this era they are the technologically adept and creative producers of information and media 
products and services––the technical/knowledge/cultural workers. Following the authoritative labour force 
analysis of American economist, Robert Reich (1992), I label his “symbolic analyst” category the iconic 
worker class for post-Fordism. For reasons I will expand upon below, I focus on their experience, more than 
the other categories Reich identifies, such as “routine” or “in-person service” workers, when I perform a 
comparison of work culture and neospiritual values and skills throughout this dissertation. I argue that 
iconic worker culture and the new spiritual culture have qualitative affinities with each other. 
The basic project is to establish the homological character of new workers’ skills and beliefs and those of 
practitioners of “spirituality.” I demonstrate a set of parallels between the work and spiritual cultures based 
on skills practiced and the structures of the worldviews both sets of participants hold, resulting in a number 
of point-for-point similarities. Once I show the homology of new-spiritual and new-work cultures, I then 
consider accounts for why it exists. This second segment is speculative. To confirm or disconfirm related 
theories of the evolution of this situation—i.e., the homological nature of these two cultures—empirical 
work must follow. However, I contend that by reviewing the structure of thought developed in this dis-
sertation, considering the questions raised and the speculative answers provided, scholars exploring why 
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neospiritual values permeate contemporary culture will find a useful, internally-consistent and robust body 
of theory that can guide more empirically-oriented studies. 
As part of this original synthesis of political-economic and social theory, of recent cultural history in North 
America, and of labour analysis, positioned in relation to scholarship on new forms of spirituality, I con-
sider a number of questions that arise. By what processes did spirituality achieve its importance in work-
places? Are workplaces primary sites for the strengthening of neospiritual values, or only one type of set-
ting, amongst others, which support this ethos? What characteristics of neospirituality make it attractive as 
a belief system to workers as they adapt to new workplace demands? What makes it attractive to employers, 
and by what means have they encouraged engagement? Did workers themselves facilitate neospirituality’s 
transit from its early countercultural setting to their workplaces? What has changed for neospirituality in the 
process of its transition?  
The Context 
These questions and the main thrust of my dissertation should not be taken to suggest that no other factors 
besides workplace culture have had a hand in normalizing “the spiritual” as a social concern. By no means 
is interest in spiritual practices restricted to workplaces. For example, mindfulness meditation engages 
North Americans widely, in both institutional and non-institutional contexts (Wilson 2013). “Life coaches” 
help people to evoke their “personal potential” privately as well as at work (Hornborg 2013). In fact, citi-
zens in advanced economies experienced many decades of broad cultural change preparing them for such 
interests––rather prior to the changes in capitalism discussed in this dissertation. Personal subjectivity since 
WWII has been molded by the three pursuits: towards greater authenticity in social relations (Taylor 1989), 
more personal autonomy in relation to authority structures (Woodhead 1995, with Heelas)
3
, and “subjec-
tivization” (Hervieu-Leger 2000). Ultimate loyalty is no longer owed to the institution, tradition, or 
community but to the “self.” People need to seek authenticity. To do so they need complete freedom to “be 
themselves,” or to “be true to themselves.” Hence, the institution, tradition, or community is defined as a 
barrier to the search for authenticity and self-realization. Consequently, one’s attitude to institutions, tra-
ditions and community is instrumental: does it serve the program of the search for authenticity? If it does 
not, it is jettisoned. These developments underwrite general changes in religiosity amongst Western (and 




 People now wish to be autonomous in their spiritual and religious choices; the opposite of autonomization, 
Woodhead argues, is paternalism (i.e., traditional hierarchy). 
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phenomenon he called “invisible religion” (1967), observed more recently that "the sacralization of sub-
jectivity is celebrated in much of mass culture" (1996, 76). 
Religious studies scholars have examined the waning church attendance since the 1960s in most industri-
alized nations. Initially, they accepted these attitudinal changes as the secularization expected in modernity 
(Andrew Dawson 2006, 180-82). However, in the midst of such study, the traditional faiths and their in-
stitutions began to display common transformations, either towards fundamentalism or liberalization 
(Beyer 1994). These new forms are increasingly accepted as part of the modern world. In the 21
st
 century, 
these and a number of other developments
4
 have further underscored the inadequacy of secularization as an 
explanatory concept (Martikainen and Gauthier 2013). 
Although the growth of fundamentalism has been unmistakable to the most casual observer, a more subtle 
yet pervasive development within many religious institutions is their liberalization. From this liberalization 
has emerged the category of Western believers who answer in surveys that they are “spiritual but not reli-
gious” (SBNR) (Davie 1994; Fuller 2001; Marler and Hadaway 2002; Forman 2004). In Sweden, they are 
called the “unchurched but spiritual” (Hornborg 2013, 191). In Britain early research called them “believ-
ers, not belongers” (Davie 1994). Two Canadian studies (Grenville 2000; Bibby 2004) suggest that half of 
all adult Canadians are spiritual but not religious.
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Formally, these terms mean that their professors “do not affiliate with a particular religious institution or 
movement but they still have some experience of the sacred” (King 2010, 323). However, many who still 
attend conventional religious services identify as more spiritual than religious.
6
 Talk of personal “spiritu-
ality” has been legitimized within the halls of worship of the classical faith traditions that survive in reli-
giously-diverse, formally-secular and democratic societies. This is because the SBNR attitude is implicit in 
the liberalization of most religions, post-war, which in turn reflects the changing attitudes towards the self 




 “Pressing issues in the study of religion today [include] changed relations between religion and state in a more 
globalized environment; the increasing devolution of regulative power to the judiciary; the rise of new forms of 
religion (be it fundamentalist currents, Pentacostals or new spiritualities); the increase in the public visibility of 
religion; the growing importance of issues of identity and recognition; the impact of electronic media on religion and 
so on” (Martikainen and Gauthier 2013, 3). 
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Officials in churches, synagogues, temples and mosques indulge religious individualism and support the 
pursuit of personal religious experience. Church regulars as well as more marginal participants feel entitled 
to consult their feelings to guide the choice of personal beliefs and moral behaviours even if these do not 
exactly match formal institutional teachings. Canadian “independent believers [confess] that their personal 
beliefs about Christianity are more important than what the churches teach, but nevertheless tend to assent 
to basic Christian doctrine” (Grenville 1996, 219).
7
 Indeed, the elevation of personal spirituality is part and 
parcel of changes to organizations and practices that liberalism invokes––including decreasing pressure on 
followers to subscribe to orthodoxies (Bramadat and Seljak 2005).  
Accordingly, a contemporary working definition of Christian spirituality offered by scholars is “following 
intuitions in the quest for fullness of life” (Hense 2014, 43), which can hardly be distinguished from a 
specifically “spiritual” attitude. Much earlier, New Age experimenters emerged to take these intuitions to 
heart. Concentrating the broader social trend towards individualism and posthierarchy attitudes, New Agers 
began to invent their own practices and beliefs. With their innovation, the celebration of personal spiritu-
ality achieved primacy amongst the range of personal, moral and social concerns that were mixed with it in 
formal religious institutions. New Age projects also often included experiments with Eastern religious 
beliefs and practices.  
At about the same time, experimenters with personal computers and the nascent internet began to anticipate 
a new social order. Along with the broader counterculture, with which the New Age was entangled, they 
began to articulate a new cultural and political vision with these revolutionary technologies in a central 
position. These communities with esoteric values substantially coalesced in the early employment sites of 
new-economy labourers.   
This contiguity and integration of cultures partly accounts for the chief point I make in this dissertation: that 
neospirituality culture mirrors and so complements the beliefs and practices of new economy workers. 
Post-Fordist workers are sympathetic to neospirituality partly because they inherited a culture established in 
its connection with esoteric religiosity even at its earliest stages. This could be called a passive reason for 
why, during the duration of the iconic post-Fordist form of work, neospirituality (or its seed, New Age 




 Cited in Chandler 2012, 77-78 
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In this dissertation, I also provide an account of active adoption of neospirituality in workplaces through its 
promotion by corporate managers. That they promote neospiritual programs at worksites is not in dispute. 
Why they do so is considered. A synthesis of scholarship on this topic suggests that it provides an ideo-
logical framework that gives post-Fordist work practices subjective meaning, offering valued workers a 
form of respite from their intensive work lives so that they may continue to perform well, and helping 
employees align their interests with those of the corporation.   
In any case, New Age beliefs, expressed in the movement’s texts, can be mapped onto the worker’s atti-
tudes with a high degree of consistency. Iconic New Age organizational practices and skills and those of 
workers are similar. Perhaps uncannily, the early adopters of spirituality values, intermingling with com-
puter hackers and the counterculture in key times and place (particularly the American West Coast), honed 
skills and values as they learned how to express their religiosity that they would need on the job for very 
different purposes.  
In other words, what they developed or learned in order to follow New Age pursuits were not far off from 
the skills, beliefs and behaviours they would need in worksites. Practical skills included the ability to ex-
ploit contacts on ad hoc bases (to learn more about their personal spiritual-development possibilities), 
openness to new methods (for the same reason), greater reflective capacity about their own feelings (so they 
could chart their personal paths), a sense of obligation to pursue this self-development (because pursuing 
your true spirit benefits the world), and cooperative practices based on a principled denial of basic conflicts 
with others (since below individual pursuits was a common, perennial vision). With slight changes in 
language, these are descriptors of skill-sets of contemporary technology, information and media workers. 
Naming the Subject: The Religious Culture 
“Spiritualities” are now studied as a category, or rather a set of categories. Hense, Jespers and Nissen (2014, 
6) argue “there is no such thing as ‘generic’ spirituality.” The term is invoked in popular culture as well as 
in “organizational, educational, health care and aesthetic contexts.” As this is partly an historical study, I 
must refer to manifestations of spirituality in earlier and later forms. To understand the germ of what be-
came spirituality, I turn to the literature on New Age. Wouter Hanegraaff (1996) makes a distinction be-
tween New Ages sensu stricto, and sensu lato;
8




 Hanegraaff (1996, 49 and 94) also articulates the time-frames of these stages. The New Age sensu stricto, surviving 
into the late 1970s and the 1980s, can be regarded as one of the components of the New Age sensu lato (97). The wider 
New Age movement emerged when increasing numbers of people, by the later 1970s, began to perceive a broad 
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culture, and the later, the diffused one. The first designates the more devoted, and much smaller populations 
in Western countries (usually only a few percent, depending on where and when
9
). Being an informal or-
thodoxy, even in its more concentrated form, as stricto, it exhibits varied beliefs and practices depending, 
again, on time and place. However, Hanegraaff defined the stricto ethos through analysing its key texts. The 
second, the sensu lato version, evolved from this concentrated group, and is much more widely represented. 
In numbers and focus they are more akin to the “spiritual but not religious” folks, which, as noted earlier, 
even include church-affiliated religious liberals (who identify with a particular orthodoxy, but practice on 
their own terms) as well as the unaffiliated.  
Sutcliffe and Gilhus (2013) note that “the popular language of ‘spirituality’ emerged as a lingua franca 
around the time of the decline of the new age sensu stricto, but empirically, we know surprisingly little 
about the details of this evolution” (Sutcliffe and Gilhus 2013, 8). They do note, however, that “from the 
1990s onwards ‘new age’ came to denote a loose, hybrid, popular culture of ‘spirituality,’ to use a term 
increasingly employed by practitioners in preference to ‘religion’” (Sutcliffe and Gilhus 2013, 5).   
What are the contents of this new spirituality? A broad set of descriptors of it was articulated in Lorne L. 
Dawson’s synthesis (1998) of this culture, gleaned from three early “insightful yet largely forgotten essays” 
(Stone 1978, Westley 1978, and Campbell 1978) as he studied new religious movements. He elaborated on 
these later as “barometers of larger social transformations” (2006, 180). These barameters included: 
… pronounced religious individualism; [an emphasis on] experience and 
faith rather than doctrine and belief[;] a more pragmatic attitude to ques-
tions of religious authority and practice[, involving] skill development and 
skill testing of a progressive nature[––particularly ritual skills;] relativism 
and toleran[ce] of other religious perspectives and systems[;] a holistic 
[or] monistic worldview[, rejecting] almost every kind of dualism[––]the 
traditional dualisms of God and humanity, the transcendent and the im-
manent, humanity and nature, the spiritual and the material, the mind and 
the body, the subjective and the objective, male and female, good and evil, 
even cause and effect[; and finally,] greater organizational openness[, 
exhibiting] less effort … to address all aspects of followers lives [by any 
one religious institution or source of guidance]” (Dawson 2006, 183-84).  
 
 
similarity between a wide variety of “alternative” ideas and pursuits, and started to think of these as parts of one 
"movement" (355-6). 
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 For example, Heelas and Woodhead (2005) identified “stricto” adherents—celebrators of “subjective life” in their 
terms—as less than five percent of the population of the English town, Kendall, that they studied.  
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To this list, Dawson added compatibility with late modern institutions, receptivity to a scientific world 
view, a worldwide vision, an emphasis on healing, and an anti-institutional and decentralized character 
(Dawson 2006, 192–93). 
I would characterize New Age culture, sensu stricto as a short-lived vector of particular values that are, 
themselves, now seen in diluted form as a new spirituality normalized in urban liberal culture, similar to 
what is described by Dawson (and in largely marginal pockets, as the original version). Siobhan Chandler 
(2011, 6) describes the New Age sensu stricto as a bridge that, as well as concentrating or “reinforcing a 
symbolically significant cultural premise, namely individualism and the value of personal autonomy, [also 
reasserted the latent] American metaphysical traditions that included Transcendentalism and the New 
Thought movement. It was this complex movement that flowered in the eighties and persists today (Lewis 
and Melton 1992, Hanegraaff 1996, 103).”
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According to these judgements, we can equate the New Age sensu lato with the term spirituality. It also 
follows that contemporary spirituality essentially manifests the belief structures and practices of the New 
Age sensu stricto, and that the latter can be consulted to understand the former, following Hanegraaff. 
Accordingly, I use the term “New Age,” when defining its classic beliefs and practices—in its stricto sense. 
However, this dissertation is primarily about a more diffused version that permeates popular and work 
culture, and I need to name that general, diffuse belief system.  
For terms to use for the popular spiritual culture that emerged from the New Age, I have a number of 
choices, including “self-spirituality” (Heelas 1996), the “New Age sensu lato,” (Hanegraaff 1996), “new 
era religions” (Andrew Dawson 2007), “new metaphysical” religion (Bender 2010), “spiritual prosump-
tion” (Andrew Dawson 2013), and “neospirituality” (Hornborg 2013), to name a few. “Spirituality,” “ho-
lism,” “mind, body and spirit” and “revived subcultural rubrics such as ‘occult’ or esoteric” can be added to 
these (Sutcliffe and Gilhus 2013, 4). Practitioners of complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) also 
reveal similar beliefs.  
Paul Heelas (1996, 368) offers the most basic definition as “the experience of the divine as immanent in 




 “None of the six primary characteristics of the new religious consciousness… is unique or truly new. They are 
manifestations of trends that have been developing in American religion for centuries. But most observers would agree 
with Stone [1978, 127] that ‘their incidence never has been documented to be as strong or as widespread’ (Stone 1978, 
127; see also Bednarowski, 1989)” (Lorne L. Dawson 2006, 186). 
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as self-spirituality. Taking Heelas’s definition in general, Hornborg has renamed it “neospirituality.” To an 
extent she has updated it to the more rationalized era, in which formally-organized coaches and trainers of 
the many versions of spiritual self-development abound (most notably in Sweden, which she writes about 
here). For example, she notes, half of the population of Sweden used CAM in 2001 (Hornborg 2013, 191). 
Coaches and trainers of this ilk are an expanding component of urban culture, and offer their services on the 
private market and to institutions, including governmental (Hornborg 2013, 189). Their teachings invite 
“individuals… to create new ways of self-presentation (self-branding)” (Hornborg 2013, 189).  
Hornborg’s description (2013, 190) resonates with L. Dawson’s (2006) characterization: “The term ‘ne-
ospiritual’ refers in this context to a universal, spiritual essence, embedded in the deep self. The charac-
teristic of this immanent power is usually defined by practitioners as opposing religion, the latter being 
depicted as ritualistic, dogmatic, and something which hinders humanity from transcending contextual 
borders.” Additionally, the language of neospirituality is “science-like,” (or “scientistic”), which means to 
lend authority by referencing scientific concepts, however casually. She also refers to the need of the 
late-modern self for “new, individual-centred practices, responding to the longing for intense experiences 
of personal transformation on the way to finding the authentic self” (Hornborg 2013, 193). 
Recently, A. Dawson (2014) offered a more sophisticated term for the practitioner of spirituality, the 
“spiritual prosumer.” A. Dawson’s term reflects a unique aspect of the contemporary economy. His is a 
creative use of the technical term “prosumption”––a neologism of production and consumption–– which 
delineates a unique dynamic of the contemporary economy. This term indicates that production and con-
sumption are tightly integrated now as elements of the whole process of circulation of goods. With this 
adaptation, A. Dawson’s concept of the spiritual prosumer affords us the opportunity to consider this belief 
system in strong relationship to an economy, and to apprehend its character more precisely the more we 
understand the economy’s dynamics. It is theoretically the most apt term to use here, to refer to this new 
spirituality.  
According to post-Fordist political-economic analysis, the idea behind “prosumption” is that consumers 
themselves effectively produce value (i.e., complete or enhance products) through their participation in 
buying and using goods and services. It points at the contemporary exaggeration of the relationship between 
production and consumption present in all modern economic systems (Smythe 1981). “The act of 
prosumption is an archetypical neoliberal process in that its fusion of consumption and production max-
imizes profit through minimization of corporate outlays and business overheads” (A. Dawson 2013, 
137-38). Through prosumption, consumers extend the life or utility of, modify, and repair products as they 
buy or use them. They too must have at the ready skills and attitudes similar to those of formal producers, 
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and may therefore exhibit a similar mindset because of these particular demands. Prosumption predicts that 
people marginal to the culture of those who make the products, but consume them, would share values with 
these workers because they must adopt the others’ work skills and mimic their work patterns, simply in 
order to fruitfully use the consumer goods. Additionally, because the workforce in some areas of the 
economy is actually recruited from sophisticated users––iconically, video- and computer-game players 
(Kline, Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter 2003; Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter 2009)––there is often only a 
fine line between producer and consumer. Including other implications, A. Dawson’s analogy suggests that, 
since spiritual persons take responsibility for their own religious growth, they effectively act as spiritual 
advisors (to themselves) and recipients of spiritual advice at the same time. In addition to its highlighting 
the prosumptional process in the economy, A. Dawson’s coined term also encapsulates aspects of the 
therapeutic ethos and the personal entrepreneurialism that is characteristic of the general culture of this era. 
These features will be discussed in more detail in other chapters. 
The theoretical “package” A. Dawson’s provides via the coinage of the “spiritual prosumer” concept, as-
similating practitioners, practices, and parallels to new capitalism, means the term offers considerable value 
to the theory of this dissertation. In addition to its facility for advancing theoretical reflection, I contend that 
this concept also justifies an aspect of my method––consulting the literature on spirituality and consump-
tion to shed light on the issue of spirituality and production, which follows in Chapter Three. However, I 
also consider the prosumption process relevant as I try to understand how a subset of new workers could 
possibly influence the attitudes towards spirituality of the general public, which is a secondary interest in 
this dissertation. On top of the direct influence key workers could have on others because of their social 
prominence, the culture of iconic work sites could be imagined to spread to the broader culture indirectly, 
through the operation of prosumption. Prosumption gestures towards the skill-set key workers share with 
non-workers or different workers, which might create common understanding. To the extent that what we 
do and how we do it influences our beliefs about the world, prosumption may argue for similar 
“work-related” values being spread past iconic workers to general populations in this global economy. 
Symbolic-analytical values and skills may––at least vaguely––shape the subjectivity not only of “iconic 
workers,” not only of all contemporary workers, but even possibly of non- and marginal workers. In fact, 
one of the major sources I consult about forms of work, the authors Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri 
(2000) argue precisely this, asserting that whole populations do “immaterial labour” in this economy. I 
discuss this idea and its limitations in a later chapter.  
However, A. Dawson considers the prosumption process relevant because he understands the contemporary 
spiritual practitioner as both producing and consuming themselves during their spiritual pursuits. Thus, 
through reference to prosumption theory, the spiritual practitioner is further specified:  
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Reflecting… notions of the late modern individual as entrepreneur and 
virtuoso of the self, the alternative religionist is both master of the 
prosumptive act and artisan of the technical processes involved. Although 
variously construed as enlightenment, healing, release, and transfor-
mation, the benefits inherent in spiritual prosumption always involve some 
form of direct (physical and emotional) or indirect (employment and liv-
ing conditions) betterment to the spiritual prosumer. Whatever the benefit 
accrued, however, its acquisition is posited as a spiritual good obtained as 
the outcome (product) of a transitional process through which the indi-
vidual has moved from point a to point b…. What makes this transform-
ative process truly prosumptive is the self`s role in effecting (as producer) 
and experiencing (as consumer) the transition (as product) from a to b. (A. 
Dawson 2013, 138) 
A. Dawson (2013, 138) is convinced that “the dynamic of ‘spiritual prosumption’ [is] central to the shared 
repertoire of beliefs and practices to which the entangled, late modern life experience of urban professional, 
non-mainstream religionists give rise. While by no means encompassing all that the alternative religious 
repertoire embodies, the notion of spiritual prosumption is nevertheless a useful means of explicating a 
range of characteristics, tendencies and dynamics which combine to manifest and reproduce much that is 
typical of late modernity as a whole.” I anticipate this use-value here. 
Dawson further identifies his subject group as symbolic analysts. He attributes spiritual prosumption to 
globalized cosmopolitans from a number of nations doing particular types of work, They are “chiefly em-
ployed in administrative bureaucracy and management, communications and information technology, ed-
ucation, health and research, and sundry provision of cultural goods, capital services, and immaterial 
commodities” (134-5). The term also is meant to suggest the group of predominant interest in this disser-
tation, those who are spiritual but not religious, New Agers sensu lato, “neospirituals” etc. (A. Dawson 
2013, 137). However, because of the awkwardness of his term, I would seek a shorter moniker to define this 
ethos. Based on rough equivalency of definition and its recent coinage, to reflect up-to-date characteristics 
of the spiritual orientation, I opt to use the term “neospirituals” generally.  
Hence to recap my overall project with this new terminology, establishing the compatibility of neospiritu-
ality and work forms is the primary purpose of this dissertation. On the basis of synthesizing the various 
contributions of labour-force analysts, I model a worldview and practical culture of symbolic-analytical 
work that can be compared to the features of neospirituality, so as to show that, on the basic of their similar 
contents and structure, new workers exhibit an elective affinity with this value-system.  
Beyond that, however, I wish to shed light on the question of whether this value system could have been 
promoted and refined by the changes in capitalism in the late-20
th
-century and beyond. Certainly, although 
the belief system is widely diffused in globalized urban cultures, and a much larger population than actually 
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works in iconic employment within this regime has adopted neo-spiritual convictions, I wonder whether 
new workers, who have neospirituality values reinforced by their work, are helping with this diffusion. 
However, these other questions will remain at the level of hypothesis throughout, awaiting confirmation or 
otherwise through empirical studies, which must follow this one. Such follow-up research would be val-
uable because, were that hypothesis proven true, we could then expect a continued expansion and deep-
ening of this ethos as long as the current political-economic trajectory persists.  
Political-Economic Sources 
To explore new labour conditions in depth, in addition to Reich’s work I refer to a body of economic theory 
that foregrounds that transition to the new capitalist model (Aglietta 1979; Lipietz 1985 and 1987; Harvey 
1990; Lazzarato 1996; Hardt and Negri 2000). This analysis draws a line between the early-to-mid 
last-century configuration of governments, economies and civil societies in Western nations on the one 
side, and those of the final third of the 20
th
 century, and into the 21
st
, on the other. The former era they call 
“Fordism,” and the contemporary one, “post-Fordism.” Post-Fordism took shape in the 1970s and 80s, as 
Fordism waned. This transition instituted the new working conditions. My goal is to perform for the new 
spirituality what Fredric Jameson (1991) and David Harvey (1990) did for the postmodernity ethos. They 
showed it to be a factor in the “sea-change” in the organization and practices of advanced capital.
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Post-Fordist theory provides a coherent, overarching framework for comparing culture and economics. It 
creates a picture of society’s functional organization and culture on the one hand, and the larger economic 
patterns on the other––and their inter-relation. In examining the issue of spirituality the theory has the 
advantage of theoretically integrating culture (including religion) with society’s structural features and 
showing how both partly emerge from the larger economic patterns. The larger patterns post-Fordist theo-
rists call the regime of accumulation. Formally speaking, this is “the intermeshed ordering of wage rela-
tions, consumption norms, and state intervention that synchronize the overall social prerequisites for the 
extraction and realization of surplus-value” (Dyer-Witheford 1999, 55). Any viable economy must also 




 “What has happened is that aesthetic production today has become integrated into commodity production generally: 
the frantic economic urgency of producing fresh waves of ever more novel-seeming goods (from clothing to 
airplanes), at ever greater rates of turnover, assigns an increasingly essential structural function and position to 
aesthetic innovation and experimentation. Such economic necessities then find recognition in the institutional support 
of all kinds available for the newer art, from foundations and grants to museums and other forms of patronage” 
(Jameson 1991, 55-56). Jameson (57) adds: “Post-modern culture is the superstructure for a new wage of American 
military and economic domination.”  
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persuade or coerce private agents to conform to its schema” (Dyer-Witheford 1999, 55). My study will 
largely be an examination of a neglected aspect of the post-Fordist mode of regulation—that is, how ne-
ospirituality supports it. 
Components of Argument 
The synthesis of theory from disparate sources provided throughout this dissertation, paired with the his-
torical accounts of the mutual shaping of neospirituality and the culture of post-Fordist work, are the key 
analytical contributions of this dissertation. The theoretical material adds to the historical accounts an in-
ternally-coherent range of hypotheses about the processes by which these homologies between the two 
cultures have been reached. There are a number of testable positions taken within this body of theory that 
provide points of departure for empirical work through which the overall speculative thesis can be evalu-
ated in subsequent studies. 
Establishing Homologies 
In this dissertation, my goal is less ambitious. I establish the homologies between the two cultures and 
proceed to develop the hypothesis that contemporary iconic workers have an elective affinity for neospir-
itual values because of the way their subjectivity is shaped by their work. I show the homology between the 
work and neospiritual cultures based on skills practiced and the structures of the worldviews they both hold, 
resulting in a number of point-for-point similarities. These parallels are first presented in a tabular format in 
this chapter, explored in depth in subsequent chapters and re-presented in the conclusion. Creating this final 
version in the concluding chapter requires the assembly, scrutiny and interpretation of the data about the 
contemporary conditions of work, as well as analysis and condensation of scholarly understanding of New 
Age spirituality’s features. These acts of ‘conditioning’ what is known about these two domains of human 
activity so they can be correlated with each other, are key analytical elements of this study.  
As I have noted, one part of this analysis is to model the type of worker most exposed to spiritual practices 
and discourse at work. I chose to name an “iconic worker” for this purpose. On the other side of the equa-
tion, as I have explained, for the purpose of understanding the neospirituality belief system conceptually, as 
well as its organizational model, I narrow the subject to the New Age sensu stricto form, as did Wouter 
Hanegraaff (1996), though he was interested in the New Age in general. The intellectual reduction of ne-
ospirituality to New Age sensu stricto for definitional purposes is parallel to characterizing post-Fordist 
work culture in terms of that of key workers. I assume, as does Hanegraaff, that the sensu lato form reflects 
the stricto form, though less precisely, due to its diffuse nature. Contemporary neospirituals tend not, for 
example, to practice channeling, or to consciously hold a belief in New Age reincarnation, even though 
their worldview is essentially similar in structure to the New Age worldview.  
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It might be argued that rather than the symbolic analyst, a simpler choice of model for this ideal worker is 
the entire class known to have neospiritual values, i.e., “Western” middle-classes (Sutcliffe and Gilhus 
2013, 12). The values of this class could be identified and proposed as the bases for comparison. However, 
finding the old middle-class worker within this new economy is not a straight-forward proposition. Because 
the post-Fordist economic period is characterized by continual flux in the nature of its processes and 
structures––not least the composition of its work-force and the contents of the jobs held therein––the class 
status of many of these workers is not only ambiguous but continually changing. 
For example, replacement of jobs by technology from the mid-twentieth-century onward went far beyond 
the automation of industrial work, to replacing mental labour as well. Even intellectual jobs inaugurated by 
the computer revolution were felled or attenuated by being fully or partially automated (such as, even, 
software programming itself). Alternatively, skills mostly formerly restricted to a professional cadre, such 
as photography, became so widespread because of the diffusion and cheapening of the production tools, 
that “the experts” are structurally under-employed. Together these developments either degraded the con-
tents of the job or eliminated the ‘profession’ entirely. This process continues. Although it is also true that 
new types of “professional” workers have arisen, the set of all those whose work is putatively “middle 
class” is contained within a smaller subset of the overall population than in the past. Not only does this 
make defining the work of a ‘middle class’ hard to represent, but also (in making a ‘middle class’ difficult to 
define in this economy), challenges the confidence exhibited by religion scholars in the putative 
class-composition of New Agers.  
As an alternative to focussing on a class of worker as “iconic” of work in general, the very scarcity and 
insecurity of work (Dyer-Witheford 2015)––i.e., its “precarity”––might, logically, be considered the key 
distinction that defines the experience of new workers. Perhaps, moreover, symbolic analysts cannot be 
considered representative because they may experience precarity less than do other workers, such as routine 
or service workers. However, although symbolic analysts may not be exposed to the full brunt of the im-
plications of insecure labour in this economy due to their valuable skills, insecurity of tenure is built into 
their work structure. The structure is a series of terminating projects which force them to move (either 
inside or outside their companies) to new such projects. What is more, precarity of working conditions is 
only one aspect of the work form, and symbolic analytical work concentrates it with other important fea-
tures, as I will show.  
Although resorting to calling it simply a “middle class” is an ambiguous act, nevertheless, the shape (along 
with the culture) of this new social segment made up of symbolic analysts is coming into view. Whereas, in 
this dissertation I define “symbolic analysts” in terms of work-patterns, many scholars have sought to de-
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fine them socially. A. Dawson (2013) list  terms used to describe this new social segment. They include 
“the ‘new professions,’…‘new petite bourgeoisie’… ‘new cultural intermediaries,’ ‘new class,’ 
‘knowledge class,’ ‘emergent and service class,’ (new) new middle class,’ ‘transformed’ and 
‘post-industrial middle class,’ and, most popularly and his preference, the ‘new middle class’” (A. Dawson 
2013, 134). Whatever name is put on it, Dawson (2013, 133) concludes that this population reflects trends 
that predominantly impact culture in this era: globalization and commoditization. While respecting his 
emphasis, in this dissertation I add production to this short list. After all, A. Dawson's important term 
"spiritual prosumption" shifts the emphasis in that direction itself, however little he may have intended this. 
First, however, post-Fordist workforce analysis must be performed. In fact, different scholars segment the 
contemporary workforce in different ways, stressing (and interpreting differently) some work conditions 
and requirements over others in their models of the current work environment. These differences no doubt 
reflect the fast rate of economic changes, as well as the immaturity of this study topic. It follows that the 
ideal worker’s subjectivity is also debated. Gill and Pratt (2008, 2) explain that “while work is central to 
accounts [of contemporary capitalism,] the relationship between the transformations within working life 
and workers’ subjectivities have been relatively underexplored.” 
Mirroring the list of alternate labels for the new middle class provided by A. Dawson, above, Gill and Pratt 
(2008, 2) iterate “a number of terms [that] have been developed [to describe the work they do]. Notions 
include creative labour, network labour, cognitive labour, affective labour, and immaterial labour [which, 
together] are not reducible to each other.” Despite the differences, in the aggregate, there is strong common 
agreement about the new conditions of work and social roles that I have defined as “the iconic worker.” In 
general, these terms refer to the activity of the creative immaterial labourer, working in the information, 
cultural and hi-tech production sectors.  
In this dissertation, I underscore the fact of spirituality in workplaces (often referred to as SaW) through a 
review of industry literature, written by and addressed to managers, human resources personnel and busi-
ness scholars. This literature is the one site in which the connection of the New Age and work is made. 
Although scholars within this tradition aspire to be critical, in general they do essentially “normal re-
search,” maintaining many of the assumptions of the managerial class that has introduced spirituality into 
workplaces. Managers have made room for spirituality, so the research does not delve much beyond its 
claimed presence and operation. Critical analysis that might demand radically rethinking a corporation’s 
culture, or even purposes, are kept mostly tentative. It is true that many writers within this tradition express 
concern that spirituality in workplaces may be a form of propaganda that does not benefit the workers 
themselves. However, as I would argue, because of this integration of spiritual and corporate cultures, their 
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concern should be difficult to address from the limited vantage point of internal operations. Under such 
circumstances, proper appraisal of this issue would demand putting the wider economic context in front of 
their lens, such as I do in this dissertation.
12
 It is important, therefore, to distinguish the managerial writing 
on spirituality and the workplace from my approach and line of analysis. Unlike the authors in this literature 
(with rare exceptions), I ask at a high level why there should be consonance between the life of capital and 
the spiritual life.  
Explaining Homologies 
Establishing the fact of spirituality in workplaces and the commonality of the work and neospiritual cultures 
provide only part of the contents of this dissertation. After acknowledging and elaborating on these paral-
lels, speculatively accounting for them is another purpose of the study. I investigate the processes of the 
integration of the work and neospiritual cultures in several ways. Although the parallelism of new work 
structure and neospirituality implies that these two sets of values (the neospiritual and work cultures) are 
independent of each other, they are only compared in that way for heuristic reasons. Holding these two 
communities in isolation from each other is an abstract exercise that does not ring true on the basis of the 
histories of the New Age and new work communities that I provide in this dissertation. To account for the 
homologies seen in the tables, and their significance, I challenge the idea of their independence in the re-
mainder of the dissertation. 
This complementarity suggests a degree of interactivity between, and mutual influence across, each pop-
ulation. My argument is that both communities interacted historically, and that where, in popular work 
culture, neospirituality is not openly expressed, the worldview explicated there (represented in technolog-
ical terms, because technology and its use help define these workers identities) is shaped according to the 




 For example, highly-relevant to spirituality at work is the aspiration to be “empowered” by work. This concept must 
have different meanings whether one considers merely the worksite or the larger environment of employment. In the 
early post-Fordist era, the aspirations to empowered work that the neospirituality ethos supported, like middle-class 
identification itself, were found within a wide swath of the youthful population. Indeed, “empowered work” was 
introduced earliest to those on assembly-lines producing automobiles (as Toyotism). By contrast, empowerment (such 
as it is) in workers today is available only to the subset of reshaped workers, as segment of the progeny of the 
middle-class, much reduced in number. They work within a milieu of high structural unemployment, to which they 
themselves fall victim to varying degrees. Therefore, whatever forms of gratification they accrue from their work, its 
status as empowerment must be measured against their very limited control over the duration of their employment, and 
therefore access to the “empowering” environment. In this context, the concept of empowerment must be broadened 
beyond the specific conditions of the place where the worker is employed. This example illustrates that considering 
the relationship of the neospirituality value system to that of work must range outside the immediate confines of the 
workplace, to consider would-be and occasional workers. This nuanced representation is an element of my study. 
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ceed in this dissertation, the initial comparisons seen in the tables in this chapter will take on greater sig-
nificance for the reader. 
To provide context for these discussions, I document how conditions of work have changed since the period 
when, coincidently, church attendance was high and religious officials were afforded much public stature. 
This phase of heavy industrial production––Fordism––waned in the 1970s. The altered economic dynamic 
also altered work’s content, conditions and availability for the average person in these nations. Drawing on 
the writing of a number of authors, I present these new conditions, and the workplace and community 
cultural responses, after which I extend that scholarly work through arguments that are theoretical, histor-
ical, and sociological. 
Although I concede that both the neospiritual and new worker groups were subjected to common influences 
that cannot be fully defined as economic, which include the broad changes to subjectivity mentioned ear-
lier, I suggest that economic developments of the last fifty years and the neoliberal orientation that under-
girds them are behind the refinement of both. In the case of work culture, the direct underwriting by 
business structures is obvious. Therefore, one focus of this dissertation is on discerning how neospirituality 
might be implicated in these new economic conditions and political values.  
To explain the common production of these two cultures, I trace the direct and indirect threads of influence, 
intervention and connection between the populations, to speculate on the reasons for the generic nature of 
their cultures. Participants in the early New Age communities and consultants influenced by them had 
important roles in bringing neospirituality into workplaces. I argue that the behaviours and values pertinent 
to performing well under new working conditions were already developing in the culture as the new spir-
itual practices. The two cultures enjoyed cross-over and mutual enrichment both bodily and ideologically. 
It was carried bodily into workplaces by new workers, managers and human resources consultants and 
personnel already participant in, or sympathetic to, countercultural and New Age religious participation. An 
account of an historical nature places incipient job-redesign activists and new technology workers together 
with New Age proponents in an original, common community that never entirely separated, and would lead 
to the translation of New Age sensu lato to worker values in as the new economy advanced. I suggest in this 
dissertation that the demographically and geographically key new workers, the symbolic analysts (partic-
ularly on the American West Coast), along with activist organizational developers, and technology 
“hackers” associated with these communities, originated in the same populations of counterculturalists and 
New Agers. Together constituting a vanguard of agitators for humanistic and “empowered” work, they 
argued for restructured workplaces––a challenge eagerly met by some managers, who recognized such a 
need in the changing economy.  
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Their worldview and ethos were carried into workplaces ideologically through the adaptation of New Age 
values to the high-tech, commercial worlds these new workers and consultants entered. The new worker 
ideology has features of New Age or neospiritual commitments, but converted to embrace the high-tech 
world and new working conditions. Various scholars have represented the worldview or ideology of the 
typical worker. In Chapter Eight, among a larger set of such representations, I discuss the network cos-
mology (Fisher 2010), the hacker ethic (Himanen 2010), and the Californian ideology (Barbrook and 
Cameron 1996). I show these value systems to be in a similar vein, their differences more attributable to the 
particular foci and degree of generality than to a difference of analysis. However, I also argue that they are, 
all, similar to the neospirituality in terms of several parameters, some of which are, again, introduced in the 
table below. 
My account shows these two groups as having common origins, as maintaining connections, as being 
mutually influential and, in the end, as substantially integrated—particularly the incipient neospiritual 
believers into new workers. Where they have remained separate, I argue they are different representatives 
of the same broad cultural ethos. This account is certainly not an assessment of definitive causation, which, 
even if such an attempt were appropriate, has more facets than could be managed here. For example, there 
are issues of active and passive transmission of values and skills between each of these groups, not to 
mention influences from, or impacts upon, external actors, by both groups together.  
To return to the “workplace transformation” account, despite these introductions and translations, the in-
novative spirit had a shelf-life. Some of the politically-democratizing energy and utopian desires of the 
New Age sensu stricto was lost in translation, or over time. As the new economic form evolved, some of the 
initiated changes were retained, and some not. Nevertheless, no doubt supported by the broader “empow-
erment” culture in which workplaces continued to function, employee expectations for “empowered” jobs 
did not diminish along with managerial interest in its realization. While, in the long run, this amalgam of 
interest groups had only qualified success, their agitation left a permanent mark on the culture of compa-
nies, especially those propelling the economic transformation, the producers of cultural products, infor-
mation technologies, and services.  
Within these workplaces, “empowerment” is expected, even if this expectation is more aspirational than 
real. In any case, managers must cater to it. The events and relationships I document, coupled with the 
critical analysis I consider, lead me to posit that corporations are evolving into what certain theorists of 
organization call “psytopiae”— spaces in which corporate managers arrogate employees’ personal spirit-
uality to the corporations themselves, allowing the latter to be cast as alive and spiritual (Leinberger and 
Tucker 1991; Nadesan 1998). Moreover, there is evidence that innovative use of such spiritual exercises as 
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mindfulness meditation facilitates employees’ reconstruction of the corporation’s interests as their own 
(Cruz 2016) a process economist and philosopher F. Lordon (2014) calls “co-linearization.” 
Carrette and King (2005, 132) emphasize that “capitalism uses spirituality and religion to promote the 
corporate agenda of business.” They state that “the adoption of religious language by the business world is 
a part of a set of power shifts away from what Barley and Kunda (2004) calls faith traditions towards what 
we can call the faith in capital tradition (i.e., the corporate religion)” (2005, 161). They argue, further, that 
“the second privatization”—the transfer of the benefits of New Age spirituality practice from the self to the 
corporation—was nascent in its first stage (i.e., the adoption of personal spirituality in lieu of formal reli-
gious affiliation, the SBNR attitude). 
A specific point of focus in the work of these two authors relates to the historical confluence of the early 
New Age movement and new work forms (and the ideology that went with them). In particular, Carrette’s 
(2007) work details the most elemental ideological association between neospirituality and new work, 
through Abraham Maslow’s development of a secular definition of spirituality and associating the latter 
with the empowered or self-actualized person––another of his constructs. These developments advanced 
the therapeutic ethos, as defined by Illouz (2008), found in business, as elsewhere, and the human potential 
movement (Carrette 2007, 141). Maslow’s principles were a major source of, and continue to be cited as, 
support for the as-yet unrealized democratic and autonomous worksite. In Chapter Three, I present these 
authors’ account of the intellectual operation Maslow performed on traditionally religiosity to make it into 
the commodifiable “spirituality,” as well as to ground the pursuit of self-actualization at work. Carrette’s 
sole work (2007) is a more theoretical analysis of the links between neospirituality and capitalism. He 
argues that Maslow’s work is a particular and key manifestation of a broader mutually-supportive rela-
tionship between the discipline of psychology, per se, and the economic model of human being and action.  
Although the validity of these scholarly claims cannot be fully verified or refuted over the course of this 
dissertation, I review research from secondary sources that support them. This material suggests that 
workplace neospirituality practices and discourse soften contradictions and mitigate some of the hardships 
of the work; that is, they facilitate the required processes of contemporary labouring. 
Drawing this introduction to a close, I must add that neither the Gauthier and Martikainen texts (2013a, 
2013b), nor Carrette and King’s (2005), consider the nature of post-Fordist work as a particular factor in the 
evolution and spread of neospirituality. In developing this theme, the contents of my dissertation will add to 
and expand on their material. It will also be enriched by the work of others. For, though workplaces have 
not been intensively explored by religious studies scholars, neither have they been entirely ignored. 
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With this dissertation, then, I turn attention from consumption to production—and hence labour—as a key 
determinant of social change. Yet I do this with an entirely new parameter, that is, the implementation of 
religious belief for this purpose. As the concept of “prosumption” suggests, this change in focus from 
consumption to production is not, however, an either-or decision. One of the advantages of the Regulation 
School perspective on Fordism and post-Fordism is precisely that it links a high level overview of changes 
in economic structures to new production methods and consumption habits—considering both as a complex 
with culture integrating them. The analysis of neospirituality’s connection to post-Fordist labour should not 
therefore be seen as superseding the analysis of its immersion in patterns of capitalist consumption. From 
one point of view, looking at production and work completes the analysis offered of consumption. How-
ever, in bringing to light this somewhat occluded aspect of the link between capital and spirituality, it also 
corrects it.  
Stef Aupers and Dick Houtman (2010, 9) call on scholars to “document... how spirituality is socially con-
structed, transmitted and reinforced, and how, why, and with what consequences it enters the public do-
main.” Although essays in their text (2010) indeed touch on the topic of “spirituality at work,” they tend to 
focus on the technological modality both in the work context and elsewhere, investigating the relation of 
neospiritual thought to technology itself, rather minimizing the fact that technology is always embedded in 
social practices that give it its sense. This emphasis on technology while excluding the institutional struc-
tures that create and manage it is a deficiency of analysis I take to task within this dissertation.  
Nevertheless, one of the authors in the collection broadens the discussion by asking: “Are we witnessing the 
emergence of a new work ethic today? Could New Age philosophy be of crucial importance for a modern 
work ethic, in the same sense as Weber considers the Protestant ethic as central to early capitalism as it 
developed in Western society?” (Bovbjerg 2010, 116) This scholar of religion would perhaps recognize the 
aptness of comparing my task to Weber’s. With this broadly-framed question, Bovbjerg inaugurates a 
discourse that my study engages. Furthermore, because it is an example of the kind of work that Aupers and 
Houtman encourage, I consider it an important contribution to religious studies scholarship.  
Empirical study is more productive if based on theoretically-sophisticated modelling of the phenomenon 
under study. Therefore, my ultimate purpose is to suggest a theory about the nature, roles and significance 
of New Age spirituality in new workplaces that can provide the basis for further study of this relationship 
and its implications for workers, neospirituality, and society. 
An underlying theme of this dissertation is the question of the relationship of cultural and material factors 
under conditions of social change. As this is one of the major debates in history and social science, I do not 
seek to resolve this issue in the context of this study. However, I discuss this issue at length in terms of 
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Weber’s work, in Chapter Five, as “The Material/Ideal Quandary.” Other issues important to our under-
standing of neospirituality are completely set aside, but deserve consideration in the wake of this disserta-
tion. One is the degree of participation in and attitudes towards spirituality of the workers themselves. What 
do workers perceive to be the value of spirituality’s infusion in workplace culture? To what degree do they 
support this?  
More broadly, regardless of the nature and function of neospirituality in workplaces, should one defini-
tively collapse all manifestations of neospirituality into the forms found in workplaces (or as commodi-
ties)? Is there a broader cultural zeitgeist that transcends these workplace forms––that construe them as 
secondary or residual (if powerful)? If so, what is the relationship between this workplace presence and 
“uncontained” version(s) of neospirituality?  
As I have noted, my accounting for worker adoption and interpretation of the neospiritual worldview is not 
restricted to tracing histories and examining congruencies. I develop the work of theorists of religion and 
economics who argue that the neoliberal turn in late modern nations provides settings in which the ne-
ospirituality ethos can flourish. These scholars acknowledge and consider in some detail the complemen-
tarity of the ethos and the values required of publics to support neoliberal forms of governing and the in-
tegral capitalist forms of managing resources seen in late-twentieth-century nations. Their works provide 
substantial underpinning to the explorations of this dissertation.  
As noted, key theoretical analysis of spirituality’s relation to capitalism comes from Selling Spirituality by 
religion scholars, Jeremy Carrette and Richard King (2005). Other scholarly works I examine in depth 
which also present neospirituality as shaped by neoliberal ethos and post-Fordist economic form include 
Kimberly Lau (2000), Eva Illouz (2008), Majia Homer Nadesan (1999) and Karen Lisa Goldschmidt 
Salamon (2001), and selected essays from the Gauthier and Martikainen compilations (2013a, 2013b), 
including A. Dawson’s. Together, these authors explore aspects of the match between the values and or-
ganizational practices of neospirituality and post-Fordism. In concert and debate with their arguments, this 
dissertation will assert that neospirituality is a product of developments in religion that began as far back as 
Protestantism and the Enlightenment, accelerated post-war, and is currently enjoying a form of social 
validation in contemporary post-Fordism in its workplaces. It appears to provide a functional ethos for new 
workers. My historical account of the processes of its post-war shaping and social institution, as well as my 
own reflection on the issues they discuss, add to the theoretical work of the above authors. This account, 
along with the synthesis of material from work and religion scholars I provide, are the key analytical con-
tributions of this dissertation to scholarly understanding of neospirituality’s popularity and dissemination. 
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The Project: Two Bodies of Literature Associated 
By way of opening the discussion of my approach to task of this dissertation, this section provides a brief 
discussion of each of the two bodies of literature related in this dissertation, post-Fordist work and ne-
ospirituality. This is followed by a schematic representation of their parallel characteristics.  
From Fordist to Post-Fordist Work 
It is generally agreed that, over the last fifty years, the nature and conditions of work in advanced capitalist 
societies has undergone dramatic change. Western countries have seen the loss of many secure, bene-
fit-supported, hierarchically-managed, and relatively well-paid industrial jobs. These have been (not fully) 
replaced to a degree by employment in the “information economy,” in jobs varying greatly from their 
predecessors in terms of the skills needed, remuneration, security, nature of integration with private life, 
and other factors. These clustered changes in economics, politics and work have been described in various 
terms. One of the most influential accounts is that supplied by economists of the Regulation School 
(Aglietta 1979; Lipietz 1985 and 1987) who describe a shift, commencing in the 1970s, from a Fordist 
regime of accumulation, based on the centrality of the industrial, assembly-line factory pioneered by au-
tomobile capitalist Henry Ford, with its associated institutions of mass consumption and the national wel-
fare state, to a post-Fordist regime predicated on cybernetic technologies, new management techniques, 
transnational supply chains and neoliberal governance.  
According to Harvey (1990, 2), post-Fordist conditions include the emergence of “entirely new sectors of 
production, new ways of providing financial services, new markets and, above all, greatly intensified rates 
of commercial, technological, and organizational innovation.” Unlike in the past, “labour processes, labour 
markets, products, and patterns of consumption” are constantly changing. Harvey labels the new, 
post-Fordist capitalist regime as one of “flexible accumulation.” One of its requirements is a “flexible” 
workforce (Harvey 1990, 147), a concept we will fully explore in later chapters. 
Recognizing that post-Fordist jobs embrace a variety of differing situations, scholars of new workplaces, 
such as Harvey, Robert Reich (1992), Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000), Ursula Huws (2003) and 
Catherine McKercher and Vincent Mosco (2007) nonetheless concur that there are some common features 
across apparently very different post-Fordist employment situations, even though they often disagree as to 
the appropriate terms by which to describe them, and the salience to be given to particular features.  
The list below presents the skill- and character- requirements of key, post-Fordist workers. They must be: 
 Technically-skilled: Most workers need to be good users of technology.  
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 Cooperative and socially competent: More horizontal labour organization and the elimi-
nations of job demarcation result in organization in teams. Team members, not managers, 
coordinate and appraise team-members’ work.  
 Respectful of personal experience (versus book-learning) and insight. 
 Energetic, and skilled at time-management, because of continuous time-pressure: High 
circulation (fast-changing) economy creates intensive work-demands, so that work-life 
imposes on private life. High-circulation tools, software and apps change continuously. 
Mastery of these, and requirement to do multiple tasks on projects requires continuous 
learning, both on-the-job and in personal time. “High-circulation job” refers to short-term 
nature of work. To access one’s next project, one must socialize with coworkers or leaders 
after hours.  
 Outward-looking and opportunistic (with respect to new products): Pay is performance 
related, and workers are subjected to detailed bonus systems. The high-circulation econ-
omy (based on the fashion-sensitivity of products) and continuous improvement of prac-
tices, requires continuous attention both inwards and outward: inwards, to better produc-
tivity; outward, to environment for ideas, leads, to “keep up.”  
 Flexible and entrepreneurial (regarding one’s next job): Vertical disintegration of corpo-
rations has led to business organization as networks, and short-term employment. Together 
with weaker labour laws and unions, these erode the security of workers and the balance of 
power between workers and managers. Workers must constantly negotiate where, when, 
under what conditions, and if, they work. 
 Submissive to personal surveillance and the judgements of team leaders and co-workers 
(the latter during peer-reviews): Workplace surveillance is endemic. Workers are subjected 
either to metrics or to personal surveillance by co-workers and leaders, by non-opaque 
processes. Workers are increasingly unprotected by formalized authority structures, per-
formance standards, or appraisals as basis of promotions. Personal success and work re-
ferrals depend more and more on others’ goodwill. 
 Global in outlook, with a desire to make synthetic connection with strangers. 
 Open to change (personally and for the world); forward-looking or optimistic 
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Neospirituality (aka New Age Sensu Lato) 
Beliefs 
Definitions of what constitutes New Age beliefs have proliferated since L. Dawson’s early characterization. 
However, emerging from an analysis of New Age texts, Wouter Hanegraaff’s (1996, 355–56) codification 
of New Age beliefs (exerpted in the following four paragraphs) has been influential:  
“Holism is pervasive in all forms of New Age thinking.” However, the holism is tempered by 
“this-worldliness, particularly of the weak variety.” The “belief in experiential reality” to which 
“this-worldliness” refers dictates that the holism is “seldom of a ‘transcendent absolute’ variety.” Instead, 
New Age holism “emphasizes the universal interrelatedness of all things, either or not based upon a 
common/creative source of Being.”  
Second, Hanegraaff specifies, “Evolutionism is equally pervasive…. New Age believers do not regard 
evolution as random, but as teleological or creative. The idea of a universal process of evolution of con-
sciousness… is central.”  
Additionally, “the psychologization of religion and the sacralization of psychology [are] highly character-
istic of New Age religion…. In the context of [evolutionism, this] implies that the evolution of con-
sciousness leads to a perfect gnosis or illumination, in which Self-realization and God-realization are one 
and the same….”  
Finally, there are “expectations of a coming New Age…. [which are] a direct expression of the movement’s 
criticism of the worldviews dominant in Western culture generally, and modern Western culture particu-
larly.” 
Regarding this last point, scholars have recently noted changes in the nature of the millenialism now at-
tributed to New Age beliefs, consistent with the rationalization associated with diffusion into the broader 
culture. Writes Sutcliffe, “New Age is now not so much a historical prophecy as a ‘realized eschatology for 
living in the here-and-now.’[Now, as earlier,] a marvelous, even perfected future is on the horizon, but 
achieved through very different means than in the past: in the former case largely by otherworldly, su-
perhuman agency and, in the second, by this-worldly, humanistic endeavor” (Sutcliffe 2008, 2).  
The millennialism that was core becomes converted to a smaller kind of transformation, that of the indi-
vidual. What is now essential to the New Age is the belief 
… that human beings are essential gods in themselves[; that they] contain 
a ‘God-spark,’ a central infusion of divinity[;] that human beings undergo 
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successive reincarnations as part of an evolutionary process which returns 
them to full God-realization[;] that the human individual is responsible for 
creating his or her own reality[; and that] the entire evolutionary quest and 
desire [to emerge into the divine state takes place] in a single intercon-
nected field. [Furthermore,] this holistic notion provides the New Age 
spiritual orientation with its guiding transcendent value (York 2001, 364).  
Scholars stress different features of New Age and neospirituality beliefs and practices––in either lengthy 
tomes or, as with Heelas (1996, 368), with extreme brevity. Ellwood (1992, 60) ties many of Hanegraaff’s 
features together as a function of holism; it means that the self is an integration of mind, body and spirit, all 
of which subtly interact, and that the self and the cosmos (the natural and celestial worlds) model each 
other, such that action or changes at one level can register at others. Albanese (1998, 348) stresses the 
healing––an integral aspect of holism—is primary. She claims that “healing of self and planet is the main 
practice of the New Age,” and that these are intertwined. The cosmology dictates that personal wellness has 
an effect on the wellness of the planet. Healing is articulated by some scholars as the use of particular 
techniques. For example, a series of meetings in contemporary Nottinghamshire UK, documented by 
Matthew Wood (2007, 10), explored meditation, healing, divination and spirit possessions (or channeling). 
Other healing techniques are ‘bioenergy therapy,’ radiesthesia or dowsing, yoga and acupuncture (Hall 
2013, 147). 
Based on his studies in Brazil, Andrew Dawson (2007, 104) boils down the belief structure to three prin-
ciples: holism, individualism and pragmatism. Holism has been discussed. Individualism identifies the 
believers’ sense that they themselves are responsible for finding the religious or spiritual convictions that 
move them. Heelas (1996) calls this the conviction of “self-responsibility.” York (2001, 364) restates this: 
“The human individual is responsible for creating his or her own reality.” This might involve a long-term 
quest with serial acceptance and rejection of different practices and beliefs, and/or constructing a compi-
lation of them for one’s personal religion. Pragmatism follows from individualism in that only a qualified 
embrace of any congregation, religious leader or guru, or belief system is felt to be necessary to test its 
appropriateness for one’s devotion. The emphasis on feeling or religious experience also comes into play 
here, since the standard of acceptability of any of the above (regularly revisited) are, essentially, their ca-
pacity to produce a sense of transcendence of the mundane. 
It should be remembered that all of the above representations can describe the beliefs of many of the 
“spiritual but not religious,” which means that the beliefs can be found within certain precincts of formal 




Despite their casual mutual relations, in their explicit roles as religious seekers, New Agers have charac-
teristic organizational and meeting patterns that express their primary roles as individualistic seekers. As 
religious practitioners they can certainly be distinguished from those following “traditional models of re-
ligious engagement, [which define] ‘congregants,’ ‘regulars,’ ‘converts,’ the ‘lapsed’” (Sutcliffe 2008, 8). 
Sutcliffe defines them as “virtuosi able and willing to select, synthesize, and exchange an increasing di-
versity of cultural practices and beliefs” (Sutcliffe 2008, 8). Indeed, with the advent of New Age practices, 
religious seeking was democratized. Whereas, historically speaking, seeking was the “prerogative of elite 
social groups—theologians, contemplatives, and privileged lay practitioners…, spirituality makes the role 
available to a mass audience.”  
For the seeker, there are both outer, geographic, and inner, spiritual, journeys (Sutcliffe 2008, 11). They 
follow three seeker tactics. Singular seekers (such as the Buddha) follow the traditional pathway towards a 
goal they define as “achieved,” and to which they are loyal during an extended period. Serial seekers move 
from one practice or truth to the next without loyalty concerns; the movement itself distinguishes them as 
unique and their search as authentic. Their actions most accurately illustrate the postmodern bricolage of 
cultural experimenters. Depending on the commentator, this is “creative exploitation,” or the behaviour of 
anxious and confused individuals (Sutcliffe 2008, 10). Multiple seeking is most typical of New Age seek-
ers. There is a “multidirectional and synchronic activity,” through which the seeker assembles a tool-kit of 
ideas and practices uniquely suited to oneself (Sutcliffe 2008, 10). This practice is justified by holism and 
by weak, this worldly mysticism: the belief that the forms of the world are somewhat illusory and mainly 
different appearances of the same underlying reality (Hanegraaff 1996, 478). This position is seen in writer 
Louise Hays’ recommended affirmation to seekers: “In the infinity of life where I am, all is perfect, whole 
and complete, and yet life is ever changing. There is no beginning and no end, only a constant cycling and 
recycling of substance and experiences.”
13
 Multiple seekers are understood to enjoy the process of seeking 
itself, not a particular outcome; theirs is “diffuse and deregulated behaviour” (Sutcliffe 2008, 11). Their one 
rule of thumb is to resist restraint in their seeking.  
The typical fora of these seekers (including, also, on-line settings) are 
… lectures, workshops, small groups and societies, and calendrical and ad 




 Cited in Sutcliffe 2008, 11. 
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centers of groups and societies, as well as libraries, [etc.]; and the 
open-ended networks of association—kinship, friendship, mailing lists, 
telephone trees, and e-mail lists and Web sites—that loosely articulate 
these relatively simple, but immensely flexible and resilient, cultural in-
stitutions. The resulting networks extend both synchronically and dia-
chronically . . . constituting a cultural ‘web’ . . .that both spawns its own 
relatively discrete enclaves and infuses a wider quest culture” (Sutcliffe 
2008, 12). 
Compared: New Work and Neospirituality 
Initial observations organized in tabular format below complete the introduction to this study. Over the 
course of the remaining chapters, I clarify and assess the contents of these tables, and consider why spir-
ituality now has an accepted place, by name, in business corporations.  
Table 1, Fordist Religious and Business Organizational Forms Compared, shows that the common (bu-
reaucratic) organizational form of religious institutions of the past mirrored those of their contemporary 
corporations. Table 2, Post-Fordist Religious (i.e., Neospiritual) and Business Organizational Forms 
Compared, shows that this pattern is now reproduced for the post-Fordist era, wherein neospiritual or-
ganization mirrors the networked corporate world. Table 3, Neospiritual vs. Post-Fordist Team-worker 
Beliefs and Skills, indicates the parallel nature of the values and practices of iconic post-Fordist workers, 
compared to those of neospiritual practitioners.  
Table 1: Fordist Religious and Business Organizational Forms Compared 
Fordist Religious (Church) Organizational 
Forms 
Fordist Business Organizational Forms  
Fixed sites for worship—churches—directly 
owned 
High capital investments: material ‘plant’ owned 
Geographically-defined constituency Workers hired locally 
High membership and commitment rates ‘Employed’ status of workers highly bounded 
Religious professional roles prescribed; Hir-
ing/assignment processes routinized  
Formal hiring and reporting structures for specific 
employment positions 
Hierarchical, one-to many (mass) communica-
tions structure 
Few ‘line’ managers to many workers ratio  
Formal behavioural/ritual action protocols; Business-like decorum; worker discipline  
Engagement balanced with other life functions Engagement balanced with other life functions 
Sacred/ secular distinction maintained and 
marked 





Table 2: Post-Fordist Religious (i.e., Neospiritual) and Business Organizational Forms 
Compared 
Post-Fordist Religious (i.e., Neospiritual) 
Forms 
Post-Fordist Business Organizational Forms 
Meetings are in ad hoc and changing commer-
cial, community and natural sites 
Companies divest of capital costs, such as buildings. 
For individual workers, desks and cubicles shared; 
workplaces mobile and ‘borrowed;’ community (li-
braries) and commercial (coffee shops) 
Global religious logic Workers hired ‘globally’ and by on-line recruitment; 
loyalty is to company; stands in for global capitalism 
Membership within any one group/practice 
fluid, and contingent; group boundaries weak  
Due to part-time, temporary and piece-work (and 
telework), worker/ non-worker boundaries weak  
Religious authority contingent on appeal to 
religious seeker (commercial model); religious 
virtuosi self-select; leadership contested/ in-
formally negotiated; lay/professional distinction 
weak making group composition amorphous  
Managers are ‘leaders’ or ‘coaches,’ pretending 
equality with workers. Teams manage collectively; 
appraise each other; amateurs learn on job; reward 
system informal; ‘Professional’ status degraded 
Network model of interaction Network model of interaction 
Endless and reciprocal teaching/learning 
(seeking) 
Team members multitask and teach each other  
Hybridity of religious discourses and traditions Professional/technical discourses intermingled 
Formalistic mien of professionals rebuked: In-
stead, ability to induce religious experience/ 
enthusiasm/ energetic connection  
‘Professional’ reserve ridiculed; intimate style val-
ued; work is play; euphoria and engagement re-
warded 
Religious (spirituality) language infuses secular 
institutions; Breakdown of sacred/secular peri-
odization; irregular schedule of religious activ-
ity 
Intensive work regimes intrude upon private life; 
opportunistic work patterns; no secular workweek. 
 
Table 3: Neospiritualist vs. Post-Fordist Iconic Worker Beliefs and Skills 
Beliefs: New Age Practitioners Values: Post-Fordist Team-Workers 
God is not transcendent; more of a partner.  Manager is coach or team leader; equal to workers 
Public self (persona) is false; the essential self 
(spirit) is real. 
Formal roles in (Fordist) bureaucracies degrade 
creativity and effectiveness. 
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Beliefs: New Age Practitioners Values: Post-Fordist Team-Workers 
Universe ‘knows’ (i.e., acts on) your intentions. 
Causation is unrecognizable in explicit terms. The 
universe changes via subtle connections, of which 
one must remain essentially ignorant.  
Authority is enacted covertly, via surveillance. 
Public and explicit discourse in company culture 
only partly determines one’s standing and pro-
spects. Subtle power dynamics and systematic 
monitoring do also. 
Bodies are not only biological but foci of energy. 
Matter is energy. 
Effective company processes are “frictionless.” 
Workers’ needs as situated material beings must be 
suppressed. Instead they must focus and transmit 
team energy. 
Religious variety/ personalized paths are good, 
but should be contained within the person.  
Workers’ “habits”—constructed by ethnic, racial, 
gender, geographical and personal loyalties and 
locales—are impediments to team-action. They are 
of interest only as inputs to commodities.  
Spiritual growth is one`s own responsibility. Success is one’s own responsibility; no career 
path/job ladder planned by Human Resources. 
Networking––one-to-one connecting––provides 
new views about/directions for seeking the self. 
Networking for new contracts and job-related in-
formation is essential, within and across projects. 
Affective energy, transmitted to others, facilitates 
religious experience. 
Other team members’ energy is source of vitality 
and creativity. Service workers trade in affect. 
Healing one’s self heals the world. Personal empowerment is good for all. 
Discovering your true self makes a better world. Expressing your true self creates good products. 
Levels of well-being are unlimited, up to the state 
of personal divinity. 
Empowered people can be heroes; gifted amateurs 
(with vision) can put professionals to shame. 
Conventional science is oppressive.  Tacit, non-codified knowledge and experience rival 
book learning and traditional expertise; knowledge 
can always be accessed. 
 
Outline of Remaining Chapters 
Chapter 2 New Age Spirituality 
This chapter begins this dissertation with an overview of neospiritual beliefs and practices.  
Chapter 3 Capitalism and Religion 
Here I consider important critical analyses of the relationship between religion and capitalism. Amongst 
other critiques, I look at Carrette and King`s (2005) and Carrette’s (2007) theoretically sophisticated work 
on the common roots of psychology and spirituality in the individualizing ideologies of advanced capital-
32 
 
ism. Their work provides a context for considering New Age spirituality in relation to both consumption 
and production. I relate this material to A. Dawson’s (2013) concept of spiritual prosumption, the theories 
of the therapeutic self (Illouz 2008), and psytopia (Leinberger and Tucker 1991). The discussions in this 
chapter play an important role in organizing the contents of subsequent chapters and, ultimately, in speci-
fying the logic of neospirituality’s embrace in contemporary workplaces.  
Chapter 4 Spirituality at Work 
This chapter discusses the management-oriented literature on the incorporation of New Age spirituality (or, 
more properly spirituality) practices into the workplace. This includes an overview of what is occurring in 
companies under this rubric. I also cite a selection of industry texts that present and discuss key critical 
questions asked within that literature about these practices. In this chapter I argue that while there are 
critical voices within the industry literature that disclose important aspects of the political-economic con-
text of neospirituality, they lack an over-arching critical theory of the connection between changes in the 
workplace and the ready support of neospirituality therein. 
Chapter 5 Post-Fordism and Work Culture 
To address this lack, this chapter summarizes the political economic analysis on the transformation of 
capitalism from its mid twentieth-century Fordist phase to an end-of-millennium post-Fordism. Beginning 
with a review of the key concepts of the Regulation School economists, in whose work this analysis orig-
inates, it provides an overview of the chronology of this metamorphosis and its economic, social and po-
litical dimensions, with particular attention to changes in the workplace. The chapter features discussion of 
the work of theorists such as David Harvey (1990), who discuss the cultural dimensions of the shift from 
Fordism to post-Fordismwithout mentioning religious institutions or spiritual practices. 
Chapter 6 Types of Work and the Iconic Worker 
Here, I draw on the typology of post-Fordist work-forms of American scholar Robert Reich (1992) and 
support and cross-examine his model with the contributions of other important scholars, including au-
tonomous Marxist scholars Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) and Maurizio Lazzarato (1992). I 
scrutinize contemporary work from the point of view of these work-types, assessing the skills required. I 
also introduce Hardt and Negri`s assertion of the hegemony of the immaterial labouring form (i.e., that even 
non-workers have learned to use technology like, and for similar purposes to, workers and so think and act 
like them), and suggest that this is a way to understand the dissemination of workplace culture beyond its 
boundaries (relevant, since workplaces embrace spirituality). The skills distributed through this hegemonic 
process are networking, cognitive and affective.  
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I identify symbolic analysts (SAs) as the workers who do the most characteristic post-Fordist work, and so 
are its iconic workers (and the main focus for considerations of neospiritual adoption). However, I add to 
the concept of the hegemony of immaterial labour forms (above) by examining the more mundane ways in 
which SAs are socially influential and can therefore actively contribute towards valorizing and dissemi-
nating their own worldview.  
As a supplement to this chapter, I scrutinize in detail the types of affective skills that are demanded of 
contemporary workers, concluding that the term ‘affective labour’ is a highly-ambiguous concept, except 
for several specific and well-acknowledged forms. However, of particular interest is a purportedly novel 
kind of affective labour, claimed to be operating in post-Fordist productive settings, the production of en-
livening energy. Although, its actual reality and function as a work-skill is currently unverified, it is of 
particular interest in a study of spirituality in workplaces. New work may demand the activation of enliv-
ening energy. If so, it would seem to create a welcoming environment for the neospiritual ethos, which 
bases its theology around its operation.  
Chapter 7 Post-hierarchical Paradigms and Practices 
This chapter provides a history of efforts to create posthierarchical workplaces, to make them both more 
responsive to the changing market conditions and more enabling of workers. The activist consultants and 
managers who tried to implement these changes emerged from the same milieu as did neospirituality, and 
professed similar humanist concerns. Responsive companies understood that producing and selling im-
material products required autonomous, entrepreneurial and creative employees, who differed substantially 
from the white-collar “organization men” found in the Fordist- era bureaucracies. 
The model that guided many consultants, often called Toyotism, pointed to work in semi-autonomous 
teams, with members continuously monitoring quality and authorized to intervene when it falters. The 
original model was accompanied by promises of stable employment. Yet the post-hierarchical work form is 
ultimately made effective through its easy ability to acquire and shed workers—guaranteeing precarious 
working conditions for Toyotist workers. Therefore, the promise of stability was abrogated over time, 
leaving workers responsible for many management functions as well as their traditional responsibilities. In 
other ways as well, empowering work structures were partially dismantled by the 1990s, leaving a com-
promised model, or hybrid system, in place. This was a white-collar Taylorism, guided by the human re-
sources philosophy of humouring rather than enabling workers, and decisions based on accountancy re-
tained at the top. However, despite compromises to posthierarchy, the idea continues to hold the attention of 
managers and workers alike, particularly focussed around vigorous repudiation of the bureaucratic struc-
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tures of Fordism (with disdain for governments in close attendance). Its valorization, without validation, 
suggests that posthierarchy is the basic ideology of post-Fordist workplaces. 
Chapter 8 Net Age 
This chapter pursues themes broached in the preceding one with particular emphasis on the common 
(counter-) culture of the American west coast, the New Age that emerged there, and the new-technology 
hackers that partook of both, yet emerged as the pre-eminent workers of post-Fordism—the Silicon Valley 
SAs, or technical workers. I suggest that the cosmology these workers defined for themselves, explicitly the 
hacker ethic, the network cosmology, and the Californian ideology were efforts to resolve the basic con-
tradiction of their lives. This stemmed from their gestation in the countercultural milieu that opposed cap-
italism, instrumentalism and anti-collectivity (which they saw as hierarchy), yet their maturation in the 
highly-individualistic milieu in which they found themselves working and becoming wealthy. The 
worldviews they adopted as a response, defined somewhat differently but similar in form, embrace a form 
of holism substantially similar to neospiritual holism, too. All hypothesize that individual action resolves 
through the operation of a unifying process (for neospirituals, through divine intention; for the workers, 
though network processes) into a world of enriched life and plenty for all.  
Chapter 9 Conclusion 
In this chapter I return to the tabular comparison of the culture of neospirituality and new work with a 
synthesized version, integrating what has been reviewed in the dissertation. I also discuss three themes 
developed over the course of the dissertation, posthierachy, holism and dematerialization, showing how 
these values influence business and workplace practices and beliefs as well as those of neospirituality. 
Further synthesis of the chapter material renders five hypotheses as to why neospirituality is present in 
workplaces. I conclude the dissertation by outlining its limitations and value to scholarship.  
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Chapter Two: New Age Beliefs and Practices 
Introduction 
In Chapter One, I discussed scholars’ difficulty in studying the social distribution of New Age spirituality 
along with its features. These difficulties continue to mount over time, with this spirituality showing greater 
levels of diffusion, renaming, and hybridity (Clarke 2006, 25). More complex syntheses of traditional re-
ligious elements appear. “Hybrid forms … have emerged, which [disseminate] key themes and practices 
into new cultural streams, especially under conditions of globalization” (Sutcliffe and Gilhus 2013, 4–5). It 
was argued in Chapter One that these difficulties are better met by studying spirituality’s implication in 
broad social processes than by seeking to corral it as if it were a religion. However, there is a great variety of 
social trends that neospirituality is said to mark off, and of social sites in which it is deemed to play a part. 
Neospirituality (with its cognates and fellow-travelers
14
) has been considered in relation to globalism 
(Rothstein 2001), as a fundamental characterization of the individualized society (Inglehart 1997), as a 
by-product of secularization, and the cultic form of liberal religiosity (Bruce 2002), as liberal religion 
(Schmidt 2005), as an American form of ‘gnosticism’ (Bloom 1992),
15
 as indicative of the easternization 
of Western culture (Campbell 2007),
 
as a new ethos for social service institutions (Bender 2010), as a broad 
form of opposition to contemporary power structures (Lynch 2007), as a version of the American civil 
religion strongly influenced by the Transcendentalist tradition (Albanese 2007), and other themes.
 
 
All told, given the differing directions that “New Age sensu lato” research takes, it should not surprise us 
that opposing judgements about its importance are made: either it is insubstantial enough to be insignifi-
cant,
 
or so pervasively inflects the values of different social and cultural institutions that it should be looked 
at as an overriding motif. Yet, the diffuse, but persistent, character of the belief system (and indeed, its 




 These include Neopagans, Eastern and traditional Western esoteric religious practices, ‘alternate’ health and 
wellness technologies, ecofeminism, and ‘progressive’ spirituality, to name most. 
15
 Campbell (2007, 349) explains Bloom’s position:“For [Harold Bloom] has argued that, despite all appearances to 
the contrary, the religion of the American people is not really Christianity, but Gnosticism…. What Bloom considers 
to be the key belief in this religion is that one’s innermost being is ‘a magic or occult self, spark. Or pneuma as the 
Gnostics called it’ (Campbell (2007, 50-51), and that this is clearly a shamanistic one, constituting as it does the belief 
that ‘what is best and oldest in you was not made by God, but is God Campbell (2007, 54). Finally Bloom makes it 
clear that he considers both the neo-Pentecostal and charismatic movements together with the New Age movement all 
to be aspects of this American Religion. As he says, ‘The God of the American Religion is an experiential God, so 




spirituality plays an important role in social or political-economic processes and has been selected and 
shaped to become a (perhaps the) popular ethos for Western societies. Its “similarity” to the culture may be 
a result of broad cultural change that has either assimilated it or been structured by it. Although there is 
common skepticism as to the very existence of a New Age movement (Hanegraaff 1996, 525; Wood 2007; 
York 1995, 26; Spangler and Thompson 1991, 64), and practitioners often repudiate the New Age term 
itself (Sutcliffe 2008, 3–4), this does not mean that its “essence” is not now distilled within (at least a 
segment of) culture in general.  
If its very existence represents and is determinatively implicated in broad change processes, ever-greater 
refinements of its history, definition, correlation, and conditions of incidence (as the Suttcliffe and Gilhus 
text provides), construing the “new age” as a relatively bounded phenomenon, may not render fundamen-
tally greater understanding of the new spirituality ethos. Studying new age spirituality as a phenomenon 
within society—as attempted by Sutcliffe and Gilhus (2013) and writers in their collection––may be at the 
wrong level of generality. These concentrated studies may amount to a more elaborate shrouding of ne-
ospirituality’s possible ‘structural’ role within contemporary society, if it has one.  
Therefore, in validating new age studies and perhaps reifying a phenomenon, Sutcliffe and Gilhus (2013) 
and their writers may be forestalling a more urgent examination, that of the role(s) taken by neospirituality 
(and other cognates) in sustaining or advancing a particular social order. This is a premise of the following 
study. This dissertation responds to Sutcliffe and Gilhus’s (2013) idea of reframing the terrain as a starting 
point of research (in their case inverting what is called “normal” and “marginal” religion), but with a dif-
ferent reframing. Rather than seeing neospirituality as part of the contents of culture, I consider it the shaper 
of it. I suggest that, in its adoption by capital as a way to condition workers, it plays a key role in the new 
social order of late modernity.  
Sutcliffe and Gilhus outline three overlapping historical approaches to new age study. During the first 
approach, ‘macro-theoretical’ studies saw new age in terms of ‘new religious movements.’ The second saw 
scholars developing “rich, micro-level ethnographies and histories [revealed through] fine-grained empir-
ical data … unpack[ed] within specific contexts” (Sutcliffe and Gilhus 2013, 6–7). Examples are Courtney 
Bender’s aforementioned study (2007) of New Age integration in institutions around Cambridge, USA; 
Judith Macpherson (2008) on Reiki healing in Scotland; and Ingrid Gilhus (2012) on the reception of angels 
in Norway. Sutcliffe and Gilhus note that this second wave “has also fostered mid-range or meso-level 
analyses of local and regional dynamics: for example, Adam Possamai (2005) on the circuits of detradi-
tionalized spiritual seekers in Melbourne, Australia; Matthew Wood (2007) on the social class dynamics of 
small groups in the English East Midlands experimenting with practical adaptations of occult and esoteric 
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knowledge; and Peter Mulholland (2011) on the psychologically ‘compensatory’ function of new age be-
liefs in the uncertain economy of the post-‘Celtic Tiger’ economy” (Sutcliffe and Gilhus 2013, 6–7). The 
third wave of study noted is a return to macro-level theories without the New Age being considered only in 
relation to NRMs, but to religion in general. 
Predictably, given the New Age belief structure’s amenability to commodification, Sutcliffe and Gilhus 
(2013) also mention that the New Age has gained the attention of scholars from outside of the religious 
studies discipline, such as from cultural and consumer studies. As a result of these studies, they note that 
“we now know more about the interaction between particular ‘new age’ beliefs and practices and the 
dominant culture in specific locations and circumstances” (Sutcliffe and Gilhus 2013, 7).  
Sutcliffe and Gilhus (2013) wish to see more study of the class or “cultural capital” relations that inspire the 
adoption of these practices and beliefs. “In particular, the economic and political commitments of particular 
new age and holistic formations require to be teased out; for example, the analyses of ‘new age capitalism, 
and ‘capitalist spirituality’ by Kimberly Lau (2000) and Jeremy Carette and Richard King (2005), respec-
tively, raise germane issues about the cultural impact of neo-liberal economics, but suffer from rather po-
larized and polemicized arguments on their precise effects” (Sutcliffe and Gilhus 2013, 8). I consider these 
arguments in the next few chapters. This last, recommended, research direction is more suggested than 
actual. However, I situate my study here, extending and deepening the type of analysis added by Lau and 
Carette and King, and taking it in some new directions. 
New Age Beliefs 
As I introduced in the preceding chapter, elements of New Age culture include: a holistic cosmology, 
scientistic language, a personal healing ethos, the depersonalization of the divine, engagement in planetary 
health, striving for a re-enchanted world, a prosperity consciousness, re-incarnation, postmillennial-
ism-evolutionism, and the psychologization of religion and sacralization of psychology. 
Holism 
The preeminent value identified with New Age spirituality is “holism.” It is a key and organizing principle 
of New Age beliefs. Many of the other elements of the neospiritual worldview emerge from it. As I noted in 
the previous chapter, Hanegraaff (1996, 119), confirms this point: “Holism is pervasive in all forms of New 
Age thinking.” Confirming his authority on this issue, Hall (2013, 151) explains that Hanegraaff’s as-
sessment that the New Age is “‘a retreat from Christian dualism to holism,’ [is one] which no subsequent 
researcher has much questioned.” Broadly speaking, holism implies a strong connection between oneself 
and one’s environment. The idea is that everyone is related to the larger cosmos through invisible lines of 
energy. For example, the New Age practice of astrology “is based on the idea that there is a correlation 
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between celestial movements and terrestrial events” (Hanegraaff 1996, 107). The logic is that “there cannot 
really be any such thing as chance or randomness, since the presence of the life-force means that there is an 
order and hence also a meaning to all events, no matter how trivial they may appear” (108). Rowena Kryder 
(1992, 103)
16
 commented on the New Age tool, the I Ching or Book of Changes with the statement that 
“implicit in the use of the divination system is that within its imagery or forms lies the eternal, underlying 
structure of the universe.” The subtle lines of connection are not available to rational awareness. The New 
Age makes a reference to Eastern epistemology in teaching that, to apprehend these subtle relationships, 
one must “turn inward, and rely on intuition, insight and mystical experience” (Hanegraaff 1996, 110). 
The term “holism” is also used in a more restricted way that relates to health and healing. At the core of this 
movement is the conviction that “every human being is a unique, wholistic, independent relationship of 
body, mind, emotions and spirit.” Although it does not logically follow from that ontological assessment, 
New Age practitioners seek to further establish that wholeness––to render individuals “whole—physically, 
emotionally, mentally and spiritually” (Hanegraaff 1996, 54). All of these bodily systems can be considered 
together because they closely interact; physical problems can have mental causes and consequently 
changing psychological states can cure physical illness (Hanegraaff 1996, 99-101). This second sense of 
“holism” is considered later in this chapter.  
This section concentrates on the first—the association of the microcosm (the person) with the macrocosm 
(the universe). Although passed through 19
th
-century “harmonialism,” and Mesmerism, seen in English and 
American spiritualism, this form of association between the self (the microcosm) and the larger environ-
ment originated in an 18
th
-century source, the work of the philosopher and mystic, Emanuel Swedenborg 
(2011). His original source is the worldview of the European Renaissance, the “doctrine of correspond-
ences..., a doctrine of harmony, for earthly and heavenly spheres resonated with each other as did a host of 
more specific signs and symbols” (Albanese 1992, 71). The idea of correspondences evokes “the un-
changing ‘Platonic world of forms reflecting reality’” (Albanese 1992, 73), wherein the spiritual and ma-
terial worlds mirror each other (Albanese 1992, 70).  
However, New Age holism is not the Renaissance worldview. Swedenborg substantially adapted this vision 
by integrating it with Darwin’s evolutionary theory, which had dramatically captured European attention at 
the time. Swedenborg’s innovation modernized the Renaissance worldview by changing the world––as 




 See Hanegraaff 1996, 107. 
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a spiral model of historical progression. (The spiral is generally considered a model of positive develop-
ment or growth in the New Age world [Washburn 2003], i.e., evolution spirals upwards not downwords.)  
New Age evolutionism also differs from what Charles Darwin’s defined in The Origin of the Species 
(1759), in that the latter presupposes random elements as influential of the direction of change. His vision 
was one of progressive concentration of valuable characteristics within segments of population until they 
came to characterize the populations themselves over successive generations (because “the fittest” produce 
more offspring). Darwin saw no intentionality in this process (as when a divine knower might direct these 
developments), but rather an impersonal incorporation of randomly-occurring characteristics through sta-
tistical processes and certain principles of survival. As any scientist should, Darwin had a great respect for 
chance, or contingent events. By contrast, the New Age view of evolution inherited from Swedenborg holds 
that there is a degree of direction of the changes that occurs over time. To some degree, the universe is 
being propelled towards an outcome by some internal principle, intention, or mind.  
It is true that New Agers differ in the extent to which they credit a thinking deity as the source of this di-
rection (as opposed to an impersonal spirit). This is because they vary in the nature of the whole they be-
lieve in. Throughout his study of the New Age worldview, Hanegraaff debates its cohesiveness. He ex-
plains that “holism” is more of a general orientation than a belief structure (1996, 119). Various worldviews 
are represented in New Age holism, but coalesce into two major forms. The first “reduces all manifestations 
to one ultimate source.” The other posits the “universal relatedness of everything” (Hanegraaff 1996, 
120-122), without a centre or “source.” Seth, a voice channeled by Jane Roberts and published as “A Course 
in Miracles” (1972), uniquely “reduces all manifestations to one ultimate source” (Hanegraaff 1996, 
120-122). His metaphysic, claims Hanegraaff, reflects a duality between this-worldliness and otherworld-
liness—between God as immanent and God as transcendent.
 17
 However, Hanegraaff contends that Seth’s 
dualism is resolved in historicism, as we discussed above—over time, all manifestations become one (the 
spiral). He concludes that in the end “Ultimate Source” thinking—as with other teleologies–– imagines a 
hierarchical cosmos (Hanegraaff 1996, 123). This is contrasted with ‘Universal Interrelatedness,’ because 
the latter lacks a “Source or other ontologically privileged Center.” As a result, it “is of an unambiguously 




 A traditional religious parallel to it is “the image of God conceived as a sphere whose center is everywhere and 
whose circumference is nowhere, [which turns up in] ecological and social theories, too. [In secular terms,] the 
appropriate picture is one of a network in which every point is connected to every other point but in which no point has 
privileged status” (Hanegraaff 1996, 128).  
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Seth’s role as a major (in fact, the sole) contributor to the New Age cosmology as a hierarchy, in contrast to 
the more common monistic expressions, leads Hanegraaff to claim there is “a fundamental rift in New Age 
thinking between two contradictory views of reality,” a hierarchical and a monistic one (Hanegraaff 1996, 
132). On the other hand, he acknowledges challenges to this position from such New Age visionary and 
spokesperson as Chris Giscombe
18
 who does not see a fundamental division. Rather than an expression of 
an extreme, Giscombe views Seth’s ultimate source holism as an integration of apparent differences. 
Commenting on here positions, Hanegraaff (1996, 151) concedes: “Indeed, it may be argued that Seth has 
managed to accomplish a convergence of both types: although everything springs from an ultimate creative 




As Hanegraaff explains it, Giscombe’s position is that Seth’s model not only integrates disparate New Age 
positions on the relation of the individual to the whole, but does so in a way that eliminates the difference 
between individual and collective realities. If Giscombe’s position is valid, it follows that for New Age 
practitioners a compromise between collective and individual reality as a basic human dilemma becomes 
moot. This, as I argue, is indeed a crucial resolution for the worker worldview I describe in this dissertation, 
as it allows workers to resolve a fundamentally contradictory demand placed upon them within their 
workplaces: they must present their passion for the goals of the corporation as their own passion. This is 
said to be so because, to cut costs, corporations now hire only those they are confident will propel them-
selves to high performances minus the traditional blandishments of either carrot or stick. This is certainly 





 Giscom is a New Age public figure and symbolic ecological activist whose headquarters is “The Light Institute” in 
Galisteo, New Mexico. Her ecological efforts are consistent with holistic “psychic” approaches to world betterment. 
She writes in Human Nature Alliance: ECO SOS (2014-2016) that with her initiative: “Human Potential and Global 
Responsibility, the idea was to use our wonderful intuition and compassion to shift local and global situations… The 
concept of manifesting and de-manifesting came from “calling the rain” which the Hopis have done for hundreds of 
years. Passing energy into and out of manifestation utilizes the same principle. I have now begun the Human-Nature 
Alliance/ECO SOS. Through our interconnection, we can send energy to any situation across the globe that needs 
uplifting help.” She documents her worldwide lectures and publishes texts on her belief system. See 
(thelight@lightinstitute.com). 
19
 Hanegraaff (1996, 151) clarifies that Giscombe’s holism goes beyond Seth as, after “taking Seth’s vision to its 
logical conclusion…, Seth’s Source is discarded and ‘only radical holographic interconnectedness remains… making 
each individual mind the center of the universe.”  
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I discuss this psychic conflation of individual and collective interests in workplaces, later, with the different 
terminologies of several scholars of this process: as co-linearization, as the second privatization of religion, 
and as the formulation of the corporation as a psytopia. Additionally, the imaginative conflation of indi-
vidual and collective interests also occurs within the larger society as the neoliberal worldview that frames 
post-Fordism. In this case, the collective is characterized as “the economy,” through which individual ac-
tors, as consumers, “find themselves.” As per the relation of the worksite to the analogous broader public 
value-system, I see the former as the ritual centre of this collapse of the individual to the economic whole, 
as the shrines where the proper relationship is demonstrated and from which the proper understanding 
emanates. I will also show later that these workers have sponsored a meso-level discourse on this rela-
tionship, sitting in scale between the micro (workers’) and macro (neoliberal citizens’) worldviews. An 
important characterization of this discourse is as a “network cosmology,” posited explicitly and implicitly 
by worker and industry spokespeople and theorists who attempt to articulate the nature and correctness of a 
conflation, if not collapse, of individual and collective interests.  
The interpretation that Giscombe describes here, with Hanegraaff’s qualified support, asserts a fundamental 
parallel between post-Fordist workplace, and the New Age (i.e., neospiritual), cosmologies. However, the 
ambivalence that Hanegraaff demonstrates about the validity of these integrations—both the integration of 
New Age views in general, and the integration of the individual and collective that Seth’s worldview 
supposedly accomplishes—suggests that the neospiritual (i.e., New Age) worldview might figure in 
workplaces in other than accommodationist ways. This is a topic to be explored at a later date.  
Regardless of these differences, “New Age believers do not regard evolution as random, but as teleological 
or creative. The idea of a universal process of evolution of consciousness… is central” to New Age beliefs, 
claims Hanegraaff (1996, 158). Swedenborg’s transformation of the timeless Renaissance worldview into a 
historicist process makes it a teleological worldview.
20
 When he produced this non-Darwinian evolutionary 
model, Swedenborg was trying to overcome the relativism of science and modern history (based on science 
and history’s gradual accumulation of knowledge that over time refutes former truths). These (rejected) 
manifestations of relativism are referred to as “historist” (vs. “historicist,” above) models of societal 
change. Swedenborg complicated the Renaissance model of correspondences partly as an effort to “refute 
Enlightenment rationalism (i.e., knowing exclusively through mental activity), but not because he rejected 




 A teleology is “a doctrine explaining phenomena by final causes; a doctrine . . . that ends are immanent in nature” 
Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, Merriam-Webster Inc., 1990, New York. 
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trary, he believed the same, but felt they were only accessible via art and intuition. His adjustments forced 
him into a teleological worldview that, in Hanegraaff’s view, is an “unstable mixture” of elements that now 
characterizes the New Age vision. Swedenborg’s model of broad-level societal processes “is therefore 
intermediate between Enlightenment and the more radical types of Counter-Enlightenment. Both occultism 
and New Age are highly interested in large-scale theories of the evolution of humanity and of conscious-
ness, of the general type exemplified by German idealistic philosophers such as Herder, Schelling and 
Hegel” (1996, 415). 
Hanegraaff considers Swedenborg’s construction to have taken up the worst of both of the worlds it 
straddled. He argues that it undermines the potential for creativity amongst believers because it denies a 
random character to events, and chance motivates people to be creative. On the other hand, Swedenborg’s 
worldview equally discourages a serious investment in understanding the regularities of the world through 
rational inquiry, because these regularities are judged as unavailable to rational consciousness. This latter is 
a therefore regarded by New Age thinkers as, essentially, verboten, and a fruitless form of action. Sup-
posedly, the principles that change history, although inexorable, are intrinsically hidden from understand-
ing. Through his new model, Swedenborg “killed nature [because] his plan re-introduced an element of 
dualism which posits the superiority of spirit over matter—nature acted on by spirit… In other words: the 
constellation of a higher spiritual world of life is mirrored by a lower material world, which is dead” 
(Hanegraaff 1996, 426).  
To have “killed nature” is surely a great indictment of any system of ideas supposed to have a connection 
with New Age spirituality, or indeed any religious ethos that emerged from the counterculture. However, 
Hanegraaff insists on this point: “It should be noted that Cartesian dualism is combined in Swedenborg’s 
mind with traditional Christian emphasis on renouncing the things of this world for the sake of heaven. 
[However, in Swedenborg’s world,] not matter as such is responsible for evil… but the mental orientation 
of state of consciousness of human beings” (Hanegraaff 1996, 428).  
Hanegraaff’s analysis refutes the neospiritual and popular understanding that feeling is the source of crea-
tivity, and shows the reality to be more complex. He attributes this misunderstanding––which he says in 
much more prevalent in English, as opposed to European philosophy––to an extreme rational-
ist-irrationalist dualism. New Agers reproduce and complicate this error in Hanegraaff’s judgement. They 
claim to valorize feeling over thought, but the teleological character of the New Age worldview shows it to 
have a strong rationalist undercurrent. Following Swedenborg, they are unresponsive to if not intolerant of 
incongruency and randomness (which responsiveness sparks the imagination, and which intolerance hob-
bles scientific inquiry). This implies that the New Age’s scientific credentials are questionable as the 
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worldview is also creatively closed. This anti-empiricism is a feature of the tendency of the New Age to 
conflate individual and collective interests, and possibly makes its product, neospirituality, susceptible to 
the rationalization of voices that we will see is product of post-Fordist capitalism as well. I will discuss this 
issue in many contexts of the dissertation, for example, in the next chapter as mathesization.  
The direction of history implied by New Age holism is towards some ideal condition. The transformation to 
a better world in the future is an original New Age belief. However, since its early expression by Alice 
Bailey, strict New Age millenarianism has lost saliency in favour of the celebration of personal, individual 
change. Nevertheless, the discussions of reincarnation and scientism below reveal that the prospects for the 
world in its entirety are still a concern. The later New Age vision admits that, as the individual changes, so 
in parallel may the world. Reincarnation helps, since the span of more than one existence allows reaching 
into the past and future. In the end, when I change for the better, so does the world. Further discussion of 
holism is intertwined with the related topics below. 
Reincarnation  
That people reincarnate is an integral element of this evolutionary model. However, reincarnation is con-
ceived differently from its Eastern forms in that New Agers regard it positively––an opportunity to perfect 
oneself while living. (Among other communications, New Age channellers help people make contact with 
their past selves, to acquire insight and advice from them that may guide action now or in the future). In 
Buddhism and Hinduism, the necessity to reincarnate if one has not met certain requirements in one’s life is 
abhorred and considered a curse. In Buddhism, the only way to free oneself from this process, over a series 
of lifetimes, is to become detached from desire, while holding onto one’s duty, or dharma; in Hinduism, 
views on reincarnation are in the same vein. Thus, New Age reincarnation loses much of the profundity of 
Buddhism and Hinduism because it fails to make a sharp distinction between life in materiality and the 
escape from it.  
New Age reincarnation clearly has an optimistic thrust to it, in keeping with the larger American ethos of 
progress. New Age’s “weak this-worldiness,” an orientation discussed in detail below, expresses ambiva-
lence about material (as opposed to spiritual) existence. Since the “reality for the New Age [is] a new ver-
sion of ‘progressivism’” (Campbell 2007, 326), reincarnation is partly valued as an opportunity to improve 
one’s life in the material world. In fact, Hanegraaff (1992, 262) contends that most New Agers (as true of 
Westerners in general) do not actually believe in reincarnation as such, but rather, “progressive spiritual 
development.” Campbell (2007, 326-331) argues historical narratives are not now credible, and that the 
history that fascinates the West— “their version of reincarnation”—is a mythical meaning system. This is a 
move “from materialistic dualism to metaphysical monism.”  
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The New Age’s version of reincarnation suggests a reduced willingness to recognize elements of the world 
(i.e., past events) as “other,” but real; yet connections to past and future are sought through alternate means. 
Reincarnation is an accessible form of “progressive spiritualism.” It provides a framework for an individual 
to construct a personal narrative and invest it with cosmic significance. Self-development over numerous 
existences is believed to contribute to the progress of all creation (Campbell 2007, 335-338). 
Scientism 
With discredited historical narratives, the “collapse of epistemological realism in science” follows, ac-
cording to Campbell (2007, 331). Along with the wider Western public, the New Age challenged the value 
of science. An outcome was first demonstrated within religious studies by Bellah et al’s (1985) interview 
subject “Shiela,” who famously attended to her “own small voice” when in doubt about the truth.  
In After Heaven (1998, 149), Robert Wuthnow reported the same of his spirituality-seeking subjects, Avery 
and Coleman. He explained these responses:  
For many people, the deeper spiritual context in which such exploration 
were being carried out consisted of a growing uneasiness about objective 
knowledge itself. When there is assurance that an objective reality exists, 
either in nature or in the supernatural realm, then attention can be devoted 
to understanding this external reality. But when doubt arises as to the 
objectivity of this reality, attention shifts inward toward the subjective 
realm of perceptions and experiences.  
Commonly, New Agers use the language of science without attending to its spirit. Although early as-
sessment (see L. Dawson 1998a) suggested that the NAS is open to science. However, commonly, scientific 
concepts are used figuratively to validate New Age metaphysical claims. These are interpretations of sci-
ence transposed to different, and arguably inappropriate domains of discourse, a practice Hammer 
(2004, 205–08) calls “scientism.” An iconic example of scientistic New Age literature is Fritjof Capra’s 
The Tao of Physics (1975). 
The processes of the mind, little understood or accessible, are commonly described by analogy to more 
understandable operations in the intelligible world. For example, Freud’s early theory of repression has 
been called a “hydraulic” model, after engineering principles well-understood in Freud’s time (Brennan, 
2000). The antecedent traditions to New Age spirituality––occultism, Mesmerism and New Thought––
commonly practiced scientism. Their spokespeople selected an emerging new science to explain their 
claims as to how the spirit operated. Famously, Anton Mesmer, founder of mesmerism, relied on the lan-
guage of 19
th
 century physics and its new discovery of electricity to explain how “animal magnetism” 
worked to eliminate the physical and emotional ailments of his clients (Jenkins 2000).  
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The New Age’s scientistic imagery has been updated from Mesmer’s time, consistent with its more recent 
founding. In 1895, physicist Max Planck built on James Clerk Maxwell’s 1870 hypothesis that light is an 
electromagnetic, vibratory phenomenon, which travels in waves (appearing variously, as either matter or 
energy). He confirmed Maxwell’s research: “Matter dissolved into energy and then reconfigured itself as 
matter, as later research with mass accelerators showed” (Albanese 1992, 71). Accordingly, referencing 
this element of quantum theory helps structure New Age theology. Additionally, the New Age worldview 
engages esoteric models of the world based on the holographic paradigm of David Bohm and Karl Pribram, 
the paradigm of self-organization associated with Ilya Prigogine, the theory of formative causation of 
Rupert Sheldrake, and the Gaia-hypothesis of James Lovelock (Hanegraaff 1996, 62-76 and 113-181). 
As they are interpreted by New Age practitioners, the scientific paradigms listed above are similar in their 
holism. For example, in a holographic image, each element contains and can reveal the whole image. 
Therefore, expanding this theory to a worldview suggests that each part of the universe not only connects 
to, but represents, the whole. Since, according to New Age theology, the whole universe is infused with 
spirit, it is therefore construed that every act and idea of a spiritual nature relates to the same divinity 
(Hanegraaff 1996).  
However, of the scientific paradigms listed above, Lovelock’s interest may have offered the most utility for 
satisfying collective needs, both imaginative and practical, at this time. Twentieth-century discoveries in 
organic chemistry and biological science have guided development of artificial intelligence, as shown by 
the discussion of scientist Jay Forrester’s work below. New understanding of brain processes served as 
models of network relations (as the network cosmology) as I will discuss in a later chapter. Additionally, 
the systemic processes identified in organic chemistry strongly influenced New Age thinking about the 
relationship of the individual to the whole, the collective, and even to the divine. Commonly, New Agers 
criticized what they saw as “traditional” science’s “reductionism,” its supposed tendency to conceptualize 
“living” wholes as constituted by parts whose independent actions make the whole func-
tion—mechanically, as it were (Hanegraaff 1996, 119). This has its obvious parallel to the assembly-line 
organization of work, which presented a dreadful prospect for those working, or about to work, in such a 
form of organization.  
New Agers also charged “science” with theoretically separating “the spirit” from the matter of the living 
and assuming the spirit to be an epiphenomenon of material processes (Hanegraaff 1996, 120). In common 
with many New Age practitioners, ecofeminist Carolyn Merchant (1972, 46) lamented that “during the 17
th
 
century, the organic framework, in which the Mother-Earth image was a moral restraint against the ex-
ploitation of nature, was replaced by a new experimental science and worldview that saw nature not as an 
46 
 
organism but as a machine—dead, inert, and insensitive to human action.” By contrast, “before the scien-
tific revolution, most ordinary people assumed that the earth was in the center of the cosmos, that the earth 
was a nurturing mother, and that the cosmos was alive, not dead” (Merchant 1972, 48). Merchant expresses 
New Age flight from the alienation of the industrial mindset, the norm of social roles and modern power 
relations. She hopes for a world where expression is “true” and personal. In the end, she wants it restored to 
its past form, when the “relationship between most peoples and the earth was an “I-thou” ethic of propiti-
ation to be made, before damning a brook, cutting a tree, or sinking a mine-shaft” (Merchant 1972, 41). As 
New Agers more commonly express, we should treat sentient beings not as means (towards our instru-
mental goals), but as ends in themselves. 
In contrast, political theorist Janet Biehl (1991) rejects the idea that science per se is dominating. With such 
an idea, she argues ecofeminists are practicing another form of scientism. Ecofeminists and New Agers 
should target a more particular reality than science to truly realize their aspirations. This is “the much more 
insidious process of the instrumentalization of society, and the social forces that have benefitted so greatly 
from their use of instrumental techniques” (Biehl 1991, 112).Vilifying (or romanticizing) a lived social 
process by applying an abstract label––“science” in this case––is Biehl’s definition of ‘scientism.’  
Later in this dissertation, in Chapter Seven, I recap Biehl’s argument and focus on the scientism––or more 
properly, the technologism––of posthierarchy, as an abstraction that obscures complex and fluid human 
dynamics. 
Personal Healing Ethos 
In the New Age view, the interchangeability of matter and energy suggests not only that material objects 
interrelate energetically, but that mind and body deeply interact, an interaction that allows and legitimizes 
healing by other methods than surgery and drugs. Moreover, the idea of simultaneous healing of both self 
and environment follows from the holism of the New Age. Mesmerism, and quantum and cybernetic the-
ories, have encouraged the belief that “the boundaries between matter and spirit [are] regularly transgressed 
and, moreover, conflated. Matter became spiritual; spirit, it was discovered, possessed a refined material 
form” (Albanese 1992, 69). Accordingly, a common term used now to describe New Age beliefs and 
practice is the mind/body/spirit movement. (See for example: http://www.mindbodyspirit.co.uk/.) 
As per the analysis of one of the first to identify the New Age as a movement, Marilyn Ferguson (1980, 56), 
holistic medicine “seeks to correct the underlying disharmony causing the problem[, by recognizing the 
body as a] field of energy within other fields[, by acknowledging the mind as] primary or [a] coequal factor 
in all illness.” Another “organic intellectual,” Shakti Gawain claims that “‘dis-ease’ in the body… is always 
a reflection of conflict, tension, anxiety or disharmony on other levels of being as well” (Lewis and Melton 
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1992, 81). Accordingly, the New Age has embraced such “healers” as the “theosophically-inclined physi-
cian, Richard Gerber (2001) [who] believes we are ‘beings of light.’ [Since] matter is composed of highly 
complex, infinitely orchestrated energy fields, an ‘Einsteinian’ paradigm of healing should replace a 
Newtonian one. [Enter, therefore,] ‘vibrational medicine,’ [which entails] the manipulation of energy 
fields, ‘instead of manipulating the cells and organs through drugs and surgery” (Albanese 1992, 75–76). 
Alternatively, American holistic physician and New Age celebrity Deepak Chopra believes it is not the 
harmonial, but “the shamanic law reigns supreme.” In his view, “healing means journeying into the realm 
of non-matter in which the subtle forces transmute into material substance” (Albanese 1992, 77). 
Depersonalization of the Divine 
As discussed above, within the range of New Age beliefs there is not always a divine figure maintaining the 
coherence of “the whole.” The “universal interrelatedness of all things [is] either or not based upon a 
common/creative source of Being.” Nevertheless, consistent with the emphasis on energy, if there is a 
“common source” of universal interrelatedness, this is an abstracted divine force. The New Age divine 
image is not one drawn from Christian theistic religiosity.” The most common image of God is the notion of 
cosmic energy as a life force in which all partake (Stone 1976, 102). “In summary, individuals have a 
healing life-force, continuous with an omnipresent, immanent life-force that is the dominant power in the 
universe, and which can heal, inform, inspire, create, and bring harmony” (Campbell 2007, 110). 
Engagement in Planetary Health 
Assimilating these two forms of identification we find in holism (of mind, body and spirit as well as of self 
and cosmos), New Agers believe that, in healing themselves, they can heal the planet. Indeed, Catherine 
Albanese asserts that “‘healing of self and planet’ is the main practice of the New Age” (Albanese 
1998, 348). Techniques for healing include “dietary regimes, detoxification, living on wholly pure and 
perfectly balanced diets, such as macrobiotics and the use of ‘natural’ products” (Campbell 1987, 85). 
Healing is, however, different from curing. Healing requires acknowledging one’s interconnection with, or 
accessing the energy of, the larger spirit or whole of which one is a part. Acknowledging/establishing 







 The way that Falun Gong functions for believers in China, according to Ming Xiao in The Cultural Economy of 
Falun Gong in China (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2011), is a sophisticated interpretation of 
this process. (The process she describes occurs in the context of a more coherent group––i.e., a “new religious 
movement”––than in the New Age milieu and under different social conditions than in North America, which is the 
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Albanese (1992, 77-78) suggests there is an “ambiguity of the healing that New Agers desire. It is surely 
personal and deeply intimate… but it is also a plea for the healing of the planet and a charter to work in 
ways that are seen to help the process.”
22
 Scholars relate this identity of self and planet to the emergence of 
global communications structures, economy and governance (Robertson and Garret 1991; Hanegraaff 
2001). Both the shamanic and harmonial visions express the imagined interconnection of personal and 
planetary healing. 
Albanese observes that when the scientistic orientation is combined with the holistic vision, as in the New 
Age worldview, description is commonly collapsed into prescription. Really, this logic reflects a confusion 
of is and ought. Attributing a collective character to the world as a scientific fact (such as when the organic 
or holographic processes are identified with the entire human-natural cosmos) implies that one could not 
escape interconnection if one tried. Nevertheless, despite the logic that the supposedly “true” form of the 
universe (i.e., as an integral whole) demands rather than invites cooperation, one’s willingness to cooperate 
is deemed a virtue. This is a morality by fiat. The fact of the claimed connection somewhat oddly ignites the 
exhortation to New Age believers to strengthen it. This seems to be parallel to the contradiction with regard 
 
 
prime setting for the contents of this dissertation. The differences cannot be incidental, since the existence of the 
collective is key. However, Xiao’s explanation seems to apply.) Xiao sees the rhetorical reappropriation of the 
Chinese cultural heritage by Falun Gong’s leader, Li, as recasting the privatized suffering of many Chinese citizens 
(currently sustaining the shocks of radical social transformation) as common suffering, shared with other members of 
the cult community. As is well-known, China’s embrace of global capitalism over only a few decades has destroyed 
stable and familiar forms of sustenance, such as entire home-towns through expropriation and family supports via 
social and employment mobility. This dislocation has been somatised, creating illness without biological cause. Li’s 
rhetoric and the Falun Gong community help transform the illness into wellness. Xiao claims that healing occurs when 
members begin to trust and gain emotional support from each other (Xiao 2011, 53-61). 
Xiao’s position that the trauma of radical social change is the main reason for Falun Gong participation hints at why 
this ‘healing’ is needed in other places, such as in North America, undergoing less radical but significant 
transformations too. Scholar of New Age religions in Brazil, Andrew Dawson, also holds that much New Age activity 
in Brazil emerges from the dislocation of the ‘middle class’ since Brazil became democratic and neoliberal. (As we 
will discuss further, the term ‘middle class’ in this context refers to a more insecure state than the term historically 
would suggest.)  
22
 This association of personal healing with that of “the planet” suggests the realization that environmental effects and 
personal illness are related. Epidemiologists know that a more stable social environment (i.e., of ‘the whole’) reduces 
the severity and incidence of somatic illness. However, the New Age view seems to confuse the direction of influence, 
thinking that individuals are making the planet sick, and not vice versa. Of course, they also overestimate the possible 
impact of high levels of personal “empowerment,” believing that self-healing will heal the planet. Such mistakes of 
analysis, and the level of grandiosity required to make them, need not be pursued further here, except to make several 
points. One is that the sense that one can and must individually try to change the world would seem to invite a cauldron 
of feelings of guilt and inadequacy for its ills, at the same time as it shields people from grasping systemic causes of 




to workplaces alluded to above and to be discussed further in the next chapter as the formulation of cor-
porate psytopiae: if the corporation is indeed the embodiment of the (divine?) whole, actions to strengthen 
this status (through workers fealty to the corporation) would seem unnecessary and redundant. Neverthe-
less, in workplaces as in general for the New Age, the existence of the micro/macro connection demands a 
personal active engagement in the hoped-for planetary health. Despite the great power of the cosmos (or 
earthly plane) to stabilize itself—its vaunted homeostasis—human beings are nevertheless obliged to pro-
vide further stabilization.  
Although reinforcing a supposed fact is a questionable idea, so is the virtue of trying to do so. However, as 
Albanese explains, New Agers rarely question whether their self-healing, assumed to radiate out to the 
world in its entirety, will have positive consequences for planetary health. They do not debate whether their 
capacity to change the planet automatically implies their right to try. Their scientistic mindset (i.e., fol-
lowing the model), morally justifies attempting mental control of the environment. Albanese shrewdly 
judges that, with another of the sciences the New Age embraces, quantum theory (derived from Plank’s, 
Maxwell’s, and Einstein’s work): 
[T]he stage was set for a latter-day synthesis, [wherein] the blurring of 
matter and energy at the subatomic level would be linked in principle to 
the occult romanticism of the mesmeric-Swedenborgian habit of mind. 
The manipulative potential of minds that could control self and others 
would be joined to a matter that followed laws of harmony. Thus, acts of 
harmony would become, simultaneously, acts of power and control. And 
the world in which these things would happen by the late twentieth century 
would belong to the New Age [my italics] (Albanese 1992, 73).  
Re-enchanted World 
According to Hanegraaff New Age holism is tempered by this-worldliness, particularly of the weak variety. 
He contrasts this with a holism of a transcendent absolute variety, which he defines as strong 
this-worldliness. Echoing the earlier discussion of reincarnation, holism and scientism, he notes that weak 
this-worldliness is not so much “a focus on the world of experience as such [but on] on a better ‘this-world’ 
to come which is modeled on the present world, but better…. [T]he better ‘this-world’ may be envisaged 
either as located on this earth (which amounts to some form of millenarianism) or in another reality beyond 
death” (Hanegraaff 1996, 114).  
Hanegraaff attributes strong this-worldliness to Neo-pagans, whereas other-worldliness is rarely seen in the 
New Age (he makes an exception in the tradition that follows A Course in Miracles). Thus, when New 
Agers borrow from Hinduism, and refer to the maya of existence, they do not mean that the material world 
is an illusion, faith in the reality of which offers the believer nothing but violence, sorrow and pain—as the 
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Sanskrit term is meant to convey. On the contrary, if one is not cut off from the sources of revivifying 
energy, life is imagined to be intrinsically exciting (Hanegraaff 1996, 115). New Agers want to bring the 
divine energy into the world, not to escape from materiality. As the discussion of post-millenarianism im-
plies, and as alluded to in Chapter One, New Agers (like Pentecostals and Charismatic Catholics
23
) “believe 
in the reality of a spiritual realm that is distinct yet parallel to the physical world of our senses, one that is 
capable of breaking through into the latter” (Campbell 2007, 345). 
A this-worldly attitude often finds expressions in ecological terms—and the promotion of “the 
re-enchantment of the world.” Lovelock’s vision of the earth as Gaia represents the planet as alive; “ho-
meostasis is maintained by active feedback processes operated automatically and unconsciously by the 
biota” (Lovelock 1988, 19). However, Earth’s “energy” (or perhaps its balance) is recognized as having 
been damped, and New Agers are, as noted, obliged to help restore it. Harsh industrial processes (with 
Fordist assembly-lines in mind) are seen as a source of energetic degradation, as is environmental pollution. 
However, the energy of strife––quintessentially, violence and war––also degrades or masks the earth’s 
revivifying energy. To reduce violence on a personal level is presumably one of the means by which per-
sonal healing impacts the planet positively. 
Analytical thought also masks the earth’s energy. Analysis is supposedly the thought process only of 
Newtonian scientists, who study a particular sphere of the earth’s operation that works primarily mechan-
ically, necessitating certain kinds of study methods. I believe they stand in for the “traditional scientists” 
who are considered deficient in the New Age culture. By contrast, the sciences that New Agers cele-
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23 Many scholars have noted a similarity between the New Age ethos and what is pursued in the neo-Pentecostal and 
charismatic renewal movements. Campbell (1987, 345) summarizes these positions: “Pentecostalism stresses the 
disciples’ experience of being ‘filled with the Holy Spirit’ on the day of Pentecost. The charismatics and Pentecostals 
believe they have similar experiences. They believe they interact with God on a daily basis. Primarily, this belief that 
they have received “the charismatic ‘gifts’ that were granted to the disciples on the day of Pentecost, traditionally 
identified as the powers of prophecy, tongues, healing, miracles, wisdom, [etc., suggests of] this form of 
Christianity… that it bears a considerable resemblance to the New Age movement. Several commentators have 
remarked on this similarity, listing the many parallels (Neitz 1987; Lucas 1992; L. Dawson 1998). 
“[Additionally,] just like New Agers, Pentecostals see personal renewal as the answer to social problems, [where that] 
growth is also seen as essentially spiritual in nature. What is more, this is to be achieved by precisely the same means 
in both cases, which is by getting in touch with God or a higher consciousness or a different reality, a process that is 
identified with accepting oneself, being oneself, or being fully alive. As Lorne Dawson (1998, 146) observes, ‘both 
stress a discovery of the experience of sacred power in the daily lives of ordinary people…. Both movements associate 
these experiences with the continuous presence of spiritual energy, whether prana, mana, orgone energy, or the Holy 
Spirit in human affairs.’”  
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brate—which study quantum dynamics, holography, complexity and cybernetic systems, for some exam-
ples—presumably do not demand analysis as part of their processes (Hanegraaff 1996).  
The moral and legal status of animals has emerged as a concern as a part of this outlook. Animals’ repre-
sentation as mere chattel is opposed. Awareness of the intelligence and sensibilities of many animals, from 
pets to whales, has led to campaigns not only for good care, but for a level of right to live according to their 
own “species-being” (Clarke 2004). Ethical vegetarianism is another manifestation of concern for animals’ 
welfare.  
Eco-feminism and the sacred ecology movement also express these beliefs, but these movements generally 
repudiate a New Age affiliation. Nevertheless, they all have in common what they reject. This includes the 
many dualisms that L. Dawson (2005) listed. In the words of movement ecologist Lynn White, these 
movements, including also Neo-pagans, express their ‘this-worldliness’—weak or strong—by rejecting the 
supposed Christian practice of “taking the divine out of all that is earthly and lodging it in some distant and 
comprehensively male Godhead” (cited in Campbell 1987, 86). The inability to “sense” the intelligence, not 
only of other human beings, but also all other earthly beings, is claimed to be the outcome of Christianity’s 
transcendentalism. Based on the above concerns, Campbell (1987, 88) feels the New Age and these other 
movements add a “vague, mostly depoliticized, spiritual dimension to the environmental movement.”  
Prosperity Consciousness 
The intermingling of the spiritual and material realms is also responsible for the ease with which New Age 
teachings have been translated into programs for self-advancement in a material sense. For those with 
prosperity consciousness, there is no limit to what “right mind” can accomplish in the material world. 
Covering the gamut, Michael York (2010, 59) notes that “psychic powers become helpful tools for military 
efficiency, business acumen, and political and economic management.” This human potential orientation of 
the New Age belief structure stems from its New Thought antecedents. Perhaps inspired by growing 
awareness of the capacity of the human mind, New Thought emerged with a number of other American 
religious movements from the 1870s onward which, in common, attributed potentially-divine powers to 
human beings. New Thought itself became a specific designation in the 1890s, whereas derivations from it, 
such as Christian Science, also marked out a particular manifestation of this conviction (Melton 1992, 23–
26). Many Christian authorities declaimed these movements as heretical, since they attributed to human 
beings the powers that only God could have. Worst was the denial of the reality of original sin, which made 
Jesus’s sacrifice unnecessary (Jenkins 2000).  
However, rather than usurping God’s dominion, this movement posits an alliance. In Christian Science, for 
example, filling one’s mind with thoughts of God leaves no room for illness, or evil, in one’s body. 
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However, in some versions of this belief, the application of divine power through the human vehicle ranges 
beyond the confines of the body, to influence the environment. In these visions, not only one’s physical, but 
also one’s material, health could improve. Gordon Melton (1992, 26) connects these for us: “From the 
beginning within New Thought, the idea that God is the source of all good led to the understanding that if 
just attunement with God could overcome disease it could in like measure overcome poverty.”  
Matter and energy intertwine for the New Age. The world can manifest the mind’s contents because both 
are of the same “stuff.” This instrumental aspect of mental power is one reason why Mary Baker Eddy 
coined the name Christian Science for her movement; students of New Thought are scientists, studying and 
harnessing the power of God. That desire, or will (from whatever source), can dictate “natural” processes is 
another illustration of the teleology of the New Age worldview. The universe is propelled on a trajectory. 




More recent formulations of this principle spread widely in American popular culture. The publication in 
1952, of The Power of Positive Thinking, by Methodist minister, Norman Vincent Peale (1963), supported 
by a half-century of lecturing, radio and television programming, was hugely influential. The attitude he 
encouraged, along with others such as Robert Schuller (1967), came to be called ‘prosperity consciousness’ 
(popularly, “the power of mind over matter”). Concurrently, humanistic psychologists, particularly Abra-
ham Maslow, (whose contribution we consider in a following chapter) founded and developed the human 
potential movement (which branched into transpersonal psychology). 
Eva Illouz (2008) shows how, from the late 20
th
 century onwards, prosperity consciousness evolved into a 
therapeutic attitude to life’s challenges.
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The evolutionism of the New Age does not restrict progress to biological entities. What evolves is beyond or in 
addition to bodies and their functionality and greater capacities of brains, if the thinking of Catholic theologian and 
mystic, Teilard de Chardin, (Let me Explain. New York: Harper and Row, 1970) is considered. Apparently influenced 
by the impending information age, de Chardin saw the bank of knowledge to which humanity has access —which he 
called the noosphere—growing enormously, and becoming universally accessible through some kind of advanced 
human apprehensive or mystical capability. Again, however, he used the biological (i.e., holistic) metaphor of “a 
difference that makes a difference,” (the expression of communications theorist, Gregory Bateson), to represent his 
idea that beyond a certain volume of such knowledge, a threshold is reached at which the nature of being human 
changes.  
25
 This theme has been well-explored by scholars of religion, particularly as an offshoot of the “commodification of 
religion” critique. Chandler (2010, 111-2) highlights important themes: “In the memorable phrase of Christopher 
Lasch, a ‘culture of narcissism’ [underwrites] the consumptive ethic of late capitalism[. This] substitutes attachments 
to commodities for attachment to real people, thereby disrupting the development of a coherent identity and the ability 
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involving self-revelation, a process in which many have sought and received education during the 
post-Fordist era. Illouz shows us that the route to one’s better and more successful self always involves 
learning an “articulation regime,” carried out orally or in writing, of one’s personally-cherished or resisted 
qualities. Besides the group, counsellor or therapist, the presumed audience for this new form of 
soul-searching is not God, angels, or “ascended masters,” but oneself.  
Illouz presents the therapeutic identity as a learned behaviour that mediates between a Fordist-type ac-
ceptance of one’s life-circumstances and the new world of the commodified self. Superficially following 
the psychoanalytic model established (for elites) by Freud and his followers, these therapeutic practices 
expanded and diversified in the late twentieth-century, under the direct or indirect supervision of psycho-
logical coaches (the latter, through “self-help” vehicles). As it became general, skill with self-talk gained 
value. Daniel Goleman (1995) successfully defined this as emotional intelligence (EI).  
The pursuit of EI may have become widespread in response to people trying to save family and social 
relationships as their stable forms degraded since the 1970s. This was a result of many factors, including 
lowered standards of living for North American middle classes. As the pursuit of restored “intimacy” with 
others, a vaunted outcome of the therapeutic process, became normalized, psychologists and counsellors of 
all descriptions set themselves up to facilitate this for clients. It is perhaps because of the widespread pro-
fessional promotion of self-revelation that, as Illouz notes, very few commentators have classified this 
behavior as making a fetish of communications. She suspects, however, that it does.  
The ideal… of communication[, which] has never been questioned by 
sociologists, may well be… ‘a language ideology,’ [which] resides in a 
number of beliefs: That self-knowledge is gained by introspection; that 
introspection can in turn help us understand, control, and come to terms 
with our social and emotional environment; and that verbal disclosure is a 
key to social relations (Illouz 2008, 244).  
 
 
to relate to others in a genuine way outside the nexus of the family…. Given these challenges, individuals (mostly the 
affluent) have gravitated towards therapy, and this ‘therapeutic ethic’ has replaced religion as the new ideology of 
American culture.” Chandler (2010, 187) further explains that the therapeutic ethic “links the social-psychological 
narcissism in American culture more generally to the specific activities of what [Lasch] describes as the ‘new 
consciousness movement.’ [In] Habits of the Heart (1985)[,] Bellah et al argue that the therapeutic discourse that has 
arisen since the sixties is socially untenable because it frames moral concerns as a matter of personal preference, and 
is, therefore, not able to give any substantive definition to the public good” However, clarifies Chandler (2010, 




This assumption of the intrinsic value of self-revelatory activity is an element of the fixing of the self that 
we consider later—a complement to post-Fordism’s transformation of the self into a commodity and a 
“spiritual worker.” 
Transformations, Large and Small 
The evolutionary idea is an ingredient of New Age millenarianism, which itself is of a particular 
type—post-millenarianism. Post-millenarianists believe that the world must be prepared (improved) before 
the final divine initiative of world-transformation can occur. This contrasts with pre-millenarianism, which 
has believers wait for the arrival of the avatar, or divine entity, who initiates or autonomously brings about 
world transformation (Clarke 2006, 365). The post-millenarianism of the New Age requires its believers to 
participate in the coming of the New Age, as partners of the divine principle, before the avatar arrives or the 
divine principle appears. This partnership is only possible because of the permeability of the boundaries 
between material and spiritual worlds, in which New Agers also believe.  
As suggested above, the “expectations of a coming New Age,” which Hanegraaff’s considered a key New 
Age belief, has come to be nuanced by scholars of religion (Melton 1992). As New Age spirituality became 
“neospirituality,” the expectations and even hopes for a collective global transformation have, these 
scholars argue, fallen away from this worldview. 
For example, Michael York’s assessment of the New Age in the 1990s (1995, 49) emphasized millenarian 
hopes. Then, he claimed that “amidst mutually contradictory opinions and beliefs[…,] what unites all New 
Agers, however, is a vision of radical mystical transformation on both the personal and collective levels…; 
the awakening… is the New Age springboard for a quantum leap of collective consciousness which is to 
bring about and constitute the New Age itself.” However, later (York 2003) he restricted this transfor-
mation to what occurs to individuals. As the postmillenarian ideal was dropped, what was core became 
converted to a smaller kind of transformation–– that of the individual. Heelas also makes this distinction.
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At the same time, the oppositional tone of the New Age was muted. 
The broader diffusion changed the New Age vision. Indeed, from its predecessors, through the stricto, to 
the lato versions, the agents religiously appealed to to facilitate change become more mundane (i.e., the 
godhead is progressively downgraded). To illustrate, New Age stricto founder, Alice Bailey (whose vision 




 See Hanegraaff 1996, 115-116. 
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earthly affairs, for a global transformation. Over time, “angels” (with or without pedigree) and esoteric 
channels were more commonly appealed to.
 27
 Eventually the intervenor becomes “energy” per se, and the 
only point of intervention, the individual (Campbell 2007, 346–47). At the extreme, as noted by Campbell 
(below), even ritualistic practices whose original role is to call the deities, become the putative sources of 
transformative power. 
As these sources become more mundane and impersonal, so are the anticipated impacts reduced in scope 
(Sutcliffe and Gilhus 2013, 4). This is clarified by Campbell (2007, 120). 
[T]he new age sensu lato signifies a more this-worldly cluster of beliefs 
and practices with the ‘spiritual growth’ of human beings at its centre––
closely related to cultural consumption after the 1960s––New Age sensu 
lato is strongly immanentistic and focused on life in the ‘here and now,’ 
and retains only weak traces of the original millenialistic goal, in the form 
of transformative expectation attached by users to the many available be-
liefs and practices. (My italics.) 
Given this diminution in power of the intervenor and scope of the intervention, will not the referent to 
which holism refers—i.e., the whole that is to be impacted by personal transformation—be also reduced? If 
we refer above to the idea of an enchanted world as a New Age belief, yet consider it against this diminution 
of the agents and sites of action, it is not reasonable to wonder whether “the earth” is now (or will become 
soon) too large a unit for the imagination to reach towards? In fact, in the next chapter, I explore the claim 
that “the whole” has now been reduced––at least for workplace practitioners of neospirituality––to the 
corporation.  
There are exceptions to these trends. Catherine Albanese believes that millenarianism has always been 
weaker in the North American, as opposed to the European New Age, due to the former’s gestation within 
the Californian counterculture and its domination by the metaphysical and New Thought traditions (Al-
banese 1992, 97). Andrew Dawson (2007) found that millenarianism had not diminished in the Brazilian 




 These last few points indicate that the millenari-




 Stricto refers to a period when the term had “a fairly restricted and unambiguous meaning relating, as the term 
would suggest, to an apocalyptic or millenarian tendency, that is, an expectation that a ‘new,’ that is to say more 
spiritual, age was imminent” (Campbell 2007, 120). 
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 Its continued existence presented him with a major conundrum, because, as he noted, millenarianism (especially as 
‘pre-millenarianism’), has always been associated with an underclass whereas in Brazil it is found in new era 
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Sacralization of the Self 
Another of its core features, the sacralization of the self, is an outcome of the perceived permeability of the 
boundaries of the material and spiritual worlds, the holistic vision, the way of seeing the self as perfectible 
(which undergirds the therapeutic mentality), and the understanding that individuals have a role to play in 
ushering in the new millennium. If trying to create a divine world depends partly on perfecting oneself, then 
the divine must reside in the self. York (2001, 364) explains that “what is now essential to the New Age [is 
the belief] that human beings are essentially gods in themselves; [they] contain a ‘God-spark,’ a central 
infusion of divinity[––] that human beings undergo successive reincarnations as part of an evolutionary 
process which returns them to full God-realization.” 
In a holistic model, when the transformation expected is grand, human beings can have a very powerful role 
to play in world events. However, the belief in one’s capacity to overcome (one’s own) poverty and other 
material restrictions, as per prosperity consciousness, is yet again a diminution of the power and scale of 
New Age aspiration. In referring to the New Age in Brazil, where millenarianism has persisted, sacralisa-
tion of the self means “the ennoblement of the individual.” A. Dawson (2007, 162) calls this 
… the raison d’etre of the new era repertoires. [Within them, the indi-
vidual] is endowed with a significance and operational reach of truly 
universal proportions…. [N]ew era millenarianism valorizes the individ-
ual and his new era worldview by asserting both that the practical 
knowledge you live by is the very same practical knowledge by which the 
world will be transformed and upon which a new civilization will be 
founded and the fact that you live by this practical knowledge places you 
among the vanguard of this renewed and enlightened civilization. (Italics 
in original.) 
In other words, just by living (thoughtfully, mindfully, consciously) in the world, you can have a major 
impact on it at a deep level. However, this view of agency works both ways. In this worldview, there must 
be a whole that can powerfully register one’s actions, thus amplifying them. Identifying the larger whole is 
essential to perceiving personal power. Hence, this whole must be available to the creative imagination, and 
Brazilians seem to have (maintained) such access. But a loss of the ability to imagine such an agent entails 
a corresponding deflation of one’s own mystical power. If we credit Hanegraaph’s claim that New Age 
beliefs diminish imagination, we can expect a spiralling down towards increasing more restricted terms 
 
 
followers who are solidly middle and even professional class, according to his analysis. He sought a number of 
explanations for this situation. (A Dawson 2007, 159-162)  
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within the belief structure, which is what has been documented, as per the discussion in the preceding 
section. 
Psychologization  
Hanegraaff declared the psychologization of religion as a basic feature of New Age belief. Psychologiza-
tion is a feature of privatized religion. It has had a long history, as religions losing social importance and 
saliency as a result of secularization (Casanova 1994) opt to stress the advantages individuals can gain from 
a religious attitude and experience rather than their obligations and personal transcendence based on 
membership. Religious participation becomes defined as a personal religious attitude, one’s “spirituality.” 
In The Invisible Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society (1967), Thomas Luckmann radi-
calized the thesis of secularization, by taking the process of privatization into consideration (Casanova 
1994, 19). He showed, claims José Casanova (1994, 36) that 
… modern differentiation leads to a sharp segmentation of the various 
institutional domains whereby each domain becomes an autonomous 
sphere governed by its own ‘functionally rational’ internal norms…. Since 
the individual’s social existence becomes a series of unrelated perfor-
mances of anonymous specialized social roles, institutional segmentation 
reproduces itself as segmentation within the individual’s consciousness. 
Rather than a religious commitment colouring all aspects of life, religion in the modern world is kept in its 
own domain, as a part of an individual’s consciousness, with selected spiritual behaviours performed only 
with others of similar conviction, and as an element, but not the entirety, of life. Thus, religious privatiza-
tion requires its psychologization.  
As I explained in Chapter One, contemporary liberal congregations of all stripes accommodate neospiritual 
beliefs. They also respond to privatization and psychologization. Through hiring practices, for example, 
they subject their choices of religious leaders to standards of effectiveness, that is, ability to appeal to in-
dividuals (Bramadat and Seljak 2009). This relegation to the private domain of life also forces contempo-
rary religions to self-present to both their committed and prospective adherents as providers of “well-being 
commodities.” They appeal to people ensconced in a consumerist world as purveyors of personal “goods” 
(Miller 2005). 
New Agers followed these tendencies to the point of rejecting the idea of religious authority altogether. 
These practitioners argue that if spirituality is personal, there is no logic to maintaining even qualified 
loyalty to a church that may promote a theology that conflicts at least partly with one’s personal beliefs, and 
whose attempts to orchestrate the conditions and qualities of personal religious experiences may well be 
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misguided. As in the consumerist model, any potential guru or guide is sized up and subjected to the prac-
titioner’s choice based on an individual’s judgement of their personal value to him or her.  
This is arguably a necessary response to the breakup of the one meaning system of traditional cultures into 
the many that pertain to the functional subsystems of modern technocratic existence. As religious authori-
ties could not dictate overall social direction or meaning, the myth-making and social-organization func-
tions of religions had to be dropped: “The more the performance of nonreligious roles becomes determined 
by autonomous ‘secular’ norms, the less plausible become the traditional global claims of religious norms” 
(Casanova 1994, 36).  
Psychological language is a substitute for the mythologizing capacity that is the traditional mode of reli-
gious language. “The changing climate of modern capitalist societies has led many traditions, including 
modern Western ones such as Christianity, to de-mythologize, by moving away from the older cosmolog-
ical and disciplinary language of the past and replacing this with the interiorized and psychological-
ly-inflected language of spirituality” (Carette and King 2005, 170). Thus, the cognitive function that reli-
gion had offered is replaced by the subjective meaning the individual creates for herself. Religion becomes 
relegated to the private sphere–– in other words, it is a personal experience. 
As discussed, some Christian communities, such as the Pentecostals and Charismatic Catholics (Neitz 
1987), exhibit high levels of psychologization––to a degree that rivals New Age spirituality. They have in 
common their tendency to present God’s presence as energy, which one can feel tangibly. These traditions 
are a new version of the English Pietist tradition, as well as of a litany of American and Canadian traditions 
over the shared continent’s history (Albanese 2000, L. Dawson 2006, Jenkins 2007). Hence, although it is 
most evident in New Age practices, psychologization is a feature of modern religion in the West in general.  
Contrary to the popular ethos that neospirituals, too, have absorbed, religions other than Christianity in the 
West have also psychologized. Most importantly in this context, this includes the Asian religions that 
contribute significantly to the New Age ethos, under the understanding that they reject dualism and societal 
obligations. For example, the Indian sage, Vivekananda’s representation of Hinduism (which was mod-
ernizing in his homeland) at the World Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893, the first major intro-
duction of Eastern religion to Westerners, illustrates the psychologization process well.  
Carrette and King (119-120) provide this account. As is well-known, Vivekananda had a particular strategy 
in trying to gain Western acceptance for Eastern values. His major argument was that Westerners under-
stand the material aspects of life, but Easterners, the spiritual. There was more craft than this, though, to his 
presentation. Vivekananda downplayed the institutional aspects of Hinduism by ignoring Raja Yoga, which 
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emphasizes highly-structured social behaviour and virtues, while emphasizing Jnana Yoga—the way to 
enlightenment through knowledge. From the beginning Vivekananda sought to “mentalize” Eastern reli-
gions. He also presented them as immanent or esoteric, rather than transcendental. Ironically, this seems to 
have created a dualism between the mind and the body. Noting the fact that Hatha (exercise) yoga is never 
practiced with meditation, Carrette and King (2005, 118) assert that “Yoga in the West emphasizes either 
the mind or the body,” but never both. This reveals, in their view, a “Cartesian trap” in New Age thinking.  
After the decades of similar presentations to Western audiences that followed Vivekananda’s appearance at 
the Parliament, the form of Hinduism and Buddhism that Western counterculturalists and New Agers 
adopted was the “mystical, experiential, and individual” version. “The early psychologization of yoga in the 
West remains a key approach among the bourgeois world of alternate spirituality that first emerged among 
the educated middle classes in the late 1960s.” Now, the countercultural cachet of yoga is one of its key 
selling points, except that the “metaphysical, institutional and societal dimension has been lost” (Carrette 
and King 2005, 118) 
This is the same method, now, for creating a “spiritual” product. The practice is a formula for corporations 
wishing to create a business ideology: “Take an ancient religious idea and mythologize it!” (Carrette and 
King 2005, 140-141). However, there is another important stage in the process of psychologization—which 
I discuss in the next chapter––that fully brings spirituality into the period studied in this dissertation, the 
transition from Fordism to post-Fordism. This is the redefinition of religious experience as secular, pio-
neered by humanist psychologist Abraham Maslow. With this process, as Carrette and King argue, psy-
chologized religion could be directly harnessed to the therapeutic discourse which, they insist, finalized its 
status as a commodity.   
New Age Practices: A Networking Religion  
As New Agers have always opposed the “hierarchical” social structures, they explored emerging net-
working patterns. Although its network structure has long been recognized by scholars, they began to look 
at New Age as a networked religion in a more concentrated way only recently. Decades ago, spokespeople 
for the early New Age spirituality described organizational structures using a sociological concept growing 
in importance at the time, that of the SPIN (“Segmented Polycentric Integrated Networks”). Sociologist 
Luther L. Gerlach (1999, 289-290) explains the acronym that he and his colleague Virginia H. Hine (Ger-
lach and Hine 1970) had developed:  
Segmentary: composed of many diverse groups, which grow and die, di-
vide and fuse, proliferate and contract; Polycentric: having multiple, often 
temporary, and sometimes competing leaders or centers of influence; 
Networked: forming a loose, reticulate, integrated network with multiple 
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linkages through travelers, overlapping membership, joint activities, 
common reading material and shared ideals and opponents. 
Marilyn Ferguson (1980) most notably used this term while proposing that New Agers interacted through 
networks, as she analyzed the “universal connectedness” being established by the “Aquarian Conspiracy” 
at the time. Her usage of term powerfully identified the networking activities of activists for change ob-
served during the intermediate period between the countercultural engagement of the 1960s/early 1970s 
and the New Age Movement as it took shape in the 1980s. Hanegraaff (1996, 356-357) tells us that “Fer-
guson described the emerging new movement in terms of … SPINs. Her description of a SPIN shows the 
concern… for a non-hierarchical holistic structure which does not threaten individual freedom.”  
Ferguson (1980, 236) contended that seeing the community as one such net did not describe the situation 
fully; rather, she saw a “SPIN of SPINs.” She assessed that “the Aquarian Conspiracy is indeed loose, 
segmented, evolutionary, redundant. Its centre is everywhere.” Starhawk (1988, 132) also reiterated the 
idea of religious seekers following a network model. She described “circular structures of immanence,” 
organized by many and varied clusterings of actors. “In the social and personal change associations de-
scribed by Starhawk, affinity groups form clusters—sending ‘spokes’ to cluster meetings. [These could be 
called the] networks of circles… acephalous…, [although] ‘centers’ serve as points for the collection and 
distribution of information to all circles or members of a group.”  
Consistent with the perennial interpretation of network dynamics, when early New Agers adopted network 
organizational patterns, along with their countercultural and politically-activist comrades, they imagined 
that this structure drew out the true convictions of everyday participants. American Actress Shirley 
MacLaine, another spokeperson for the New Age, commented on the emergent, or “grass-roots” nature of 
New Age interest. In Out on a Limb, (1987, 7) she wrote: “…everywhere I went, I continually encountered 
a deep need for spirituality and expanded consciousness, a need for people to come together to share their 
energies in something that worked.” 
Hanegraaff (1996, 357) refined an elemental (but contestable) theme of the New Age community when he 
contrasted SPINs and networks, and bureaucracies, in order to claim that networks circumvent structures of 
power, and so are intrinsically democratic. He explained (1996, 351) that “whereas the conventional or-
ganizational chart would show neatly linked boxes, the organization chart of a SPIN would look like a 
‘badly-knotted fishnet with a multitude of nodes of varying sizes, each linked to all the others, directly or 
indirectly.’” Along this line, anticipating Taves and Kinsella (2013), York (1995, 324) asserted that New 
Age activity did not lack organization, but had “a different kind of organization than that known through the 
bureaucratic and hierarchical structures of the traditional establishment.” Furthermore, the SPIN concept 
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described the contemporary horizontal growth of NRMs more accurately than a typology (such as of 
churches and sects) that implies the “traditional hierarchical development of religious organizations” (1995, 
329). Starhawk (1988, 132) defended networking in efficiency terms, against bureaucratic structures, by 
claiming that such organizational practices have no more “‘wastage, theft and minor sabotage’ [than] oc-
curs daily in the lower levels of hierarchy.” Networking practices continue to be valued by neospirituals 
based on similar beliefs. Taves and Kinsella (2013, 84-85) assert that these practitioners have a basic, 
“in-built resistance to organization.” This resistance is “at least to vertical [hierarchical] organization, as 
opposed to lateral, networked organization” (Sutcliffe 2003, 224-25).  
These commentaries show that rejection of “hierarchy” is intrinsic to the New Age identity. For Paul 
Heelas, the decreasing acceptance of authorities is an aspect of the New Age’s moral individualism. He 
associates both with a profound yearning for freedom: “The rejection… of external voices of authority, 
together with the importance attached to Self-responsibility, expressivity and above all, authority, goes 
together with fact that one of the absolutely cardinal New Age values is freedom. [The goals are l]iberation 
from the past, the traditional, and those internalized traditions, the egos; and to live a life expressing all that 
is to be truly human” (Heelas 1996, 26). 
The hostility towards authority structures also emerges from the conviction that one’s essential inner nature 
is inevitably suppressed by society, which leads to sickness. Aversion to the social also implies the ne-
ospiritual conviction that the real self—the spirit––lurks beneath the social self and must be uncovered. 
Maslow's (1976) work reinforced this vision. The self-actualization he fostered was felt to be able to free 
this “delicate and subtle” inner nature that could be “overcome by habit, cultural pressure, and wrong at-
titudes,” it was also possible to “reveal,” “foster,” and “fulfill” its actualization through “peak” experiences 
(Maslow 1976, 7). The view is that “we malfunction because we have been indoctrinated… by mainstream 
society and culture” (Heelas 1996, 18). Individualism manifests as a political agenda of realizing a 
“posthierarchical” world.  
Recently, Gerlach (1999, 289) reviewed the work that he and Hine had done in the late 1960s, analyzing 
SPINs in social movements. They had that “found that the most common type of organization was neither 
centralized and bureaucratic nor amorphous, but one that was a segmentary, polycentric, and integrated 
network (acronym SPIN).” Looking back, Berlach (1999, 290) argues that this organizational form was 
“more adapted to the task of challenging and changing society and culture than was centralized organiza-
tion… Since then a consensus has emerged that SPINs have many benefits, and not just for social move-
ments.” For one reason, “competing leadership” often strengthened these movements, by introducing re-
dundancy (York 1995, 325). Manuel Castells (1997), an expert on network organization, adds that this form 
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enhances the strength of the diffuse movement through greater innovation and adaptability. Equally im-
portant, such a group organization is appropriate for people seeking to transgress the rules of an established 
order. Castells (2004, 6) add that a network is “flexible [and] able to reconfigure itself according to 
changing environments while keeping its goals intact. Although individual nodes may blink in or out of 
existence, values and/or aims are dispersed through multiple nodes any of which can reproduce its mes-
sages. The inclusion or exclusion of a particular node does not disrupt the overall orientation of the entire 
network, giving it stability and durability.” 
It follows that overcoming the disciplines and power of traditional authorities is a reason for organizing in 
networks. York (1995, 330) notes that Gerlach and Hine “developed their concept of the SPIN through 
investigations of ‘change-oriented movements’ in general—including communism, Mau Mau, Black 
power, the new left, women’s liberation, the counterculture, the Vietcong, Palestinian liberation move-
ments, and the ‘participatory ecology movement’ as well as both early Islam and the Pentecostal move-
ment.”  
Despite the secular and politically-activist orientation of many SPIN participants, York (1995, 325-6) 
considers the SPIN to be “perhaps the most accurate sociological construct applicable to the New Age, 
Neo-pagan and similar non-institutional, boundary-determinate movements.” After reviewing the long 
history of the church-sect-cult-denominational typologies scholars explored as a way of situating the New 
Age, he concluded that “If the . . . SPINs concept is combined with . . . analy[sis] [of] formations and 
changes among the NRMs, and cells or segments that constitute the reticulate polycephalous structure 
comprising the holistic movement, we have a viable sociological tool that is applicable to contemporary late 
twentieth-century developments and study” (York 1995, 330-331). 
Writing more recently, Chandler (2010) agrees that network structures are appropriate for describing New 
Age spirituality. However, she is interested in defending New Age spirituality’s supposed “institutional-
ly-decentralized” nature and discusses the network organizational form in this context. She does this by 
arguing that practicing networking still leaves plenty of opportunities for group cohesiveness amongst 
participants. In pursuing this point, she introduces nuance to the idea that networks intrinsically democra-
tize (i.e., by dissolving all group—i.e., power—structures into individuals freely interacting). She offers 
Tindall and Wellman’s (2001, 266) clarification on this point. They argue that, depending on the patterns of 





 Chandler (2010, 82) contends that “Network theory avoids the oversimplified opposition 
between group membership and social isolation. All groups—even dyads—are seen as networks; variance 
is merely a function of group density and interconnectivity.”  
Chandler (2010, 81-82) reiterates a now-common theme about networks and groups that for earlier scholars 
was not so obvious: “The advent of the Internet… has radically altered the networking power of the cultic 
milieu. From Castells’ perspective at least, networks such as those inherent in life spirituality have unique 
adaptive advantage that make them structurally stable.” Finally, she concedes that “social networks analysis 
is a promising but as yet largely unexplored approach to reconceptualizing the social viability of life spir-
ituality.” 
The emphasis on networking as a mode of organization, especially as it embodies a rejection of social 
hierarchy, establishes a strong parallel between neospiritual organization and post-Fordist work forms, and 
the values placed on certain kinds of participants therein, as we will see in later chapters. This organiza-
tional form also suggests that neospirituals will easily adopt the values of new workers that are based on 
their networking patterns, the network cosmology. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I reviewed different genres of scholarly literature about New Age spirituality, from dis-
cussions about its religious antecedents and influences, considerations of the larger social processes in 
which its development is implicated, and analyses of the trends and complications of its study. Following 
this review, I provided an overview of New Age beliefs and practices.  
I explained that New Agers hold a vision of the universe as “whole” whose elements, large and small, 
continuously reference and reshape in accordance with each other. They believe in a depersonalized di-
vinity and a re-enchanted world. They believe they can “heal themselves” through spiritual practices and 
attitudinal changes, and that the pursuit of personal healing is mandatory since this could change plan-
et-level social and natural dynamics for the better. Furthermore, “illness” is not merely somatic dysfunction 
but also faulty attitudes.  
They believe a change of mind, or consciousness, can engender personal prosperity. Fundamentally, they 
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scientific language in unscientific ways because their worldview is essentially teleological. They attribute a 
power to mental activity that extends beyond the locale of the thinker, because thought is a form of energy. 
Despite their holism, the locus of action, of initiations and registrations of transformations, is confined 
strictly to the individual self. For them, psychology is the social science that embodies all relevant 
knowledge of the human.  
Since they are required to bring about change as a moral duty, they must perform sustained work re-
searching, discovering and experimenting with techniques or methods that can effectively transform. They 
acquire the skills necessary to use these techniques indiscriminately, without concern for their possible 
mutually-incongruous origins, because the standard of value for a method is outcome in use.  
New Agers minimize personal obligations to a group, yet recognize that group behaviour helps reinforce 
values and provides access to different methods or skills leading to personal healing and planetary health. 
Physical gatherings can also enhance energetic experiences emanating from individual minds/bodies, 
which can be stronger based on that concentration of individuals or in relation to particular planetary ge-
ographies or structures. Their characteristic group action consequently follows a loose “network” pattern. 
This means that groups form on temporary and contingent bases, and repetitions might consist of different 
compositions of individuals.  
In the next chapter, I consider important scholarly theories of the ways in which New Age beliefs and 
practices, to become neospirituality, are now shaped by and implicated in contemporary economic pro-
cesses––specifically, in production and consumption. 
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Chapter Three: Theories of Capitalism and Religion 
Introduction  
While the main focus of this dissertation is the relation of neospirituality to contemporary labour condi-
tions, such conditions are indivisible from the nature of the commodities this economy produces. In 
post-Fordism, the two “moments” of capitalist circulation--production and consumption--are strongly in-
tegrated. The precise nature of this tight coupling, stronger than in the earlier Fordist era, will be made 
clearer in future chapters. Suffice it to say here that production now puts more emphasis on “soft” or cul-
tural products, and that their marketing is tied, and largely prior, to production. Because of this strong in-
tegration, we must consider the commodification issue in this dissertation. Fortunately, there is a consid-
erable body of scholarship on neospirituality and consumption. The scholarship on the commodification of 
religion takes neospirituality’s subordination to this era’s capitalism as a key theme. I begin by reviewing 
several important contributions by scholars of religion on the topic of religious commodification, which 
features neospirituality as its embodiment. I then provide religious scholarship that looks beyond neospir-
ituality’s role in commodification to that of production. (This excludes the industry literature on “spiritu-
ality in the workplace” reviewed in the next chapter.)  
The primary source of discourse on religion and capitalism in general is Jeremy Carrette and Richard 
King’s (2005) text Selling Spirituality. Carette and King argue that a “second privatization of religion” 
locates a spirituality that centres on the corporation itself, both within but also outside worksites. It is “the 
whole” to which employees’ holistic religious attentions are dedicated. However, I consider two other texts 
as important supplements to the Carrette and King work. One of these is Carrette’s (2007) title, Religion 
and Critical Psychology: The Ethics of Non-Knowing in the Knowledge Economy, a philosophical work 
arguing that psychology’s emergence is implicated in this process of refocusing on the corporation itself as 
the beneficiary of spirituality. Secondly, Tucker and Leinberger argue in The New Individualists: The 
Generation after the Organization Man (1991) that, by channelling employees’ personal energy and 
“power,” corporate workplaces now create “psychtopias” within their confines, whose signal features is 
that the corporation itself is the only entity characterized as an agent. Employees are dedicated to “enliv-
ening” the corporation. 
These scholars are on one side of a contemporary debate in religious studies. As Aupers and Houtman 2010, 
73) point out, Carrette and King have argued “that privatized religions perpetuate the idea of the ‘closed 
self,’” that is, a self that is personally and not socially created (2005, 85). They think that New Age’s 
psychological model of the human being is “pernicious and dangerous because it overstates the notion of an 
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independent self at the expense of social interdependence” (Aupers and Houtman 2010, 57). Chandler 
(2010, 69-87), summarizes the themes by which scholars of religion such as Carrette and King belittle the 
importance of neospirituality (or “life spirituality,” as she calls it) as a religious ethos: that it is institu-
tionally decentralized and that it is commodified. Her summary is succinct and apt, “While the absence of 
institutional coordinates motivates scholars to dismiss life spirituality’s inclusion in civil society on what 
might be called structural grounds, its economic activities are frequently condemned on moral grounds” 
(Chandler 2010, 82).  
Along with Chandler, Aupers and Houtman challenge these condemnations. However, though they might 
be able to make persuasive arguments about this while looking at neospirituality in other domains than 
workplaces, as we shall see, neospirituality as it manifests in worksites seems to validate Carrette and 
King’s claims. If a convincing argument is made that neospirituality has been shaped by capitalism and is 
currently its tool, the onus on dissenting scholars is to show that a balance of forces pulls the ethos away 
from this role or that, despite its ideological role in workplaces, it has a fundamentally different nature that 
manifests elsewhere. 
Following on these reflections, and before I proceed to consider theories of neospirituality’s relation to 
consumption and production, I preface it with a discussion of problems that scholars encounter in studying 
neospirituality in general in the contemporary world, and explain how understanding the new politi-
cal-economic climate appears to resolve them. The account provided highlights general reasons why strong 
associations are found between neospirituality and capitalist institutions. 
Studying Neospirituality and Capitalism 
Despite earlier discussions of the terminology for the new spirituality, some scholars of religion are satis-
fied with “new age,” or “New Age.” However, this seems to be as part of a project to recuperate the in-
tegrity of the movement—to distinguish it as a form of religiosity rather than an inflection of culture (which 
I lean towards). These scholars express difficulty defining the New Age phenomenon and its practitioners. 
Making the comparison to traditional religious institutions, they illustrate why its stronger and weaker 
forms should have found a strong institutional base in work sites—it lacks the social place that the religious 
institutions offer. This is the fundamental reason the ethos evades sociological characterization, and why its 
status as religion has commonly been denied (Bruce 2002, 2013). Catherine Albanese (1992, 73) expressed 
the dilemma: it “has no central church or organization [and] possesses no authoritative denomination offi-
cialdom, no creedal platform, no sectarian tests for inclusion or exclusion.” More recently, Steven Sutcliffe 
(2008, 5) quoted Simmons’ (1990) similar objection: the New Age “lacks most of the requisite so-




According to Sutcliffe (2008, 4), other scholarly syntheses reveal “a number of common features in which 
New Age is deficient. These include coordinating or umbrella organizations; a certain normative 
strength—and reflexive documentation—of historical tradition; a viable level of internal stability and 
continuity; suitable evidence of boundaries and criteria of belonging by members’; a realistic level of 
critical debates, social mobilization, and proselytization; and, crucially, a confident and communicable 
identity and goals” Nevertheless, Sutcliffe (2008, 5; again citing Simmons [1990]), insists: “If there is, in 
Popperian terms, no ‘falsifiable’ movement, there is clearly ‘something going on,’” which must be ex-
plored. Sutcliffe and other scholars pursue this “something.” Their basic problem is that New Age practi-
tioners are from “a larger population of Western seekers who formed alternative networks of beliefs and 
practices before the New Age trope or emblem rose to prominence (in the ‘largely post-war’ period), and 
will persist after it falls into obscurity” (Sutcliffe 2008, 1). Accordingly, an important purpose of their 
studies is to firm up boundaries around a phenomenon constantly in danger of absorption into the general 
culture. However, if the New Age has been a vanguard movement whose essential function was to (re)inject 
a strong dose of esotericism into the global urban psyche, anticipating the new economic structures that 
benefit by them (as I will argue) such a pursuit would seem to be misguided. If New Age values, in weak 
form, have normalized into the wider culture, the studies of Sutcliffe et al would amount to fruitlessly 
picking out trees while ignoring the forest of which they are a part. 
As I showed in the preceding chapter, it is not that New Age characteristics cannot be isolated and identified 
(both in their concentrated form and more diffuse, as outlined earlier). For beliefs, New Agers expect(ed) 
“an immense cultural shift analogous to the Renaissance which will dramatically augment human power 
and responsibility on a transnational, global scale” (an expectation rehearsed since the 1930s), which gives 
form to the range of practices (Sutcliffe 2008, 1). More concisely, New Agers pursue “seeking or com-
posing a religious package that is meaningful, awareness of and discourse on ‘energy,’ consultation with 
others, periodic meetings with mutually-interested practitioners, and the seeking of euphoria” (Sutcliffe 
2013, 28). A short list of New Age practices includes “meditation, healing, channeling, and prophecy, as 
well as pilgrimages to geographical ‘power spots’… organic and vegetarian dietary practices, and 
post-1970s—a vast range of ‘human potential’ and ‘personal growth’ psychotherapies” (Sutcliffe 2008, 2). 
The generally-positive position these researchers take with regard to the New Age’s organizational affili-
ations reflects their agenda to reverse its association with consumerism as weakening its religious character 
(a position articulated by Daniel Bell 1976 and Daneille Hervieu-Leger 2000, among others). The ethos has 
also been denigrated as either individualistic and antisocial (e.g., Berger 2010; Bellah 1985) or marginal, 
the residue of dying religious interests (e.g., Steve Bruce, 2002, 2013). Some scholars now oppose these 
dismissive interpretations of the New Age or new spirituality (Chandler 2010). Taking up the new position, 
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David Martin (2013, 310) asserts, “self-spirituality is a well-defined doctrine with a strong potential for 
socialization [whose cohesive body of practices and beliefs suggests that] the entire milieu constitutes a 
shared culture in the public arena possessing a ‘unifying moral imperative’ and a well-documented pedigree 
in the esoteric milieu of the nineteenth century.”  
Also sympathetic to this position, Aupers and Houtman (2010) examine how New Age and spiritual prac-
tices are integrated into supposedly-secular institutions, including technology-oriented companies and the 
internet. Examining the pursuits of the “the new metaphysicals,” in relation to privatized artistic, health and 
educational institutions (“fields of production”) around Cambridge, MA, Courtney Bender (2010) articu-
lates the thesis clearly: practitioners “institutionalize” by forming a critical mass of believers around secular 
social thematics and institutions. The three “institutional fields” produce spirituality in different ways 
(Bender 2010, 40–44), as they also reflect and shape the wider culture in which they operate. The argument 
offered in the light of these affiliations is that, indeed, New Age spirituality does have a more robust in-
stitutional structure than imagined, but it gets it from the institutions it infiltrates rather than the institutions 
it creates for itself. 
But, why would “mainstream” institutions be adopting or absorbing this supposedly “alternative” ethos that 
must challenge the basic principles that have guided modern institutions? Generally, are they turning away 
from technocratic governance that has maintained them in the past? Is the New Age or neospiritual ethos 
being absorbed by secular modern institutions, or are they changing to accommodate it? Are common social 
institutions now reaching towards the esotericism that has always lurked below the surface of rational, 
scientific (and Christian) values through which the West gained its hegemony? These transitions certainly 
raise questions about the current state of these institutions and society in general.  
Gauthier and Martikainen offer answers to these questions. Their two-volume collection (2013a, 2013b) 
addresses understanding New Age and neospiritual practices and beliefs in terms of “the changed economic 
order and related ideologies.” Gauthier, Martikainen and Woodhead (2013, 18) define these changes as 
promoting “neoliberalism, consumerism, marketization, management and ‘governance.’” Neoliberalism 
can be contrasted with the liberalism that prevailed during Fordism and, indeed, since Adam Smith artic-
ulated its principles. This difference is the significance afforded market relations. “If classical liberalism 
found in the workings of the market and its ‘spontaneous harmonization of interests’ is the model for op-
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timal social regulation, neoliberalism goes a step further by defining the social sphere as a form of eco-
nomic field” (Gauthier, Martikainen and Woodhead 2013, 31). 
For its impact on religion, these authors point particularly to the new form of governance of neoliberalism, 
as defined by Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose (2008)
30
 (but first articulated by Michel Foucault). “Gov-
ernance has been defined as a production technique for norms, rules and procedures, and as a way to answer 
a variety of conflicting interests” (Gauthier, Martikainen and Woodhead 2013, 17). There are different 
forms of governance, depending on the regime of accumulation. Under the neoliberal (or post-Fordist) 
governance mandate, a government’s new purpose is to make citizens responsible for selecting and pro-
curing social goods that would otherwise be provided through social relations based an affiliation with 
groups, or by the governments themselves. “The role of the state is to promote autonomy and self-care in 
the form of entrepreneurship of the self” (Gray 2013, 73).  
Both reliable social connections and government services have attenuated since the abandonment in the late 
20
th
 century of the economic arrangement called Fordism. In the United States, this has led many gov-
ernments to rely on RNGOs (religious non-governmental organizations) (somewhat at odds with the 
American separation of church and state) secular civil society institutions, and a welter of new spiritual, 
wellness and prosperity teachers, to fulfill this role (Ashley and Sandefer 2013, 126). “Civil society or-
ganizations are tasked with rendering individual subjects ‘responsible’ for their own integration through 
‘self-care,’ and ‘making the right choices’” (Gray 2013, 74).  
This social agenda strengthens the economic position of the purveyors of spirituality programs and prod-
ucts, from informal New Age and spiritual practices, through to formal and perhaps elaborate spiritual, 
prosperity and wellness services. In addition to contracts they fulfill for corporations and social service 
agencies, many of these purveyors offer their services to the general public as well, directly through the 
market. However, whether supported institutionally or made available to private individuals, they are 
needed to train people to adapt to a world of risk, and potential material and psychic insufficiency. 
I would accept this analysis as far as its goes. However, in the many essays in these texts, these scholars do 
not appear to privilege market-based, for-profit institutions––corporations––as the preeminent site in which 
these adoptions are propagated. Nor do those who cite Bender’s work. The implication is that all institu-
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ethos. However, I would argue that because of neoliberalization, social services such as education that were 
formerly publicly-provided have been privatized or semi-privatized and so function similarly to the cor-
porations on which they are modelled.  
In the Fordist period, during the post-war hegemony of Keynesian economic theory (where deficiencies in 
the market’s ability to distribute wealth equitably were compensated for by governments) services were 
generally supplied by public institutions that operated differently from private. Now, most social services 
are expected to operate with concern for market principles. Moreover, privatized “public” services (often 
called “not-for-profit” services and agencies) have many of their functions performed on contract by 
market-based companies (Barlow and Robertson 1996). This would be true also of the groups that Bender 
studies. These developments reduce the difference between how “not-for-profit” services and agencies on 
the one hand, and commercial companies on the other, function. Therefore, I would argue that fully 
commercial corporations provide the structural model for the social services in many cases, making them 
the paradigmatic organizational form. Hence, though all institutions, whether “private” or “public,” may 
appear to be adopting neospiritual services at comparable rates, an examination of the inner workings of 
corporations rather than of these services will generate greater understanding of why and how this adoption 
occurs. 
Another impact of neoliberal governance that contributes to the rise of neospirituality over traditional re-
ligiosity is its principled suppression of public discourse and decision-making on the basis of principles. 
(Previous eras expressed commitment to such discourse, regarded as a fundamental feature of democracy, 
even if it were not realized in fact.) Indeed, proponents of neoliberalism would hold that translating the 
delivery of social goods to market processes is an advantage for society because it undercuts the need for 
such “inefficient” discussions. Later, I call this reduction of principled discourse one form of the demate-
rialization or streamlining of society that is a mark of neoliberalism. The state’s withdrawal from its role as 
a shaper of society means that the state also relinquishes pursuing substantive goals—“so-called val-
ue-ridden, arbitrary, political regulation” (Gauthier, Martikainen and Woodhead 2013, 17). The state has 
not the capacity to “produce” and “use” valuable concepts such as peace, justice, freedom, etc. in order to 
maintain its legitimacy. Whether substantive outcomes such as a measure of material justice or equality 
amongst citizens are achieved, is considered (at least in private) beyond the state’s responsibility. Instead, it 
settles for administering procedures for citizen participation in decision-making—by default through the 
market or via formalized consultations such as elections, commissions of inquiry and referenda. “With the 
extension of ‘the liberal tradition’ [into neoliberalism], in its preference for juridical and technical con-
ceptions of regulation” (17), “governance” replaces “government.” The state must merely ensure that 
everyone can participate in the decisions made, according to processes that are procedurally “fair.” These 
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processes, amounting to competitions for influence, can be periodic, such as by polling, consultations and 
“focus-groups,” or on-going, such as by administrative procedures. In any case, this form of governance 
helps to “naturalize the market” (Gauthier, Martikainen and Woodhead 2013, 17). 
In short, the move to governance principles forces states to restrict pursuit of substantive outcomes within 
political collectivities. As a result, “organized capitalism distanced administrative mechanisms from the 
system of legitimacy. This meant [there could be] no expectation of any administrative production of 
meaning.” They add that the state’s inability to generate substantive discourse is paralleled in religions, so 
that “religion then lacks discursively redeemable norms based in relatively autonomous religious commu-
nities, [which provokes] a retreat into subjective beliefs” (Ashley and Sandefer 2013, 126). This brief 
statement speaks volumes about the relationship between economic and religious change constituted by the 
transition from Fordism to post-Fordism. 
Neoliberals have abandoned society, not only the principles understood to guide it, but even the idea of 
society. Edwin Ng (2016, 140) explains that  
… Dilts [2011] paints an arresting portrait of the neoliberal view of homo 
economicus.‘The neo-liberal analysts look out at the world and do not see 
discrete and identifable forms, producers, households, consumers, fathers, 
mothers, criminals, immigrants, natives, adults, children, or any oth-
er ‘fixed’ category of human subjectivity. They see heterogeneous human 
capital, distinct in their specifc attributes, abilities, natural endowments, 
skills.They see entrepreneurs of the self. They see homini œconomici, 
responsive agents to the reality of costs and benefits attached to activities, 
each of which are productive of satisfaction. 
Although Gauthier, Martikainen and Woodhead (2013, 5-6) criticize Carrette and King’s work (2005), as 
being “pessimistic and nostalgic” in terms of the latter’s lament that “consumerist forms of spirituality… 
lack the moral depth and social cohesiveness of more traditional religion,” Carette and King would concur 
with these authors’ analysis of the relationship between neoliberal governance and neospirituality’s growth. 
In fact there are strong correlations between the ideas in these two compilations and Carrette and King’s 
text, as we will see later. Carrette & King (2005) would assert that the embrace of neospirituality is due to 
the systematic restructuring of capitalism, as it adapts to globality and the neoliberal order, including by 
commodifying cultural resources.  
As stated above, the relation of neospirituality’s emergence to the changing nature of contemporary capi-
talism is not a new concern for scholars of religion (A. Dawson 2007, 2013; Aupers and Houtman 2010; 
Wuthnow 1998; Heelas 1996). However, as also noted, when scholars first studied its relation to capitalism, 
they concentrated on the issues of individualism, choice, consumption and consumerism (e.g., Berger 1967; 
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Lasch 1979, Bellah et al. 1985, Lau 2000; Bibby 2004a; Bowen 2004). Because of neoliberal encroachment 
of market relations into the social world, this entanglement of religion in commodification processes should 
not surprise us. As replete with cultural content as commerce now is, we should not expect religion to be left 
out of this grip. Equally important to recognizing religion’s commodification, however, is asking whether 
certain religious cultural content is, indeed particularly amenable to commodification. To put the question 
another way, is spirituality a particular shaping of religion for the market? Carrette and King (2005) would 
answer yes to both of these questions. They go beyond exploring the commodification of religious contents 
as the unfortunate “collateral damage” done by the market machine as it sweeps through cultures, to seeing 
religion as the prime target for this massaging––creating ‘spiritualities’ out of it that are specifically shaped 
for that machine.  
Indeed, as Carrette and King’s see it, neospirituality’s integration in market relations is an unavoidable 
outcome of its “first privatization.” According to their analysis, discussed in detail below, the transition 
from privatization to commodification is not haphazard. Privatization is a prior condition of commodifi-
cation and leads directly to it because all privatized goods can be sold on the market. In other words, em-
bedding religion’s “ownership” in and conferring its benefit to the individual implies its commodification. 
Roof (2001) and Miller (2005) take this position when they explain how monopolistic media producers 
overrode the two crafts of traditional religious publishing and maintaining a religiously-engaged commu-
nity, respectively. The result in both cases is a generic spirituality. The thrust of their arguments is that 
neospirituality was made to be a marketable commodity. 
Effectively, these scholars document traditional religious material as key inputs of post-Fordist production. 
Furthermore, the relationship has changed religion in general:  
Indeed, the religion of the market is now increasingly acting as the dom-
inant theology through which representations of the various ‘religions’ are 
filtered; and ‘religious’ ideas are being professionally produced by a new 
information proletariat, largely unaware of its collusion with the privati-
sation and corporatisation of the market. (Carrette and King 2005, 167) 
These authors even claim that “the corporatization of the world’s cultural and religious traditions com-
moditizes human cultural heritage and subordinates its concerns to the economic theology of neoliberal-
ism” (178). 
Carrette and King’s (2005) and Carrette’s (2007) writings about capitalism and the new spirituality form a 
strong and broad-level theoretical matrix for considering the issues framed by this dissertation.They high-
light the movement of neospirituality as a consumer good to its role in production, now as equally in service 
to corporate culture as to positive corporate imaging. That transition of neospirituality’s site of engagement 
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from consumption to production correlates with the two stages of privatization Carrette and King (2005) 
write about. Its first stage, religious liberalization “placed religion in the private space of individual choice” 
(Carrette and King 2005, 133). However, they claim that neoliberalism established “the second mode of 
privatizing religion [by] re-placing religion (already disentangled from its institutional and cultural origins 
and repackaged as ‘spirituality’) into the corporate realm of business. We are essentially witnessing a 
corporate takeover of the religions” (Carrette and King 2005, 133). Their core idea is that “this merging of 
‘spirituality and business’... builds upon the modern refashioning of the term spirituality as an exclusively 
private reality, but reorients the term is such a way that it now reflects corporate, not individual interests” 
(Carrette and King 2005, 129). I will consider the validity of this claim, later in terms of the concept of 
psytopia. I discuss important theories of these two moments, below. 
First Privatization: Religion for Consumption 
Commodities are now more integral to production than in past forms of capitalism, but also to life itself. 
Furthermore, many scholars of religion assert that neospirituality is strongly tied up in the distinctive 
commodification of this era. This point of view persists because, as the post-Fordist economy advances, so 
does the prominence of the products that characterize it. These are immaterial (i.e., information or cultural) 
products, as well as services, to which the commodification of religion well lends itself.  
New Age practitioners procure the revolving and multivariate contents of their religious attentions by 
continually redeploying materials from the extant cultural (including religious) record (Suttcliffe 2003). 
This process constitutes the continual discursive innovation for which New Age practice is known. Ex-
hibiting little concern for substantial or formal coherence amongst the elements they have composed as a 
personal religion, practitioners readily introduce new material. As their interests advance, “narrative pegs 
can be easily changed” (Illouz 2008, 174).  
There is a formal parallel between these operations on extant religious contents and post-Fordist producers’ 
continuous invention and provision of innovative personal services, information and cultural products. 
These latter are the drivers of this fast-paced economy, and a high rate of turnover of such products is 
necessary. Elements of the religious heritages of the world provides material culture, symbols and myths 
that can be incorporated into or inspire new motifs for products and services. Continual “sourcing” of 
material from the historical cultural stock guards against these becoming thematically banal or repetitive 
over time. 
However, more than parallels, the two processes by different social actors appear to be substantially of a 
piece. Generally, scholars have found that versions of traditional religious rituals, beliefs and practices 
make excellent immaterial commodities. Religious paraphernalia are also reproduced and resituated for 
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sale, too, as cultural products. In many applications (products, ideas or services), religious material inte-
grates with the economy. As Carrette (2007, 16) sees it,  
… the very marketing of intense, short-lived experiences was a joy for the 
capitalist world. ‘Religion’ and ‘spirituality’ were psychological products 
and in the world of late-capitalism, following the deregulation of the 
markets by Reagan and Thatcher in the late 1980s and 1990s, the spiritu-
ality market would burgeon even more than before.  
Not uncommonly, religious commodification is undertaken by religious institutions themselves, a process 
discussed in more detail below. Religions directly enter the immaterial commodity market. The lack of 
traditional supports for religions (partly due to their removal from traditional contexts and, hence, their 
modernization) is one reason religions are propelled to enter markets. They may or may not undertake to 
immunize themselves against market values. For example, the Tibetan Buddhists in Ropka, Scotland, be-
lieve they are protected from the typical consequences of commercialization (which I elaborate on, below). 
To circumvent corporate commoditization, they have branded their group for higher visibility, offer 
fee-based services such as “courses and health therapies” to the relatively uncommitted, host locals and 
visitors in their teashop, and sell worship-related objects. On the other hand, the lamas restrict access to 
higher levels of teaching. “Advanced dharmas are chiefly passed down orally to the most dedicted practi-
tioners, in accordance with traditional practices” (McKenzie 2014, 166-7). Additionally, the commercial 
activities allow them to pursue “engaged Buddhist” activities, such as “forging environmental conservation 
programmes and establishing welfare projects” (McKenzie 2013, 171). 
Perhaps New Agers’ adoption of diverse religious elements to make up their personalized religions––the 
paradigmatic form of religious bricolage––has normalized the “cut-and-paste” practices of immaterial 
producers, proper, and paved the way for the commodification of cultural contents in general (Miller 2005). 
One might even consider that the New Age habit of “mixing and matching” for spiritual reasons was an-
ticipatory to the dynamics of the new economy. In any case, once this bricolage has achieved social ac-







 In this context, the maintenance and ever-hardening, as fundamentalisms, of religious traditional values and 
practices, which is the contemporary compliment of liberalization of many traditions in the global world (Beyer 1994), 
seems to have as important function. Carette and King (2005) argue that the boundaries of the religious traditional 
orders must be maintained to the degree that they remain a source of cultural appropriation for the immaterial 
economy. The religious content is “stabilized” for commodification by the continued structure offered by religious 
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Additionally, due to the holistic ethos in which they are embedded, consuming “spiritual” products ad-
dresses a dilemma of modern post-Fordist consumers. Through spiritual consumption, they can feel that 
they are supporting some kind of moral good in a world that has lost its traditional sources of moral per-
suasion, whether by religious institutions or socially-concerned governments. Spiritual beliefs continue, 
somewhat against the facts, to be held as countercultural or oppositional to the prevailing economic 
structure, vaguely felt to be unjust. Accordingly, “spiritual” (like “organic” and “environmental”) con-
sumption validates the consumer’s desire for special status or distinctiveness as compared to ordinary 
consumers, who supposedly seek only their own good in the process.  
The section below focusses on these themes, as developed by key sources. Wade Clark Roof (2001) shows 
how religion’s contents are marginally differentiated to become spirituality. Evelyn Lau (2000) and Olav 
Hammer (2004) argue that the act of consumption now substitutes for political action or a sense of en-
gagement in civic affairs, as it also confers a sense of distinction on consumers. Vincent Miller (2005) 
outlines the implication of this process for religion. 
Roof: Marginal Differentiation and Homogenization 
In Spiritual Marketplace (2001), Roof reported on his studies of American Baby Boomer religion, in the 
late 1980s and again in the late 1990s. As his title suggests, commercial institutions were shown to play a 
growing role in structuring American religion in general during that period. Roof suggests that spirituality 
(in his view, amorphous religion) is a construct of the commercial publishing industry. For him, the changes 
in religious publishing over this period epitomized the impact of commodification on religions. In his view, 
the commercial need to continuously re-sell what is essentially the same product, slightly changed, is at the 
root of the emergence of spirituality as a popular religious form. Marginally differentiating (i.e., slightly 
changing) products from one rendition to the next is intrinsic to how anything is successfully commodified. 
During the 1980s, the waning economy of traditional religious publishing was further disrupted as the large 
commercial houses saw opportunities to use broad religious messages (centred in self-help language) to sell 
books to the general public. They sought to provide content for people experiencing a ‘spiritual vacuum’ in 
their lives. These new religious suppliers “take religious pluralism for granted and cater to the open reli-
gious climate” (Roof 2001, 140). Following the principle of marginally-differentiating one publication 
from the next, their books addressed these spiritual voids, and sought to “shape and fill them and often in 
 
 
traditions, making them the “reserve” repository from which the market in cultural goods may draw for its material. 
This counters the regression to the mean that threatens religious contents when transmitted through market processes 
(Roof 2001).  
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ways that are highly formulaic and homogenous” (Roof 2001, 139). They play to theories of choice and 
provide a “menu” of spiritual possibilities. “They appeal to primitive desires for ecstasy, for bonding, for 
health, for hope and happiness, for the sacralization of everyday life” (Roof 2001, 140). 
Encouraging readers’ identification with their brand is more important to these publishers than respecting 
the boundaries of readers’ own (residual) religious loyalties. “They are mass producing religious cul-
ture—biblical study guides, newsletters, self-help books” (Roof 2001, 139). To maintain their brands, each 
of the titles in the publishers’ series has to bear a generic similarity with the last. As a consequence, “reli-
gious suppliers create fluidity between traditions by using similar vocabularies and common imageries” 
(Roof 2001, 139). In the process, publishers destroy the distinctions between traditions or sects. Hence, as 
they develop the religious themes that guide the choosing (and cultivating) of titles, they actually structure 
the religious consciousness of their subscribers. The product is, in Roof’s view, spirituality. 
Ironically, even though their content is homogenized, there is also an “edge” to the messaging in these texts, 
expressing a theme we will see play out in a number of contemporary contexts. The invocation of the 
spiritual, in advertising, at work, and even in popular culture, implies that the neospiritual consumer stands 
out from the passive and mystified masses. Consumers of this literature “buy into the idea of ‘the spiritual’ 
as somehow ‘alternative,’ counter-cultural or subversive of mainstream values. Here, ‘spirituality’ is sold to 
the consumer as a form of cultural critique; even if it ends up supporting the very system that at one level it 
appears to be challenging” (Carrette and King 2005, 134-135) 
Lau: Creating ‘Moral’ Consumption 
Roof pointed at the marginal differentiation, commercial nature and homogenization of the institutions of 
the American religious landscape. In Lau’s book, New Age Capitalism (2000), she essentially draws out the 
significance of the “holism” ethos to the religious commodity. She explores what motivates ‘religious 
consumers’ and finds that, by a series of imaginative steps, they construct the belief that this consumption 
contributes to a better world.  
Lau refers to Ulrich Beck’s (1992) “risk society” thesis to explain why “wellness” appeals. Since our 
highly-technologized societies create actual risks that cannot be mitigated, people must use their imagina-
tions to feel safe. As the earlier discussion of holism suggests, New Age products communicate this safety 
through discursively referencing historical or geographical spaces that users feel are romantically attractive, 
or spaces of innocence. Fantasies work best when the focus is on what are deemed more “innocent” (i.e., 




Of course, “spiritual consumers” believe that aromatherapy, macrobiotic eating, yoga and t’ai chi will bring 
about personal wellness (if not transformation). More importantly, however, they also believe their con-
sumption will similarly transform the world. This belief that the outside world mirrors you (or reflects your 
intentions), is called ethnomimesis (Cantwell 1993). Through this imaginative process, planetary health, for 
example, is correlated with personal wellness, which is why the environmental and peace movements at-
tract neospirituals. They expect these practices to bring about planetary health because the practices are 
imaginatively set within exotic (romanticized, real, or purely imagined) worlds, the values of which are 
expected to bleed over into present circumstances. Of particular interest are those worlds believed to have 
used “non-Western paradigms of health and wellness.”  
Western populations have been romanticizing exotic communities since European explorers made their 
ways to foreign climes. These romantic fantasies may have served as a flight from the harsh realities of 
early capitalism in Europe, or from the cold analytical rationality inaugurated by Enlightenment science. As 
this fantasizing (and, early on, the trading) most commonly focussed on lands east of Europe (i.e., the 
“Orient”), the practice has been called Orientalism (Said 1992). The most significant (and more recent) 
example of this behaviour from a group that prefigured New Age spirituality is seen in British and Amer-
ican Theosophy at the turn of the twentieth century. Theosophical literature cites a number of exotic 
communities, real or imagined, as sources of authority. The imagined were Atlantis and Lemuria; the real, 
India and other Eastern countries. More exotic sources, still, were consulted by leader Helen Blavatsky. 
These “ascendant masters,” figures from an unknown space/time (mythically, the past), were claimed to be 
close to the source of original power and knowledge (Prothero 1996).  
Marketers have updated this process for the contemporary culture markets––by not explicitly naming the 
imagined space. Despite such reticence, New Age marketing allows consumers to “circle back to an im-
agined past existing prior to industrialization…, epitomized by more integrated relationships with nature 
and the interconnectedness of all living things” (Lau 2000, 9). The romanticization of nature that frequently 
underlies Orientalism is an implicit critique of modernity. The references to nature stands in for references 
to “ages of innocence,” or “ages of energetic connection to nature” that the consumer wishes to revive. As 
we have already considered, the implied interconnection of the individual and the whole determines that at 
the same time as one revives oneself, the perfection or purity of the other world to which one refers, is 
restored to this one (Albanese 2007).  
Conversely, referencing the innocent past confers this quality on oneself. The New Age’s “weak, 
this-worldly mysticism” expresses that the Divine energy or personage can reach across distances of time 
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and place to the participant’s material present. With the conflation of the personal and the global, a single 
act can address dual problems; and this act is simply one of consumption. 
Lau feels that Jurgen Habermas’s (1989) ideal public sphere, represented by seventeenth- and eight-
eenth-century salons where the European bourgeoisie met to debate issues of the day, has been replaced by 
the space of consumption; consumption is a form of discourse that expresses who the consumer is and what 
she wants. In Lau’s view, “consumer behaviour is a form of communicative action.” As noted, communi-
cative capacity is enhanced through the consumption of the exotica from a place that is “different.” The 
consumption of items from the global marketplace is meant to imply sympathy and affinity with the distant 
climes. Consumers “exploit their associations, both real and imagined, with global, non-Western cultures” 
(Lau 2000, 10–11).  
Lau (2000, 13-14) echoes Albanese (2007) by arguing that, beyond discouraging political action from 
outside the market, the discourse surrounding alternate health products, which associates them with global 
betterment, forces an obligation on us as consumers: We must seek “personal life enhancement” because we 
“must take responsibility for social and planetary health as well.” Alternate health and wellness products 
“are positioned for the ills of modernity.” 
The economic imperative that structures economies is the target of this selective consumption. One has 
choices in what one consumes, and, because they can direct capitalist enterprise towards healthful alterna-
tives for the planet, these choices must be made. The array of one’s consumer choices, then, defines one’s 
beliefs about what is a good direction for the planet. Based on refined understanding, certain products, in 
and of themselves, can be seen to have an intrinsic spiritual quality to them, and their consumption bodes 
well for the planet. “Buying into this bricolage is the first step towards responsibility…. Such a process is at 
once social and individual” (Lau 2000, 13). This idea is supported by the presumption that having spiritual 
beliefs is subversive, as noted above. “It is precisely this impression that consumer power has some ability 
to undermine capitalist systems that ultimately allows New Age capitalism to thrive” (Lau 2000, 14). 
However, because the “direction” offered is via the vehicle of the market, capitalism’s purview, this is a 
highly doubtful impression. 
Over time, the basis for attributing a spiritual character to a product has expanded. Initially, “spiritual” 
commodification was only applied to “body-mind-spirit” products. Progressively, this changed. “The 
language of consumption as political action is not contained within the public sphere of alternative health 
and wellness, [but, r]ather, it seeps out and into the consumer landscape through advertisements for a range 
of goods and services” (Lau 2000, 137). Now, the products of the old industrial economy, such as auto-
mobiles, are equally marketed with a spiritual mystique. (See television advertising for the Lincoln by 
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American actor, Matthew McCougnaghey.) We cannot lose sight of the fact that advertising has always 
created a mystique around its subjects. The “spiritual” motif, precisely because of its obscure content, may 
simply make this easier. This suggests that advertising around New Age products per se had a temporary 
role to play in the process of identification of all consumption as spiritual. Once strengthened, the spiritual 
motif can now be disconnected from its ostensive objects and be made to perform duties for advertising in 
general. 
Lau criticizes such globalization theorists as Roland Robertson, for missing the pacifying implications of 
the theory of the “global/local” interpenetration of contemporary culture. Essentially, she charges, the 
intellectual importance placed on this dynamic shrouds consideration of the more important social pattern. 
“Attention to class and equality issues are supplanted by concern for individual and planetary wellness, 
considerations… easily accommodated through consumption as a mode of social action” (Lau 2000, 135). 
One might also note that this transition accompanies the movement away from sociological towards organic 
worldviews that marks neoliberalism. It appears that New Age commodification has served to reorient a 
culture, formerly suspicious of consumption, since it was called into question in the 1960s. 
Furthermore, spiritual consumers’ holism implies that their “responsible” consumption patterns will nat-
urally reverberate––“globally,” as it were. (New media that enable and celebrate “viral” messaging imply 
the greater possibility of this—with significant selectivity. The term used to describe this process is, of 
course, an organic one.) However, as Lau points out, a true diffusion, following this “trickle-down,” or 
viral, idea is not valid. When New Age consumption becomes material (not just ideational), and despite its 
“We’re all one!” slogan, it is elitist. New Age product advertising positions would-be consumers socially.  
[D]iscourses of alternative purchasing would make no sense [without their 
registration of class status]. Despite the anti-material tenor associated 
with the public sphere of alternative health, the fact is that purchases re-
flect social status and class distinctions. Eating macrobiotically is expen-
sive and time-consuming, and many celebrities who extol [it] rely on 
full-time chefs to prepare it (Lau 2000, 17). [My italics] 
We see the economic elevation of access to these services and products in terms of their corporate support.  
The corporations that employ alternate health practitioners for employees and managers are not poor and 
small--nor are the “servants” they hire. “The companies that invite Yoga instructors to teach onsite tend to 
be Fortune 500 companies, not your local mom-and-pop store. The economic reality of pursuing these 
alternative health practices and buying these products necessarily makes them part of elite culture, and it is 
this association—in conjunction with the ideology of the alternative—that has made New Age capitalism so 
profitable” (Lau 2000, 17).  
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More recently, “mindfulness meditation” has become the preferred focus of wellness efforts. The sale of 
assistants to individuals, as “apps” for their smartphones or “wearable gadgets,” is very high, to be sure. 
However, we can infer from the corporate numbers that, by far, the most lucrative contemporary clients of 
“mindfulness meditation” in its many forms are corporations, for their employees. Jen Wieczner (2016) 
reported in the business magazine, Forbes, that  
In 2015 the meditation and mindfulness industry raked in nearly $1 billion, according to research by 
IBISWorld, which breaks out the category from the alternative health care sector. But even that doesn’t 
count the revenue from the nearly 1000 mindfulness apps now available, according to Sensor Tower (top 
app Headspace recently raised $30 million and has been downloaded 6 million times), or the burgeoning 
category of wearable gadgets designed to help people Zen out (the popular Muse connected headband 
measures brain activity during meditation for $299). 
This year 22% of employers will offer mindfulness training—typically priced between $500 and $10,000 
for large-group sessions—a percentage that could double in 2017, according to a forthcoming survey by 
Fidelity Investments and the National Business Group on Health. The survey shows that non-profit Search 
Inside Yourself Leadership Institute, a mindfulness training program incubated at Google, grew revenue 
more than 50% last year by offering two-day workshops (up to $35,000 for 50 people) to dozens of other 
Fortune 500 companies, including Ford… and American Express. 
Despite this ready and ever-growing
32
 embrace by Fortune 500 companies, Lau explains that the exoticism 
of the religious and cultural traditions that New Age and the alternate health industries draw from is crucial 
to the coherence of their messages.  
This mode of cultural critique in popular discourses [enacted through 
consumption and articulated in the New Age vision] relies upon an East-
ern agelessness, in opposition to a Western modernity…. [T]he West is 
represented as highly individualized, technologized and scientized mo-




 “The recent Willis Towers Watson Staying@Work survey found that more employers have adopted a broader view 
of workforce health that includes physical, mental, emotional, and financial health. According to the survey, 64% of 
U.S. employers say that by 2018, they will focus on developing a workplace culture that supports employee well-being 





spirituality, nature and harmony. It is precisely this imagined contrast that 
allows for cultural critique by creating a position from which to reappraise 
and reform… the West. [However, rather than subverting the hegemony of 
the Western Enlightenment project,] the discourses of bodily practice re-
inforce it by invoking the impression of a critique as a marketing device 
and selling points (Lau 2000, 132). 
Lau looked at how traditions were used in several industries at a particular point in time. Olaf Hammer, 
looking at the New Age more directly, argues that “the East” is only one of the possible mysterious cultures 
that has been or could be used as a foil for said beliefs. Because the cultures must be relatively mysterious 
for the mechanics of the message to work, the exotic tradition referenced changes in relation to the pro-
gressive opening of cultures to Western, particularly American, popular awareness. (This follows the tra-
jectory of travel destinations by Western tourists, too—places are “worn out” of their exoticism as they are 
visited and become more friendly; it also follows the process of “gentrification” of neighbourhoods by 
Western middle classes, who want to live close to “ethnics,” and “artists” until their mundane lives become 
too familiar [while the ethnics and artists get priced out of that local market].) If we substitute “the exotic” 
in general, for Lau’s term “the East,” as per Hammer’s analysis, her summary of this process is broadly 
applicable to much contemporary cultural consumption. 
Miller: Repurposing Religious Traditions 
From his point of view as an American Catholic theologian, Vincent Miller, in Consuming Religion, 
Christian Faith and Practice in a Consumer Culture, (2005) directs his attention not as much to the 
“borrower” of religious traditions—New Agers being the chief perpetrators--but to the impact of that 
borrowing on the traditions. Essentially, he laments that their meaning, especially the social justice import 
of Christianity, is lost when they are broken up into parts. Carrette and King (2005, 28) also stated this 
position: “While New Age followers... selectively ravage the feel-good fabric of ancient cultural and reli-
gious traditions, their disciplines and practices can easily isolate them from the resources of social justice 
and community, to be found within those same traditions.”  
Miller argues that cultural objects that are part of a religious tradition get their complete meaning only in 
their integral aspects. However, they are being extracted from their traditional socio/religious contexts as 
cultural innovators appropriate and insert them into the wider secular (or ‘spiritual’) culture. He asks how 
religion can survive in a social structure where culture is the product sold. He considers a wide range of 
communication and commodity relations theory to define the problem. He concludes that where “produc-
tion for exchange” is the organizing principle for society, religious communities are threatened. They are 
subjected to the fragmenting force of the economic machine that adopts and discards cultural novelty con-
tinuously. When the constituting elements of a religion, its rituals, symbols, material paraphernalia and 
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even theological ideas, are extracted from their contexts and their interdependent relations, and are pre-
sented to define identities, to sell products, or indeed are the products, they lose their meaning and capacity 
to unite people. 
Miller’s account of the economic background to this problem is consistent with Lau’s analysis and with my 
analysis of post-Fordism in Chapter Five. The market messages associated with products do not refer to the 
products themselves but to cultural attributes that are taken on as the identities of consumers. Accelerated 
borrowing and mixing of cultural contents emerges from the necessity of providing continuous (marginal) 
novelty in the potential identity markers, as per Roof, so consumption will continue. Miller understands that 
“the post-Fordist religious marketplace, like cable television, needs content” (Miller 2005, 78). In addition 
to the more abstract aspects for the information economy, religion’s physical objects are also broadly 
commodified. “There is a particular interest in paraphernalia of a size suitable for mass marketing--prayer 
beads... , jewellery and body adornments, bindis, henna tattoos, [etc.]” (Miller 2005, 78). 
In considering the specific issue of how commodity relations may shape the religious traditions that 
(mostly-involuntarily) provide that content, Miller is concerned about what happens to them in the process. 
Launching elements of the whole religious experience on the market degrades its experience and power.  
[W]hen cultural elements are encountered and engaged in commodified 
fashion—as floating, shallow, post-modern signifiers unrelated to one 
another or to particular communities and practices—interpretation and 
syntheses, no matter how sophisticated, will have little practical impact…. 
This is a profound problem for theology… Symbols [will] have no cultural 
friction, [and therefore cannot] impact the life of the believing community, 
and may be used in any context where they can facilitate the sale of 
something (including, for example, a ‘spiritual’ tourist package) (Miller 
2005, 66).  
Religious concepts can become commodities that reflect on non-religious activities and objects, encour-
aging “religious” engagement in a provisional and superficial way. Miller mirrors Carrette and King’s 
position as he considers the impact of “the Joseph Campbell Phenomenon.” The popular writer about re-
ligious motifs compiled others’ original work, providing a way for believers (particularly Catholics) to  
… re-appropriate (and de-parochialize) the symbolism of their own tradi-
tion. In the process, symbolism is freed from its communal and institu-
tional infrastructure. As a consequence, religion is tendered increasingly 
as private and individual…. Traditions are pillaged for their symbolic 
content, which is then repackaged and recontextualized in a way that jet-






Miller sums up the situation: “two things… are destabilized by the commodification of culture: a culture in 
which beliefs, symbols and practices had stable meanings; and communal and institutional infrastructures 
that linked these meanings to the practice of life” (Miller 2005, 143). What is lost is a common culture 
(Miller 2005, 70). Miller recognizes the vulnerability of traditional churches to secularization, and the spirit 
of bricolage and reconstitution of culture that dominates in this “post-modern” world. He is also aware that 
religious authorities alter their own traditions as they respond to commodifying impulse, and struggle with 
their diminished power due to secularization. Mary Jo Neitz (1987) identifies the same process in her study 
of Catholic charismatic movements. Religious leaders allow followers to “engage traditions as sources 
from which [to] draw [without] incurring an obligation for their maintenance” (Miller 2005, 213). 
Despite his ‘conservative’ aspiration to revive church-owned media, whose loss Roof described, Miller also 
reflects on possible counterforces to commodification. He proposes “creative appropriations” from one’s 
own tradition, for he does not object to “repurposing” cultural content per se. However, he strongly dis-
tinguishes between what is done to sell products and the use of religious content as a tool of resistance by 
oppressed people, such as what the liberation theologians aimed for among Central and South American 
marginal peoples (as per Orlando Espin’s efforts there) (Miller 2005, 166). He would also be sympathetic to 
the type of activity in which Falun Gong, a Chinese New Religious Movement engages in, in that country. 
Ming Xiao (2011) describes the group’s strategic use of cultural contents from the Chinese historical rep-
ertoire, in rhetorical debates with Chinese political authorities, so as to defend their religious freedom and 
personal safety against governmental oppression. Miller (2005, 167-72) also approves of the “repurposing” 
practiced in Spanish Harlem, as Robert Orsi (2010) describes it. Orsi studied the popular appropriation of 
religious traditions in Harlem New York, over most of a century (such as is demonstrated at the National 
Shrine of St. Jude, in Chicago).   
However, Miller clarifies that repurposing should not be merely instrumental—even if devoted to em-
powering the oppressed or to other social goods. It should have religious value to people. Religion is “a 
complex of practices, relationships and desires that entwine and secure the beliefs of the devout in their 
lives [and its value] cannot be tidily classified as purely liberative or simply repressive” (Miller 2005, 168). 
Commodity relations specifically hurt (or at least, greatly change) traditional religions, whether 
Judeo-Christian, Islamic or Hindu, because their traditions are given meaning through multi-faceted, col-
lective obligations and enactments accumulated and reflected on over time. They are grounded in histories 
and localities. They are virtually formulations of history and geography as well as of accounts of humanity 
struggling with social life in relation to a divine entity. If commodity relations specifically deny history and 
human struggle, their hegemony clearly strike a death knell for these traditions, barring their questionable 
contemporary reconstruction as very different entities and adapting religion to a new cultural reality and 
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environment. Again, this comment reflects the distinction between an historical worldview and the organic 
(or historist) one of neospirituality, as defined in the preceding chapter. 
Second Privatization: Religion for Production 
The above are important themes of the commodification of religion.
 
Despite the recent efforts of scholars to 
redirect research towards arguing for neospirituality’s autonomy, as discussed above, scholars such as 
Carrette and King remained undeterred. After raising the stakes in the commodification of religion debate 
by suggesting that as privatized religion neospirituality is specifically adapted to the immaterial economy, 
they advance to the thesis that this is but a stage or moment in a larger process, spirituality’s redeployment 
in the interests of capitalism. They call this movement the second privatization of religion. 
However, the discipline of psychology has been important in all stages of privatization. The authors directly 
link individualism, ‘psychologization,’ and neospirituality to capitalism. Psychologization is the process 
that mediates between the two worlds of economics and religion. In his highly theoretically contribution, 
Carrette (2007) claims that the discipline of psychology rose in importance as the model of society became 
more economistic, i.e., with post-Fordism. His argument is this: Capitalism seeks to satisfy human needs 
and desires through commodities. Commodities are always, by definition, owned—either by single indi-
viduals or corporate entities that distribute access to individuals. (This is as opposed to collective or public 
goods, where rights to access are informally-identified or weakly-enforced.) The discipline of psychology 
reinforces the commodification process because it supports the fundamental assumption of a commodi-
ty-based culture––that the unit of analysis in the social world is the single individual. “In short, psychology 
is a mechanism of a wider ideology of privatization and individualization [that creates] a form of subjec-
tivity built on the ideals of consumer freedom” (Carrette and King 2005, 56-57). 
By an extension of this argument, the transferral of religiosity from the group to the individual is an interim 
stage in its commodification, and the discipline of psychology has a role to play here. Since psychology 
supports the transition from religion to neospirituality, and because that resituation of religiosity into the 
individual psyche prepares for the commodification of religion, then the pre-eminence of psychology in 
public discourse is contributory to the commodification of religion. Essentially, Carrette and King (2005) 
contend that the psychologization of religion naturally leads to its commodification. Although the psy-
chological being is prior to the consumer, the former necessarily becomes the latter. Consistent with this 
argument is the fact that the most important contributor to religion’s commodification was the psychologist, 
Abraham Maslow (1976), who formulated it as a psychological phenomenon and as an attribute or quality 
of individuals. However, Western individualism has a much more extended history than this twenti-
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eth-century intervention. Prior to considering Maslow’s work, I will provide the definition of the modern 
psychological individual which grounds Carrette and King’s arguments. 
The Calvinist In-Worldly Individual  
Carrette and King (2005) suggest Christianity can be posed as an antidote to individualism. This seems 
contradicted by their accompanying point that individualism began with the Protestant Reformation. 
Moreover, Carrette and King (2005) support the view that Christianity inaugurated the radical idea of the 
individual person, and that Christianity has not been hostile to certain forms of individualism for many 
centuries. However, the contradiction can be resolved by understanding the unique nature of modern in-
dividualism. To flesh out their argument, Carette (2007) reviews an aspect of the history of the Western 
individual. They show that pre-reformation Christian individualism had an “outworldly theology,” and is 
different from the psychological individualism of today.  
It is not individualism as such which results in certain economic realities, 
but a specific ideological framing of individualism. Psychological indi-
vidualism is an in-worldly individualism, which serves particular ideo-
logical purposes… [There are] different forms of introspection. 
[S]elf-knowledge is stabilized for new forms of political economy. The 
history of introspection, from its pre-modern psychological roots to 
modern psychological measurement, reveals the epistemological separa-
tion of self-knowledge from out-worldly theology. (Carrette’s 2007, 
52-53) 
The “individual” we see in contemporary times was “established at least from the Enlightenment, but ar-
guably from the Protestant Reformation, which removed religion from the public to the private world” 
(Carrette 2007, 222).  
Louis Dumont (1986, 26-27) explains the creation of the “in-worldly” individual by post-Reformation 
Calvinism. Earlier Christians had had to weigh their personal concerns with what God wanted from them, 
making them out-worldly. For guidance, they looked to church officials as well as signs from their envi-
ronment. However, according to John Calvin (who followed Luther), God would no longer communicate 
through authorities, and nature too became mute. 
[W]ith Calvin the hierarchical dichotomy that characterized our field of 
consideration comes to an end; the antagonistic worldly element that in-
dividualism had hitherto to accommodate disappears entirely in Calvin’s 
theocracy. The field is absolutely unified. The individual is now in the 
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world, and the individual value rules without restriction or limitation. The 
in-worldly individual is before us (Dumont 1986, 53).
33
 
Following Dumont, Carrette explains that neither the pre-modern self, nor, consequently, his or her relig-
iosity, were well-contained. The private bounded self may have been unimaginable. It was believed that the 
self (or soul) might disappear, temporarily, or be fused with another’s consciousness for a period. By con-
trast, the contemporary self, is always extant (always there), distinguishable from the environment. What’s 
more, the modern spiritual view is that one’s spirituality is an attribute of one’s own self and is thereby 
contained.  
According to Dumont, Calvin constructed this self by effective “streamlining” what could be admitted as its 
substance. A Calvinist should have no recourse to claims of an absent self, no blurred lines between self and 
other, no ambiguity about what belonged to the self, so that there was correspondingly no escaping God’s 
judgement. It is a pitiless ethos. At the same time, as per Weber’s thesis (1985) (discussed in Chapter Five), 
God did not return the favour of self-revelation; his judgement was entirely opaque to the worshipper. It is 
for this reason that the Calvinist resorted to good works (in the capitalist’s view, becoming materially 
successful). Accordingly, the dilemma that preoccupied pre-Reformation Christians, being torn between 
the self’s interests and God’s, was overcome. Now, only the material domain could be perceived.  
The Modernized Psychological Individual 
The above describes a major development in the history of the modern individual’s formulation. However, 
individualism was also greatly advanced in the near-present, with the rise of psychology. Carl Jung 
(1875-1961) and Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) made important contributions to the process of individual-
izing and psychologizing religion (Carrette and King 2005, 72; Carrette 2007, 222). Then, in the founding 
of humanistic psychology, Rollo May (1978), Gordon Allport (1950), Eric Fromm (1978, 2004) Carl R. 
Rogers (1986), and Abraham Maslow (1976) shifted their attention from the study of pathological behavior 
to the study of healthy individuals (Lucas 1992, 201–02).  
Humanistic psychology portended the human potential movement and its “theoretical wing,” transpersonal 
psychology (Hanegraff 1996, 50). All ground “the extreme focus on the self, seen in the New Age as well as 
elsewhere in society” (Lucas 1992, 2000). Naturally, this attitude has been judged harshly by scholars of 
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personal interests. Robert Bellah et al’s Habits of the Heart (1985) is a seminal work, launching an influ-
ential critique of “the ‘therapeutic attitude’ for its emphasis on self-knowledge over community relation-
ships and on ‘full, open, honest communication’ over communal obligations and commitments” (Nadeson 
1999, 101). 
As a further affront to traditional religions, Maslow was the chief architect of recasting religious experience 
as a phenomenon independent of religion. He theorized the existence of “peak experiences” and 
“self-actualization” as independent of any reference to God or a transcendent entity (Carrette and King 
2005, 75). In discussing this point, Carrette distinguishes Maslow’s intention from that of philosopher and 
scholar of religion, William James (1880), who inspired Maslow. James intellectually separated “religious 
experience” from religions as a method of examining the former more effectively, whereas Maslow aimed 
for the entire theoretical extraction of spiritual experience from religion. Maslow gave “spiritual values… a 
naturalistic meaning, that [needed no] supernatural concepts to validate them” (Carrette 2007, 150).  
From Theological to Economic Accountability  
However, the person who has escaped being shaped by a religion (i.e., is not subjected to “theological 
accounting”) has not escaped any such shaping. “Once boundaries have been drawn around the self, once 
theological accounting of the self [has shifted] to the contemporary economic accounting, or auditing, the 
subject can be fixed for the economy” (Carrette 2007, 55). The individual developed in this way is prepared 
for consumerism––and to be a commodity. 
To be prepared for consumerism, one must know how to respond to calls for it. One must be alert to sug-
gestions of personal improvement or changes in one’s life. However, to be motivated to improve or change, 
one must understand oneself as a repository of attributes, the quantity and quality of which can be adjusted. 
This entails measuring oneself—registering a benchmark self against which acquisition can be tested. To be 
a ready consumer also requires understanding that acquisitions are dependant upon one’s own initiative in 
procuring them. To be a consumer is to have an opportunistic mentality. Only by seeing oneself as rela-
tively autonomous and responsible for the amalgam of personally-held qualities can one keep attention on 
the process of acquisition.  
More centrally, as per the neoliberal transformation of persons from sociological to entrepreneurial sub-
jects, mentioned earlier, the acquisition of qualities, in and of itself, is legitimate consumption. In the ne-
oliberal arena, workers become “active economic subjects, implemented, rationalized, and calculated by 
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the person who works” (Foucault 2008, 223).
34
 In this view, the wage then becomes “an income stream, 
which is a return on an investment, or more precisely, a return on ‘human capital’” (Schultz 1972).
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However, value can accrue to oneself by other means than through income. “Labor conceptualized in terms 
of human capital is thus not connected to paid work, but any activity that maximizes an individual’s po-
tential to secure any form of material or immaterial future return” (Foucault 2008, 226).
36
 From the ne-
oliberal viewpoint, work is considered one of a number of alternatives towards this goal, all “opportunities 
for the individual to work on and transform their initial investment of human capital with differ-
ent technologies of the self… by their own means or with the help of others …, in order to attain a certain 
state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality” (Foucault 1993, 203).
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Contemporary technologies of the self include cosmetic surgery, therapy, 
life-coaching, exercise, and of course, mindfulness training. Labor con-
ceptualized in terms of human capital is thus not considered to be paid 
work, but any activity that maximizes an individual’s potential to secure 
any form of material or immaterial future return: ‘Any activity that in-
creases the capacity to earn income, to achieve satisfaction, even migra-
tion, the crossing of borders from one country to another, is an investment 
in human capital’ (Read 2009, 28). In this manner, homo economicus 
shifts radically from being a ‘partner of exchange’ to an ‘entrepreneur of 
himself [sic]’ (Foucault 2008, 226).
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Thus, consumption in this culture importantly involves conscious self-production (which is discussed be-
low as spiritual prosumption)––hence the importance of immaterial capitalism. Experiences, for example, 
may be valued for what they add to the self, by changing her or him––not simply for momentary enjoyment, 
if they offer that as well.  
These processes of consumption for the purpose of self-development are parallel to what is enacted from 
the outside as one becomes engaged in the knowledge economy. For the neoliberal subject is acted on by 
both self and “the social order.” The “analytic of governmentality understands subjectivity in its dual sense 
—that is, to be subjected by a dominant influence and to be subjectivated by one’s own effort and con-
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data, at the broadest level demographic, but becoming ever-more-refined as one engages with the digital 
world. Attributes or qualities are added (while others are dropped or subordinated) to a repository or profile. 
Derived from consumption, institutional or online use, one’s actions are continually registered, interpreted 
and correlated. This may occur anywhere that personal data is collected (with major exceptions for areas 
that are pointedly sequestered from this scrutiny, such as medical data, in the normal course of events.) This 
measurement was performed crudely by independent market studies in the past, but with computer-based 
media, use can be gauged directly. At the same time, precise user profiles can be developed and turned 
around on the user as targeted advertising and other enticements to further consumption (CBC: Ira Basin 
interview, Feb 15, 2016). Meanwhile state surveillance systems bank massive amounts of personal data, 
ready to be searched, if justified, so as to pinpoint or explicate any recorded individual’s actions or utter-
ances (Diebert 2013). 
Thus, data collection is a routine aspect of the institutional rationalization of the self that must be performed 
in an information economy. For, to be put to financial advantage, knowledge about people must be 
mathesized—processed to be reducible to a mathematical equation (Carrette 2007, 183). For this to work, 
attributes must be located in individual selves, each autonomous, bounded and divested of encroaching 
social ties. Hence, the consumer is the measurable self, and is therefore measured, and sold to marketers 
(Smythe 1981).  
Like Calvin, these systems rely on the assumption that characteristics are fully contained by, and so fully 
attributable to, the individual. People are measured as individuals. This epistemological extraction of the 
person from his associations—this streamlining of the self—is necessary so that he or she can be known 
(without intimacy) as a compilation of data, a profile. If profiled, each individual is a unique set of scores, 
unrelated to other individuals, on standard or esoteric measures.  
The measures are necessarily a function of the research question. Selves are modelled according to the 
concerns of funding institutions (Irvine, Miles and Evans 1981). That no statistical study or profile grasps 
the whole self is a normal understanding within the social sciences. Moreover, the selves described, either 
for juridical, administrative, or commercial processes, are massed and “played back” as sociological 
knowledge, shaping collective self-imagery. This is another norm in modern society (Giddens 1991).  
Carrette and King call this process the mathesization of the self. Carrette does not entirely reject the re-
ductions that create this accountable self. However, he believes we should be cognizant that this form 
leaves out the full story about persons. Indeed, what is left represents “the blurring of the value-laden 
conditions of introspection and the closure of a space to control and limit analysis” (Carrette 2007, 59). If 
overbearing, these feedback processes can highly limit the individual self-reflexive capabilities. “Such 
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strategies are not about revealing the truth of being human, but rather the stabilization of a certain truth of 
the human being for a new type of society based upon an instrumental rationality of calculation for effi-
ciency and control” (Carrette 2007, 54). With these objections, Carrette is validating Michel Foucault’s 
(1980) well-known summary of the situation: “The individual is a social category of government” (quoted 
in Carrette 2007, 60).  
Above, I discussed neoliberal governance–– the political context of the information society. I noted that this 
governance is expected to compensate for the reduction of government (which is discussed in detail in 
Chapter Five), whose effect is that services once offered to citizens at minimal cost (i.e., were paid for by 
taxation) are put out for tender to profit-making or not-for-profit bodies. Moreover, many of the services 
formerly offered publicly were addressed to creating equality of living standards broadly. Because capi-
talist economies tend to concentrate wealth, this withdrawal of governmental compensatory programs in-
evitably results in deficient quality of life for some. As explained above, governments authorize service 
agencies to address these deficiencies––but not necessarily by correcting them. Rather, they are tasked with 
motivating those who suffer them to correct their “problems” themselves––either imaginatively or actually, 
through increased competitiveness. This is the essential underpinning of the “therapeutic society.” The 
therapeutic self, discussed further below, defines life deficiencies as personally correctable. This discussion 
of neoliberal governance reveals it to be the link between the mathecization of the self and therapeutic 
culture. As I explained above, Carrette and King also argue that the “methodological individualism” of 
psychology is an interim step to translating social life to generalized commodity relations. By their reck-
oning, Maslow’s work advancing “psychologization” lays the groundwork for this mathesized––and so 
commodified––self. This is because making the spiritual into an attribute of, or something possessed by, 
the self, was a necessary step in the process of creating the individual that could be subject to general 
commodification (Carrette 2007, 53-57). Effectively the connection to community had to be broken first; in 
this case, to a religious community. The meaning of the spiritual person can be assessed without reference 
to his or her connections, whether communal or divine. 
Effectively, we might see “personal spirituality” as the label for the unique valuation that a person makes of 
their world. Ironically, if the content of a person’s spirituality can be talked about, articulated, or otherwise 
discerned, it can then be inserted into the commodification process. 
The new patterns of introspection are playing with a consumer mentality 
which Maslow—somewhat innocently—initiates in his work, a consumer 
mentality that creates notions of ‘religion’ and the ‘spiritual’ inside the 
psychological for redistribution. This redistribution occurs by bringing 
experience into the ‘realm of human knowledge’, that is to make it ‘ob-
jective,’ ‘public’ and shared’ (Carrette 2007, 55). 
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The therapeutic process brings these values to consciousness. It is a compliment to mathesization. Therapy 
is the means by which individuals reflect on, internalize and publicize the qualities they discern in their 
subtle awareness. Eva Illouz (2004) calls it “the quantification of emotional interest.” Since articulable 
self-knowledge is a commodity in the post-Fordist economy, and accrues value to the holder if deployed, 
Illouz calls the new economic structure “emotional capitalism” (Illouz 2004, 60). We will see later the 
operation of emotional capitalism in workplaces. 
The spiritual self might be seen not so much as the product of individualism as the process of individual-
izing. Articulating the exact content of one’s self-understanding is possibly the ultimate form of 
self-differentiation. Carrette (2007) would agree with Illouz, as he claims that spiritual introspection, en-
acted through the therapeutic process is tied to quantifying the self for consumer society. It is a language for 
articulating consumer preference in an immaterial economy.  
There may be a fundamental difference between the expected returns on consumption in a world where 
most goods are material and more or less functional, and one where they are immaterial (conceptu-
al/ideational) or a service (abstract). We already know that prosumption operates in the immaterial 
economy. Consumers are forced into producing (improving, repairing, offering personal data etc.) in order 
to use, or in the process of using, consumer goods. However, we can now posit a trajectory towards in-
creasing degrees of intimacy or personal tailoring in prosumption. Along this path, we proceed from the 
more impersonal prosumptive tasks, such as assembling a piece of furniture bought as parts in a box, then 
advancing towards prosumptive activities that involve tailoring a process or product to one’s own prefer-
ences or particular needs––such as setting up a desired level of difficulty in a video or computer game. This 
trajectory towards more intimate tailoring continues to the point of inversion of act and acted upon–– i.e., 
spiritual prosumption, as introduced in Chapter One. Here, the self is altered in the process of consumption, 
and what is explicitly sold on the market is the medium of that transformation. This might be called 
“self-prosumption,” as the self is consumed as well as produced—i.e., reproduced––in the act. However, A. 
Dawson’s adds another element to make it “spiritual-prosumption.” This is the transitory process––the 
movement “from a to b," which justifies the perception of “direct (physical and emotional) or indirect 
(employment and living conditions) betterment” (A. Dawson 2013, 138). That transition is “the product.” 
Through this process, the change that is produced via consumption is a change to oneself. To acquire new 
attributes, the self must be transported to a new place (a more meaningful place?). Consumption is there-
fore equivalent to advancing along a spiritual trajectory.  
As discussed above, this is a particular kind of spirituality. The in-worldly individual, freed since the 
Reformation from adjudicating between personal desires and outer signs of God’s direction, makes the self 
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centuries, say Carrette and 
King (2005), by capitalism. Neospirituals’ and liberal religionists’ refusal of Christian domination does not 
mean they can escape any domination, as they hope; belief in the infinitely-malleable and unencumbered 
psychological self is an illusion (Carrette and King 2005, 77). Once introspective knowledge is anchored 
according to an in-worldly individualism and the individual is abstracted from the interrelated needs of the 
wider community, systems of political and economic control then provide the mirror for the self. The choice 
involves 
an adoption of another authority and another system of constraint. In the 
very act of freeing the mind from the dogma of religion, consumers now 
entered the thought-control of individualism. Rejection of the Church, the 
synagogue and the temple is replaced by the new authoritarianism of the 
market and capital. Spiritual self-actualisation is a market actualisation, 
clever in its very concealment (Carrette and King 2005, 77-78).  
A precondition for spiritual prosumption is the individually accountable individual (theorized by Maslow, 
for instance). Once the individual can be accounted for in terms of a number of attributes, he or she can be 
slotted into an accounting system, whether, as noted, it is consumerist or bureaucratic. Since, by definition, 
spiritual prosumption is realized through market relations, we could say that spiritual prosumption is 
consumerist accounting of/for the self via the therapeutic process. 
Carrette’s position that Maslow’s “peak experiences,” held to evoke passion and feeling, are the vehicles 
for the formation of the commodified self seems to be the ultimate irony. However, the idea that mystical 
experiences realize or confirm a prior worldview is not foreign to scholars of religion. They recognize that 
these events are interpreted through the imagery and language of the mystic’s own religious beliefs. This 
being the case, what, then, could be the content of a peak experience of an atheist, or of one whose religious 
vision regularly shifts? In a consumer society, these environments are continually altered. For example, it is 
no less common for participants in a large, popular-music concert to achieve a sense of collective absorp-
tion and ecstasy than it is for successful meditators to do so. Peak experiences, or periods of “flow” 
(Czitzenthihalyi 2007) appear to be relatively common in this entertainment-oriented world. However, the 
embracing environment for such a succession of environments as the concert and the meditation hall might 
be the economy that processes the commodity form.  
Carrette (2007, 160) tells us Maslow came to regret the uses to which his theory of self-actualization was 
put, including at Esalen. “He was concerned about the ‘over-extreme, dangerous and one-sided’ use of his 
work and believed he had been ‘too imbalanced toward the individualist and too hard on groups, organi-
zations and communities.’” He modified his “peak experiences” term to “plateau experiences.”  
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However, in Carrette’s view, “Maslow’s efforts to reposition his psychology also faced calamity when he 
saw how his work inspired the privileged culture of capitalism. [Failing to realize that] his hierarchy of 
needs was a hierarchy of capitalist values, and that the idea of ‘self-actualization’… was locked into a 
fundamental individualism and motivation of capital,” Maslow tried to argue that the poor can be 
self-actualized too (Carrette 2007, 160-161). The founder of est, Erhardt, disagreed. Michael York (1995, 
56) supplements Young’s (1987, 142) observation that est followers come from the liberal and intellectual 
classes of North America and Western Europe, by adding: “The appeal to these various people is explained 
as a search for satisfaction in lives otherwise evaluated as successful. As Erhardt explains, satisfaction is not 
the concern of hungry people.” 
However, prior to his regrets, from the 1950s to the 1970s, Maslow worked to theoretically contain spir-
ituality in the individual. In doing so, he made a tentative rapprochement with experimenters at the Big Sur 
California, Esalen Institute. As a secular humanist, Maslow’s first contact with a mystical approach to 
self-actualization occurred there in the early 1960s (Alexander 1992, 36). Scholars have differences of 
opinion as to the relationship of Maslow’s humanism, the New Age, and “transpersonal psychology.”
39
 At 
Esalen, experimenters explored both Eastern Yoga practices and Fritz Perls’ Gestalt therapy. The Esalen 
practitioners corrected (precursor to New Age) New Thought’s emphasis on the mind as dominant in 




Other scholars indicate that transpersonal psychology added to humanistic psychology a spiritual dimen-
sion, such as “personal experiences that go beyond the usual range of humanistic investigations” [Campbell 
2007, 95]). In transpersonal psychology, “interest in self-actualization developed into a concern with 
‘soul-actualization” (Alexander 1992, 38). Marylin Ferguson (1980) noted that the “transpersonal per-




39 “Activities and interests under this rubric include hypnosis and clairvoyance, spiritualism, and mediumship, 
psychical research and survival issue, parapsychology and ESP, and such diverse esoteric schools as Anthroposophy 
(Rudolph Steiner), Rosicrucians, and an interest in past lives” (York 1995, 46). 
40 In 1964, the first Gestalt training workshop was held at Esalen by Perls’ students. Perls had learned of the impact of 
the body on the mind from his analyst, Wilhelm Reich, in Frankfurt, prior to the fifties and founded Gestalt Therapy 
Institutes in America from the 1960s onward. Reich called his study bioenergetics. (Alexander 1992, 39-40) 
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Considering Maslow’s intervention through to the addition of a supposed mystical dimension, via the ho-
listic transpersonal psychology, we might ask whether these developments show a return to “religion, 
proper,” with implications for compassionate behaviour, which Maslow had, arguably, undermined. 
Apologists for this belief system contend that they do. However, if so, it is with “a twist.” Carrette and King 
deny that it has restored what was lost in the Christian worldview, or that transpersonal psychology re-
turned spirituality to it collective origins, from the privatization that humanistic psychology and the human 
potential movement supposedly advanced. Rather, “despite its considerable promise as an antidote to 
psychological individualism…, transpersonal psychology maintains the technical language of religion, but 
locates such experiences in [essentially individualistic] human potential and states of consciousness” 
(Carrette and King 2005, 72). Transpersonal psychology was unable to make an adequate transition back to 
language of collectivity--which is why it does not inspire collective movements, and also why, in its optic, 
spirituality emerges as a product of religious fragmentation and eclecti-
cism, hidden in the psychological structures of individualism. It is a box 
without content, because the content has been thrown out, and what is left 
is a set of psychological descriptions with no referent (Carrette and King 
2005, 73).  
Carrette (2007) suggests by the above that once a common ethos is ceded in favour of individual experience 
and interests, thereby subordinating collective considerations, restoring a sense of responsibility to the 
group is not easily accomplished. Doing so demands the complete reconstruction of an ethical system, the 
content that is absent from the box, and integrating it somehow in community relations. Carrette and King 
(2005, 77) suggest that these contents must relate to meaning at a social level and, therefore to belonging. 
Otherwise, it lacks the basis of a viable religion. 
After Maslow, spirituality became the new addiction for the educated, white middle classes… the new 
cultural Prozac, bringing transitory feelings of ecstatic happiness and thoughts of self-affirmation, but never 
addressing sufficiently the underlying problem of social isolation and injustice. In an environment where 
many experience a lack of meaning in their lives, spirituality offers a cultural sedative providing individual 
rapture (Carrette and King 2005, 77).  
In Carrette and King’s view, the loss of a sense of collective identity is the most deleterious implication of 
psychologized religion. The loss proves, for them, that it is commodified, and not genuine religion. 
Different ‘Wholes’ in the Global Capitalist New Age 
Leinberger and Tucker (1991) provide substance to the theory of the “second privatization” of religion 
thesis by defining the important contemporary condition of its implementation. They diagnose the process 
through which workers are led to accept the contemporary corporation as the “whole” that consolidates 
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their religiosity. Their analysis (like Carrette and King’s) does not apply to all workers in this economy, 
who are not, in any case, universally encouraged to adopt a spiritual orientation or exposed to programming 
to encourage this. It applies to a broad, somewhat elevated category of workers who, as I have argued, and 
will clarify further in a later chapter, are the “classic,” or “iconic” post-Fordist workers in this new 
economy. As I explained in Chapter One, they–– the symbolic analysts––are generally technically-skilled, 
and do creative work with relative autonomy. The characteristics of their work are fully examined in later 
chapters. 
Leinberger and Tucker (1991) explain that management’s encouragement of humanistic language in 
workplaces (which primarily posits that workers should feel empowered by their work), while actually 
running workplaces according to the old human resources (HR) principles of emotionally manipulating 
employees in the interests of company profits, requires careful direction of employee expectations so that 
their aspirations appear to mesh with corporate goals. As these authors’ see the situation, through actions on 
company culture, HR professionals and managers cast the company as the organism with the most legiti-
mate aspiration to its own self-realization (with the support of workers). Workers then see themselves as 
resources devoted to sustaining the subjecthood of the corporation (Nadesan 1999). The company becomes 
then a psytopia, or psychological utopia, according to the authors. Leinberger and Tucker (1991), and 
Nadesan (1999), explain the basic conundrum. Lip-service paid to the employee’s self-actualization pre-
vents their being managed simply as members of groups. At least superficially, the aspirations of each 
individual must be honoured. However, a business corporation is not a provisional association of individ-
uals temporarily supporting/exploiting each other in pursuit of their own goals. The corporation acts as an 
entity, and its survival depends on its performance according to exacting business parameters. A business’s 
brand focusses or refines how it aims to succeed in the marketplace. Companies aim for superiority on the 
basis of service, innovation, quality and/or price. For example, while IBM may compete on service, 
Hewlett-Packard may compete on price. None of these can be the personal goal of an employee. At best, the 
latter can only be temporarily-aligned or ancillary to any corporate goal (while shared profits, of which 
these workers often partake, may compensate for misalignment). The idea of “pull,” discussed below––
which implies that the company follows the (personal) objectives of (carefully-selected) employees, at least 
for a time, does not seem credible under these conditions. Hence, in order for a personal goal to be conflated 
with a corporate goal, a process of translation of corporate to personal goals must occur. 
Leinberger and Tucker (1991) feel that the historical culture of Post-Fordist workplaces, first populated by 
the residues of counterculturalists and New Agers, accounts for why managers must pay lip service to 
employee actualization. Although this narrow attribution somewhat overlooks the larger cultural context of 
broad pursuit of self-actualization and autonomy that would have brought these values to workplaces in any 
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case, there was a concentration of efforts to make work actually empowering and autonomous at an earlier 
stage of post-Fordist implementation, which I document in Chapter Seven. Organizational activists and 
managers responded to aspirations inside and outside companies and sparked a period of organizational 
experimentation that inculcated humanist values in companies. Employees continue to insist that they be 
personally empowered. However, what happens in fact is a major restriction of the term empowerment. As 
a result, according to Leinberger and Tucker (1991, 193), an elaborate apparatus of worker psychic condi-
tioning is necessary. The manager “must find ways to adjust humanistic values to commercial ones…. The 
result is a systematic conflation of instrumentalism (HR) and irrationalist humanism.” 
As noted earlier, Lordon (2014) calls the the alignment process “co-linearization.” He argues that the 
“coaching” operation, found either in special consultations or workshops, or fulfilled by the “team-leader” 
as a matter of course in team culture, is the prime operation for effecting this transposition. As will be 
shown in a later chapter, the nature of workplaces in this economy requires a high degree of employee 
autonomy, which the conviction of empowerment necessarily supports. It is essential that workers require 
little specific direction to exert creativity and energy in doing their jobs. “Employees who occupy them-
selves of their own accord… is uncontestably the greatest success of the neoliberal co-linearization pro-
gram” (53). Coaches are skilled at helping employees (including high-level managers) redefine problems 
stemming from objective conditions of their work––over which they have little control––into personal 
problems they can try to address. The primary goal of their intervention with the coachee is to “transform an 
exogenous pressure into an andogenous motivation” (98). They are led to understand that “what happens to 
them inside the enterprise cannot be called into question—only how they deal with it can” (99). 
In addition to coaching, hi-tech behemoths, such as Google Inc., have additional procedures and discourses 
that also help align employee and corporate interests. Prior to this process, however, Google acknowledges 
discordant interests by offering workers a segment of their working day to freely work on their own projects 
(assumed to be for eventual company exploitation). This is known as a “20% time” program (Cruz 2016, 
64). The acknowledgement of different interests is somewhat contradicted, however, by the adaptations that 
Google has made in its employee mindfulness program. “Search Inside Yourself” (SIY), as it is named, 
asks meditators to “find aspects of their relationship with work that are out of alignment and work with 
management to address them; it promises to help workers reach a place where ‘your work will become a 
source of your happiness’” (Chade-Meng 2012, 139).
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(2012, 135) drew on Mihaly Csikszenmihalyi’s (1988) concept of “flow” in suggesting that “aligning 
ourselves with our work through mindfulness can help us achieve a ‘state of peak performance…, being 
completely involved in an activity for its own sake’” (Cruz 2016, 65-66). Meng’s “pithy summary of the 
primary objective of his program is simple: ‘Optimize Thyself’” (Chade-Meng 2012, 17).
42 
The contradiction is acknowledged by organizational theorists Tom Peters and Robert J. Waterman’s 
(1982), in their immensely popular management text, In Search of Excellence.
 
This business book asserts 
that “a chief attribute of excellent companies is productivity through people. It is the old conundrum of 
human relations: The most effective means is to treat people as ends.” The authors add, “The rationalized 
employment relationship misses out on a key value driver in the postindustrial economy: employee com-
mitment and loyalty. As such [they say], organizations ought to instill the workforce with strong senti-
mental attachments to the business enterprise” (Peters and Waterman 1982 112). 
Human resource philosophy and practices emerged from a particular interpretation of the Hawthorne ex-
periments by Elton Mayo in the late 1920s and early 1930s. These researchers discovered greater produc-
tivity when workers were given an opportunity to collaborate on how to do their work. However, instead of 
pursuing the actual worker empowerment that this implied, the HR profession worked on creating an ap-
pearance of consultation and personal concern. In fact, paying attention to workers’ emotional needs in this 
way was for purely instrumental purposes, a means to better motivate workers (Leinberger and Tucker 
1991, 191-92). 
There was a break from using this philosophy during the post-war expansion (when economic growth, 
leading to good wages, made it unnecessary) and throughout the 1970s and the early 1980s, when organi-
zational innovation was sincerely attempted. In Chapter Seven, I discuss this latter period and the largely 
failed attempts of organizational theorists and job-redesigners, such as W. Edwards Deming (1986) and 
Chris Argyris (1964) (guided by Maslow’s thought) to make workplaces genuinely more humane, and 
workers empowered.  
However, in the 1980s, the HR philosophy and practices that developed in the early 20
th
 century returned to 
workplaces. The booms were over, and accountants regained their traditional places as regimenting con-
trollers of company operations. By the time of this revival, however, the HR philosophy had to be melded, 
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interregnum. According to Leinberger and Tucker (1991, 192-195), this fusion creates contradictions in 
company culture that must be glossed over for employee acceptance. The mystification necessary to make 
this work is one of holding the company up as a spiritual entity in and of itself. The logically-inconsistent 
discourses are combined to create an ideology of the corporation as organism, as “the whole” around which 
all human activity orients. In the end, according to Leinberger and Tucker, this “elision” of the two con-
tradictory philosophies has created a more extreme, but yet a more subtle state of instrumentalism in 
workplaces. 
The world of New Age or neospirituality outside of corporations, religion in its first stage of privatization, 
might be considered an embryonic psytopia. I have already documented some of the elements of the New 
Age’s emergence in parallel with humanistic psychology, transpersonalism, and the human potential 
movement. However, as theorized by Leinberger and Tucker, the concept of the corporate psytopia adds 
aspects to and supports Carrette and King’s thesis of a second privatization of religion. Tucker and Lein-
berger make a distinction very similar to Carrette and King’s, between the first and second privatization, 
but, again, make the process more concrete for us.  
The casting of the corporation as a kind of spiritual organism is certainly an extension of the corporation’s 
legal status in American law as “a person.” However, how can a company be seen as “a soul”? Of course, an 
organization is essentially a social system, but “the organizational model for humanizers becomes a much 
more nearly psychological one, sanctioned by the ineradicable American habit of personifying organiza-
tions[;] at its most extreme, this model of the organization becomes, in effect, a psychic projection” 
(Leinberger and Tucker1991, 193). Peters and Waterman (1982) acknowledge this. They declare the sin-
gular mark of an excellent company to be a company’s “‘acceptance of the limits of rationality.’”
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The corporation, inscribed as a person, must be “endowed with a psyche,” as part of the process of 
transmuting the aspirations of employees to personally self-actualize into an effort to help the company do 
so. The corporation becomes the only actual agent as employees’ sense of personal agency is reassigned to 
the corporation (Nadesan 1999, 17). In Nadesan’s view, this means that because the corporation’s “life 
force” actually comes “from its entrepreneurial-like employees[, a] critical reading of this discourse reveals 
a tendency for individuals to be seen as ‘soft,’ ‘corporate assets’ ready to be engineered to enhance ‘cor-
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When contemporary efforts to humanize the workplace are assimilated, covertly or overtly, to the instru-
mentalist goals of the far older human-relations movement, they promise an even more totalizing machine 
in the form of an even more encompassing personification: the organization as artificial psyche (Tucker and 
Leinberger 1991, 195). 
Organizational behaviour theorist Eric Berne’s 1963 publication, Games People Play: The Basic Handbook 
of Transactional Analysis, demonstrates the veracity of this claim. He initiated a therapeutic discourse for 
corporations, suggesting that corporations could be seen as organisms which “might need therapy.” Addi-
tionally, a 1987 publication, F.R. Kets de Vries and Danny Miller’s Unstable at the Top, is a “full-blown 
recent view of organizations as psyches” (Tucker and Leinberger 1991, 195). 
Although workplaces are supposed to be humanized for the benefit of workers, worker energies are instead 
devoted to humanizing an inanimate entity. Since this is an absurdity, “psychic apparatus” is devoted to 
mystifying the situation. For, if “the organizational is not enough of a person [, and so] wants a little hu-
manizing…, the only way to go about such a thing is through more artifice, more systems of control, 
however diaphanous or ‘non-directive’” (Tucker and Leinberger 1991, 195). I show in later chapters and 
introduce below that many of the new forms of work organization that survived from the innovative period 
have now become icons of employee actualization but, arguably, not its reality. They do, however, embody 
processes that require considerable emotional commitment and energy from workers. These efforts might 
be seen as the resources that vivify the corporation. 
Within the contemporary understanding of the modern corporation, the belief that workers are 
self-actualized extends to the view—mentioned above and to be discussed in more detail later––that an 
employee’s pursuit of his or her own goal(s) can “pull” a company along. Workers are hired for their abil-
ities to “pull” the corporation in the direction of the workers’ own interests. In the light of the resolution 
claimed above, between the company’s and the worker’s objectives, this idea provokes immediate skepti-
cism. Carette and King (2005, 134-35) reject the idea that the worker leads, and they implicate neospiritual 
programs and discourse at work, precisely, in the misrepresentation of the relationship:  
Thus, while claiming to be ‘alternative’…, the goal is to align the em-
ployee’s personal mission with that of the organization for which they 
work. This is an attempt at thought control, further facilitated through the 
use of ‘mood altering techniques’ in staff-development seminars devoted 
to ‘exploring the spiritual dimensions of life.’ 
Lisa Goldschmidt-Salamon (2001) has a slightly-different view of the site of the godhead in the corpora-
tion, but her focus is on corporate CEOs. In their holistic worldview, the “whole” they relate to is the world 
that global capitalism embraces. This, however, is different from the global community. Having global 
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concerns used to be referred to as “internationalism.” Fordist citizens were inspired by the “universalist 
ideals” of the (waning, imperial) world. But the contemporary idea is different. A global corporate CEO, as 
a model of a world administrator, has provisional loyalty to a whole that nevertheless lacks a formal-
ly-articulated system of political representation (i.e., through government) and demands little or nothing of 
them in terms of extent and responsibilities within that commitment.  
This cosmology of the New Age-type [of globalism] is ‘self-religious,’ 
and whilst sometimes voicing Universalist ideals, it is not practically in-
terested in modernist universal programmes of large-scale, organized or-
der-creation and human equality. It is concerned with the individual living 
in a corporate community. [This] tends to commodify identity into what I 
want to call instant identity; a non-obliging access to short-term, but 
highly intensive communitas, that can be cast away and replaced with the 
next move of career (Goldschmidt Salamon 2001,168). 
One can sense the psychologistic processes in this description. Group association is achieved (in the context 
of temporary association) through identification or empathy, which can wane. This kind of identification 
with the group does not require sustained commitment of resources based on principled decisions to sup-
press self-interest for the greater good, as many international governmental programs promote (at least in 
theory). We can logically extend this explanation back to the other case, which Leinberger and Tucker 
outline, where “the whole” focussing employee energies—the corporation—is at a lower register but in the 
same relation to them as global capitalism is to corporate CEOs. The energies of workers, theoretically 
expended for self-realization, are transferred along with the conferral of “spiritual agent’ status, upward. 
The recognition of an embracing whole is an emotional process—a psychological identification—which 
endures for the length of time the material association continues. Then, presumably, in the worker’s case, it 
is transferred to a new collective entity, a new corporation that acts as the whole, as the worker is employed 
anew. This is Goldschmidt-Salamon’s “instant identity.” 
As Lau (2000) and Hammer (2001, 2004) explained, New Agers evoke real or fantastic pre-modern (or 
time-travelling) cultures as foci of their aspirations for unity, and the innocence and purity of the imagined 
world is felt to be conferred back on their own lives. However, the object to which innocence or natural 
power is attributed must continue to be either exotic (named, but elusive) or entirely mysterious. In the case 
of successive New Age manifestations (i.e., “metaphysical religions”), the projection has to be redirected 
from one fantasy world to another as believers became more “worldly” (Lau 2000; Albanese 2007).   
In other words, if the imputation of innocence is lost, “the exotic” must be redefined. This may be the 
meaning of urging managers to recognize “the limits of rationality.” They can exploit irrationality and 
project a mysterious character on workplaces. Carrette and King (2005) discuss an aspect of this as delib-
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erate corporate branding of the company as spiritual. I will discuss many of the organizational features of 
SA work in later chapters (such the common pretense that “work is play”) that also contribute to the mys-
tification of corporate purposes. In general, the need to maintain a company’s (and the CEO’s) mystique 
under pressure of the contradictory obligations to workers and corporate profits, which Leinberger and 
Tucker describe, likely accounts for why Peters and Waterman also strongly assert the CEOs must be 
charismatic (Peters and Waterman, 1982). The “inspired” leaders of corporations, such as Richard Branson, 
Bill Gates, for a period, and, of course, Apple Inc.’s Steve Jobs, “displaying the qualities of religious 
leaders,” help this animation process (Carette and King 2005, 159) In representing themselves in this he-
roic, or guru-like way, they no doubt help maintain the corporation’s mystique. 
That these leaders influence the self-perception of workers by their model is suggested by a theory of good 
management practices offered by psychologist Steven Reischer (2002). He claims that good leaders are 
“entrepreneurs of identity.” The leader must be sufficiently like the worker to be identified with. Leaders 
“can articulate our values; be prototypical…; represent for us what our values are.” Furthermore, to 
maintain worker interest, the leader must continually remake him- or her-self. 
Leinberger and Tucker’s text is really about generations. Because they were the children of “organization 
men,” (i.e., of Fordist managers and “bureaucrats’), the authors call the New Age baby boomers the or-
ganization offspring. These were the agitators for the humanistic workplaces mentioned above, in keeping 
with their rejection of their parents’ perceived subjugation to their roles in Fordist corporations. However, 
the younger members of the baby boom cohort participated in the transition from celebrating the 
self-actualization of the personal self to that of the corporation. As these younger members began to attend 
business schools and move into workplaces a decade or two after the older ones, they found, in their new 
employer, a different “corporate person” to work with than their older siblings had found. For, if the cor-
poration could be seen as a psyche, as Tucker and Leinberger muse, it could take on particular forms of that 
psyche. As post-Fordism advanced into the 1980s, and managers freed of Fordist restrictions transferred 
their efforts from making industrial consumer products and maintaining high levels of employment, as 
agreed upon with governments, that psyche began to develop an ego. In that case, the powerfully-energized 
neoliberal corporation may have simply been too overbearing a personality for workers to resist. Write 
Leinberger and Tucker (1991, 196): “If, for many of the older members of the (post-Fordist) generation, the 
‘self’ became the measure of the organization, for many of the younger members, it would be the other way 




As I noted earlier, Taves and Kinsella (2013) identify three successive trends in the study of New Age 
religiosity. These are as individualistic religion, as a product of commodification, and as a religion with a 
networked organizational structure. We considered the network structure in the preceding chapter. Now we 
have considered both individualism, and how it leads to commodification. The works discussed in the 
second section of this chapter, taken together, paint a compelling portrait of the commodification of religion 
as neospirituality. Whereas religion scholars described the marginal differentiation of new religions pro-
liferating from mid-century, Roof anatomized this process occurring for religion-in-general through 
commodity-production (rendering neospirituality). Lau’s work shows how holism makes New Age spir-
ituality amenable to capitalist commodification and how spiritual products can be marketed via their ten-
dency to refer to exotic worlds--simple, non-alienated places where the individual feels a unity with his or 
her environment, not challenged by contradictions and social constructs. Miller’s work demonstrates how 
traditional integrally-related religious icons, symbols and practices are pulled from these relationships and 
placed in incongruous relation to elements from other traditions as they all provide the ideal raw material 
for commodification in a high-circulation, immaterial capitalist economy.  
Important as these analyses are, however, I moved beyond these arguments to discuss theoretical presen-
tations of neospirituality as an ingredient in production. I provided Carrette and King’s philosophically 
profound and historically extended argument as to how religion was prepared, by individuation, privatiza-
tion and psychologization to be entirely subsumed by capital. The other side of this process is that “We are 
now seeing… the tailoring of those individualized spiritualities to fit the needs of corporate business culture 
in its demands for an efficient, productive and pacified workforce” (Carrette and King 2005, 29). Nadeson, 
Goldschmidt-Salamon and Tucker and Leinberger deepen this argument, by showing why and by what 
mechanisms the corporation becomes “the whole” for the workers within it. Finally, Andrew Dawson’s 
concept of spiritual prosumption provides the bridge between the roles of neospirituality in consumption 
and that in production. Indeed, as we will see in later chapters, workers in iconic post-Fordist sites, pro-
ducers of immaterial products and services, must continually transform themselves to provide, access and 
understand the cultural material that is the raw resource of post-Fordist production. 
The next chapter reviews the industry literature on spirituality in the workplace. Although it is huge, re-
flecting the degree to which spirituality is promoted there, a selection of key texts from among it show that, 
although the scholars attempt to grapple with moral and political-economic issues in relation to this rather 
anomalous phenomenon in a supposedly modern and technocratic world, the approaches they take, in 
general, are circumscribed and unable to reach the kinds of comprehensive analysis that the above scholars 
provide. It is to these presentations that we now turn.  
103 
 
Chapter Four: Spirituality at Work  
Introduction 
In Chapter Two I discussed the beliefs and practices of neospirituality. In Chapter Three I explored the 
relationship between capitalism and neospirituality, considering both commodification and production as 
theorized by religion scholars. I tracked the progressive realization of religion’s privatization (which ne-
ospirituality expresses) from its implication in consumption, to its engagement in spaces of production. I 
proceeded from showing spirituality to be a good marketing message or product, to assessing its capacity to 
socialize workers when inserted into the production process.  
In this chapter, I consider spirituality in the workplace as presented by industry scholars. This review il-
lustrates that the association between new workplaces and neospirituality is robust and continuing. New 
Age and spirituality programs and language have indeed been introduced into workplaces by managers for 
a number of decades. The programs are well-accepted by global corporations, though the degree to which 
employees embrace these programs is not fully known. Organizational and management theorists have 
already created a legacy literature about them. University-based business programs teach the ‘whys’ and 
‘wherefores’ of spirituality in the workplace.  
Historical Summary 
Throughout the latter part of the twentieth century and since, much has been written from manage-
ment-oriented sources about how to introduce, and the effects of incorporating, spirituality practices into 
the workplace. Since the 1970s, companies have supported New-Age-type training courses and workshops 
for their employees.
44
 During the early stages of post-Fordist retooling to sell ‘cultural,’ instead of ‘hard’ 
products, organizational consultants emerged directly from communities exploring New Age values and 




 These include Transcendental Meditation (TM) (www.tm.org) , Neurolinguistic Programming (NLP) 
(www.neurolinguisticprogramming.com), and The Learning Organization (www.solonline.org) Course emerging 
from Peter Senge’s innovative theory of management (1990). Senge’s website describes him as ‘a senior lecturer at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is also founding chair of the Society for Organizational Learning (SoL), a 
global community of corporations, researchers, and consultants dedicated to the "interdependent development of 
people and their institutions."’ The Financial Times (2000) named him as one of the world’s "top management 
gurus.” Business Week (October 2001) rated him as one of The Top (ten) Management Gurus. In 2008, Dr. Senge was 
named by the Wall Street Journal among the top 20 most influential business thinkers. Peter Senge received a B.S. in 
engineering from Stanford University, an M.S. in social systems modeling and Ph.D in Management from the MIT 
Sloan School of Management.  
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in more detail in Chapters Seven and Eight: Posthierarchal Illusions and The Net Age respectively.) These 
consultants wished to change attitudes and behaviours in corporations, particularly those of managers, since 
the way to manage ‘creative’ information workers differed greatly from what had been needed in an earlier 
era for industrial workers.  
The assumptions and value orientations of the human potential movement influenced nearly every sector of 
American life, as secular contexts such as the family and school were targeted for transformation into sites 
for individual self-actualization. It also had a significant impact on the workplace, as it added to the earlier 
human relations (HR) theories, as we will see in Chapter Seven. Important innovators include Douglas 
McGregor (1960) and Rensis Likert (1961), among others. Whereas HR practitioners up till the 1950s 
sought to minimize worker opposition and increase morale by encouraging managerial empathy towards 
employees (Hertzberg 1964), a key strategy in early post-Fordism was to change job structures so that work 
would be intrinsically fulfilling for employees. The objective was to create employees who felt so rewarded 
by their work that they were motivated to go beyond their stated duties to ensure the quality of the com-
pany’s products. Organizations would benefit by decreased demands for external control mechanisms and 
enhanced workplace productivity. 
These innovations were needed because “Corporate downsizing, declining wages, and job security, coupled 
with increased workplace demands…, place[d] considerable demands on managers [to] motivate both low- 
and high-end employees” (Nadesan and A. Trethewey 1998, 56). Job insecurity meant that employees 
lacked traditional positive motivators, such as promotions, merit increases, and profit-sharing programs. 
These trends are put in a larger context in Chapter Five, which details how economic structural change 
influenced the employment landscape.   
Initially, to produce the positively-motivated and self-directed attitudes these new job structures required, 
‘mainstream’ companies invited representatives from new religious and New Age communities on site to 
teach their consciousness-raising techniques to employees (Bovbjerg 2010, 120-21; Aupers and Houtman 
2010, 135-60; Mikaelsson 2010, 160-74; Heelas 1996, 139-66).  
In the 1970s and 80s, the more secularly-branded “human potential’ programs or initiations were also 
represented. Werner Erhard Seminars Training, known as est, and spinoffs,
45
 and similar programs such as 
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45 Est was replaced in 1984 by The Landmark Forum (www.landmarkforum.com) 
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Lifespring, and Insight Seminars,
46
 were provided at special in-house sessions. These programs ran in such 
preeminent sites as General Motors, General Electric, Procter and Gamble, Lockheed, Scott Paper, 
Chemical Bank and the U.S. Social Security Administration, to name a few (Rupert 1992). Other compa-
nies that have engaged these practices over the years include “Guinness, General Dynamics, and Boeing 
Aerospace, and even the US Army” (Aupers and Houtman 2010, 149). 
Although the above appears to be a list of old-guard corporations, over time, the typical hosts of these 
programs became the “post-industrial [companies]…, especially the organizations producing immaterial 
services rather than material products” (Aupers and Houtman 2010, 150). This is because much of the work 
in post-Fordist companies demands significant emotional and mental effort. “Burnout,” which “might more 
clinically be classified as depression, [or] anxiety” (Berardi 2009, 135) is a typical hazard in these sites. It is 
commonly met by voluntary (unpaid) sabbaticals, so employees can recover. Tellingly, Google Inc.’s em-
ployees have a median tenure of only 1.1 years (Cruz 2016, 241). In these high-pressure industries, notably 
those in Silicon Valley, California, employees identify “feelings of vulnerability, hyperactivity, unset-
tledness and affective exhaustion” (Cruz 2016, 42). Companies attempting to retain employees are willing 
to experiment with ways to improve employee morale and effectiveness. Many such experiments can be 
classified as neospirituality exercises.   
However, Aupers and Houtman (2010, 156) generalize the type of employee who receives this training 
beyond the hi-tech workers of Silicon Valley. They clarify that it is the “highly-educated professionals 
working typically in top- to mid-level management, [rather than] production workers” who are more likely 
to be in involved in workplace spirituality training Aupers and Houtman concur with Mitroff and Denton 
(1999) that these upper-level employees “are more oriented to intrinsic motivations, goals and rewards [and 
seek] interesting work [and to realize] their ‘full potential as a person’” (Aupers and Houtman 2010, 156).  
In the 1980s, internationally-respected business publications regularly promoted and studied such training 
programs. The Training and Development Journal (December, 1986) explains this activity as: “training in 
the use of the ‘higher self’ for improving job performance and satisfaction” (cited in Heelas 1996, 91). 
However, the concept of a “higher self” has little intrinsic content, without the context of the human po-
tential and New Age movements it references. When they are urged to reach for their higher selves, what is 




 www.lifespringclinics.ca and www.insightseminars.org 
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Jerry Biberman (2014, 108), a well-cited scholar on this topic, defines workplace spirituality, on a 
three-factor scale, making it easily recognizable as New Age or neospiritual. The elements are “intercon-
nection with a higher power, interconnection with human beings, and interconnection with nature and all 
living things.”   
In the 1990s, in both Europe and North America, a number of consultancies took up corporate spirituality 
training as a specialty. This service has been a mature and stable industry since the late 1980s in Holland. 
“We are not dealing with a mere hype or the latest management fashion,” note Aupers and Houtman 
(2010, 156) about this industry in their native country. Currently, major Dutch banks and insurance com-
panies utilize the programs. An example given is the Dutch bathroom equipment retailer, Morca, which 
regularly offers employees opportunities to engage in various New Age courses, expecting that as a result 
its employees will be “more happy, and hence, more effective, so as to increase productivity and profits” 
(Aupers and Houtman 2010, 153).  
One of many Dutch consultancies, Obibio, offered a myriad of courses, such as “‘Team management and 
the soul’ and ‘Management in astrological perspective,’ to keep companies ‘ready for battle’ in times in 
which ‘dynamic streams of production, services and information increasingly put pressure on organizations 
and managers’” (Aupers and Houtman 2010, 149). Heralding the breakdown of differentiation between 
workplace and home that is a feature of post-Fordism, the consultants aimed at “deconstructing the typi-
cally modern separation between the private and public realms, by trying to impose the logic of the former 
upon the latter [in order to make] the rationalized environment less alienating and open to ‘authenticity’ and 
‘spirituality’” (Aupers and Houtman 2010, 150). In other words, the workplace should be ‘like home,’ 
where relationships are both ‘spiritual’ and ‘authentic.’ What is the advantage of such initiatives for the 
company? “‘Authenticity’ is held to result in both well-being and efficiency; ‘spirituality’ in happiness and 
profit, while ‘soulful organizations are portrayed as successful” (Aupers and Houtman 2010, 150).  
As introduced in the previous chapter, “Mindfulness” meditation programs are currently very popular in 
workplaces. In the US, Oprah Winfrey’s Harpo Productions make daily mindfulness exercises mandatory 
for employees (Cruz 2016, 41). Aetna Insurance offers mindfulness-based stress reduction and mindful 
eating workshops, among other mindfulness teachings. The company believe these programs “have re-
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Jeff Wilson (2014, 191) considers that contemporary mindfulness training is consistent with Catherine 
Albanese’s (2007) criteria for metaphysical religion, including, its emphasis on mobilizing “energy.” This 
places it within the domain of neospiritual practices. Certainly influential in the wider culture, mindfulness 
meditation is now specialized to appeal to almost every urban demographic and social need. It embodies 
“the mystification of Buddhist mindfulness,” advanced particulary in the twentieth century throughout 
Western nations (Wilson 2014). The mystification includes reinterpreting Buddhist cosmology--not least 
by defining “freedom from suffering” differently than does traditional Buddhism. In the traditional sense, 
“freedom from suffering” is only possible when the cycle of rebirths has ended. Mindfulness posits that 
people can free themselves from suffering while continuing their existence on the material plane—i.e., in 
the present life (Wilson 2014, 171). Mindfulness “recontextualizes [Buddhist meditation] as a psycholog-
ical technique” (Wilson 2014, 76).  
The mindfulness-based practice, SIY, was initiated at Google Inc. in 2007 (Cruz 2016, 41) to address “poor 
leadership and a lack of trust within teams” (Cruz 2016, 64), as well as to reduce short employment tenures 
due to “burnout” (Cruz 2016, 241). SIY teaches improved attention and listening skills and enhanced 
self-knowledge about capabilities and motivations (Cruz 2016, 64). “SIY can be seen to function as a sort of 
affective release valve, forcing workers to turn off their brains in order to recuperate from the mental de-
mands of creative labour” (Cruz 2016, 65). Program developer Chade-Meng Tan (2012, 182, 212)
48
 insists 
that “regular meditation produces better workers, who are not only more productive, but happier, [and] 
more compassionate…. Mindfulness enables people to‘become more perceptive and receptive’ to others’ 
perspectives, which enables, in turn, ‘stronger leadership and teamwork qualities.’” SIY is not a mandatory 
program; yet, there is a long waiting list to join it, of six months on average (Cruz 2016, 64).  
To add a contemporary Canadian example, a Toronto-based consultancy that accepts donations as well as 
fees for service advertises that it offers “coaching, mentoring and consulting services… to bring more spirit 
into your work... and grow more work that enriches your heart, your life and the planet” 
(http://spiritualityatwork.org). The Centre for Spirituality at Work offers help to those who feel a desire 
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insights into how to make ‘more of a difference,’ new ways to communicate your ideas, projects, events, 
products or service, and greater understanding & connection with clients/customers, 
co-workers/colleagues.” The consultancy arranges regular teleconferences for many southern Ontario cit-
ies, and offers in-person services in Toronto. 
Above I provided glimpses into the contents of spirituality programs in workplaces over the decades of new 
economic structures. In the following section, I provide an overview of industry discourses on the topic.  
Industry Scholarship 
The terms “spirituality in the workplace,” aka “workplace spirituality,” “spirit at work,” “faith at work,” 
“workplace ministry” (Neal 2013, 4), refer to the upwelling of practices, professions and publications 
linking religion to issues of work, labour, management and business ethics that occurred in the mid-1990s 
and early 2000s, primarily in North America, but also internationally.  
The movement of spirituality at work has an institutional basis in organizations such as the International 
Center for Spirit at Work, Spiritual Business Network, and the Foundation for Workplace Spirituality, as 
well as academic programs training business leaders in spiritual practices. Lake Lambert (2009, 121) 
writes: “One study identified 115 refereed journal articles on work and spirituality in business publications 
between 1990 and 1999. The Journal of Organizational Change Management was the most prominent 
publication with sixty-eight articles from 1992 to 1999 mentioning spirituality and two special issues on the 
subject.” At the end of this period, the Academy of Management annual conference hosted “workplace 
spirituality” workshops, which led to the establishment, in 2004, of the first refereed journal in the field of 
workplace spirituality: The Journal of Management, Spirituality and Religion (Lambert III 2009, 121). 
Reva Berman Brown (2003, 393) enlarges this list: “Cavanagh (1999) comments that the field of spiritu-
ality in the workplace expanded rapidly during the 1990s, and that a bibliography distributed at a session on 
spirituality in the organization at the 1998 Academy of Management conference listed no fewer than 72 
books on the subject, 54 of them published in the five years since 1992… Numerous journal articles have 
appeared on the subject, as well as special issues of journals devoted solely to the concept—see, for ex-
ample, the special issues of the Journal of Managerial Psychology (1994); Chinmaya Management Review 
(1999)…; and American Behavioral Scientist (2000). A special issue of the Journal of Management Edu-
cation (2000) has advocated the teaching of the subject to management students. There are also two jour-
nals devoted to the topic: Spirit at Work and Business Spirit.” 
In sum, this drive to “connect spirituality to mainstream organizational research”—often with the explicit 
goal of helping “successful organizational performance” (Giacalone and Jurkiewicz 2010, back cov-
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er)—has generated a substantial literature; some of which can be considered as advocacy for “spirituality in 
the workplace,” some of which takes a scholarly approach towards it, and much that sits somewhere be-
tween these two poles.  
One study (L. Tischler, J. Biberman and C.J. Fornaciari 2007, 106-108) assessed the research focus of 187 
empirical journal articles appearing between 1996 and 2004 on the topic of management, spirituality and 
religion. The authors created a three-dimensional matrix with which to classify the articles. Levels of 
analysis ranged from individual to societal. Types of analysis were either self-reporting (“interior”) or 
based on observation and measurement (“exterior”). Measures included cognitive, emotional and ac-
tion-related. The authors concluded that most of the studies were at the individual level, and qualitative 
research methods significantly outweighed the quantitative types of study. This means that “most of the 
studies used interior validity for some type of self-report” (L. Tischler, J. Biberman and C.J. Fornaciari 
2007, 108). Not even the impact of spirituality on work groups received much attention; much less spirit-
uality within the whole organization or in relation to society. Given the limitations of theorization and 
analysis that these choices of subject and method allow, the current industry research would seem to pre-
clude rigorous soul-searching on the meaning, purposes and advisability of encouraging spirituality in 
workplaces. 
Nevertheless, in 1999, Ian Mitroff and Elizabeth Denton’s influential study, A Spiritual Audit of Corporate 
America, drew on 131 in-depth interviews and 2,000 questionnaires in American companies, to demon-
strate that employees and managers felt a great need to integrate spirituality into their business life: 
This age calls for a new ‘spirit of management.’ For us, the concepts of 
spirituality and soul are not merely add-on elements of a new philosophy 
or policy. (…) No management effort can survive without them. We re-
fuse to accept that whole organisations cannot learn ways to foster soul 
and spirituality in the workplace. We believe not only that they can, but 
also that they must (Mitroff and Denton 1999, 14).  
Some early and influential advocacy works in the field were G.W. Fairholm’s Capturing the Heart of 
Leadership: Spirituality and community in the new American workplace, (1997); and J.Biberman’s edited 
collection, Work and Spirit: A reader of new spiritual paradigms for organizations (2000). Today this 
literature includes many anthologies and handbooks, such as Judi Neal’s Handbook of Faith and Spiritu-
ality in the Workplace: Emerging research and practice. (2013); Louis W. Fry’s Psychology of Religion 
and Workplace Spirituality (2012); Robert A. Giacalone and Carole Jurkiewicz’s Handbook of Workplace 
Spirituality and Organizational Performance (2010); Joan Marques et al.'s The Workplace and Spirituality: 
New perspectives on research and practice (2009), as well as single monographs, such as Neal’s Creating 
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Enlightened Organizations: Four Gateways to Spirit at Work, and Sue Howard, and David Welbourn’s The 
Spirit at Work Phenomenon (2004). There is even a Complete Idiot's Guide(R) to Spirituality in the 
Workplace (Early 2002). In what follows, I review the contents of commonly-debated themes within this 
literature.  
Perhaps one of the most balanced (i.e., sympathetic-yet-critical) accounts of ‘spirituality in the workplace” 
is Lake Lambert’s Spirituality, Inc.: Religion in the American Workplace (2009). Using a broad brush, he 
describes the results of the movement as follows: 
At food giant Tyson Foods, workplace chaplains roam the corporate halls 
and processing floors. Corporations like Ford and Xerox sponsor spiritual 
retreats to spark creativity, and small businesses include Bible verses and 
Christian symbols in their advertising. In the fast food industry, Chik-fil-A 
honors the Sabbath by closing on Sunday, and amid rapid growth they 
dedicate each new store to God’s Glory. Prominent business theorists . . . 
write books about Jesus as a leader, and even Wal-Mart sells the publica-
tions. At the same time, major American universities . . . offer courses 
touting the value of spirituality to future business managers, and . . . public 
policy makers wonder how to respond to a rising tide of religious dis-
crimination complaints (Lambert III 2009, 1).  
Lambert acknowledges the two major strands within the ‘spirituality in the workplace’ movement, the 
Evangelical Christian and neospiritual forms (which is sometimes referred to as “New Age” and more 
commonly, “spirituality” or “spirituality at work”). However, his understanding of the origins of workplace 
spirituality (as well as overt discussions) is very much focussed on the Christian forms. Admittedly, 
Evangelical Christians have made a distinctive, direct contribution to workplace spirituality through “their 
Protestant roots,” in the form of “the tradition of vocation…. In their formative history[, they] had readily 
embraced business and market culture as an economic system, means of evangelism, and form of ecclesi-
astical organization” (Lambert III 2009, 13–14). Therefore, he locates the roots of the movement in the 
Christian notion of “calling” or “vocation” (Lambert 2009, 3) and the link made by Puritans between 
business and spirituality, i.e., Weber’s “Protestant ethic.”  
Indeed, Evangelical texts such as Rick Warren’s The Purpose Driven Life (2002) play an important role in 
the spirituality in the workplace movement, effecting an integration of the values of the new American 
capitalism with religious beliefs to achieve a new iteration of “the gospel of health and wealth[, with] work 
serving as a primary point of reception for God’s abundant blessing” (Lambert III 2009, 15). However, 
Lambert acknowledges that the contemporary “spirituality in the workplace” movement occurs in a context 
that is definitely “not a Puritan New England economy” (Lambert III 2009, 8). Although Lambert never 
uses the term “post-Fordism,” many of the workplace features he identifies—increased insecurity at work, 
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loss of long-term employment relations, technological change, and the new corporate stress on creativi-
ty—match those that I will describe as post-Fordist in the following chapter. Lambert, too, ascribes much of 
the rise of “spirituality in the workplace” movement to the emergence of a new group of “knowledge 
workers.” He argues that “[c]reativity, community, autonomy and holistic concern became new employee 
benefits that supported the productivity of the new knowledge class, and a particular type of spirituality 
found a partner in knowledge work” (Lambert III 2009, 12–13).  
The wellness gospel seen in Evangelicism is also, however, fused with what Lambert terms “a faith that 
some would regard as no faith at all”--that is, the diffuse current of the ‘spiritual but not religious’ (Lambert 
III 2009, 15-16). He correctly associates this faith with the ‘metaphysical tradition’ that Catherine Albanese 
anatomizes in A Republic of Mind and Spirit (2007). It consists of “theories of mind power, mysticism, 
energy therapy, and healing, plus forms of occultism” that co-existed with orthodox Christianity, “even in 
Puritan New England.” Following this line into the modern era he refers to Leigh Schmidt’s account, in his 
book Restless Souls (2005), of a ‘religious liberalism.’ This encompasses “desire for mystical experience, 
valuing meditation and silence, a fascination with Eastern religious traditions, the idea that all religions 
have ‘common ideals’ [and] an emphasis on creative self-expression and adventure-some seeking” 
(Lambert III 2009, 13-16). Lambert also refers to Robert Fuller’s (2004) discussion of the ‘spiritual but not 
religious’ as an ‘unchurched tradition.’ However, despite Lambert’s acknowledgement of this strand, most 
of his analysis, with the exception of a brief section examining the Maharishi University of Management, 
(owned by the Transcendental Meditation Corporation) implies or states a Christian spirituality. He dis-
cusses practices in “Christian” companies,” and books that “attempt to make Jesus into a source of lead-
ership and management guidance,” and theologically based “life coaching” (Lambert III 2009, 125).  
Converging onto Generalized Neospirituality 
Despite judicious references to traditional religiosity, discussions of the liberalization of churches in earlier 
chapters should lead us to suspect only a modest difference between what organizational scholars call 
Christian spirituality and New Age-derived spirituality. This is, in fact, quite evident in the contents of 
Lambert’s discussions, as it is in the organizational literature in general.
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 One example of the similarity, as I wrote in Chapter One is that “New Agers (like Pentecostals and Charismatic 
Catholics) ‘believe in the reality of a spiritual realm that is distinct yet parallel to the physical world of our senses, one 




than questions, the internal tendency to assert a polar relationship between liberal Christianity and New Age 
in general when, in fact, they tend to converge on each other, as the underlying neospirituality. As has been 
explained, almost all modern religions have adapted their theology and practices to the generic spiritual 
outlook or ‘liberal religion’ (Bramadat and Seljak 2009; Schmidt 2005). Heelas and Woodhead (2005) 
found the same was true in the town of Kendal, England. In other words, modern forms of Christianity, 
Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, and Hinduism, on close examination, are very similar to neospirituality in terms 
of their emphasis on individual authenticity and subjectivation.  
Despite this, the tendency to assert the polar relationship is highly apparent in Sue Howard and David 
Welbourn’s The Spirit at Work Phenomenon (2004). While in many ways it draws on very liberal ideas 
within Christianity, such as the writings of Teilhard de Chardin, it concludes with a short but pointed re-
jection of the New Age term, although not its values. In the appendix: “The New Age and SaW [Spirit at 
Work]” the authors, reveal that the average corporate practitioner has little understanding that esoteric New 
Age (i.e. sensu stricto) has given way in general to the diffuse spirituality (New Age sensu lato, or SBNR) 
that now strongly influences Christian spirituality.  
It is difficult to say what proportion of people in SaW are following or have followed—as some no doubt 
have at one stage or another—a distinctly New Age path. Our impression though is that most of the people 
we have met or read about, or whose books we have studied, would have little sympathy for the more ex-
treme or bizarre aspects of New Age belief. Many SaW writers, and writers quoted by them, make no ref-
erence at all to the New Age or show ambivalence towards it. Some make distinctly hostile remarks about it 
(Howard and Welbourn 2004, 222).  
Assessing the balance of SaW opinion Howard and Welbourne (2004, 223-224) claim it rejects “New Age 
beliefs, as ‘superstition,’ ‘spiritual shopping’ or ‘hocus-pocus,’ and insists that “a spiritual journey is not a 
trip.” However, they clarify that “many who are unwilling to have the actual label ‘New Age’ attached to 
them have in fact taken on board aspects of New Age thinking, [and that] it is therefore difficult to draw 
firm conclusions about the degree to which New Age has influenced SaW,” the overwhelming impression 
left by this discussion is that they are anxious to set a firm distance between the two currents.  
Arguably, corporate promoters unwittingly perform the important function of rationalizing the spiritual for 
the contemporary age and for corporate consumption, as SBNR values are progressively accepted as normal 
culture both within and outside workplaces. Manifestations of the more historically located, esoteric New 
Age and its theatrical aspects become superfluous to this normalized culture. This normalization of “spir-
ituality” values at work, which reflect those of society at large, explains why regular HR programs, as 
Lambert notes, are increasingly more difficult to distinguish from efforts to induce a spirituality culture in 
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workplaces. “More significantly, for business leaders and managers, as spiritual practices sneak into cor-
porate America through mainstream training programs, it may be increasingly difficult to parse out what is 
religious or spiritual and what is legitimate and truly ‘secular’ professional and organizational develop-
ment” (Lambert III 2009, 151). As the broader culture is indeed, moving towards being neospiritual, this 
difficulty is predictable. 
This tendency to default to a generic spirituality is predictable on the basis of what we know from the 
previous chapter about the regression of many different religious traditions to a ‘mean’ of spirituality once 
their elements enter secular institutions. Roof (2001) theorized this process in the context of ‘spirituality’ 
publishing. Each new version of ‘the teaching’ must be different from the last, but similar enough to be 
sought after by readers. They are, therefore, marginally-differentiated products, which is a basic feature of 
all good commodities.  
Since the 1990s, workplace spirituality has indeed changed its face: most programs that lean towards inner 
values, now, are coached as ‘spirituality.’ This refers to a melange of practices. Lambert reminds us that 
“spirituality programs, meditation, yoga, the writing of personal mission statements, and even Native 
American spiritual practices have been used for team building and tapping the creative processes of em-
ployees, [and are all] presented under the guise of professional development” (Lambert III 2009, 150).  
Generic spirituality is no doubt increasingly preferred in workplaces because the concept of spirituality has 
now been cleansed of overt esoteric or religious references, either New Age or Christian. This cleansing 
process can be recognized in almost all writing about religion, in terms of the replacement of the term 
‘mysticism’ with ‘spirituality.’ Referring to Walter Principe’s (1983) research, Carrette and King (2005, 
43) summarize the history: 
While both spirituality and mysticism went through the process of psy-
chologisation, the former has emerged as preferable in designating a 
de-traditionalised and this-worldly phenomenon in western society at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century. ‘Mysticism’ still carries with it the 
connotations of occultism, mystery and association with particular ‘world 
religions.’ In that sense the term ‘mysticism’ has lost much of its earlier 
appeal precisely because it has remained strongly associated with religion 
and the supernatural, ideas that have been largely eradicated by the 
‘this-worldly’ and individualistic uses of the term ‘spirituality.’  
We can assume that the principle behind this substitution also operated in the gradual dropping of modifiers 
of ‘spirituality’ that referred to outside communities and loyalties (except where they have been trans-
formed into trademarked brands, such as for TM meditation products). Broadly speaking, ‘New Age spir-
ituality’ has become ‘spirituality’ in workplaces. 
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There is evidence now that spirituality is being further rationalized. An example is provided in Sweden, 
where the esoteric New Age has long been accepted (but is now rejected as “flaky or mumbo-jumbo” [191]) 
and where neospiritual therapies are common. Neospiritual therapies experienced a surge of adoption by 
layman coaches (192), who multiplied in response to a dramatic expansion of contracts let by the Swedish 
Employment Service in 2009 after a surge in unemployment. These coaches were contracted to mitigate or 
redress the effects of that unemployment. They were charged to encourage “250,000 unemployed 
Swedes… to search for their inner potential, boost confidence and find a job” (193). Hornborg argues that 
neospirituality and the coaching practices are converging. A key ingredient to making these services 
fundable by the secular state (which as explained earlier, is required for governance in an era of retracted 
public services) is a transition in terminology that will finally stamp out any suggestion of religion. Indeed, 
this can be seen in the common promise of coaching services not to enhance clients’ spiritual awareness, but 
to “free their inner potential”––this, while using neospirituality’s practices and referencing its worldview 
(196-197).  
Roof’s contribution was to show the age-old perennial philosophy to be a tool of modern commodification. 
For, the process he describes is a form of reversal of the reductionism of that philosophy, which presumes 
that all religions are at root the same. Perennial philosophy’s assertion of common root of all religions is 
generally accomplished by noting that all religious people seek mystical experience, that the latter defines 
religion, per se, and that all of the other features of religions are epiphenomenal to this (ways to bring 
people to and help them understand this essential experience). Ironically, the marginal differentiation of 
commodification restores different ‘clothes’ to the essential experience. However, of course, these clothes 
are not the historical ecclesiastical garbs of the different traditions, but guided by the mix-and-match ethos 
of fast fashion. 
Biberman (2014) seems to be reading straight from the perennial philosophy (and neospiritual) rule-books 
when he defines workplace spirituality, saying about religions that “the mystical experiences of the key 
figures in each religion form the basis of the religions.” That “the experience of the mystics came first, and 
the laws and dogma for each religion then followed,” serves for him as an argument that religions are es-
sentially that experience. “Thus, there can be no religion without its spiritual or mystical roots. On the other 
hand, it is possible to claim to be ‘spiritual’ or to follow spiritual practices outside of a religious context 
(such as New Age spirituality).” From these judgements, it is not surprising to see Biberman’s claiming 
religions to be “concerned with belief, faith and dogma, [whereas] spirituality is more experiential, and is 
more concerned with values and experiential feelings of transcendence and interconnectedness with others, 
and with the practices that individuals engage in to attain these experiential feelings of transcendence and 
interconnectedness with others” (Biberman 2014, 104). This is none other than the popular assertion of the 
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‘spiritual but not religious’ ethos, as discussed extensively above. Popular self-help and spirituality liter-
ature has found a place in the business world. It has been fashioned in many ways to put greater emphasis on 
conflict-resolution, stress-reduction, and other secrets to workplace success. The texts “constitute a general 
blend of humanistic psychology, New Age Spiritualism and human resource precepts” (Nadeson 1999, 10). 
Following the norm for workplace practices, a genre of popular business literature strongly muddies the 
distinction between Christianity and neospirituality. Although labelled as “Christian” and pitched to the 
many self-identified Christians in the business and working community, its content often has little to do 
with Christianity. A good example is Jesus, CEO, one of a series of similarly-titled ‘you can do it’ (or 
‘human potential’) paeans by Laurie Beth Jones (1995) that advocate ‘emulating Jesus’ in one’s businesses. 
Jones’s recommendations include: have a plan, and guard your energy. Although Jones evinces a degree of 
‘feminism’ in her writing, and refers to evolution, Lambert identifies her as a fundamentalist. However, her 
work appeals both to self-identified Christians and “adherents who seek guidance from the Jesus who is the 
great teacher of wisdom” (Lambert III 2009, 83). Jones accommodates this second audience by using 
‘generic God-talk.’ “Jesus, God and a Higher Power [are conflated]; the latter two are clearly synonymous 
for her, but it is not clear if Jesus is divine” (Lambert III 2009, 80). 
Implementing Religious Doctrines 
 As we have seen, there is a tendency for the industry scholars to disparage any practice associated in their 
minds with “New Age,” even though ‘Christian’ spirituality is more legally troublesome. Although more 
often in the United States than elsewhere (Rhodes 2006), spirituality tends to prefaced by the modifier 
‘Christian.’ In most cases, the actual activities and ideas identified as Christian—formally or informally, 
depending on the conditions—are shaped by neospirituality, sometimes bearing little resemblance to tra-
ditional Christian spirituality. However, there are a number of business owners and managers of a variety of 
religious traditions who make an attempt to create “religious businesses.” 
Some companies self-promote as sites for the realization of religious doctrines. A specifically “Christian” 
spirituality is promoted and supported, usually by Evangelicals. A number of other private-held companies 
claim to be Muslim, or Jewish, businesses.
50
 In Western democracies, it is theoretically legal for private 
employers to promote religion as long as practices are not forced on employees, and all are fairly hired and 




 An example is a company owned by a practicing Evangelical Christian: Chik-fil-A --a fast-food chain in the United 
States (Lambert III 2009, 76).  
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managers in public companies, or secular non-profit agencies and government departments, from pro-
moting religious values in workplaces (Lambert III 2009, 76–77). New Age spirituality and human poten-
tial programs have been less identifiable as religion, making their presentation in work-settings more pal-
atable to authorities (and possibly to workers). These programs have been protected from legal challenges 
until recently, a protection that now seems to be waning.
51
 Glenn Rupert notes that, although Yoga or 
‘native American spiritual practices’ may not seem so to regular practitioners, “to a fundamentalist Chris-
tian or devout Muslim, these practices may be the very essence of idolatry” (Rupert 1992, 135). As of 2008 
in the United States, these programs would be judged by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) as ‘religious’ (Lambert III 2009, 150).
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Consequently, for business managers and owners, explicitly religious language is restricted to after-hours 
‘parachurch groups,’ in which they meet to discuss their faiths and how the latter could impact their busi-
nesses. Most of these groups are organized by Evangelical Christians, since “most evangelists, from 
Charles Finney in the early 19
th
 century to Billy Sunday, operating during WWI [and onward, have been 
interested in] saving souls through business practices, [as they] continue to be apologists for the divine 
character of capitalism” (Lambert III 2009, 53). Lambert assures us that, despite complications, those 
businesses (in the US) that are privately owned by Evangelicals, “are quietly creating new business para-
digms that are distinctive in the way they draw upon Evangelical theology and practices in their forms, 




While most of the literature about ‘organizational spirituality’ simply describes and prescribes it, some 
insiders have begun to analyze and critique it. Lambert III (2009), as we have seen, reviews many possible 
challenges to claims about the workplace spirituality phenomenon by industry insiders. The following is a 




 Recent lawsuits suggest that such programs are indeed vulnerable to the definition of religious indoctrination 
(Rupert 1992, 133–135).  
52
  As of 2008, “the EEOC has defined the religious protection of the Civil Rights Act to include ‘moral or ethical 
beliefs’ and any other sincere belief that an individual might hold—whether it is found among a religious group or not. 
Since the distinction between spirituality and religion has no meaning as a matter of law, ‘spiritual-but-not-religious’ 
practices in the workplace (and education) might lead to these calls for accommodation and complaint of harassment 
or discrimination that more traditional forms of religious practice and belief might cause” (Lambert III 2009, 151).  
53 This includes ‘honest dealings’ and ‘quality products’. Since employment discrimination based on religion is 
illegal, it is the two ‘stakeholder groups’ that managers deal with--customers and suppliers—who suffer the brunt of 
the proselytization (but who may also benefit from the principles) (Lambert III 2009 54-56). 
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ality in the workplace that support his analysis. The nature and promotion of ‘spirituality at work’ is ques-
tioned in the industry literature in terms of: appropriateness of the corporate setting of spirituality programs, 
effectiveness of strategies for resolving different religious affinities in workplace programs, quality of 
definitions of spirituality, and assessments of the programs’ impacts. I will consider each of these themes 
separately, through the writings of particular authors. This cannot be a representation of all themes in the 
literature, but identifies common and important ones relevant to this dissertation. 
Appropriateness of corporate setting:  
A question implicitly or explicitly posed in the industry literature is whether there is a conflict between 
spiritual concerns and the profit-making orientation of corporations. The literature reveals ambivalence 
about whether ‘the systemic logic of global capital’ must be circumvented for spirituality programs to work, 
or whether ‘spirituality’ indeed can work for the betterment of both workers and the corporation.  
Ken Kamoche and Ashly Pinnington (2012, 504) pose the essential question here, by asking whether the 
managerial fostering of spirituality aims at “profits and enhanced employee productivity [while] concealing 
these objectives behind a veil of higher spiritual ideals.” The answer typically given to this question is that 
there is no conflict between profits and spirituality, so no veil need exist. William O’Brian (2012) provides 
the argument of Margaret Benefiel (2008), an important ‘spirituality in workplaces’ scholar, on this ques-
tion. She argues that “this quality of care does not ignore bottom-line concerns but energises individual and 
corporate activity towards these concerns[, by which she means that] good interpersonal relationships lead 
to cooperation in an organization [and hence make it] more efficient and profitable” (O’Brian 2012, 101). 
O’Brian characterizes spirituality as concern for others and the collectivity. Based on interviews with a 
small sample of employees “from a Christian background,” O’Brian finds that employees “expressed their 
spirituality by utilising their talents, education and energy in the service of others[; in] the way they help 
and respect each other . . ., trust and comfort each other in times of crisis . . , share problems, [and] cover for 
each other and support each other in times of sickness and bereavement” (O’Brian 2012, 99-101). Thus, 
O’Brian characterizes a mutual-support community. 
O’Brian seems less convinced than Benefiel that there is no conflict between the above behaviour and the 
demands of production. He knows that concern for others may come in conflict with company prof-
it-making. But his equivocation between acknowledging and denying the significance of this is a highly 
typical apologist salve; in the end he suggests that the resolution rests on managers’ overriding the struc-
tural demands of their positions by adopting a ‘spiritual’ mantle. The structural demand drops out of con-
sideration, however, as O’Brian characterizes the issue as a function of personal characteristics. “[W]hen 
employees are treated solely as factors of production, their spirituality can be exploited [but suggests that] 
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this is not an outcome of the systemic logic of global capital but is rather dependent on the quality of 
‘spiritual leadership’ exercised within a corporation” (O’Brian 2012, 103).  
Better still, all corporate actors can take such initiatives. O’Brian (2012, 108) concludes by asserting that 
“any employee can be a leader with soul, irrespective of the level of job he or she occupies . . . can educate, 
inform, support, challenge and influence all those who come into contact with them . . . can connect with 
their authentic selves, and by expressing their spiritual values in the way they give service to others, they 
can facilitate personal and organisational transformation.” O’Brian does not so much defeat the materialist 
argument as try to overwhelm it with lofty thoughts. 
Effectiveness of strategies for resolving different religious affinities in workplace programs 
Judi Neal (2013) is a leading ‘spirituality in the workplace’ scholar. Neal (2013, 4) is more open to New 
Age spirituality in workplaces than others. However, her work exhibits a different form of ambivalence. 
Her liberal dilemma generates from posing the ‘workplace spirituality’ problem as the resolution of dif-
ferent religious preferences, particularly between the New Age and Evangelical Christian sensibilities, 
which is a particular source of conflict in workplaces. While pursuing her goal of overcoming these dif-
ferences, she seems to minimize the shaping process of the corporations themselves—i.e., both New Age 
and Evangelical Christianity being shaped into a generic spirituality that is appropriate to workplaces. This 
somewhat begs the question of resolving conflicts between the supposedly different religious sensibilities.  
Ironically, she takes a classic neoliberal stance by positing that the corporation as a neutral ground on which 
value-based issues can be freely debated, and policies implemented untarnished by the supporting eco-
nomic infrastructure. She presents workplaces as sites of multicultural or multi-religious debates, with the 
help of mediation too, as she is noted for offering as a consultant. In posing the drama of competing reli-
gious worldviews which need to be reconciled with their integrity intact, while ignoring the setting issue, 
Neal is an important consolidating figure within the movement to promote workplace spirituality. In slight 
contradiction, she also repeats the “perennial philosophy” fallacy—let’s get together; we all have the same 
interests at heart. She does not wonder why there is a convergence in workplaces towards one form. The 
very assumptions behind her efforts prevent reflection on the shaping processes that Carrette and King 
(2005), and Tucker and Leinberger (1991) define.  
In the introduction to the recent edited collection Handbook of Faith and Spirituality in the Workplace: 
Emerging Research and Practice (Neal 2013a), Neal characterizes the early years of this conflict as be-
tween ‘religion’ and ‘spirituality’ per se. These were widely regarded, she asserts, as “mutually exclusive. 
The religion-focused camp felt that the ‘spiritual but not religious’ emphasis left out centuries of human 
wisdom and tradition that could have a great deal of value for the workplace and for society, and that the 
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focus on spirituality was too light-weight and, worst of all, ‘airy-fairy’” (Neal 2013a, 13). She claims that 
“over time, practitioners and scholars have been able to find more common ground” across this divide. To 
some degree Neal’s very ecumenical collection, which includes contributions from “faith and spiritual 
leaders and scholars from many traditions including Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, 
Baha’i, and indigenous traditions,” bears out this hope. Neal’s own work clearly draws on the New Age 
literature and she acknowledges the importance of Ferguson’s Aquarian Conspiracy in a growing move-
ment to “integrate faith and spirituality in secular life.” Nonetheless, the index to the collection contains no 
entry for “New Age.” 
Neal’s way of framing the softening of conflict between promoters of ‘Christian’ versus generic (holistic) 
spirituality as a principled debate, is a good illustration of the ‘idealism,’ that grounds liberal discourses. If 
the general thesis of this dissertation is correct, this was not a principled debate at all, but a shaping of 
spirituality to conform to the changing structure of workforces and the kinds of skills/capacities employers 
needed for profit. Neal overlooks that different religious beliefs and practices are implicated in power 
structures (McCutcheon 2004), or, alternatively, that the roles they play in communities is part of their 
meaning (Orsi 1985). Having an ‘idealistic’ understanding of belief systems commonly presupposes the 
possibility of reconciliation through discourse on a neutral ground.  
Quality of definition of spirituality 
Arguably, many papers on the topic of spirituality in the workplaces appear to use definitional confusion to 
evade its critical consideration (often, as we have noted, to maintain the ‘Christian’ face of the ‘spirituality’ 
in question). Definitions, especially confusing, multiple or multi-layered ones, can go far towards 
shrouding the actual nature of spirituality at work. This confusion may reflect ambivalence about the 
changes to Christianity I described earlier, as a result of modernization, wherein the forms of rituals, the 
dogmas, and church attendance have been downgraded in relation to experiential aspects of religion, ren-
dering the common SBNR attitude. Even apologists who wish to identify or promote those formal elements 
of Christianity end up identifying only perennial aspect’—rendering it like neospirituality––despite what 
they intend. 
In Michael O’Sullivan’s (Sullivan and Flanagan, 2012) work, seemingly both goals are met. (They may be 
indivisible.) In the “Introduction” to Spiritual Capital: Spirituality in Practice in Christian Perspective he 
notes that “the language of spiritual capital is seeping into management, leadership, international devel-
opment, social science and education courses” but lacks a clear definition within “the academic study of 
Christian spirituality” (2012, 1). To redress this, he takes as a starting point the work of the Catholic ethicist 
Luk Buckart, which has been developed by the Spirituality in Economics and Society (SPES) forum. 
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Buckart treats ‘spiritual capital’ as a ‘multivalent term’ referring both to the “extrinsic commodification of 
the spiritual [in new forms of capitalist enterprise and] intrinsic meaning [of spirituality] that applies the 
instructions of the great spiritual teachers, such as Socrates, Jesus Christ and Gandhi [to] the tasks of the 
marketplace.” He refers to the latter, ‘intrinsic,’ version of spiritual capital as ‘profane’ in the sense that “it 
seeks to draw Christians and non-Christians together in a dialogue to look with Jesus, Buddha and other 
great spiritual teachers at the economic crises engulfing the world” (O’Sullivan 2012, 3). This is another 
form of the perennialist argument: these religious figures have the same message. That the message is 
called “intrinsic” indicates that it is the personal, feeling-related aspect of religions, neospirituality, to 
which he refers. 
While O’Sullivan claims to set ‘spiritual capital’ in a specifically Catholic horizon—an extrinsic or public 
form of religiosity--as defined by the encyclical utterances of successive Popes, he makes the intrin-
sic/extrinsic distinction again: There are “two poles” of Christian spirituality—“Christo-centric[ with] an 
emphasis on the practices… taught to the disciples by Jesus, [and] Pneumo-centric, (i.e., intrinsic), with] a 
focus on the outpourings of the Spirit… and on the diverse races, creeds and tongues by which glory is 
given to God” (O’Sullivan 2012, 5). Classically, although lipservice is initially paid to a formal religious 
association, since workplace spirituality cannot in fact be practiced in respect of it (for a variety of reasons), 
he brushes this option aside. Instead, as if this choice is voluntary, he writes that the approach of the col-
lection “tends towards the second [Pneumo-centric, intrinsic] pathway” (O’Sullivan 2012, 5). 
It might be these alternating distinctions and confused conflations that led Berman Brown (2003, 393) to 
assert that, after a review of the literature, she found the organizational spirituality concept to be incom-
prehensible. She summarizes: “At its best, workplace spirituality is intended to provide a means for indi-
viduals to integrate their work and their spirituality, which, it is alleged, will provide them with direction, 
connectedness and wholeness at work. At its worst, workplace spirituality is a new management fad, with 
sinister undertones, which, when unmasked, is likely to prove ineffective and ephemeral. Because most of 
the literature is discursive, there is little empirical evidence to show which aspect is most likely” (Brown 
2003, 394). 
An article by Emma Bell (2008) may exaggerate the political-activist potential of spirituality in workplaces, 
by minimizing the differences between liberation theology-influenced activism and neospirituality. She 
proposes that “subjective life” spirituality (Heelas and Woodhead’s [2005] term for neospirituality) might 
be harnessed to political action in workplaces. Following others, such as Casey (2012), she charges that a 
discipline referred to as Critical Management Studies (CMS) is not doing its proper job in that respect. 
Where these scholars consider religion, they look at its traditional form and consider it oppressive. “Critical 
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analyses have therefore focused on the disciplinary effects of religious values and beliefs in maintaining 
control of organization members and have highlighted the individualizing, patriarchal effects associated 
with evangelical capitalism (Nadesan 1999)” (193). She urges (Pratt 2000) CMS scholars, to encourage an 
activist stand in workers with spirituality as their vehicle (Bell 2008, 295).  
Bell follows Lau (2000) in conceding that spirituality is open to cooptation by capitalism. But, that does not 
prevent her from urging CMS scholars, with their “Marxism and labour process” roots, to explore “how 
‘subjective-life’ spirituality could potentially enable critical organizational praxis;” one that makes deci-
sions in other than utilitarian terms (Bell 2012, 294).  
Bell argues that there are places where “critical workplace spirituality” is being practiced and theorized. 
Citing C. Casey (2002, 165), she suggests a “revolt from within,” where professional corporate employees 
seek out spirituality as a response to the “pressures associated with rationalizing modernity within organ-
izations.” Casey “contends that this is in the form of a social movement based on spirituality, concluding 
that ‘one-sided modernity now meets a counter-force it unintendedly helped generate’” (Casey 2002).
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This idea, which references an important Marxian concept, is worthy of further consideration. Although 
Bell’s and Casey’s proposal cannot be resolved in this chapter, or even over the course of this dissertation, 
I will return to consider the possibilities they raise (and further study that it suggests) in its concluding 
section.  
Bell’s line of argument is that because there have been important historical examples of traditional (Heelas 
and Woodhead’s “life-as”) religious figures’ intervening in workplaces to facilitate worker activism, ne-
ospirituality could possible play such a role as well. This might be true if neospirituality or subjective life 
religion were not in fact the product of capitalism, which research cited in this dissertation suggests is true. 
If so, she underestimates the shaping that capital has done on religion to produce spirituality, precisely 
because it is at least benign with respect to workplace injustices. The exemplars she presents of (Christian) 
religious activists are the French worker-priests of 1943–54, and the industrial missionaries in the British 
coal miners’ strike, 1984–85.  
Bell does not entirely ignore that her sample workers were supported outside workplaces by communities 
with strong Christian and Marxist commitments to justice. In fact, she betrays ambivalence over the po-




 Cited in Bell 2012, 295 
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spirituality, with its denial of conflict and thrust towards a New Age orientation are “an ideological attempt 
to capture the power of religion for the purposes of supporting capitalist interests” (Bell 2008, 293) and to 
prevent the emergence of “radical organizational alternatives.” Yet, she retains hope that neospirituality can 
play a role for the political left, as a counterbalance to the workplace influence of Evangelical Christians. 
Because, as she sees it, the power of the political right is being exercised without challenge in American 
workplaces, Bell argues that critical scholars cannot afford to simply write off neospirituality (as it, pre-
sumably, scorns the Evangelicals). She argues that “benign neglect or outright rejection by the left will 




I stated above that Bell used the term “subjective life spirituality,” coined by Heelas and Woodhead (2005), 
to describe workplace spirituality. This “subjective life” attitude is one of the four types of religiosity 
identified by these scholars during their interviews. Bell correctly assesses the term as meaning “a more 
privatized, subjectivist approach to belief systems based on personal experience rather than conformity to a 
higher truth” (Bell 2012, 302). However, Heelas and Woodhead used this terminology to describe what 
would I have argued can be called neospirituality (and workplace spirituality) in other contexts. 
This calls into question Bell’s argument that subjective life spirituality is a third type of religiosity, other 
than the supposedly compliant neospirituality and the Evangelical Christianity that is potentially emerging 
in workplaces. She suggests that ‘subjective life’ spirituality merits critical management scholars’ attention. 
Of course, it bears little similarity to the activist Christian behaviour of her exemplars, but she feels that in 
some way its manifestation as “spirituality at work” can promote social justice.  
This is certainly a matter of definition, and calls for intensive examination in the future. For Bell’s thesis to 
be accurate, the ways that “workplace spirituality” might differ from “subjective life” spirituality would 
have to be identified. There are indeed many practices that are grouped under that rubric, as we have seen. 
However, the trend she has identified is not immediately obvious. This is more so when the history of 
spirituality in the workplace is examined. Carette and King’s would counter Bell’s hope with the claim that 
only a particular kind of ‘religious’ orientation can emerge in workplaces, and this is because it has been 
cultivated for that very purpose. They would reject the idea that such a genuine variety of religious orien-
tations could exist within companies. Bell may be mistaken in thinking that the full political spectrum of 
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Bell also mentions the work of Michaela Driver (2005, 1106–7), who sees the “possibility of both repres-
sion and liberation” in workplace spirituality. Neither she nor Driver (see below) can be accused of am-
bivalence regarding the prevailing situation in workplaces, which Bell identifies as repressive (with a few, 
pointed and well-theorized exceptions). However, as noted, Bell implies that there may be an embedded 
potential activism in workplace spirituality, if it could be channelled. In other words, it might benefit the 
worker to gain some detachment from the corporation environment rather than greater integration with it. 
This hope may have some grounding, although it was not provided by Bell. Bell’s reference, on the other 
hand, to historical workplace interventions by Marxist worker-priests, who emerged from the prophetic and 
‘liberation-theological’ traditions of Christianity offers questionable insight as to how neospirituality could 
be harnessed in this way. Comparing these activists connected to powerful religious institutions and 
through a strong religious doctrine to professional workers trying to lighten their pressured lives with 
meditation practices, does not seem helpful to her project. This too-casual conflation/distinction of different 
religious forms in the discourse about organizational spirituality cannot lead to comprehensive under-
standing of its nature and effects (nor, probably, to revolution from within). To achieve greater under-
standing, she could first pursue a rigorous analysis of workplace spirituality’s social and political roles. 
Otherwise, her argument that resistance is possible in workplaces is weak. 
Misunderstanding spirituality’s impact 
Michaela Driver (2005) has a more pointed thesis vis a vis the great majority of definitions of organizational 
spirituality, which she believes can be consolidated into “three core dimensions, namely transcendence of 
self, holism and harmony of self and personal growth” (2005, 1091). Flatly, she then claims that they point 
not at employees’ liberation or empowerment, but at their oppression. Her observations, too, are piquant in 
relation to the charge of corporations as psytopia. 
Driver expands briefly on these three dimensions, using language perfectly consistent with the contents of 
New Age or neospirituality discussed in Chapter 2: “Specifically, experiencing spirituality at work means 
that the individual feels part of something larger than him/herself. It also means that the individual expe-
riences the self as integrated and is able to reconcile in an authentic manner the various dimensions of the 
self at work. Finally, spirituality is experienced when the individual feels him/herself to be on a develop-
mental path toward self-actualization and the realization of inner potential” (2005, 1091). A number of 
important scholars on workplace spirituality have spoken in this vein. For example, Giacolone and 
Jurkiewicz (2003, 42) claim workplace spirituality “to be a framework of organizational values evidenced 
in the culture that promotes employee’s experience of transcendence through the work process, facilitating 
their sense of being connected to others in a way that provides feelings of completeness and joy.”   
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As we have seen, objections to such claims have oriented around questioning whether claimed experiences 
of completeness and joy are valid, rather than, say, the context for employee manipulation. If experienced, 
other critics ask whether it is appropriate that employee’s sense of connectedness should be to corporations. 
Driver, however, challenges the complex of values itself. She sweeps aside the very assumption that 
seeking “wholeness” is, in itself, psychologically healthy. In fact, she turns to Lacanian (or ‘depth’) psy-
chology to show that it is not. Her thesis is that all of the summary values noted above are misguided as 
representations of an empowered or vitalized person, a true self, in Lacanian language. She explains: 
Current definitions of core dimensions of organizational spirituality rest on conceptualizations of the self 
that, while claiming to increase the autonomy of individuals in organizations, actually lead to delusion and 
potential repression. Specifically, they claim to lead to the experience of an authentic self at work, which is 
connected to a higher order, fully integrated, balanced, complete and ultimately fulfilled. However, from 
the perspective of depth psychology such claims capture little more than the imaginary function of the ego 
and the empty speech in which it engages (Driver 2005, 1997). 
Driver provides a brief but clear summary of Lacanian thought. Essentially, Lacan claims that when en-
gaged in discourse that reinforces a myth about one’s autonomy--the only type of knowledge about the self 
that the ego can retain--one is engaging in ‘empty speech.’ Accordingly, Driver argues, as per Lacan, this 
spirituality is not in employees’ interests. This is not because it misdirects loyalties, but because it en-
courages them (through their ‘empty speech’ about their autonomy) to adopt a ‘false self.’ Even if one were 
to accept the narrowing of the referent for the ‘whole’ in ‘holism’ to the workplace community, or even to 
the corporation itself (as opposed to the whole global community, or beyond--as one might think to be the 
proper scope of a religious belief), Lacan’s analysis shows the encouragement of identification with any 
whole to be exploitative.  
While this is indeed an eye-opening criticism of workplace spirituality, suggesting many subsequent lines 
of enquiry, Driver does not pursue them. We are left wondering how this false formulation of human au-
thenticity in corporations could be so widespread. We realize that, undoubtedly, the pervasiveness of the 
pursuit of the psychological condition premised by workplace spirituality clearly shows that it has a func-
tion for corporations, if not for employees, but we cannot glean what that could be from Driver’s article. 
This lack, then, propels us on to discern the logic by examining the question in more detail, approaches to 
which have already been mooted, and are presented in the following chapters. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have shown that practices which purport to benefit employees under the rubric of en-
hancing spiritual awareness are widespread in North American and global companies, especially those that 
125 
 
are part of ‘the new economy,’ which we will explore as post-Fordism in the next chapter. There is a huge 
industry literature on this topic, commensurate with the pervasiveness of spirituality programs and exer-
cises in workplaces. Supporting this is scholarly reflection on the topic and the training of future corporate 
managers in spirituality practices within the confines of respected business schools and university pro-
grams. There is continuing disagreement as to how to define workplace spirituality, not least because a 
large contingent of its promoters, who identify as Evangelical Christians, do not recognize that this form of 
Christianity, like liberal religions in general, have moved towards neospirituality or the SBNR conviction, 
in beliefs and practices. Regardless of the religious affiliations they support, analysts provide definitions of 
workplace spirituality that show that tradition as increasingly privatized, with all that entails, as discussed 
in earlier chapters. In addition to problems with the definition of spirituality, there is also increasing dif-
ficulty in distinguishing spiritual practices from mainstream training programs and the more truly ‘secular’ 
professional and organizational development. This evolution is consistent with the pressure to avoid ac-
cusations of promoting ‘religion’ in workplaces, (whose definition expands indirectly with the abandon-
ment of traditions), as it is also a reflection of the infusion of neospiritual values and discourses into the 
wider contexts of these workplaces. 
Critical scholars consider workplace spirituality to be in the interests of employers for the sake of extracting 
more productivity from workers and otherwise disciplining their workforces. (This perception is reinforced 
by the observation that Evangelical Christians, who are the voices of right-wing politics in the United 
States, figure prominently in the promotion of workplace spirituality.) However, industry critics may 
overlook more basic issues such as injustice in the workplace or the subordination of employee interests for 
profit, or when they do not, are unable to grasp the depth of these problems, which stem from the basic 
nature of capitalist workplaces, or the specific features of those in this economic period. 
I have argued that critics of workplace spirituality, a segment of the industry scholars considering it, snap at 
its edges with their criticisms, but generally fail to take large bites out of it. This is normally because they do 
not challenge the fundamental raison d’etre of capitalist enterprises, or more narrowly, their specific nature 
as post-Fordist enterprises. For example, the vested nature of precarious work as a major source of suste-
nance of the corporation must now continually intrude upon an employee’s pursuit of psychic well-being 
therein, but this issue is not taken up as fundamental in the supposed study of the function or workplace 
spirituality.  
Driver’s commentary is the most intriguing of those I referenced above, in that it turned the tables on many 
other supposedly critical analyses of workplace spirituality. Her article potentially adds further complexity 
to an effort to draw out the implications of the holism of neospirituality, which is undertaken in general in 
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this dissertation. To fully understand workplace spirituality, the Lacanian ideas behind her judgement de-
serve to be considered in their own right in future scholarship. However, lacking in Driver’s account, and 
more generally throughout the literature I have reviewed in this section, is any systematic account as to why 
‘spirituality in the workplace’ should have burgeoned in the very period that saw a dramatic change in the 
production methods, labour requirements, and managerial techniques of capital—that is to say, in the 
transition from Fordism to post-Fordism. Without such an analysis, relating changes in ‘spirituality’ to 
changes in ‘work,’ ‘workers’ and ‘workplaces,’ it is impossible to really place ‘spirituality in the work-
place’ in a materialist and historical context. It is to this task that we turn in the following chapters. Ac-
cordingly, I begin in the next chapter with an in-depth analysis of what has changed in terms of economic 
structure and work, in the last half-century, to render “post-Fordism.” 
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Chapter Five: Post-Fordism and Work Culture 
Introduction: Accumulation and Regulation 
“Post-Fordism” designates the type of capitalism that evolved in Western nations since the early 1970s—a 
departure from “Fordism.” Many elements of society and culture change in this transition, including forms 
of religion and spirituality. The purpose of this dissertation is to establish a correlation between these two 
sets of changes by arguing that neospirituality, which became a popular ethos as post-Fordism developed, is 
a particularly apt belief system for iconic post-Fordist workers. I have already discussed hypotheses about 
how and why neospirituality has moved into workplace settings. However, a clear picture of the economic 
model these workplaces emerge from has yet to be shown. This chapter, accordingly, establishes some of 
the basic political-economic features of “post-Fordism”, and how it differs from the preceding Fordist era 
of capital, particularly in regard to the types and practices of labour on which it depends. 
European scholars of the Regulation School, such as Michel Aglietta (1979) and Alain Lipietz (1985, 1987) 
first proposed the term post-Fordism in the 1980s. Examining the new conditions of capitalism they had 
seen developing over the previous decades, they observed a production/consumption model very different 
from mass-market, assembly-line-based Fordism and deemed the new order evolving in Western nations a 
systemic change in capitalism. To analyze this change they deployed two related concepts, that of the re-
gime of accumulation and the mode of regulation. 
The regime of accumulation refers to the set of business mechanisms—organizational structures, tech-
nologies, typical raw materials, labour-sourcing techniques, financing procedures, ways of distributing 
goods, etc.—that creates a successful business environment. Properly speaking, a regime of accumulation 
deserves it name when it demonstrates a pattern of “generalized and sustainable economic growth” (Tickell 
and Peck 1995, 373). In more technical language, the term describes “the stabilization over a long period of 
the net product between consumption and accumulation” (Tickell and Peck 1995, 374). Fordism and 
post-Fordism refer, then, to different conditions of stabilization or sets of such mechanisms.  
The system does not, however, function in an institutional, social and cultural vacuum. The counterpoint to 
the regime of accumulation, the mode of regulation, is the way a social order develops coherent cooperation 
amongst society members, so that the economic regime functions smoothly. I introduced this term in 
Chapter One, but the concept requires further clarification. One author calls it the set of “institutional forms, 
procedures or habits that either persuade or coerce private agents to conform to [the] schema” (Lipietz 
1987, 55) of the regime of accumulation. Another states that the mode of regulation is “a “facilitation shell” 
of economic, social and political arrangements, cultural and artistic sensibilities, the world of ideas and 
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bodies of knowledge, everyday life experiences, and the conceptions of the individual in society” (Fisher 
2010, 20–21). These varying definitions indicate that the concept is broad, but they all make clear that 
social habits, institutions and conventions work to support economies; practical, social and cultural life 
behaviours are institutionally integrated, and they in turn support the way a society provides itself with 
material goods. This concept opens the way to the association we will make between neospirituality and 
work in the recently-changed economies of the West, arguing that, as an element of the culture of work, 
neospiritualityis a component of the mode of regulation of post-Fordism.  
The distinction between the regime of accumulation and mode of regulation, defined as complements, leads 
to reflection on a higher-level question that perpetually engages philosophers, historians, political econo-
mists and others–: to what extent do material, economic and other structural factors dominate ideation of 
cultural ones, or vice versa, when societies change. Scholars theorizing large-scale change have staked their 
reputations on claims of one or the other as a leading factor, or neither. Clearly, societies do change. If the 
regulation school thesis—of a full correspondence between cultural and material factors—were taken 
strictly, such change could not occur. Necessarily, there are deficiencies of correlation between them.  
The debate relates directly to a secondary question of this dissertation—if there is a correspondence be-
tween the culture and practices of work and of neospirituality (the primary question) what has been the 
influential, or “push” factor, in the pairing of these two societal elements? Neospirituality strongly belongs 
in the ideational or cultural camp (a part of the mode of regulation, as I posit) and work in the material 
structure of post-Fordism (integrated with the regime of accumulation). 
As is well-known, the important sociologist, Max Weber (1986), debated the question of the nature of 
mutual influence between a religious ethos and the expansion of a political-economic regime when he 
studied how Calvinist Protestantism and a nascent capitalism interacted in a major sites of its early emer-
gence––i.e, in England, Holland and France. In this section, I preface the primary material of this chapter, 
about the post-Fordist economy and working conditions, with a critical discussion of “determination” that 
focusses on Weber’s thesis. This debate is particularly relevant to this dissertation, which should provoke 
general reflection on the issue of causation. Therefore, in order to inaugurate the topic of this chapter, and 
theoretically orient the reader to the “material-ideal forces” conundrum, I consider aspects of the debate 
over those same considerations sparked by Weber’s (1986) thesis in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism in this section. 
As the Weberian debate is left unresolved, so will the parallel one presented in this dissertation––regarding 
the role that neospirituality, a cultural factor, plays in the construction, destruction or maintenance of the 
economic order. Despite this lack of resolution, however, issues considered in the Weberian debate alert us 
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to relevant considerations in the contemporary example, and provide us with guidance as to how to con-
clude it. Dilemmas abound. On the issue of workplace spirituality’s early history, for example, I show in 
Chapter Seven that the 1960s counterculture as well as the nascent New Age practitioners introduced ideas 
about good work prior to post-Fordism’s maturation, which may seem to support the idea that culture de-
termines the material base. Furthermore, as I also explore in Chapter Seven, and have noted earlier, ideas of 
self-actualization, global interconnection and other ideas identified with New Age were incubating in the 
culture that spawned that movement, as was the agitation for meaningful work. Neospirituality could not 
have been successfully introjected into workspaces without a prior receptivity to it within the population 
from which workplaces draw for workers, regardless of the structure of the work itself.  
On the other hand, as industrial societies have moved more assuredly into post-Fordism and the neoliberal 
regime, I document an increasing alignment of neospirituality with capitalism, which strongly suggests the 
latter has the upper hand in shaping the former. Overall, I support the thesis that neospirituality has been 
shaped for post-Fordist capitalism and the neoliberal order, and believe that the weight of the theoretical 
material provided in this dissertation supports this position. Essentially, I see the formulators of New Age as 
vanguard cultural interpreters who anticipated material developments. Thus, these vanguard members who 
began to understand the post-Fordist social order before it had entirely coalesced.  
The Material/Ideal Quandary 
In focussing on an iconic worker, I might be said to be using Max Weber’s approach in The Protestant Ethic 
and Spirit of Capitalism (1985), as he modelled the ideal capitalist on the basis of his belief structure. 
Michael York tells us that: “In Weber’s work, the ideal-type is an “analytical construct”—one not expected 
to be found in reality, but nonetheless useful as a basis for comparison and measurement” (1995, 276). 
Weber (1985) proposed associations between religious and political-economic forms. He argued that an 
emerging capitalism was enabled by the belief-structure of Calvinist Protestantism in England, Holland and 
France (Weber 1985, 98), because it encouraged the new economic model more effectively than those 
countries that lacked such an ethic. Based on the Christian presumption that God was all-powerful, John 
Calvin (whose theology built on Martin Luther’s) preached that membership in the elect, those who were to 
be saved for a life of eternal bliss, was pre-ordained. As an all-powerful God cannot change his mind, 
Calvin reasoned, there can be no alterations to these pre-ordained decisions for the Christian in this life, 
either through acts or belief. Nevertheless, a good Christian must practice unwavering faith that he or she is 
amongst the elected ones. Deprived of any way to either seek this status if it is to be denied (Weber 1985, 
105) or even to confirm or disconfirm that status (Weber 1985, 110), Protestants had to find some personal 
peace under the circumstances. Moreover, they could not abandon themselves to the pleasures of the world, 
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since they were required to practice worldly asceticism. Such as stricture did not go to the extreme of re-
quiring a purely ascetic life, such as Catholic monks practiced (Weber 1985, 120-121).  
As Calvinists were required to embrace their time on earth, they were “now forced to pursue their ascetic 
ideals within mundane occupations” (Weber 1985, 121). Combatting self-doubt through good deeds and 
hard work (Morrison 1995, 250) was the only avenue sufficiently engaging to help them stave off loneliness 
and even despair, Weber reasoned (Weber 1985, 113-115).. He argued that the class of people who adopted 
Calvinism chose to become leaders within the new business communities, the activity presented them by 
virtue of their class positions and the declining feudal structure..  
There was no contradiction between Christian conviction and making money, as Weber explained. Alt-
hough the Puritans (who derived from the Calvinists) had railed against wealth, a more careful examination 
of what they preached revealed that it was indolence and self-indulgence that might emerge from holding 
wealth that was criticized rather than wealth itself. Though an immodest display of wealth was not ac-
ceptable, the effort put in to develop wealth was an act of glorifying God. “Not leisure and enjoyment, but 
only activity serves to increase the glory of God” (Weber 1985, 157). Enrichment meant that the busi-
nessman was realizing the gifts of skill and competency that were from God. Since profit could not be 
translated into consumer goods, re-investing it in the business was the common recourse. This “accumu-
lation of capital” in the Calvinist countries that resulted from this reinvestment was the root of the devel-
opment and spread of capitalism. 
In this dissertation, I adopt Weber’s use of an ideal model. More importantly, Weber (1985) juxtaposed the 
rise of a particular religious sensibility and changes in an economic order, which is precisely my topic. 
Weber also used several concepts that are useful in what follows, including, for example, his term “elective 
affinity,” which he uses to mean a “resonance or coherence between aspects of the teachings of Protes-
tantism and of the capitalist enterprise, notably the ethos of the latter. The relationship was unconscious so 
far as the actors involved were concerned” (Scott and Marshall 1988). 
The term applies to the relationship I argue exists between the new conditions of workers and New Age 
spirituality (NAS). The demands put on workers due to the nature of contemporary work organization and 
requirements create a receptivity of workers towards a certain set of values and worldview which match the 
NAS values and cosmology. I posit that maintaining a NAS belief system lends coherence to the unique set 
of work practices and mirrors values promoted within corporations. It helps workers make sense of their 
existential condition. As I have stated, many corporate managers have instituted corporate cultures that 
promote the adoption of “spirituality” values in workplaces, as they also establish relevant training pro-
grams and practices on-site.  
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Weber’s analysis serves as a model, too, because, although the Protestant ethic was chiefly a value system 
for capitalists, businessmen who were in the higher levels of enterprise, capitalism’s success would natu-
rally influence the social importance of Calvinism and promote its diffusion. Weber contended that work-
ers, too, adopted many of the commitments of capitalists, although he has been taken to task over this as-
sertion, which I will discuss further below. In any case, Weber has taught us that Calvinists developing 
capitalist businesses integrated a religious tradition with new work and behavioural demands, and so served 
as vanguard members of a process of political-economic change. They played this role indirectly, through 
capitalism’s progressive social acceptance, but also directly, i.e., ideologically, through their support of 
Calvinism as a religion for all. They were key players in the institutionalization of a new type of rationality 
for the community at large.  
The thesis explored in this dissertation generally follows Weber’s model, but for a different religious ori-
entation and different work and behavioural demands. As its major focus is not the major corporate deci-
sion-makers, but a form of upper-middle class found particularly in the media and hi-tech industries, 
symbolic analysts (SAs), it also focuses on a different capitalist stratum than did Weber. Scholarship shows 
that these are the most common adopters of NAS within contemporary capitalist workforces. Their work-
places are the most common sites for spirituality training and discourse.  
This suggests that NAS is particularly appropriate for a type of worker within the leading sector of the 
economy. These workers can and do influence others in the community, and there is reason to believe they 
are a vector for the general diffusion of NAS attitudes. I suggest they have a role in popularizing NAS 
values and worldview both through the indirect process of simply performing their jobs (for example, by 
launching new technologies that dictate new forms of sociality for the consuming public), but through 
intentionally exploiting their communications skills and social prestige to persuade others of the attrac-
tiveness of their personal cosmology (importantly, through the promotion of a technology-based worldview 
parallel to the NAS worldview).  
However, Calvinism was established prior to a mature capitalism, and Weber contends that the former 
influenced the evolution of the latter. At least one form of challenge to this position, as I explain below, is to 
argue that changing material conditions and sites of power forced capitalist innovations, and the Calvinist 
commitments of the innovators was either somewhat secondary, or a result of material conditions. In fact, 
the argument is that Luther’s teaching and Calvinism could have been interpreted in many ways, according 
to what fitted the conditions of the interpreters. For example, the radical religious sects collectively referred 
to as Anabaptists interpreted Luther as validating individual religious choice. In their view, Luther repu-
diated his initial insistence that all Christians follow their consciences when he allowed the supportive 
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German princes to impose Protestantism within their sovereign territories. By accentuating what they saw 
as Luther’s initial support of radical individualism, they interpreted Luther’s message very differently than 
capitalists did Calvin (Hill 1972). The convictions of Anabaptists (i.e., adult baptism advocates) influenced 
other Protestant radicals who “opposed state interference in religious matters” (Hill 1972). In England, 
Levellers sought economic equality and the Diggers were “agrarian communists” who built on the spirit of 
the Reformation (Malik 2014.). Luther was as conservative in his politics as he was in his faith. He sup-
ported the ruthless suppression of the revolutionary movements, especially during the 1524 Peasants’ War 
This brings us to the issue of the direction of causation between the material and ideological when society 
changes. What is the relationship between the institutions that define a society when change occurs? Do 
cultural values and ideas lead changes in material structures and vested interests during any such period of 
major social transition—or vice versa? This question is also a concern in this dissertation.  
Weber considered this question throughout his sociological corpus, which ranged in subject matter through 
many civilizations and time periods. However, he often presented his position in relation to the theories of 
Karl Marx (Morrison 1995, 214-217), who was an important influence on his work. Both Marx and Weber 
argued that religions and economic structures must complement each other. However, their positions 
generally conflict with respect to the direction of influence of the two social parameters. Weber objected to 
Marx’s argument that prevailing value systems—i.e., here, established religions—only reflect material 
conditions and, indeed, “legitimate” the power structure (as part of the superstructure). According to Marx, 
the legitimation that religion affords makes the superior privileges of the powerful appear to be “natural.” 
Weber insisted that religious values could have, as it were, a life of their own, and actually influence how 
power structures evolved. At root, this is an idealistic view of history. In fact, Weber claimed to reject this 
extreme view and felt his analysis captured the back and forth procession between these two moments. 
Weber argued that there were four social institutions that played a part in changing society—religion, the 
economy, law and the state (Morrison 1995, 225). He opposed the supposedly pre-determined nature of 
Marx’s historical predictions, and argued that the specific contributions of the economic as well as the 
non-economic determinative forces (i.e., the four listed above), cannot be predicted in theory, and that 
combinations of all of these may be varyingly influential at different times (Morrison 1995, 215-216). 
Accordingly Weber wrote that he did not want “to substitute for one-sided materialist, an equally one-sided 
spiritualist causal interpretation of culture and history” (Weber 1985, 183). However, Kieran Allen (2004, 
40) argues that Weber was not able to resist the opportunity to make an “implicit polemic against Marx-
ism,” so that he greatly exaggerated the religious (i.e., idealist) over any material causes of the rise of 
capitalism in this argument. Allen claims that Weber ended up representing the German idealist tradition in 
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his account—showing the Protestant Ethic to be a geist—“an historic prime mover” (2004, 40) that drew 
history along without the necessary execution of power struggles by classes of actors, attempting to direct 
changes in their interests.  
Georg Lukacs also takes Allen’s position. “Lukacs has argued that the overall effect of Weber’s account 
was to “de-economize” and “spiritualize” the nature of capitalism. In other words, capitalism is presented 
as a byproduct of rationalising forces, which grew out of moral duties imposed by religion” (Allen 2004, 
45). By implying a relatively smooth, self-propelling transition, Weber suppresses the amount of violence it 
took to procure the wealth or seed money for capitalism, to actually force former feudal peasants and guild 
craftspeople to submit to the disciplines of capitalism and to create a global trade system that worked in the 
interests of the capitalist countries. “The account leaves out the role of brutal force in accumulating capital, 
in imposing new disciplines on labour and in subjecting the colonies to the economic needs of the metro-
politan countries. In doing so, it romanticizes the origins of capitalism” (Allen 2004, 45).  
However, Allen considers criticisms of Weber’s view that are focussed on exactly how the Protestant belief 
system applies to the newly-emerging capitalist mentality to be “beside the point.” He also considers the 
(naïve Marxist) argument that “Protestantism was simply a “reflection” of the bourgeois class position,” to 
be irrelevant, too (Allen 2004, 40). The important question is the material forces that triggered the rise and 
prevalence of the ethic in the first place. With Talcott Parsons, Allen notes that “in emphasizing the primacy 
of ideas, [Weber provides no] systematic account” of the material events that led to the broad reception of 
Luther’s ideas, nor for the (non-capitalist) revolutionary impulses that carried it along (Allen, 39). In fact, 
there was a distinct political agenda in Luther’s initiatives. “Luther denounced usury and speculation; the 
displacement of local customs by Roman laws; the draining of Germany’s wealth into a grasping and 
wasteful Church. His doctrine of the priesthood of all believers provided a powerful incentive for removing 
the privileges of the clergy and subjecting them to taxes” (Allen 2004, 41).  
Even Protestant theology itself has political implications, as “it stresses its objection to mechanical reli-
gious actions which do not involve the heart; its emphasis on morality being self-imposed rather than 
coming from obedience to priests; its stress on preaching rather than prayer and sacraments; its use of the 
vernacular Bible and Prayer Book” (Allen 2004, 42). Luther’s assertion of “the right of Christian assem-
blies to appoint, install and dismiss their spiritual teachers… was but the corollary to the ‘communal prin-
ciple of self-government in the secular sphere’” (Allen 2004, 41). Furthermore, even if capitalists made of 
the Protestant Ethic what Weber claimed they did, others may have made something else of it. “Even if we 
assume that Weber’s non-revolutionary model of Protestant theology is correct, historically, it does not 
follow that humans necessarily lived by an official theology that is prescribed by their leaders. So Luther 
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may have preached obedience to secular authority, but this did not prevent a peasant’s revolt that used some 
of his doctrines as justification” (Allen 2004, 43). Christopher Hill (in Fisher 2010, 35-36), finally, rejects 
even the basic thesis of Weber’s argument. He argues that “there is nothing in Protestantism which leads 
automatically to capitalism. Its importance was rather that it undermined obstacles which the more rigid 
institutions and ceremonies of Catholicism imposed.” 
Despite what these criticisms suggest, Weber professed that both economic and non-economic forces led to 
the Reformation and subsequent developments (Weber 1978 and 1985, 90). Indeed, the non-economic 
forces he delineated were varied. Morrison (1995) rebuts charges of Weber’s account as narrow. He notes 
that, in his attribution of “non-economic factors in capitalist development, Weber was completely unique 
and differed from Marx significantly. [As noted, these factors are] the emergence of a system of rational-
ity…, the development of a system of laws and forms of citizenship..., the rise of the state..., and the growth 
of the ‘gain spirit’ and the system of ethics” (Morrison 1995, 226-27). The gain spirit “is based on a ra-
tionalization of the conduct of everyday life in general and a rationalistic economic ethic in particular. By 
‘gain spirit,’ Weber meant a system of conduct based on ethical norms which govern commercial activity 
and which serve to bring the economic and religious spheres into a relationship with each other” (Morrison 
1995, 230). Only the last, the ‘gain spirit,’ and the system of ethics, related directly to religion. William E. 
Connolly (2008) essentially agrees with this point, although argues it in a different way from Morrison. 
Most interestingly, he shows that Weber looked at culture as implicated in materially-based practices, such 
that it bears strong resemblance to the Regulation School’s mode of regulation. He explains:  
In playing up the encoding of spiritual forces neither Weber [1985] nor Blumenberg [1999] is an “ideal-
ist”—contending that ideas and beliefs alone are the motor of history…. While Weber sometimes talks as if 
it is the beliefs of the devotees which inspire a specific mode of conduct, a closer reading of his text reveals 
that a complex set of beliefs, habits, techniques of induction, and larger institutional processes complement 
each other, creating a complex reducible to no single element alone. This becomes most clear when old 
habits of conduct continue for a time after the beliefs to which they were attached are superseded. These 
habits will eventually wither unless they become attached to other disciplinary techniques (Connolly 2008, 
18). 
Allen and fellow critics accept a significant part of Weber’s argument. “Weber was correct to stress the 
affinity between Protestantism and the rising capitalist class… [C]learly, the religious ideas themselves 
played a huge role in stimulating the revolt of capitalist forces” (2004, 40). Allen also grants that Weber’s 
broad historical attribution of the reasons for the transition from feudalism to modernity accords with ac-
cepted materialist accounts. “Overall, the Reformation was seen as a revolt against the Catholic Church, 
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which was directly tied to the feudal order and the aristocracy. It found an echo in many social clas-
ses—disgruntled German princes, peasants but particularly among the small manufacturers, lesser mer-
chants and craftsmen who constituted its rank and file” (Allen 2004, 40). Nevertheless, the critics insist, the 
emphasis on Luther’s theology rather than politics mars Weber’s representation of the rise of capitalism in 
Europe. Weber “discards entirely the social dimensions to the Reformation and concentrates instead on its 
theological essence” (Allen 2004, 42). In so doing, his account suggests an “unreal historical vacuum, 
[because] it is difficult to explain the audience for Luther’s religious ideas without examining the high level 
of social unrest which prevailed” (Allen 2004, 40).  
To clarify the latter point, as feudalism broke down, both the Church’s and the aristocracy’s normal sources 
of wealth were depleted, so they exacted new taxes on peasants and urban craftsmen in order to compen-
sate. Cities had exploded, peasants were freed from feudal obligations, and craft guilds, which had pro-
tected entry and incomes, had been weakened. “[T]he growth of the market made it easier for the wealthier 
classes to free themselves from guild restrictions. They demanded the right to hire rural labour, to dispense 
with notions of ‘the customary price’, to impose new divisions of labour on their journeymen. The insta-
bility created by the growing market also forced the feudal orders and the church to increase the pressure on 
the peasantry for more taxes and tithes” (Allen 2004, 41). By the time Luther declared his 95 Theses, (in 
contrast to many reformers who had preceded him, with similar treatises [Allen 2004, 40]) the material and 
social stresses of society moving away from feudalism had finally reached high enough level to motivate 
revolt. “The Reformation received huge support precisely because it was seen as addressing these issues. It 
was not simply an abstract theological corpus as Weber presents it, but a movement that fused religious, 
social and political demands” (Allen 2004, 41).  
[Weber] assumes that Calvinists of the time were all motivated by the belief that an all-powerful God meant 
pre-destination, which produced anxiety, which led to worldly asceticism. Yet even in the case of Calvin-
ism, these themes may not have been picked up with the same emphasis by all social classes. There are 
some indications, for example, to show that Weber played down the more revolutionary aspects of 
Protestant theology.” [Additionally,] “it is difficult to disagree with [R.H.] Tawney’s (1938, 99) assertion 
the ‘both an intense individualism and a rigorous Christian Socialism could be deduced from Calvin’s 
doctrine, [depending on] differences of political environment and social class’” (quoted in Allen 2004, 43).  
Allen particularly recommends Christopher Hill’s (1972) A World Turned Upside Down, for details about 
the integral nature of the religious and political messages of Luther—especially to peasants and labourers. 
This history “shows a clear link between the ideas of some Protestant sects and a demand for ‘a levelling’ 
and a sharing of common land” (2004, 43). 
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The above is only a suggestion of important debates that circulate around the issue of the contribution of 
ideal versus material factors in social change (taking Weber’s history as the case). This study’s purpose is 
certainly not to adjudicate that debate. However, I have reviewed it in order to establish that the mere claim 
of an “elective affinity” of new workers for New Age spirituality should be only part of the project. Ac-
cordingly, in addition to outlining the complementarity of work and religious values, I also suggest, through 
several lines of argument, the material forces and historical events that would have brought the two into 
alignment.  
In this dissertation, I take as a given what the Regulation School argues: there is congruity between culture 
and material forces. However, I also argue, (along with David Harvey and others), that the congruity is not 
tight. Moreover, the question of which of the forces, culture or material, is determinant relative to the other 
when society changes is also left unanswered. As my analysis below demonstrates, my leanings are towards 
the “materialist” position—i.e., material factors, concentrated as a “power structure” —are primary. This is 
the general argument of the theoretitions I chiefly cite here. Indeed, as I explained in Chapter One, an 
important goal of his dissertation is to refine and fill out a materialist critique of neospirituality, by looking 
at work culture and conditions. This is not to “prove” that the critique is true but to give it full form for 
future assessment.  
As the debate between Weber and Marx also suggests, a correlation does not establish a direct influence, or 
‘causality.’ Indeed, both New Age spirituality and new work forms are together in a milieu of larger pro-
cesses that shape them, such as globalization, secularization, and new technologies. (Broad economic 
changes are reviewed in Chapter Five. An aspect of larger cognitive changes is reviewed in Chapter Seven, 
as developments in large-scale systems analysis that emerged as globalism advanced.) Although these 
larger forces cannot be denied, my argument in this dissertation is that New Age spirituality and new work 
forms have developed in such close physical proximity and historical relation to each other, and that New 
Age spirituality answers the meaning-demands of these new workers to such an extent, that we should see 
them as having a special relation to each other—enough for each to influence the other’s futures.  
As I promised to in Chapter One, I maintain a degree of ambivalence about the question of determination. 
Overall, however, I lean towards a materialist analysis—that the material is the leading force despite that, as 
I continue to show throughout this dissertation, there are many elements that appear to influence the ready 
admittance of neospirituality in workplaces. I argue that, if we wish to look for the direction of ‘causation’ 
(while granting a dialectical process at the same time) neospirituality should be seen more as being shaped 
by new working conditions and corporate interests than the reverse. 
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From Fordism to Post-Fordism 
Fordism: Mass Production 
Fordism preceded post-Fordism as the dominant model of industry and life conditions in Western de-
mocracies. According to Dyer-Witheford (1999, 52) Fordism refers to three interlocking systems: “the 
integration of a Taylorist division of labour with intense mechanization pioneered in the auto-plant as-
sembly-lines of Henry Ford…, its subsequent connection to mass markets consuming standardized man-
ufactured goods…, and Keynesian stabilization of the business cycle.” Of course, Ford built his automo-
biles and instituted the assembly-line and the ‘living wage’ in the early part of the twentieth century, but the 
impact of these innovations, along with complimentary social-democratic institutions that added to their 
effectiveness, was particularly felt after World War II. This is the era to which the term “Fordism” chiefly 
refers. 
This period was one of broad affluence for Western Europeans and North Americans. The Fordist model 
sees a significant segment of Western (male) workers, supported by union-negotiated high wages and 
benefits, settling into stultifying and deskilled, but secure, work routines. During this time, family security 
and quality of life were enhanced by large-scale government expenditures on public works and social ser-
vices. Workers produced masses of goods that were duly and daily consumed by fellow (and ‘third-world’) 
citizens. European and North American national GNPs (gross national products) rose steadily and im-
pressively. “[L]iving standards rose, crisis tendencies were contained, mass democracy preserved and the 
threat of inter-capitalist wars kept remote” (Harvey 1990, 129). The stability was also based on a post-war 
financial arrangement between nations that the US dollar would be the “free” world’s reserve currency in a 
fixed rate of exchange with other currencies. The United States and, eventually, Europe and Japan, would 
supply manufactured goods to other countries able to buy them, whilst drawing on recipient countries’ raw 
materials to make them, and the US military might maintained the system (Harvey 1990, 141).  
This balance depended on a ‘compact’ between labour, government, and business. Union bureaucracies did 
their part by restricting workers’ demands to better material compensation rather than to more democratic 
control (such as allowing workers’ influence on how their work was structured or on what was produced in 
the factories). Corporations, on the other hand, were responsible for “enhanc[ing] productivity, guaran-
tee[ing] growth, and rais[ing] living standards while ensuring a stable basis for gaining profits. This implied 
a corporate commitment to steady but powerful processes of technological change, mass fixed capital in-
vestment, growth of managerial expertise in both production and marketing, and the mobilization of 
economies of scale through standardization of product” (Harvey 1990, 134). Governments provided strong 
legal protection for workers, including their capacity to unionize and bargain with employers effectively. 
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They also supported business success. To maintain predictable consumption patterns, keep businesses 
profitable, and encourage them to reinvest their profits, Keynesian policies controlled inflation and eco-
nomic slumps. “To the degree that mass production requiring heavy investment in fixed capital in turn 
required stable demand conditions to be profitable, so the state strove to curb business cycles through an 
appropriate mix of fiscal and monetary policies in the postwar period” (Harvey 1990, 135).   
The leading economic sectors in Fordism were heavy industries, which produced cars, ships, transport 
equipment, steel, petrochemicals, rubber, consumer electrical goods, and construction goods.
 
Work rela-
tions were shaped by the “mass industrial factory, which defined the circuits of labouring cooperation 
primarily through the physical deployments of workers on the shop floor” (Hardt and Negri 2000, 295). The 
literal weight of productive materials and processes tied corporations to places. By virtue of its necessary 
fixed investments, a company had an unavoidable presence, and therefore profile, in a particular commu-
nity. Employers generally supported their host communities, most importantly through local hiring, but via 
other community support as well. In any case, factory labour is not a specialized workforce, so recruitment 
from the general locale of the plant was unproblematic.  
After WWII, counting in post-war subsidies of Germany and Japan, Fordist industries clustered in grand 
production regions in the world economy, such as the Midwest of the United States, the Ruhr-Rhinelands of 
Germany, the West Midlands of Britain, and the Tokyo-Yokohama production region. Third-world and 
native “inner-city” development monies created or maintained populations of consumers more generally. 
To compensate for decades of pre-war and war-time deprivation experienced by Allied citizens, govern-
ments also sought to establish standard, high quality living conditions by providing social services for their 
entire populations (Bauman 2005, 47–49). The services provided “a strong underpinning to the social wage 
through expenditures covering social security, health care, education, housing and the like” (Harvey 
1990, 135).
 
At least on paper, governments pursued a norm of equal success for their entire citizenry.  
These investments in social and material infrastructures “were vital to the growth of both mass production 
and mass consumption, and … would also guarantee relatively full employment” (Harvey 1990, 135). The 
result was a complex but functioning international exchange process:  
The privileged workforces in [the first-world] formed one pillar of a rapidly expanding effective demand. 
The other pillar rested on state-sponsored reconstruction of war-torn economies, suburbanization particu-
larly in the United States, urban renewal, geographical expansion of transport and communications sys-
tems, and infrastructural development both within and outside the advanced capitalist world (Harvey 
1990, 132).  
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The Fordist ‘golden age’ persisted for a generation until in the early 1970s it was thrown into crisis by a 
variety of problems, both internal to countries and as the result of growing economic globalization. 
“Stagnating consumer demand for big-ticket durable goods, new sources of international competition, 
rising unemployment, creeping inflation, and the oil shocks of the 1970s were among a variety of factors 
that would ultimately throw Fordism into economic crisis” (de Peuter 2010, 8). 
The rising and effective wage demands of unionized workers resulted in a ‘“worldwide wage explosion” 
(de Peuter 2010, 8). Pay raises, however, were only one among other demands. Workers also revolted 
against rigid and alienating working conditions, especially in factories. “The years 1968-1972 in particular 
witnessed a wave of labour unrest, as frustration with working conditions boiled over in costly wildcat 
strikes, absenteeism, and sabotage. The demand that most concerned managerial powers was that for 
greater participation and self-management in production” (de Peuter 2010, 9). However, dissatisfaction 
extended beyond workplaces, to encompass the student, “black power” and anti-Vietnam war movements, 
as well as nascent environmentalism and second-wave feminism. bThe smooth climate for corporations 
changed dramatically. “Within a matter of years [in the late 1960s,] the appearance of peaceful, passionless 
capitalist stability was spectacularly contradicted by the upsurge of domestic and international dissent” 
(Dyer-Witheford (1999, 17). 
Changes in global business conditions and regulation additionally affected internal economies. Chiefly, the 
industrial countries lost control of their power to set interest-rates (a power that had been advantageous for 
their global trade), with the cancellation in 1971of the Bretton Woods agreement to fix gold prices and tie 
currencies directly to the US dollar. Tickell and Peck (1995, 371–72) explain:  
As private capital began increasingly to circulate globally on a deregulated basis, Keynesian nation-states 
progressively lost control of one of the most important macro-economic levers—the setting of interest rates. 
The loss of interest-rate sovereignty was a significant contributor to the breakdown of the fragile interna-
tional order established under Fordism.  
National economies weakened “as cheaper or technologically more sophisticated imports successfully 
competed with indigenous industries which were reaching the limits of the Fordist division of labour” 
(Tickell and Peck 1995, 372). International institutions representing the globalizing Fordist economy, such 
as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), took 
advantage of this weakness to support the interests of their new constituency--large corporations (often 
registered as American) that increasingly saw themselves as “transnational.” Diminished national loyalty 
propelled companies to export more of their jobs, beyond a tolerable balance for local employment levels, 
precipitating chronically-high levels of unemployment in many localities. On the government’s part, since 
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these newly-exported wages were not to be returned to local economies, the domestic incentive for 
high-wage policies diminished. “[T]he growth of the export sector meant that wages were increasingly seen 
as a drag on economic competitiveness rather than a contributor to consumption. Consequently, real wages 
began to slow and then decline, compounding the problems of stagnating consumer demand” (Tickell and 
Peck 1995, 372). 
What had once been a relatively successful reciprocal system began to fail, offering diminishing returns to 
those actors who tried to maintain it. “The virtuous cycle of Fordism had turned vicious” (Tickell and Peck 
1995, 372). 
Post-Fordism: Flexible Accumulation 
The question of what kind of regime of accumulation has succeeded Fordism, or even if such a regime has 
successfully cohered, is a matter of debate. Nonetheless, the concept of a new post-Fordist system, first 
broached by the Regulation School theorists, has been widely advanced by both political economists and 
cultural theorists. One of the most accessible accounts is that offered by David Harvey (1999).  
Harvey explains post-Fordism primarily in terms of capitalists’ strategies for attacking the rigidities of the 
Fordist economic structure, which were deemed to be the chief cause of falling profits. Post-Fordism is a 
regime of “flexible accumulation.” Harvey identified 
…flexibility with respect to labour processes, labour markets, products, 
and patterns of consumption. [The new regime] is characterized by the 
emergence of entirely new sectors of production, new ways of providing 
financial services, new markets and, above all, greatly intensified rates of 
commercial, technological and organizational innovation” (Harvey 
1990, 147).  
The demise of Fordism was an outcome of the breakdown of the coordination (described above), between 
consumption and production. Despite the existence of a particularly youthful, mostly middle-class, sector 
of American society who for the first time had disposable income and made this very visible in the heyday 
of the counterculture (Campbell 2007), “the bulk of the American public found themselves at the beginning 
of a four-decades long (and counting) stagnation of real wages” (Konings 2015, 90). From the early 1970s 
on “global capitalism has experienced chronic problems of surplus capital needing to be absorbed” 
(Marchak 1993, 17). Consumers no longer had the capacity to buy the ‘surplus’ that capitalism put on the 
market. Mass consumption and productivity gains were out of sync, but their coordination is the key req-
uisite of an effective ‘regime of accumulation.’ Therefore, capitalists “sought alternatives, as they had done 
in the past” (Marchak 1993, 16). Corporations needed either to change their means of production, their 
products, or both. Both, it was! 
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The challenge was to speed up the rate at which products were consumed, so as to ‘mop up’ any surplus of 
goods that might otherwise stall the economy. This meant either that goods had to wear out quickly or be 
replaced more often by consumers motivated by advertising-induced, changing tastes. Both of these 
strategies were, in fact, time honoured. However, post-Fordism embraced them with fervour and a new 
twist: make the products so ephemeral that their value dissolved nearly at first use. Media products, services 
and information met the definition of this ideal product. Furthermore, by enhancing consumer assessment, 
targeting, and delivery capacity, the emerging interactive computers and communications technologies 
(ICTs) made their intensive production worthwhile.  
Computing and network technologies gave companies greater capacity to identify, poll, produce for and sell 
to relatively small and specific population segments. Close tracking of these targeted markets allows them 
to make quick responses to changed tastes—replacing economies of scale with economies of scope. These 
possibilities emerged hand-in-hand with the reduction of the public sphere, and collective provision of 
services, converting to market what were formerly common solutions to social and personal needs (Frank 
1997, 23-24).  
The post-Fordist term signals the implementation of fast turnover time in production and exchange as re-
quired, to keep up with this proliferation of consumer goods. For citizens to consume at an increasing speed, 
media ‘coordinated’ a medley of reminders to do so, and governments gave political, legal and regulatory 
go-aheads and supports to technologies that could ‘refresh’ consumption messages frequently. Consumers 
learned to respond to the reminders and messages of their own volition. Additionally, media messages and 
the consumption patterns they urged were integrated (amid some protest) into hitherto unconquered ter-
rains—such as in schools. Branded products were introduced to lunchrooms and complimentary learning 
aids, such as computers, to classrooms—training young people for consumption (Barlow and Robertson 
1994).  
The acceleration of consumption and economic activity also implemented the speeding-up of other domains 
of post-Fordist life. In this new regime, “the time-horizons of both private and public decision-making have 
shrunk, while satellite communication and declining transport costs have made it increasingly possible to 
spread those decisions immediately over an ever-wider and variegated space” (Harvey 1990, 147). The new 
regime’s sped-up turnover times, realized across increasingly global markets, generated a “space-time 
compression” that Harvey (1990, 147) sees as characteristic of the Post-Fordist world. 
‘Ephemeral’ Products  
Rather than just the heavy industrial goods of Fordism, ‘ephemeral,’ or ‘immaterial’ products become the 
life-blood of economies, particularly in North America. The service category includes “not only personal, 
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business and health services, but also entertainments, spectacles, happening, and distractions” (Harvey 
1990, 156). In their production cycles, even manufactured goods appear to be ephemeral. Post-Fordist 
clothing production and distribution cycles epitomize these changes. During Fordism, the trend-setting elite 
‘couturier’ centred in Paris was relatively slow-moving. Moreover, men’s clothing tastes changed at glacial 
rates. However, the durable, relatively-expensive, conventional clothing of the Fordist middle class (re-
flecting high-fashion at a remove) gave way to more cheaply-made, ‘stylish’ and disposable wardrobes, 
“fast-fashion.” In Harvey’s view, fast-fashion exemplifies post-Fordist innovation, and is a syndrome that 
reaches well beyond clothing production. Again, planned obsolescence (as for automobiles) is not new. 
But, now, all manner of consumer items that were formerly appreciated solely for their functionality are 
included within the gaze of fashion-seeking. An ever-expanding array of consumer products has been 
brought into the regime of fashion, from kitchen appliances to travel destinations.  
The media promoting ‘fast fashion’ are selling not just the new, but change itself, in “a wide swath of 
life-styles and recreational activities, [it] actively produces the very ephemerality that has always been 
fundamental to the experience of modernity” (Harvey 1990, 185). Harvey explains that “the half-life of a 
typical Fordist product was, for example, five to seven years, but flexible accumulation has more than cut 
that in half in certain sectors (such as textile and clothing industries), while in others—such as the so-called 
‘thoughtware’ industries (e.g., video games and computer software programmes)—the half-life is down to 
less than eighteen months” (Harvey 1990, 156).  
This is to say nothing of the “fashion” associated with the true post-Fordist ephemeral products, not only 
media products, proper, but ideas, opinions, personal qualities, etc., through social media platforms such as 
Twitter, Facebook, Youtube, etc. Attach advertising to these and, in a powerful positive-feedback relation, 
the medium actually becomes the message! Celebrity is now reified on electronic platforms, while, as 
people continually seek to be hip through their knowledge of technologies, the platforms themselves be-
come the celebrities. More mundanely, ‘trending on Twitter’ has accelerated fashion’s turnover to an order 
of magnitude faster than fast-fashion’s improvement on couturier.  
Vertical Dis-integration 
Because they expected their business’s basic dynamics—products, markets and modes of distribution—to 
persist over the long-term, Fordist companies sought to own as many as possible of the constituents of their 
operations as they could afford and manage. This meant owning buildings, machinery, suppliers, sources of 
material, distributions systems, etc., in order to control costs. By virtue of this “vertical integration,” 
companies maintained “long-term and large-scale fixed capital investments in mass-production systems 
that precluded much flexibility of design and presumed stable growth in invariant consumer markets” 
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(Harvey 1990, 142). This approach was efficient in the stable and predictable Fordist business environment. 
However, by the 1980s, the globalizing business environment required firms to reconsider the role of these 
company commitments and recast them as ‘business rigidities.’  
The movement towards vertical disintegration, or, less drastically, “quasi-vertical integration” (Harvey 
1990, 147), is particularly marked in the business services sector and the producers of other information and 
cultural products. It includes not only shedding of subsidiaries but, in many cases, partial dismemberment 
of the owning corporation. The dismembered or “spun-off” parts might, then operate as small business 
entities in long-term contracts with their former owners, or become “free-agents,” offering their services to 
a variety of the powerful corporate “shells,” making and breaking connections on project-by-project basis.  
Commonly, stripped-down corporations that maintain the all-important brand identities, along with their 
profits, get products to market through maintained links with a proliferation of small independent com-
mercial units (sometimes composed of groups of “outsourced” employees), contributing to production on a 
contingent (i.e., as-needed, just-in-time) basis, as a coordinated chain of sub-contractors. Depending on 
fluctuations in business conditions, these patterns of associations can be easily reconfigured through 
non-renewal of contracts etc.  
These organizational forms partly mitigate endemic business instability in the more risky conditions of the 
global, post-Fordist economy (Harvey 1990, 157-165). This is one form of the “flexibility” of the 
post-Fordist regime of accumulation. It is also a painless way of gaining people’s services without em-
ploying them. The work of “spun-off” employees, managing their own subcontracting companies, is 
available on an irregular basis without the impediments of labour-legislation that might otherwise protect 
them from such unreliable working conditions. Moreover, the self-employed must absorb normal business 
risks that would otherwise accrued to their employer, such as “the demand for a product, bad weather, 
worker error resulting in liability, etc. [These] become a problem for the independent contractor—not the 
large corporation.” 
Of course, the success of these organizational arrangements is premised on effective communications 
networks and business-processes--supported by all manner of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ technologies as local area 
networks, groupware, intranets, collaborative project schedulers, conference programs etc. (Liu 2004, 44). 
The point is to coordinate all of the links along the chain so that relevant information is “up to the minute,” 
and supplies are delivered “just-in-time,” and productivity is not lost through delays or misdirection at any 
of the nodes. Another strategy for downloading risk, just-in-time delivery also “eliminated the need for 
large, expensive warehouses (and warehousing staff). The delivery was downloaded to independent con-
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tractors, truck drivers, for example, who now carried all of the risk that their former employers used to 
carry.”  
The new information systems that allow coordination of production across the globe, including contracting 
out and just-in-time networks, have been accepted as posthierarchical forms that help undermine the ad-
vantage that large corporations with their substantial capital base enjoyed in Fordism. If this were so, it is 
appropriate that these services were largely bought through the public purse. Despite that research and 
development of innovations in software and hardware are popularly presented as “private” enterprise, the 
different technologies of communication and control are mostly the result of huge governmental invest-
ments in computer power, telecommunications and database technologies during the past half-century, 
many for the purposes of enhancing military power. As to democratizing access to business, despite ap-
parent opportunities presented to small economic actors by this scenario, it is the highly-capitalized um-
brella organizations, the stripped-down global “shells” we call global corporations, that have the capacity to 
develop the government-funded basic technological research that essentially underwrites commercial 
production worldwide (but pre-eminently in the US). Essentially, the behemoths are more able to leverage 
the public subsidies in technology research to their advantage than are small companies.  
In the global economy, the technologies that confer the most advantage are data-processing and networking 
capacity. Company success depends on immediate knowledge of technological developments, markets, 
including financial and currency markets, and government policies (Harvey 1990, 161). Access to the 
high-cost technologies that provide this knowledge is now the ultimate determinants of success in the 
global post-Fordist marketplace, and what led early post-Fordist analysts to anticipate a new “information 
society” (for example, Fritz Machlup 2016; and Daniel Bell 1976). At the same time, its importance is the 
major reason large companies can maintain their advantage over smaller companies. Since wealth buys 
more of this essential technology (which, in turn, creates more wealth), Harvey and others argue that 
post-Fordist information technologies basically concentrate, not disperse, corporate power (Harvey 
1990, 157–158). In other words, they contribute towards consolidating power, or hierarchy. 
This reality is also a direct contradiction of the general belief in posthierarchy, which frames much popular 
ideology. I discuss forms of the posthierarchical belief in Chapter Seven. More specifically, this argument 
contrasts with the image of the new marketplace in the age of the internet (although the latter’s transition to 
the commodified “information superhighway” [see Kroker and Weinstein 2001] is giving them pause). This 
popular perception is enhanced by the ideologues of a ‘network cosmology,’ technology workers who 
promote the entire e-media industry through mythologizing their worldview, as will be discussed in 
Chapter Eight. Apologists for this network cosmology (as I argue, an adaptation of neospiritual holism for 
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technologically-steeped workers) contend that the internet and personal communications e-tools are de-
mocratizing, because a world full of engaged e-technology-users has been flattened of hierarchy.  
Post-Fordism and Neoliberalism 
Post-Fordist companies wanted freedom not only from the traditional ‘rigidities’ of business, but also from 
those imposed on them by governments that had commonly intervened in their economies. They expected 
globalization and certain changes in public policies to solve their economic problems. Through their agents, 
the intergovernmental regulatory agency, such as the WTO, they launched an unrelenting campaign to press 
governments “to decrease expenditures, reduce public services, and privatize public properties” (Marchak 
1993, 22). Their aim was to “break the consensus of the welfare state” (Marchak 1993, 9).  
‘Reaganism’ in the US and ‘Thatcherism’ in the United Kingdom were evidence of their success. The 
neoliberal philosophy behind the policies urged on nations aimed “to liberate the market from political 
oversight and integrate social life as much as possible into markets” (Fisher 2010, 46–47). Fundamentally, 
this campaign meant dissolving the Fordist pattern of reciprocity amongst “big labour, big capital, and big 
government[, which] increasingly appeared as a dysfunctional embrace of such narrowly defined vested 
interests as to undermine rather than secure capital accumulation” (Harvey 1990, 142). Under the new 
economic conditions, the Fordist pact became an intolerable rigidity. 
Governments under pressure inaugurated new economic policies that re-
duced social welfare provisions. They worked at minimizing the costs of 
providing services and regulatory protections to citizens (as they reduced 
corporate taxes). They reduced the provision of ‘common goods’ and 
public infrastructure, while spinning these off to the private sector, where 
possible. They embraced ‘free trade’ pacts amongst themselves, reducing 
or eliminating tariffs that protected native industries and controlled prices 
of commodities. They also repudiated responsibility for the enhancement 
of the social fabric through economic redistributions and to the future via 
strong environmental protections (Harvey 1990, 167–168).  
As noted above, long-term commitments to labour, either by corporations or governments, were also tar-
geted as ‘rigidities.’ “There were problems of rigidities in labour markets, labour allocation, and in labour 
contracts (especially in the so-called ‘monopoly’ sector)” (Harvey 1990, 142). The strength of Fordist 
industrial employment was partly based on the trade-protectionist measures that supported domestic fac-
tories and their workforces. Unfortunately for workers, “[t]he first political condition [sought by global 
capitalists] was the private right to disinvest and move capital elsewhere” (Marchak 1993, 12). This right 
already existed within the free enterprise ideology, but it had been delimited by long-term obligations to 
labour enforced by union contracts and state legislation. It was also “morally constrained by a history of 
grants, taxation holiday, and government-provided infrastructure and resources intended to induce com-
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panies to locate in particular regions” (Marchak 1993, 12). However, flexible production processes worked 
best with a global scope and a “flexible” labour force. Geographical flexibility helped the corporations but 
hurt many domestic industrial workforces. Without their traditional pact with governments, and desperate 
to reduce costs, companies became willing to ignore their putative obligations to their traditional commu-
nities to hire locally.  
‘Flexible’ capital is far freer of frustrating governmental restraints than it was in the Fordist era. Further-
more, its international representatives keep a close watch on governmental policies in order to maintain that 
freedom. However, according to the plan, the reduction of the government in the economy is not to be 
complete. Governments have an important role in maintaining global trade, such as through free-trade 
negotiations. They are also, however, strongly relied on to subsidize companies in a wide variety of ways.
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National governments have to maintain a comfortable environment for business, ensuring not a fully 
competitive economy but a selective free market system. Global capitalism’s agents instructed the (now) 
“internationally-organized governments to be authoritarian instruments for the protection of private prop-
erty” (Marchak 1993, 195). This is the focus during the periodic policy summits of such agencies as the 
WTO. 
Limitations to Coordination of Regime of Accumulation and Mode of Regulation  
In presenting this overview of discussions about the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism, I do not want 
to gloss over the controversies that attend these categories. One such is the debate within post-Fordist 
economics as to how strictly companies need to hone down to flat-organizational and teamwork formats. 
Above, I noted that there are several different accounts of post-Fordism, placing different emphases on its 
various components, including its workplace components, and on their evaluation and interpretation. In this 
spirit, one critical analyst of post-Fordism, Stephen Vallas, indicates that post-Fordist economists take 
different positions on how closely companies need to take up that model in order to do well under 
post-Fordist economic conditions (Vallas 1999, 69).  
As Vallas (1999) points out, in the years since the Regulation School proposed their concepts, they have 
been adopted and inflected in a wide variety of ways. Vallas argues that only the strictest of a number of 
subschools of post-Fordism insist there is a very tight coordination between the regime of accumulation and 
the mode of regulation. Vallas (1999) refers to its members as “posthierarchy economists.” Important 
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members are Paul Adler (1991, 1992), Larry Hirschhorn (1984) and Shoshona Zuboff (1988).
57
 According 
to them, the flat organization is a necessity for companies to succeed in the contemporary economy. In their 
view, “the economic survival of technologically advanced firms hinges on their ability to forge new or-
ganizational structures that are capable of fully engaging the skills of their employees” (Vallas 1999, 70).  
Vallas criticizes posthierarchy economists as essentially technological determinists. Interestingly, these 
economists seem to collapse this “is” and the “ought” in their analysis in the way that Albanese argued New 
Agers do in their judgement of individual responsibility to act for the whole, which is purportedly una-
voidable anyway. In the same way, according to Vallas, the posthierarchy economists are apologists for a 
system they also argue is inevitable. They “typically emphasize the implicit structures (and, at times, even 
the emancipatory thrust) of new information technologies,” as they argue their positions (Vallas 1999, 70). 
Again consistent with New Age beliefs, they also condense the present and the future, effectively asserting 
that if the situation has not arrived yet, it must. Moreover, it should (because the outcomes would be good). 
This is a teleological position, a key argumentative strategy of technological determinists. “Consistent with 
its origins in [Douglas] MacGregor’s work, the posthierarchical view anticipates the transformation of 
workplaces to more creative places as a matter of course; in other words, as ‘technological imperatives,’ 
writ large, force new forms of work on organizations” (Vallas 1999, 71).  
The mixing of an apologetic aspect with analysis, as Vallas claims the posthierarchy economists do, pre-
sents complications in crediting their analysis. This mix does, however, underscore that there are (at least) 
two debates about post-Fordist workplace organization: whether “classic” post-Fordism organization 
structures comprehensively operate in companies, and whether, if so, they offer the salutary impact for 
employees that posthierarchy economists, argue it does. These two debates should not be confused in what 
follows. 
There are certainly questions as to the scope of post-Fordist transformations. Although work does seem to 
have undergone profound changes since the 1970s, it is important not to overstate their completeness. Even 
in the ‘advanced’ sectors of capitalism, there are workplaces whose practices are classically Fordist. Fur-
thermore, on a planetary scale, it is clear that however much Fordism may seem to fading in the global 
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factories in Southern China, where electronics for the world’s computing devices are made under severely 
Taylorized working conditions (Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter 2009). Lastly, it is important to recognize 
that, particularly since the global financial crisis of 2008, the question of whether capital actually has found 
a new, sustainable “regime of accumulation” –or is, instead, instable—must be considered unresolved. 
David Harvey and others debate the factuality of the strict coordination. Harvey (1990) nuanced this de-
terminism with his concept of flexibility, arguing that many different kinds of organizations can flourish in 
a post-Fordist regime. Harvey showed that post-Fordism embraces everything from the industrial sweat-
shop to the post-Fordist ideal I presented above as the iconic SA work. Vallas himself demonstrates his 
support for a position more like Harvey’s, as he claims that what he regards as orthodoxy’s incorrect con-
clusions stem from its narrow focus on technology, and underplays “the bearing that social and political 
structures have had on either the origins or transformation of Fordist organizations…. [He adds that, to] 
suggest that efficiency imperatives require firms to adopt one or another form of workplace organization, 
then, is to embrace a view that seems both sociologically naive and empirically indefensible” (Vallas 1999, 
75). 
There are also, as noted, debates about the value, from employees’ points of view, of the post-Fordist or-
ganizational innovations that have been achieved. Vallas claims that some scholars—such Michael Piore 
and Charles Sabel (1984)--are relatively sympathetic to management claims about the benefits of team 
work and flexible labour relations and the reality of flat- or non-hierarchical post-Fordist workplaces. 
Others—such as Harvey and Liu––are far more skeptical about what they see simply as new refinements in 
the old story of capital’s exploitation of its workforce. As such, the skeptical judgements reflect those of the 
majority of scholars I review in this dissertation.  
This argument is not to be taken as conclusive, however. As noted in the introduction to this dissertation, 
the theoretical material I examine in depth is so consulted in order to produce a strong argument, for sub-
sequent, further examination. Despite these problems, however, the concept of post-Fordism does provide a 
valuable starting point for considering the relation of changed forms of work and economic circumstances 
to new forms of religion and neospirituality. As Harvey—not, himself, strictly a Regulation School analyst, 
but one who considers its concepts valuable--observes: 
The virtue of ‘Regulation School’ thinking is that it insists we look at the 
total package of relations and arrangements that contribute to the stabili-
zation of output growth and aggregate distribution of income and con-
sumption in a particular historical period and place (Harvey 1990, 123).  
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Indeed, Harvey’s own work exemplifies the fruitful use of the concept of a transition from Fordism to 
post-Fordism to look at a ‘total package’ of social relations. Having explained the political economics of 
this process in terms of the appearance of new forms of “flexible accumulation” he goes on to ar-
gue—complementing Fredric Jameson (1991)—that there is a parallel between the emergence of 
post-Fordist capitalism and an ephemeral, eclectic and globalized post-modern culture.
58
 Even more am-
bitiously, Brian Holmes (2002) proposed a link between new forms of post-Fordist work and the appear-
ance of a new type of “flexible personality.” What is notable, however, is that neither of these thinkers 
makes any mention of issues of religion or spirituality, even though it is a clear part of workplace culture. 
This dissertation therefore moves down this unexplored road, asking whether the corollary of post-Fordist 
capital’s regime of “flexible accumulation”, and “flexible workers”, is not a new “flexible spirituality”— 
that is, neospirituality. 
Post-Fordist Work: The Flexible Labour Theory 
Among the arenas where the “rigidities” of Fordism are challenged by this new regime, of most interest to 
us is that of labour relations. “Flexibility” is now foisted on workers. This section discusses some of the 
characteristic features of their working conditions. Likewise, there are evidently many kinds of post-Fordist 
workers—in factories, offices, service jobs or professions. Theorists of contemporary work such as Robert 
Reich’s correctly place considerable emphasis on the often sharply different conditions and rewards of 
“symbolic analysts,” “routine workers” and “in-person service” workers. In the next chapter, I return to this 
crucial issue of different types of jobs within the contemporary workforce. I pinpoint the iconic worker 
whose work embodies these features most completely (the symbolic analyst), and who is the basic focus of 
study in this dissertation. I also consider the significance of these differences for understanding the class 
composition of New Age spirituality. Keeping these qualifications in mind, what follows here is a com-
posite representation of working conditions that affect different sectors of the workforce to different de-




 Harvey built on Fredric Jameson’s challenge to postmodern theory’s idealistically-conceived ‘turn to the cultural.’ 
Jameson argued that the expansion of cultural activities observed by postmodern theorists emerged from structural 
changes in capitalism that required its re-orientation to products with high turnaround. This made postmodernity a 
product of “post-Fordist flexible accumulation.” Religion scholar David L. Johnston considers his book—as it is 
“more detailed than Jameson’s work…, a first guide for explaining how postmodernity came to be, and how it should 
be defined” (2010, 29). From Jameson’s work, Harvey “progressively developed an analysis that identified the 
cultural, intellectual and aesthetic practices of postmodernism in terms of capitalist cycles of accumulation and 




overview of features of work dictated by the general form of post-Fordist economies, only briefly indicating 
how they may vary between different milieus of production. 
In a nutshell, post-Fordist “management wants companies that are lean, nimble, flexible, responsive, 
competitive, innovative, efficient, customer-focused, and profitable” (Liu 2004, 16). These criteria are 
reached by the corporate “strategy of permanent innovation: accommodation to ceaseless change, rather 
than an effort to control it” (Holmes 2002, 5). As described earlier in this chapter, this strategy often “works 
through the agency of small independent production units, employing skilled work teams with multi-use 
tool kits and relying on relatively spontaneous forms of cooperation with other such teams, to meet rapidly 
changing market demands at low cost and high speed” (Holmes 2002, 6). As noted, these teams can be fully 
independent, working as private subcontractors, or formed and reformed inside companies, depending on 
the project.  
The team format rejects Taylorism (i.e., assembly-line-type activity), which is repudiated in the interests of 
activating workers’ creativity, involvement, “knowledge and imaginative capacity in the production pro-
cess” (Stone 2004, 91-92). Whereas earlier, employees were prevented from using their personal discretion 
and judgement in the work process, because it would slow down the work, now, “professionals… determine 
how best to induce employees to exercise their discretion on behalf of the welfare of the firm” (Stone 2004, 
88).  
Many specific features of work conditions and culture are outcomes of these economic and organizational 
requirements. These include flat organization and participatory management; team culture and Toyotism; 
‘soft’ training and cultural indoctrination; flexibility, precarity and ‘boundaryless careers;’ surveillance and 
social monitoring; and passion, fun and exhaustion. I discuss these topics below. 
Flat Organization & Participatory Management 
The flat organizational form, with little management hierarchy, is characteristically post-Fordist. In man-
agement texts, the postindustrial corporation is made up of loosely-connected project-based parts com-
municating horizontally. It is theorized as “an optical fiber or superconducting wire designed for re-
sistance-free flow of information…, free from the friction of matter” (Liu 2004, 43). Management theorist 
Tom Peters famously supplied the iconic image: “Organizations are pure information processing ma-
chines—nothing less, nothing more” (Peters 1992).
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supposedly generated this friction that must be avoided, since managers supposedly had to clear every 
action with their superiors. Consequently, the radical reduction of management layers is considered the key 
to this dematerialization. Even company CEOs are subject to its strictures. “[A]ny vertical hierarchy re-
maining in the flattened organization is greased for information flow: the ideal CEO communicates with 
operations, directly or through severely pared-down middle management layers” (Liu 2004, 43–44). 
‘Flatness’ has implications for what the remaining managers do. Managers act not as supervisors, but as 
team leaders. Referring to downsizing in the 1980s, Liu reminds us that “after the damned middle managers 
[were] laid off in the millions…, the managers who remain ostensively have greatly increased ‘spans of 
control,’ more flexibility in their new roles as ‘facilitators’ or ‘coaches’ of work teams, and more cross-field 
expertise gained on ‘management teams’” (Liu 2004, 46). John Philpott agrees with this assessment, and 
adds that “the cadre of leader managers able to motivate teams and network is growing” (Philpott 2007, 76).  
Participatory management is an umbrella term that dictates and structures many features of work organi-
zation that follows from company “flatness” and “posthierarchy.” Those managers retained to direct pro-
jects and act as ‘team leaders’ must avoid the impression of direct supervision of workers. Additionally, 
because there are fewer managers in companies, team members must take more responsibility than did 
traditional workers. In flat organizations, team members are required to informally and collectively manage 
their own and team-members’ work. Furthermore, as teams often function as individual business units vis a 
vis other company departments or other companies, team members might have to function as high-level 
managers in their entrepreneurial-type relations with other such units. In addition to being aware of new 
technologies and the changing exigencies of the business environment, employees must also be kept in-
formed of company situations and strategies to a level that goes well beyond what was required for the 
performance of Fordist jobs. As team projects may require members to communicate outside of companies 
and make decisions at relatively high levels, they must be well-versed in company “values,” policies and 
other guidelines. 
As incentives, such workers also now often receive company securities, or shares, as part of their remu-
neration, which tends to reinforce their assumed identities as company owners (i.e., capitalists). Respon-
sibilities to manage themselves and fellow-workers are thrown on the shoulders of these workers. 
“Self-management” is one aspect of the supposed employee empowerment that is found in new workplaces. 
However, employees’ decision-making power within organizations is nevertheless restricted in key ways 
and “also very demanding of these workers” (Liu 2004, 45–46).  
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Team Culture and Toyotism 
Both by default, and by design, claims Liu, team culture is the expected norm of post-Fordist work or-
ganization: “The team is the unit of ephemeral identity that most flexibly fuses technologies and skills into 
skill sets (called innovation, creativity or resourcefulness)” (Liu 2004, 47). Liu makes clear, however, that a 
team is a new sociological entity: “it is not an identity group and assuredly not a class formation” (Liu 
2004, 47). The ‘technologies’ referred to, above, in “fusing of technologies and skills” are the same that 
keep business networks “well-greased” for information flow. They are a continually changing array of 
technical aids to communications, project organization, and information processing that team workers rely 
on, (Liu 2004, 44) and whose effective use determines the success of the enterprise.   
The performance demands placed on teams as a whole and the imposed opaque nature of their inner 
workings, throw all team-members together, since ‘success,’ according to team discourse, is (with signif-
icant qualifiers) only for all; never only for one. To an extent, each member is expected to ‘cover’ for the 
others (with their variety of talents and skills) to compensate for tight deadlines or weak individual per-
formance. The pressures put on teams, without much formal internal scrutiny that would identify and 
perhaps eliminate unproductive workers or force recognition that the tasks assigned the team have unreal-
istic deadlines is an effective system for forcing overwork. Team structure can thus contribute to intensive 
conditions of work as teams struggle to meet deadlines, regardless of work/life balance concerns.  
In terms of team organization and participative management, the archetypal form of post-Fordism is To-
yotism, which Liu (2004, 5) calls the “mytho-Japanese antifoundationalisms of the new corporate cor-
rectness.” It is the management system that has defined new productive organization. Toyotism, which of 
course gained its name (but not its origins—see Chapter Seven) from the post-war Japanese Toyota Cor-
poration, was a systematic attempt to break through the rigidities of Fordist production which were slowly 
throttling the productivity of the once-dominant US car industry.  
Toyotism instead demanded from its workers engagement in a process of “continuous improvement.” This 
objective called for workers to exercise collective responsibility within their fluidly organized work teams 
to continually demonstrate total commitment to refining the company’s efficiency and profitability, ex-
ploiting the considerable latitude they were allowed in the execution of their combined tasks (Liu 2004, 5). 
Central to this effort was an attack on the sharply delineated worker job-descriptions that were the outcome 
of the Fordist capital-labour compact. In place of the sharp distinctions between ‘hand and brain’ (the 
workers and the managers), conception and execution, that characterized classic assembly line work, they 
were recomposed in the new worker. 
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As Toyotist organizations in Japan trounced the US automobile companies in global competition during the 
1970s and 80s, US corporation responded by mimicking them. However, the introduction of the team 
concept into US auto production had a devastating impact on workers there. This is because teams oblite-
rated their long-developed and fought-for distinctions and rights as union members, as they also diminished 
US trades unions power and working class strength tout court. “The broad band team concept… deleted the 
entire apparatus of classification earned through class struggle, by flattening everyone to the status of 
all-purpose, anonymous worker in an ant hive” (Liu 2004, 60–62). 
The long struggle of US organized labor in the twentieth century won work rules and job classifications, 
whose perpetual contest of status differentiation within the class expressed—in what was only apparently a 
contradiction—the solidarity of the working class. Liu explains that unionized workers maintain their 
power as individuals in the union structure by virtue of the finely-differentiated positions (in terms of 
seniority and skills qualified to exercise) within the unions, effectively putting them in competition with 
each other. However, these differentiations made each individual stronger as a member of the group, even 
though group strength was only exercised at crisis points in their working lives, such as during conten-
tiously bargaining with employers. In other words, workers in the union hierarchy identified with each 
other as a class contra management only insofar as they could stake out their position on the line or shift 
according to openly-understood, fair rules that applied class-wide, that is, without the “toadyism, favoritism 
and arbitrariness endemic to the straw-boss system” prevailing from 1910-1930 (whose vagaries were the 
initial spur to developing strong American labour unions). This is akin to saying the group only has power 
to the extent that its constituent elements are finely, mutually articulated. According to Liu (2004, 62), if 
either the ties based on sameness or the internal differentiation are degraded, the strength of the group in 
general is weakened. Therefore, the destruction of the working class’s heterogeneity (based on union 
agreements) degraded worker solidarity. This internal structure was precisely dissolved when assem-
bly-line workers were reorganized as team members and expected to perform more-or-less as a flat col-
lective.  
Labour researcher Katherine Stone supports Liu`s argument, which can be extended to white-collar work. 
The loss of traditional strategies of labour protection: seniority, which “allocates priority and privilege on 
the basis of length of service [and] narrow, precisely defined job definitions…, protect workers against 
excessive demands by a supervisor and at the same time protects them against displacement by outsiders 
who might otherwise be hired to perform their work…. But narrow job classifications are the opposite of 
the flexible work places of the new employment relationship” (Stone 2004, 203). Indeed, notes Liu, 
(2004, 47) “Instead of [being] laborers chained to piecemeal tasks, multi-competent work teams are sup-
posed to oversee projects holistically with perspective on the total company strategy.” 
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Fisher also agrees that elements of the team culture, such as the elimination of titles, which were meant to 
have “workers…assume more functions and be more flexible, [on the contrary] undermine workers’ ability 
to construct… careers” (Fisher 2010, 101). After analysing engineering workplaces, Gideon Kunda (1992, 
218) is even less equivocal about the disadvantage to workers of the “de-hierarchized management style” 
that is intrinsic to team culture. He concluded in his study of corporate culture in high-tech industries that it 
“elicits more, not less, control over workers.” These corporations, argues Kunda (1992, 218-19), employ a 
set of managerial policies “designed to minimize the use and de-emphasize the significance of traditional 
bureaucratic control structures… and to elicit instead behavior consistent with cultural prescriptions.” 
Formal control, Kunda maintains, is replaced by a “‘softer’ normative control.” Finally, his judgement 
supports the claim made by labour scholars, Rosalind Gill and Andy Pratt`s (2008, 18–19), that participa-
tory management and the team concept can be considered to be invasive “technolog[ies] of power, tech-
nolog[ies] for creating and controlling subjective processes.”  
‘Soft’ Training and Cultural Indoctrination 
Lacking bureaucratic control structures, post-Fordist companies allocate significant resources to the tasks 
of defining and inculcating good ‘workplace culture.’ They must do this for several reasons related to 
managing a workforce that is expected to be entrepreneurial and creative: because of the difficulty of 
having employees dedicate high levels of energy and personal commitment and judgment under the con-
ditions of constant insecurity in which many of them work, because their necessarily “creative” employees 
may overstep certain limits in their passion, and because, given the favored flat organizational structures, 
employees must internalize management values. Restricting employee initiatives to within the bounds of 
corporate interests is intrinsic to relying on creative, entrepreneurial workers. F. Lordon (2014, 88) ex-
plains:   
[E]ach employee’s ‘own desire’ must be aligned with the desire of the 
enterprise. But there comes a point when hierarchical relaxation, the better 
to give free rein to the creativity of the ‘creatives’, begins to contradict the 
very existence of the structure of capital. If, in order to give the best of 
their talents, these employees must be left to themselves, nothing can stop 
them from escaping should they find even the residual managerial super-
vision too onerous, and the appropriation of the fruits of their singular 
creativity too abusive. 
As a result of this conundrum, managers and HR professionals who employ creative employees have a 
heavy burden of indoctrination as part of their duties. Earlier, the coordination of the interests of employees 
with the corporation was referred to as “co-linearisation,” and the cultural community that results, as a 
psytopia. As part of the process of keeping company goals at the forefront, employees police themselves as 
well as their co-workers. This gives further credence to the argument for the company as a psytopia. 
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Workers must identify with the company quite spontaneously, and this can only occur through indoctrina-
tion. It is hoped that this identification becomes embedded in employee behaviour through ‘regular’ team 
activities and communications. Teams require and are also sites for, this intensive learning.  
Team-members also need be sensitive to the economic environment in which they work, because in one 
way or another, their jobs are market-oriented, but they also must be primed to maintain favourable and 
productive relations with co-workers. Team members must participate in “frequent brainstorming, meet-
ings, perpetual retraining motivated by ‘pay for knowledge,’ and constant dissemination of company-wide 
philosophy and performance data” (Liu 2004, 45). Industry apologists have accordingly referred to the 
team itself as a sensing mechanism. 
The result of this requirement to couple group social and observational skills with an orientation of 
high-engagement in the company`s interests, is that most training programs in companies are not technical 
or instrumental, but rather cultural in nature, explicitly aiming at “worker-involvement.” In Canada, labour 
researcher Heather Menzies wrote in 1996, that the “corporate-culture aspect is obvious in the PR com-
ponent of quality circles and total quality management” (Menzies 1996, 102). Menzies observes that 
“worker-involvement programs have moved into practically every line of work since the late 1980s . . . 
Even manufacturing workers were not exempt from such ‘training.’ Dave Robertson, Canadian Auto 
Workers, director or work organization and training, estimates that this cultural orientation--including 
seminars on corporate marketing and global competition, accounts for the bulk of the ‘training’ that 
workers are now receiving on the job” (Menzies 1996, 102).  
Flexibility, Precarity and ‘Boundaryless Careers’ 
Unlike Fordist corporate workers, many post-Fordist labourers have no binding commitment of sustained 
employment where they work (Stone 2004, 110). Although the original version of Toyotism guaranteed 
life-long employment to workers who could adapt to flexible conditions, this guarantee did not survive the 
translation of its managerial philosophy to other contexts. On the contrary, one of the many “flexibilities” 
post-Fordist capital seeks is the flexibility to shed workers as and when it requires. While the merits of a 
“free agent” economy are expounded by various work pundits (Pink 2001), what for capital is “flexibility” 
is for workers often “precarity.” Stone distinguishes contingent from precarious employment on the 
grounds of the expectation of employment’s continuation of the employed worker. To describe the new 
conditions, Stone believes the term ‘precarious’ is better than a related term, ‘contingent,’ because, unlike 
the latter, ‘precarious employment’ refers to “work that has no explicit or implicit promise of continuity” 
(Stone 2004, 72). 
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Temporary employment agencies were legalized as employers in the early 1960s in the United States, and 
later, in the 1970s and 80s, state regulations made firing employees more difficult, discouraging promises 
of permanency from employers (Stone 2004, 68, 83–84). As the use of temporary agency services became 
normal, many employers abandoned internal hiring, career ladders, and full-time employment objectives 
(Stone 2004, 68-70). Beyond accommodation by temporary agencies, the ‘better reason’ for the 
“re-casualization of work [is] that work practices are being adjusted to production requirements…; [man-
agers] have to pay more attention to short-term cost reduction, [so they seek out] just-in-time’ workers” 
(Stone 2004, 86). 
By 1996, 78% of American companies surveyed used ‘flexible staffing’ arrangements. “By 2001, nearly 2 
million [American] workers worked for temporary employment agencies, many of whom were in highly 
skilled positions” (Stone 2004, 67). Increases of atypical employment included part-time, contract, on-call, 
and independent contracting (Stone 2004, 69). Stone assesses that the “change in the nature of full-time 
employment signifies the undoing of the scientific management and personnel management movements of 
early twentieth century” (Stone 2004, 72).  
Even for relatively secure post-Fordist employees, patterns of movement within companies diverge from 
Fordist patterns. Formerly, personnel managers ensured (as unions also required) progressive wage levels 
based on orderly promotion for employees (i.e., career ladders) (Stone 2004, 62, 70). New positions were 
filled through the internal labour market. Youthful new employees who performed adequately had their 
careers more-or-less planned for them, with regular and successive advances in pay and responsibility 
(Stone 2004, 91). By contrast, post-Fordist careers, insofar as they exist, do not respect age or length of 
tenure. They are “not linear or hierarchical; they rarely proceed along well-defined paths to progressively 
higher levels of responsibility and income. Even those with similar levels of experience and in the ‘same 
job’ may be paid differently” (Stone 2004, 93).  
Robert Reich, writing about some of the higher strata of post-Fordist work, amongst “symbolic analysts” 
(who we consider in detail in Chapter Six), reminds us that, at this level, employees “may take on vast 
responsibilities and command inordinate wealth at rather young ages. Correspondingly, they may lose 
authority and income if they are no longer able to innovate by building on their cumulative experience, even 
if they are quite senior” (Reich 1992, 178–79). This differential pay is enabled by ‘broadbanding,’ in which 
“jobs are defined by generalized competencies . . . rather than in a narrow job category,” allowing managers 
to assign workers to a wide range of tasks without formal reclassification (Reich 1992, 179). Firms utilize 
cross-functional teams that cut across departmental lines for many projects. In these and other ways, hor-
izontal mobility has become ubiquitous in the transfer and deployments of personnel. In this system, those 
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with similar qualifications and history can be paid very unequally. Their individual contribution to com-
pany profit is the supposed standard (Stone 2004, 111–14). In theory, every employee, on his or her own, 
must repeatedly negotiate for pay and benefits. 
The obvious and traditional way of maintaining the loyalty of employees was by ‘instrumental’ means, 
through job security and good pay packages. However, since these means are not usually available, 
new-type companies must still demonstrate, by some standard, that they treat workers ‘fairly.’ Unable to 
offer employment security and career ladder promotion, what form of ‘fairness’ can a company demon-
strate? What reward is the good worker offered? As it turns out, the most that can be offered is the continued 
opportunity to work! In management literature, the reward for good work is another (or a next) position, 
which is called “employability security” (Stone 2004, 91, 111). In theory, workers valued by peers and 
team leaders leave completed projects with a good referral to an active project leader in the same or another 
company. Many such referrals are also procured during after-hours socializing—networking—which is a 
near-compulsory social practice of team workers. With the next project, the successful employee is then 
enabled to further expand his or her “skill-base,” or “develop their human capital” (Stone 2004, 111).  
The renowned CEO of General Electric, Jack Welch, promoted the idea that workers should expect to have 
“boundaryless careers” which 
… unfold unconstrained by clear boundaries around job activities, by 
fixed sequences of such activities, or by attachment to one organization.’ 
It is a career that does not depend upon traditional notions of advancement 
within a single hierarchical organization. It includes an employee who 
moves frequently across the borders of different firms; such as a Silicon 
Valley technician…. A boundaryless career also refers to career paths 
within an organization in which individuals are expected to move laterally 
without constraints from traditional job ladders or hierarchical career lat-
tices. (Miner and Robinson 1994, 345-347) 
The lack of security this implies creates a worker with a different kind of attention from those whose 
concerns were restricted to activities within the boundaries of the corporation that employed them. This 
requires a continuous scanning for new opportunities. Welch admitted this to be the case. “People’s emo-
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Surveillance and Social Monitoring 
Not only are post-Fordist workers expected to exercise autonomy and responsibility, but they are also 
scrutinized as they do so. The license necessarily afforded semi-autonomous team-workers is comple-
mented by corresponding surveillance practices. Surveillance occurs both interpersonally and technologi-
cally. For example, the opacity of team operations from the outside, coupled with their catechism of 
non-codified performance criteria, makes the peer-reviewing function and judgments (and referrals) by 
team leaders, all-important to team-members’ careers. These functions are forms of interpersonal surveil-
lance built into the work structure. These forms are intrinsically non-systematic and intimate and effectively 
subject a team-worker to on-going scrutiny.  
There is also a great deal of technological surveillance. Liu notes that mainstream business magazines 
discuss this openly. “Business Week observed in an article published in 2000, for example, that firms have 
recently been motivated to boost their monitoring of employees because of concerns over trade secrets, 
worker productivity and legal liability (for ‘sexually-explicit, racist, or other potentially offensive materi-
al’). Information technology is both the means and the object of such monitoring” (Liu 2004, 269). There is 
also ample use of cameras in workplaces, and electronic monitoring of keystrokes for those employees 
expected to be tied to their computers for the duration of their work periods (Liu 2004, 299). However, 
mathesization of performance extends across all levels and types of employment. “There is an increasing 
trend towards e-surveillance in the workplace…. Examples include the comparative application of per-
formance information in fields as diverse as lawyer’s billable hours, call centre operators’ response times, 
surgeon’s morbidity rate, and academic’s research outputs” (Liu 2004, 299).  
Passionate, Exhausting Work  
The pleasure of passionate work is a different motivator of employees from those of the Fordist era. Before, 
unpleasant or even miserable work was tolerated for the reward of the paycheck and “the goods that wages 
circuitously permit buying” (Lordon, 2014, 44). Pleasures occurred around and in spite of work. In the 
post-Fordist world, by contrast, joy must be found in the activity of labour itself (Lordon, 2014, 44). 
Passionate involvement of workers is assumed in the iconic and powerful high-technology companies such 
as Google, Inc. (Auletta 2009). Post-Fordism’s new productive modes are supposedly exciting because they 
“allow more people to engage more meaningfully with—to bring their skills, talents, and passion to bear 
more fully upon—the productive process…; involving creativity, deep engagement, interactivity and in-
terpersonal communications” (Fisher 2010, 7) .  
One view of this situation is that companies are now supposed to operate in a “pull” relationship with their 





 According to the authors, Pull does not refer to pulling employees along towards a company goal, 
but the reverse. The company now seeks to find an alignment between the employee’s passion and the 
company’s goals so that the former, i.e., the employee, can be the engine of success. (This is in obvious 
contrast to the Fordist ‘push’ process.
62
) The consulting company Kinsey defines pull as “the new strategy 
of complex and compulsory self-engagement” (Hartmann 2009, 179). The authors of The Power of Pull 
create a vision of organizations forming around personally-motivated people, or firms drawing in people 
with personal mandates parallel to the company’s, once these latter have been identified.  
Behind the thesis of “pull” is the assumption that the personal motivation of partner/employee motivates 
intensive work patterns that are exploited by the company, until paths diverge or energy wanes (Hagel, 
Brown and Davison 2010, 67–68). However, at least as commonly-stated as the “pull” thesis––where the 
alignment between employee and company is understood as essentially serendipitous and temporary––is 
the idea that workers must, in fact, actively realign their interests with the corporations.’  
For example, this principle is openly promoted at Google through the discourse around the SIY program. In 
most worksites, mindfulness meditation, or its more scientifically-validated version, Mindfulness Based 
Stress Reduction (MSBR), is offered as a mode of worker regeneration. However, the SIY program at 
Google has added a different function to MSBR. Chade-Meng, SIY’s developer, clarified that its purpose is 
to help employees find their passion in company goals (Cruz 2016, 69). Chade-Meng specifically rejects 
“regeneration” as a proper pursuit for the high achievers at Google. Instead he suggests mindfulness as a 
means for workers to identify what type of job would best suit their values and preferences. “If life lacks 
meaning, pulling back is not the solution. Rather, advancing further into commitment is” (Cruz 2016, 52). 
Google executives Eric Schmidt and Jonathan Rosenberg (2014, 13)
63
 reinforce this judgement. They 
“recognize the potential for workers to suffer from burnout, [but] insist that this occurs not because of 




 This book is a popularly-addressed explication and promotion of post-Fordist organizational forms, typical of its 
genre, in which features of the post-Fordist work-world are presented as only partially realized, still to be developed. 
The form includes outlining a “trend” in business forms or practice that supposed cannot be resisted by other 
managers, while at the same time urging readers (i.e., managers) to stop trying to resist it, for the good of their 
companies. The literature is a cross between prognostication and promotion. This common thread indicates that 
post-Fordism as a regime is unevenly distributed or actually inchoate.  
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 “The people participating in push programs are generally treated as instruments to ensure that activities are 
performed as dictated. Their own individual needs and interests are purely secondary, if relevant at all…. Push 
programs lead to a curious combination of boredom and stress among partipants.” (Hagel, Brown and Davison 2010, 
36) 
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Workers are expected to “love their work,” to value it intrinsically, not just for the income it offers. Ac-
cording to McKinlay and Taylor (1998 173)
64
: “Macro-level surveys have registered the emergence of a 
new discourse of work: employment becomes membership, control is redefined as commitment, man-
agement transmutes into leadership. The new language of employment denies the very possibility of class 
conflict at work…the most sophisticated HR strategies are those which envisage workers as active partic-
ipants in the construction and refinement of hegemonic factory regimes, complicit in their own subjuga-
tion.” 
As Cruz (2016, 69) avers: “Here lies a fundamental contradiction of corporate mindfulness:traditional 
Buddhist mindfulness was about ridding oneself of attachments, yet SIY is designed to increase worker 
retention by aligning their values and desires with organizational objectives.” 
Self-Entrepreneurship: Continuous Personal Branding  
To employ those who might ‘pull along’ or align with the company, employers must identify them. This 
requirement points to the need for workers to create themselves as a ‘brand’ or celebrity, someone who 
literally has market presence. The proper cultivation of a public persona facilitates these matches. This 
means that the most marketable quality for a worker in this regime is not (theoretically) that they will do 
anything requested of them, but rather that they have some strong personal desire or commitment (to be or 
do something) that can be operationalized as a personal brand that guides accomplishments that the cor-
poration desires. This in turn contributes to reputation and one’s differentiation from other potential em-
ployees.  
Moreover, the networking this employee performs to make employment contacts necessitates having a 
‘personality’ or persona that can stand out from others in the hurley-burley of parties, receptions, and 
electronic social networking sites, where contacts are made. As noted, one is expected to bring one’s per-
sona, personal interests and special (i.e., personal, or tacit) knowledge—derived from interesting experi-
ences—to work. At minimum, the requirement to create a brand of oneself constitutes significant unpaid 
labour expended in order to procure or keep a job. This adds an entirely different, and additional, obligation 
on workers as they go about “reproducing their labour power” (Marx, 1990). 
Consequently, the work day does not end when the worksite is left (if the worker has such a site). The 
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fore, “bringing work home” refers to workers who must utilize their personal spaces to do work because 
they are offered no alternatives, to those whose “work is never done” because they are on call at odd hours, 
and to those who must do the unpaid work of creating a persona or brand (or learning new skills), in addi-
tion to the hours they work for pay. 
Bringing Home To Work 
Bringing personal interests, relationships and commitments into the workplace is the converse process to 
bringing work into the home site. In fact, they are different sides of the same coin. Fundamentally, intensive 
work requires that workers substantially abandon their homes, if they do not work there, and spend their 
time at worksites. “Today’s employers want to colonize as much of their workers’ waking life as possible, 
particularly those in primarily creative professions” (Cruz 2016, 69). Employers accentuate this blurring by 
trying to imbue the workplace with features of social and domestic life. This includes characterizing work 
as “fun”––essential to making work feel like “home.” This idea is reinforced by the insistent informality of 
work relations, often spearheaded by corporate leaders through their dress and language (invoking a 
childlike demeanor) and choices of offices similar to those of other workers. To these rhetorical ploys are 
added play areas for workers. 
Companies also offer services that in normal circumstance would be done informally in the home. “By 
providing access to perks and services previously relegated to the domestic or private sphere of social 
reproduction—childcare, intramural sports, leisure activities, wellness programs—management attempts 
not only to tie workers affectively to their employers, but also to normalize the conflation of work and 
leisure time” (Cruz 2016, 4). Certainly, there is no more time for uncommodified “women’s work,” 
whether performed by a male or female member of the family. As Peter Fleming (2009,75)65 notes, “(e)ven 
though the ideology of a ‘frictionless capitalism’ has a good deal of popular currency, work is still generally 
considered formally troubling by many, involving a ‘lack of life’ that the corporation seeks to suture and 
exploit by co-opting the external and internal commons to provide a life of sorts” (emphasis in original).  
The outcomes of this attempt to link joy and work are, needless to say, complex and contradictory. Of 
course, the pretext of ‘fun’ convinces workers to maintain the long hours companies want from them. “No 
more coffee breaks; let’s have refreshments at team sessions instead,” Liu imagines leaders saying (Liu 
2004, 299). Yet Gill and Pratt tell us that, despite “all the affective features of cultural labour that do not 
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mented in studies of cultural work…, [o]ne of the most consistent findings of research on work within the 
creative industries is that it is experienced by most who are involved with it as profoundly satisfying and 
intensely pleasurable (at least some of the time). [Accordingly,] we might dub this kind of labour ‘pas-
sionate work’” (Gill and Pratt 2008, 15). Fisher quotes von Osten (2007) that the “vocabulary of love is 
repeatedly evinced in such studies, with work imbued with the features of the Romantic tradition of the 
artist suffused with positive emotional qualities” (Fisher 2010, 15). 
However, many observers recognize that in these work settings, “joy” may be replaced by exhaustion, since 
much of the work is done under time pressure and long or extremely long work days can be deemed normal 
conditions. “Burn-out,” often entailing enforced periods of rest (aka, unemployment), is commonly en-
countered. Thus, working conditions are popularly deemed “bulimic,” indicative of the “binging and 
purging” of extreme dieters (Wittel 2001). These negative forms of affect at work “are not incidental fea-
tures of the experience of cultural labour; they are toxic, individualized but thoroughly structural features of 
the workplaces that include television production companies, fashion and web design houses, and (not 
least) the neoliberal university” (Gill and Pratt 2008, 16). This system is so accepted that overworked em-
ployees (SAs) who quit sustained employment in order to recover (at their own expense) from the intensive 
work, can be repetitively readmitted, once they have finished their periods of rest (Conversation with in-
termittent Pepsi Inc. marketing worker, 2013). 
The need to get the next referral so that one can continue working after the current project produces con-
tinuous anxiety (and divided attention). “You are only as good as your last job!” is the chant that quietly 
echoes through these workspaces. In this vein, Gill and Pratt remind us that the positive representation of 
affect at work [i.e., feelings of “excitement” and “fun”] “misses, also, the fears (of getting left behind, of not 
finding work), the competitiveness, the experience of socializing not simply as pleasurable potential, but as 
a compulsory means of securing future work. Above all, it misses the anxiety, insecurity, and individual-
ized shame that are endemic features of fields in which you are judged on what you produce[;] your whole 
life and sense of self is bound up with your work” (Gill and Pratt 2008, 16).  
Conclusion: The Post-Fordist Package  
After a discussion of theories of causality, and establishing the history of post-Fordism’s development and 
the character of post-Fordist work in this chapter, I move on, in the next, to distinguishing the types of 
post-Fordist workers and the relationships amongst them. I also provide contesting scholarly opinion as to 
how that breakdown should occur and pinpointed themes of particular significance within the debate on 
new work conditions in general. Additionally, I propose and justify the choice of symbolic analysts as a 
particular segment of the workforce I consider most relevant, useful and appropriate for understanding the 
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parallels between worker and neospiritual attitudes and behaviours that were listed in Chapter One, de-
claring them to be iconic post-Fordist workers. However, I note that the additional blurring, nuancing, and 
even confounding of the SA category provided by the dissenting scholars should not be forgotten, as these 
differing assessments, especially the operation of presumption and the possible hegemony of immaterial 
labour, helps us understand how a belief system grounded in work practices could diffuse beyond work-
place boundaries. Beyond these processes, I also add specific hypotheses as to how the iconic workers, SAs, 
could be spearheading a diffusion of the neospiritual ethos amongst the general public.  
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Chapter Six: Types of Work and Iconic Workers 
Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, I provided a brief history of the transition in Western nations from Fordist to 
post-Fordist economies, explaining their differences and elaborating on the key features of post-Fordist 
work.These are features that best reflect the broader economic changes. We will see below that one type of 
worker in this new economy most bears the brunt of these changes: the symbolic analyst (SA). The SA 
category groups together many professions of the former Fordist middle class, including technical and 
business experts, professionals and artists. At the same time, it drops some traditionally middle class types, 
such as many middle managers. SAs have social status because they are the more highly-skilled members 
of the post-Fordist workforce. However, many work under conditions very different from those who did the 
high-skilled work of Fordism—particularly in terms of the commonly short-duration of tenure at those jobs. 
They may well be “precarious” workers, moving from contract to contract. In this chapter I explore features 
of their work in more depth.  
Although I explained earlier that the workforce is composed of many types of work-forms––Harvey calls 
post-Fordism “flexible” capitalism partly because production and work-forms vary so much––the one that 
is most different from Fordist work in general is the SA form. I therefore define the SA model as predictive 
of trends in employment, and call SA iconic of post-Fordist labour in general. As this dissertation is con-
cerned with the existence and nature of the complementarity of neospirituality and new work patterns 
(which, as a whole, SA jobs represent) I restrict my focus vis a vis this comparison to neospirituality and SA 
work.  
The primary distinction between SA work and the other types is the high level of autonomy allowed in its 
performance, reflecting the fact that SAs are a distillate of the Fordist middle and professional (up-
per-middle) classes. Due to the flat nature of post-Fordist companies, symbolic analysts tend to share the 
day-to-day management of operations with co-workers. This level of autonomy is felt to be necessary be-
cause of symbolic-analysts’ strategic role in propelling company profits. They are the designated innova-
tors in an economic system that heavily relies on such action. SAs are expected to continually invent and 
operationalize the marketing of new commodities or services that respond to perceived needs. Global 
competition in providing these commodities and services, in the context of technological change that ac-
tivates new possibilities for them, promotes continual redefinition of the needs that can be satisfied through 
the market. However, as needs are frequently redefined, so is team composition in many workplaces. 
Though team-members have considerable autonomy at their jobs, team-participation may be obligatory, 
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and job tenure short. Indeed, the prevalence of teamwork on short-term projects most decisively distin-
guishes the iconic new working conditions from the older Fordist form. 
In order to understand SA work better, I begin by placing symbolic analytic work in the context of the entire 
post-Fordist workforce, identifying the main types of workers that compose it. The discussion relies on the 
foundational assessment by American sociologist and labour economist, Robert Reich (1992). Reich’s 
typology includes three categories of worker: routine, service and symbolic-analytic (Reich 1992, 
171-184).  Other scholars of labour whose work I consult in this chapter add complicating analyses to the 
work landscape provided by Reich. For nuances and qualifications of Reich’s typology, I focus particularly 
on the contributions of autonomous Marxist
66
 scholars, chiefly Maurizio Lazzarato (1996, 2000) and Mi-
chael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000). An important corrective to Reich is their emphasis on the high levels 
of intuition and affective skills, in addition to analytical abilities, required of SAs. Challenging Reich, they 
assert that these emotional skills are as important for SAs as they are for service workers. Additionally, 
other theorists of affect discussed show that media workers, a subset of symbolic analysts, are purveyors of 
feeling perhaps more than they are presenters of data or even of images, the conventional characterization 
of their work by communications scholars.  
Hardt and Negri also partly challenge Reich’s (and hence, my) schema through their claim that the iconic 
post-Fordist work-type is indeed much broader than SA work; rather, it is “immaterial labour.” This cat-
egory includes under one umbrella workers that Reich had separated. Hardt and Negri argue that the atti-
tudes and skills needed to do immaterial labour extend into types of work from which Reich would exclude 
them, as well as beyond formal workplaces in general. They argue that immaterial labour is generalized 
across post-Fordist society. This latter part of their extension seems to refer to the process of prosumption, 
that “amateurs” use essentially the same tools (for consumption and entertainment) and therefore have a 
similar orientation to life as workers. Hardt and Negri argue that immaterial labour’s values are hegemonic 




 The ‘Autonomous’ tradition of Marxism, elaborated first in the 1970s, in Italy, seeks a new way of conceptualizing 
‘the revolutionary subject,’ in the face of the apparent failure of traditional Marxian class dynamics which would have 
seen the blue-collar ‘working class’ oppose capitalism. Fordist post-war arrangements, and the expansion of the 
entertainment and media industries, together made it comfortable with capitalism and to seem unlikely to fill that role. 
In a violation of classical Marxism, the Autonomists imagined a revolutionary subject who could ‘make himself,’ 
lacking the spur of the traditional class dynamics, on which Marx claimed the revolutionary was dependent for his 
form of consciousness. Hence, the new revolutionary could, as they theorized, be ‘autonomous.’ Immaterial labour is 
the concept from which Hardt and Negri develop the idea of a new (potentially-revolutionary) polity that spans class. 
This expansive group they call “the multitude.” 
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labour is not verified in this dissertation, its possibility must be considered in an exploration of the relation 
of work culture to neospirituality. Hardt and Negri’s modification of Reich’s vision suggests that if a spir-
itual attitude emerges from SA work (my thesis question), its broad diffusion follows as a matter of course. 
As I have indicated in an earlier chapter, attempts to categorize the post-Fordist labour force are contra-
dictory and subject to revision. For several reasons, the symbolic-analyst is an ambiguous class. For one, 
their class-status is affected because they are differentially-remunerated and work under varying degrees of 
insecurity. Additionally, whole tranches of their work have been, and will continue to be in the future, 
eliminated or severely reduced through automation. As one example, the graphic arts workforce generally 
shrank in the last century as computer-based drafting, design, animation and illustration reduced the 
number of such workers required by various industries. Meanwhile, those in a “substitute” profession, 
web-site designers, compete for income with a large population of similarly-skilled amateurs. In short, for 
SA workers, large differences in remuneration patterns and working conditions, and lack of career stability 
due to continual recomposition of work skills rewarded within the SA class, make the SA classification 
ambiguous. These provisos and difficulties only complicate the objective of positing a culture for this type 
of worker. Nevertheless, the effort is made, below.  
The extent to which symbolic-analytical work is truly broadly diffused outside formal employment envi-
ronments, as per Hardt and Negri’s characterization of immaterial labour (and its significance, if so) has yet 
to be determined. However, even if their theory were to be invalidated, this would not effect my identifi-
cation of symbolic analytical work as iconic for post-Fordism. Nor, indeed, would it discredit the idea that 
symbolic-analyst values influence popular culture merely on the basis of these workers’ social status and 
the types of work they do.   
Robert Reich’s Work Types 
The previous chapter outlined how the employment landscape for Western workforces changed since the 
1960s as a result of the transition to post-Fordism. The general redirection of productive activity away from 
industrial to information, communication and service, or immaterial production, brought about a number of 
changes in the conditions and practices of all work in the post-Fordist economy. However, post-Fordist jobs 
are obviously not all of the same kind, and represent several new modalities of employment. As noted, 
Reich’s taxonomy of worker-types includes routine workers, personal-service workers, and symbol-
ic-analysts. In Reich’s view, members of each of these groups enjoyed different future prospects. While 
‘symbolic analysts’ were in a ‘rising boat,’ the ‘routine workers’ boat was sinking, and the prospects for the 
third group, personal service workers, was unclear. Below, I consider each of these categories of workers in 




Reich claims that routine producers do “the kinds of repetitive tasks performed by the old foot soldiers of 
American capitalism in the high-volume enterprise” (Reich 1992, 174). This category includes traditional 
assembly-line workers. In general, the material they worked on was correlated with gender, race and eth-
nicity: men worked on metal; women (especially black and Hispanic females), on fabric, circuit-boards and 
information. Supervisors for all were normally white males (Reich 1992, 175-76). 
The low and mid-level managers who monitor routine workers also do routine work, “involving repetitive 
checks on subordinates’ work and the enforcement of standard operating procedures” (Reich 1992, 213). In 
an update of the old factory labour story, the term “routine workers” includes as well the vast cadre of 
records or data-processors required of the post-Fordist economy, “stationed in ‘back offices’ at computer 
terminals linked to world-wide information banks,” also following standard procedures and codified rules. 
“[E]ven their overseers are overseen, in turn, by people who routinely monitor—often with the aid of 
computers—how much they do and how accurately they do it.” The cardinal virtues of all are “reliability, 
loyalty and the capacity to take direction” (Reich 1992, 175). In this category, Reich also includes some 
traditional professionals (such as real estate lawyers) who largely repeat familiar tasks during their work-
days (Reich 1992, 180). Overall, claimed Reich in 1992, these types of jobs comprised about one quarter of 
those in the US, but that percentage was declining (Reich 1992, 175). However, when he wrote this book, 
Reich may have underestimated the extent to which jobs could be automated. Many of the most creative 
workers at the inception of the post-Fordist era, early symbolic analysts, have seen their work routinized, as 
software applications that could do their jobs emerged.   
In-Person Service 
In-person service work is the second of Reich’s categories. This work is also simple and repetitive. How-
ever, “in-person servers are in direct contact with the ultimate beneficiaries of their work: their immediate 
objects are specific customers rather than streams of metal, fabric or data” (Reich 1992, 176). In-person 
service work is highly varied in its content. Included in this category are “retail sales workers, waiters and 
waitresses, hotel workers, janitors, cashiers, hospital attendants and orderlies, nursing-home aides, 
child-care workers, house cleaners, home health-care aides, taxi drivers, secretaries, hairdressers, auto 
mechanics, sellers of residential real estate, flight attendants, physical therapists and—among the fast-
est-growing [at the time]—security guards” (Reich 1992, 176). 
Work at these jobs cannot be done at a distance—it must be performed in person. Therefore, these jobs are 
not exportable, as is routine work. This protects them from wage deflation due to global competition. Reich 
is unsure of the prospects for those doing this work, but notes that for many of them their fortunes are tied to 
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the material conditions of the third category of worker, the symbolic analysts, who mostly employ them. 
Besides application to routine tasks, service jobs require good ‘affect skills.’ Service workers have to create 
emotionally soothing spaces for the served. “They must smile and exude confidence and good cheer…. 
They must be courteous and helpful, even to the most obnoxious of patrons. Above all, they must make 
others feel happy and at ease” (Reich 1992, 176). Though such work has traditionally been done by women, 
it has now become generalized. 
Predominantly, service work has been framed as ‘women’s work,’ and Reich’s personal service workers 
clearly do ‘affect labour’ in that traditional sense. Since the 1970s, American feminist scholars have ex-
plored these “gendered forms of labor that involve the affects in a central way, such as emotional labor, 
care, kin work, or maternal work, both in the waged and unwaged economies” (Clough and Halley 2007, 
xi).
 
As this work was progressively pulled into the waged economy (and divested of its exclusively femi-
nine purveyors), the language of critical analysis was applied, such as from Elizabeth Wissinger (2007, 
234). She explains that “the affective economy is one in which the human body and its pre-individual ca-
pacities are made the site of capital investment for the realization of profit[;] as socialization, therapeutic 
interaction, cooking, cleaning, child care, health care and the like have increasingly been pulled into the 
domain of capital.” We will return to the topic of affect as a product later in this chapter. In the meantime, 
we can discuss it in this simple sense of the comfort provided by service workers.  
Reich explains that, due to the privatization and commodification of social and personal needs that is a 
feature of post-Fordism, in-person services expanded greatly after 1980. A decade later the number of new 
jobs in fast-food outlets, bars and restaurants alone exceeded three million, more than the total number of 
routine production jobs in automobile, steelmaking and textile industries combined. In 1990, about 
one-third of the American population did in-person service work, with numbers expected to grow from 
there (Reich 1992, 177).
 
 
As noted, the future of personal service workers is strongly tied to the fortunes of the wealthier members of 
their community—often from the class that has seen its fortunes rise with post-Fordism. Wherever there are 
geographical concentrations of these busy, sometimes-rich, mostly symbolic-analyst consumers, almost 
anything that would have been done personally or informally by family members or friends (or not at all) in 
the Fordist world can now be bought as a service. This trajectory towards commodification of services has, 
in extreme cases, introduced ethical and legal dilemmas not faced in the past. Globalization and wealth 
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inequality have led to grotesque forms of exploitation such as the sale of personal body organs by the poor 




Symbolic-Analytical Work  
Here we come to the category of worker that focusses this dissertation. This is Reich’s third employment 
category—the symbolic analysts. As he contends, these workers are in a ‘rising boat.’ Their work “drives 
the service sector at the top of the information economy” (Hardt and Negri 2000, 293). SAs do “prob-
lem-solving, problem identifying and strategic brokering activities” (Hardt and Negri 2000, 291). As dis-
tribution of their products is generally not geographically restricted, they are in global competition with 
others. However, because each of these workers is in theory uniquely-skilled, they are not in direct com-
petition with each other as are routine workers. Their outputs “do not enter world commerce as standardized 
things. Traded instead are [manipulations of] symbols—data, words, oral and visual representations” 
(Reich 1992, 177). When he wrote his text, Reich expected that SAs high skill-levels and relative rarity 
across the globe would allow them to more-than-maintain their pay levels. As noted above, this has since 
been the subject of debate in terms of the continued deskilling and accelerating insecurity of many forms of 
work, with that of symbolic-analysts being most dramatic (Barley and Kunda 2004; Keen 2007; de Peuter 
2010; Huws 2003). 
Symbolic analysts are well-educated, and “the vast majority are white males” (Reich 1992, 179). In 1990, 
no more than 20 percent of American workers had such jobs, but this number was a significant rise from the 
numbers of a comparable class in the 1950s, when only 8 percent of workers were (that era’s version of) 
symbolic analysts (Reich 1992, 179-180). These fit the statistical category of “professional and technical 
workers” in the old employment datasets. Nevertheless, Reich notes that the pace of SA employment 





 In Waldie, Paul, “Women held in servitude under intense ‘emotional control,’” The Globe and Mail. Sat Nov 23, 
2014, p. A19, the author writes: “Figures on slavery and human trafficking are unreliable because so few cases are 
reported. A recent British government report put the number of cases in the UK at about 2,200 in 2012, up 9 per cent 
from 2011. The majority—71 per cent—were adults. A global slavery index developed by Australia’s Walk Free 
foundation estimated that nearly 30 million people live in slavery worldwide. That included about 4,400 cases in 
Britain and about 5,800 cases in Canada.  
Karlee-Anne Sapoznik, co-founder of Toronto-based Alliance Against Modern Slavery, said the Canadian figure is 




In Reich’s view, researchers make a big mistake by equating the “professional and technical” employment 
classification of the past with the SA category of today, as they persist in doing. “Such categories are no 
longer very helpful for determining what a person does on the job and how much that person is likely to 
earn for doing it” (1992, 182). There is an alignment of the worker and the knowledge they consult in each 
era, and the most notable difference between the two groups is their differing understanding and use of 
“knowledge.”  
Reich (1992, 180) assures us that the traditional way of classifying workers, including technical and pro-
fessional workers, “dates from an era in which most jobs were as standardized as the products they helped 
create.” The knowledge these workers applied in their jobs was also similarly standardized. A traditional 
professional is accredited on the basis of tested knowledge on a specialized subject area, which is applied to 
different types of situations or problems. “That knowledge existed in advance, ready to be mastered. Once 
the novitiate had dutifully absorbed the knowledge and had passed an examination attesting to its absorp-
tion, professional status was automatically conferred—usually through a ceremony of appropriately me-
dieval pageantry and costume” (Reich 1992, 182). Their stable knowledge base was fundamental to their 
employability and authority.  
However, the status of knowledge changes greatly as the needs of symbolic analysts in a post-Fordist 
economy replace those of professionals. The team format of symbolic analytical work requires that its 
members be non-specialists—ready to do anything necessary “to ship project deliverables.” The speed of 
production and the innovative nature of SA work dictate against several things: firstly, insisting on one’s 
authority amongst team members based on special expertise and secondly, relying on only one such body of 
expertise for ideas and the verification of business strategies. The revamped authority of SA workers is 
based on the ability to access and deploy relevant knowledge from a number of sources to manage a 
swiftly-changing business environment.  
In theory, where new products continually emerge in the marketplace, conventional market and technical 
knowledge is repeatedly rendered as invalid. “Textbook” arguments are only moderately persuasive to 
team-members looking for guidance. Where commodities are informational and partially a function of 
technological development, their very use transforms the base conditions for the next innovation. Planners 
of product development can rarely proceed according to a linear calculation based on what happened yes-
terday. This creates a situation of barely-controlled chaos, which SAs must constantly seek to understand 
through their individual or collective “sensing.”  
[I]n the new economy—replete with unidentified problems, unknown 
solutions, and untried means of putting them together—mastery of old 
domains of knowledge isn’t nearly enough to guarantee a good income. 
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Nor, importantly, is it even necessary. Symbolic analysts often can draw 
upon established bodies of knowledge with the flick of a computer key…. 
What is more valuable is the capacity to effectively and creatively use the 
knowledge (Reich 1992, 182). 
Team-members are expected to share their knowledge. The “worldly,” experiential, or “tacit” knowledge of 
other team-members is as valued as their formal knowledge. “Since neither problems nor solutions can be 
defined in advance, frequent and informal conversations help ensure that insights and discoveries are put to 
their best uses and subjected to quick, critical evaluation” (Reich 1992, 179). Coworkers consult each other 
to verify their orientation and broad understanding of what they have heard, read, intuited, or “mined” from 
a database. 
SAs “manipulate” the sensory material, ideas and data they have available to them. The tools they use could 
be “mathematical algorithms, legal arguments, financial gimmicks, scientific principles, psychological 
insights about how to persuade or to amuse, systems of induction or deduction, or any other set of tech-
niques for doing conceptual puzzles… When not conversing with their teammates, symbolic analysts sit 
before computer terminals—examining works and numbers, moving them, altering them, trying out new 
words and numbers, formulating and testing hypotheses, designing or strategizing” (Reich 1992, 178-179).  
The purposes of such manipulations could be  
… to more efficiently deploy resources or shift financial assets, or oth-
erwise save time and energy[; to] yield new inventions—technological 
marvels, innovative legal arguments, new advertising ploys for convinc-
ing people that certain amusements have becomes life necessities[; with] 
other manipulations—of sounds, words, pictures—… to entertain their 
recipients, or cause them to reflect more deeply on their lives or on the 
human condition[, or to] grab money from people too slow or naïve to 
protect themselves, by manipulating them in response (Reich 1992, 178). 
The demands on good SAs go well beyond the brief of “problem-solving.” In fact, they frequently have to 
first invent the problem that they, then, must solve. Indeed, “discovering a new problem” is Reich’s lan-
guage for “identifying a new market,” which means “finding that a specific problem exists which con-
sumers are eager to remedy”—or creating one (Reich 1992, 106). The progression from problem-definition 
to solution is very slow at first, because defining the project while negotiating with employers and con-
tractors is “by far the most absorbing and time-consuming element…. Final production is often the easiest 
part. The bulk of time and cost (and, thus, of real value) comes in conceptualizing the problem, devising a 
solution, and planning its execution” (Reich 1992, 106). This work often involves iterative consultation 
with others as well as private exploration using the knowledge sets, apps or other tool of the trade identified. 
Analysts who concentrate on this are in the highest pay-bracket (Reich 1992, 104).  
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Naturally, good communications and liaising skills figure prominently during these preliminaries. Refer-
ring to higher-level employees, Reich explains that “SAs spend long hours in meetings or on the telephone, 
and even longer hours in jet planes and hotels—advising, making presentations, giving briefings, doing 
deals. Periodically, they issue reports, plans, designs, drafts, memoranda, layouts, renderings, scripts, or 
projections—which, in turn, precipitate more meetings to clarify what has been proposed and to get 
agreement on how it will be implemented, by whom, and for how much money” (Reich 1992, 179). The 
reward system for this work is very different from how most professionals earned their livings in Fordist 
times. SAs are rewarded not for hours worked, but for “the quality, originality, cleverness and, occasion-
ally, speed with which they solve, identify or broker new problems” (Reich 1992, 178).  
As a result of their high-level, but generalized skill-sets, symbolic analysts have progressively won a larger 
share of the over-all returns of 20
th
-century capitalism. “In 1920, more than 85 percent of the cost of an 
automobile went to pay routine laborers and investors. By 1990, these two groups received less than 60 
percent, with the remainder going to designers, engineers, stylists, planners, strategists, financial special-
ists, executive officers, lawyers, advertisers, marketers and the like. As an example, of the price of a sem-
iconductor chip, “[m]ore than 85 percent is for specialized design and engineering services and for patents 
and copyrights on past discoveries made in the course of providing such services” (Reich 1992, 178).
68
   
As it discredits the authority of narrowly-defined knowledge bases, the demands of SA work also confound 
the Fordist distinction between creative and technical approaches to problems. This is why Reich is able to 
group, in one broad symbolic-analyst employment category, 
… research scientists, design engineers, software engineers, civil engi-
neers, biotechnology engineers, sound engineers, public relations execu-
tives, investment bankers, lawyers, real estate developers and even a few 
creative accountants. Also included is much of the work done by man-
agement consultants, financial consultants, tax consultants, energy con-
sultants, agricultural consultants, armaments consultants, architectural 
consultants, management information specialist, organizational devel-
opment specialists, strategic planners, corporate headhunters, and systems 
analysts. Also advertising executives, and marketing strategists, art di-




 See also Hagel, Brown and Davison (2010, 48-49): “Declining ROA [company return on investment], even as 
labour productivity rises, suggest that firms are unable to hold onto the financial benefits created by steady gains in 
labour productivity. Who is capturing the rewards themselves? Our metric suggests that creative talent is one 
beneficiary—for example, computer engineers, health-care professionals, architects and managers, whose total 
compensation has more than doubled during the past five years.”  
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publishers, writers and editors, journalists, musicians, television and film 
producers, and even university professors (Reich 1992, 177-78). 
Clustering investment bankers and systems analysts with cinematographers (i.e., analytical with creative 
workers), is not as anomalous as tradition would suggest. Brian Holmes makes sense of it by building on 
Jameson’s (1991) and Harvey’s (1989), accounting for the post-modern worldview as a function of cultural 
commodification. Digitization and the network business model now allow for the commercialization of ‘art 
production and exchange.’ Creative abilities can be integrated into the economic machine. “Cultural ex-
pressions, recoded and processed as multimedia, can enter the value-added loop of digitized communica-
tions” (Holmes 2002, 8). 
Complicating Reich’s Typology  
As compelling as it is, Reich’s typology has certainly not been the last world on post-Fordist workforce 
restructuring, and indeed may miss some important aspects of this process illuminated by more recent work 
on the topic. In order to scrutinize and supplement Reich’s model, I provide below the partially-dissenting 
views of a number of other scholars. This dissent illustrates that debate continues about the nature of new 
working conditions, which at minimum must nuance what we have learned about post-Fordist labour 
through Reich.  
Rosalind Gill and Andy Pratt (2008) narrow down Reich’s SA category. They focus on the creative worker 
segment of symbolic analysts as exemplars of the new labourer. The authors explain that they have won 
their status based on a dubious distinction, their persistent insecurity and often, poverty. “They are… 
conjured… as exemplars of the move away from stable notions of ‘careers’ to more informal, insecure, and 
discontinuous employment (Jones, 1996), [and] are said to be the iconic representatives of the ‘brave new 
world of work’” (Gill and Pratt 2008, 2). On the other hand, being members of the “creative class” (Florida 
2002) makes them a population sought-after by planners; they attract their better-paid, mobile, confreres to 
particular cities and neighbourhoods, who hope to be entertained and culturally stimulated
 
by them. Be-
cause of their potential boost to economies, industry and government figures worldwide try to promote their 
activities, as sources of “cultural capital.”
 
Despite their often straitened circumstances, they are deemed 
important to the composition of a neighbourhood and an economy. As consultant Richard Florida’s advice 
to numerous municipal planners makes clear, much is expected of attracting these workers to their cities 
(Florida 2002). “Creative workers and cultural or creative industries more generally are imbued with an 
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extraordinary range of capacities, which relate to wealth creation, urban regeneration and social cohesion” 
(Gill and Pratt 2008, 13). They are also valued for being “model entrepreneurs.”
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Whereas Gill and Pratt shrink it, Brian Holmes expands Reich’s category, by combining with creative 
work, employment in services provision, including counseling, therapy, and education (Holmes 2002, 
9-10). Finally, as noted earlier, the autonomist scholars also productively complicate Reich’s typology. 
They situate symbolic analysis within a much broader category they call “immaterial labour,” which they 
claim includes almost all contemporary workers. Thus, their schema stresses the broad category of imma-
terial labour over sub-categories. Immaterial labour is such an inclusive class that it really amounts to a 
descriptor of skills-and-culture-in-general in post-Fordism. To put this differently, Hardt and Negri em-
phasize common experiences and skills that unite workers in Reich’s categories, rather than focussing on 
what distinguishes them from each other. However, they do sub-divide immaterial labour into three sub-
categories. The first is industrial production, but changed through its “informationalization” via robotics; 
the second is SA work; and the third is work involving the “production and manipulation of affect;” the 
generation of a sense of ease, well-being, satisfaction, excitement or passion (Hardt and Negri 2000, 
289-94). 
Along with SA work, then, immaterial labour includes all kinds of creative and much personal service 
work. Therefore, with this consolidation, emphasis is on the common subjectivity of post-Fordist workers 
rather than the clustered distribution of particular skill-sets. All require the same raft of core competencies 
to different degrees, such that most jobs train or condition workers in a similar way. Lazzarato claims that 
for almost all post-Fordist workers, social and communications (i.e., affect) skills are added to technical or 




 Gill and Pratt (2008, 13-14) elaborate: “Here our emphasis is on the claims that artists and creative workers are 
model entrepreneurs, the ideal workers of the future. In recent years, a number of qualitative and ethnographic studies 
have examined the lives of artists, fashion designers, television creatives and new media workers, and this research has 
raised critical questions about the much-vaunted flexibility, autonomy and informality of these domains. A clear and 
largely consistent picture of creative labour [emerges,]…particularly micro-business in the cultural industries—what 
Ulrich Beck (2000) refers to as “Me and Company,” Leadbetter and Oakley (1999) dub ‘the independents,’ and Ross 
(2003) explores as the ‘industrialization of Bohemia.’ Studies highlight a number of relatively stable features of this 
kind of work: a preponderance of temporary, intermittent and precarious jobs; long hours and bulimic patterns of 
working; the collapse or erasures of boundaries between work and play; poor pay; high levels of mobility; passionate 
attachment to the work and to the identity of creative labourer; an attitudinal mindset that is a blend of bohemianism 
and entrepreneurialism; informal work environments and distinctive forms of sociality; and profound experiences of 
insecurity and anxiety about finding work, earning enough money and ‘keeping up’ in rapidly changing fields.”  
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category immaterial labourer to be applied to most of those who work at the centres of the information 
society globally. 
However, the category also includes non-workers in the ever-expanding post-Fordist milieu. Many of these 
have adopted the tools of the iconic workers, particularly electronic devices for core communications and 
many social activities. Prosumption dictates that consumers, too, have learned the skills and adopted values 
similar to workers. Accordingly, these scholars hold the “immaterial labourer” mindset to be “hegemonic.” 
Lazarrato claims that immaterial labour occupies “a strategic position… at a wider level…, in cognitively 
and affectively shap[ing] subjectivities throughout and for other parts of the economic system” (de Peuter 
2010, 21).  
Inevitably, criticism has been levelled at the concept of “immaterial labour” because of this very compre-
hensiveness. Gill and Pratt (2008, 19) assert that grouping personal service and mediated communications 
is a strategy that “lacks conceptual coherence and ends up collapsing entirely different kinds of work and 
experience.” For example, it conflates “within a single category the very different conditions of say, a 
network system administrator, a latte-serving barista and a sex-worker” (Dyer-Witheford 1999, 98). 
Scholars of women’s and “global-south” labour complain that “routine work” is buried through this intel-
lectual formulation. Routine work represents the common experience of female workers in general and 
almost all workers in the global south. Moreover the interests of routine workers and SAs are not the same. 
The SA work of (mostly) northern white males is made possible by the drudgery of others. Mass-producers 
support their activities. “Post-Fordism actually displays a bifurcating occupational structure, in which only 
one part corresponds to the ideal portrait of the technological adept ‘knowledge worker,’ while the other is 
constituted by a mass of low-end, poorly-paid, insecure, service workers[:] the postindustrial sector of 
janitors, fast-food operatives, and data-entry clerks” (Dyer-Witheford 2005, 147). Furthermore, even within 
the cadres of elite workers, in high-technology development (Barley and Kunda 1992), and financial ser-
vices (Ho 2009), women and people of colour are discriminated against. They may be absorbed into these 
categories, but they experience them differently. 
Adequacy of Reich’s Typology  
As with any typology, Reich’s categories are not sacrosanct. However, the alternatives I discussed above 
can also be debated. Scholars fairly object to the comprehensiveness of Hardt and Negri’s and Lazzarato’s 
category of immaterial labour and its implication that people with very different work skills, experiences 
and degrees of power can be meaningfully grouped through it.  
With these and other objections to the alternative typologies in mind, then, I conclude that Reich’s analysis 
proves to be more useful than the other contributions. Reich’s typology has the advantage of being rela-
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tively simple, and his types clearly delineated. The SA is an appropriate choice for “the iconic post-Fordist 
worker,” whose working conditions and beliefs, as compared to neospiritualtiy, are represented in the tables 
in Chapter One. In addition to the clarity of the category, the SA type explicitly amalgamates analytical and 
creative skill-sets in one worker, which is surely a key change from Fordism. This, in turn, puts prime 
emphasis on teamwork. Allan Liu (2004, 53), for one, considers this a pivotal feature of post-Fordist work 
organization: “Once team culture is in place…, all of the rest of downsizing culture follows: smart work, 
flexible competence, flat management and so on.”  
Reich’s analysis also leaves space for the class-conflict analysis that Dyer-Witheford suggested above. My 
larger analysis of the relationships between neospirituality and new work requires acknowledging these 
class dynamics. Furthermore, despite stated objections to the idea that neospiritual practitioners are middle 
class in an era where the class has lost its traditional shape, the suggestion is surely approximately true. This 
makes their comparison to SAs, who are also only roughly in that category, a reasonable strategy.  
However, the degree to which the skills and values associated with immaterial labour may be diffused 
beyond workplaces, still an open question, is provocative for the conclusion of this dissertation. If new 
work forms drive workers’ religious sentiments towards New Age spirituality, the possibility that an entire 
population acts like and believes with these focal workers has powerful implications for neospirituality’s 
diffusion. I will further consider this point at the conclusion of this dissertation. Below, I add other argu-
ments as to why, in terms of processes (which include, but go beyond, hegemony), SAs might influence a 
larger population to adopt NAS commitments.  
Iconic Workers can Disseminate Values 
Below, I also consider ways that the specific social situation and work-forms of SAs may affect how in-
fluential they are for the general values of whole populations. Including the iconic status of SA work, these 
arguments are fivefold: the work of SAs allows them to communicate their values implicitly; SAs are in an 
important industry, and that status makes them admired, and so, influential; SAs skills are diffused through 
general consumption (i.e., prosumption); SAs have the motivation and capacity to promote themselves/their 
industry. These arguments, in more detail, are:  
 Based on the nature of their work, SAs are influential. They have ready-built audiences, since they 
communicate to the public as an integral element of their work. They can implicitly disseminate their at-
titudes and values purely through this communications function, as Harvey reminded us about fashion’s 
valorization of work intensity as part of its product. 
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 Based on their social status, SAs are influential. The digital technology and media sectors, em-
ploying SA work in an essential way, have been major economic engines for much of the post-Fordist 
period (Hardt and Negri 2000, 291), particularly from 1996 to 2004 during ‘the building out’ of the internet 
(Phelps 2013, 219-221). Because their industry is a major driver of the economy, the people and jobs in 
those industries are a strong focus of media attention and popular attention? SAs model a certain kind of 
social actor whom others wish to emulate because they see SAs as influential and commanding social re-
sources.  
 Since it is iconic, SA work epitomizes post-Fordist work in general, and workplaces will be 
structured to accommodate their unique form of productivity. Other workplaces may not strictly require 
these forms, but they will mimic them anyway. If work form is a source of culture, then all workers will be 
forced to adopt the SA workplace culture.   
 The skills and attitudes required to do SA work are substantially spread throughout the popula-
tion—if we credit either a hegemonic process as posited by Hardt and Negri or the operation of prosump-
tion (since, according to this theory, all those who consume, also work while doing so). The hegemonic 
character of information work and the operation of prosumption allow people to identify with SAs on the 
basis of their daily experiences with similar technologies and life-practices. The validity of the last point 
suggests that we can posit the symbolic-analytical mentality as having been shaped into a general 
worldview, which qualifies it for comparison to an equally-broadly-shaped worldview, that of neospiritu-
ality.  
 Broadcasting values implicitly as part of the process of communication is one way to disseminate 
beliefs. Direct promotion is another. Because the industries they work in sell consumer items, are supported 
by public monies, and are reliant on favourable regulation, they need to maintain good public relations. 
Accordingly, SAs have an interest in presenting their products and industry as socially-valuable. Through 
successfully projecting a positive impression of their industry, they further motivate members of the general 
population to adopt their values. 
To summarize, being an iconic worker means being representative of all workers in a particular economic 
regime. The term suggests that other work will be more or less like that of the iconic worker with respect to 
key characteristics. Values that derive from SA work will spread to other workers. However, the SA class of 
workers is critically placed and has the skills to intentionally as well as tacitly disseminate their under-
standing of the world. In a classical ideological gambit, as SAs aggrandized the importance of their tools 
and products, so they did the same with their careers and social positions. The rash of young communicators 
and software workers in early post-Fordist days did indeed discover that their interests were aligned with 
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the advancement of post-Fordism. In Chapter Eight, I show that an important spokesperson for the industry, 
Wired editor, philosopher and author, Kevin Kelly, actively developed a mystique around their work, and 
so produced value for their industry (Fisher 2010, 49-53). He did this partially though formulating a model of 
a worldview similar to the New Age’s holism, the network cosmology.  
An additional consideration from this chapter, as Dyer-Witheford implies, is that SAs are in at least partial 
alignment with the interests of post-Fordist capitalists. With this in mind, Brian Holmes (2002, 6) asks the 
pointed question: “Which social groups were integrated to the new hegemony of flexible capitalism, and 
how?” As an answer, he endorses the thesis of French scholars Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello (2005) that 
employment in the early days of the computer industry became the vehicle for the social advancement of 
what they call the new management cadre. Although the SA cadre about which they write are the children 
of the French bourgeoisie, as their focus is on France, their analysis has been made more general by a 
number of scholarly efforts in the disciplines political-economy, communications and sociology. Different 
scholars label and theorize this group in different ways.
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Types of Affect  
Above, I presented the arguments for primarily referencing Reich’s typology for our understanding of new 
workers. However, the emphasis on affect provided by other scholars is an innovation in the thinking about 
new work that Reich neglects somewhat. The theory is an important addition to Reich’s type, and the topic 
requires more elaboration.  
A recent compilation edited by Melissa Gregg and Gregory Seigworth (2010) provides eight different 
definitions of affect in its preface, which suggests considerable ambiguity around the concept. On the other 
hand, Lazzarato (1996) is very specific, representing the enhanced requirement for affect skills in con-
temporary workers as an element of the communications skills workers need to self-manage. From this 
multifaceted landscape, I restrict the discussion of ‘affect labour’ to three senses: the communications skills 
exercised for the purpose of self- and group-management, the efforts that produce good feelings in the 
clients of personal service workers, and the evocation of enlivening energy. We can pass lightly over the 
first of these in this section, as it has been discussed in terms of SA skills. Similarly, the affect provoked by 
personal service is not, basically, problematic. Therefore, the main purpose of this section is to define and 




 For examples: Kroker and Weinstein (2001) call it “the virtual class;” Ursula Huws (2003), “the Cybertariat;” Alvin 
Gouldner, “the New Class;” and Daniel Bell (1976), “the cultural mass.”  
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Broadly speaking, characterizing post-Fordists as affect workers emphasizes the importance of social skills 
and the ability to manage feelings as key requirements of most work, from service to media work, to 
analysis. SAs, for example, need to maintain an intensive work-life schedule while constantly casting about 
for new ideas, exchanging information with fellow employees, working their network contacts, negotiating 
with others, etc. This involves demonstrating active intelligence and good ‘people skills.’  
Reich certainly implies that these skills are important for SAs, especially as he groups “creative” with 
technical workers and foregrounds the negotiation and team processes that SAs participate in. However, he 
does not question the nature of these skills in any way. Lazzarato (1996), Hardt and Negri (2000), other 
autonomist Marxist scholars, and some sociologists and critical psychologists do so. Among the latter are 
Brown 2003, McRobbie 2007a, 2007b, Nicholas Rose 1990, and Walkerdine et al 2001 (Gill and Pratt 
2008, 18). These analysts discuss the fact that, in post-Fordism, the system delves into the worker’s psyche 
and exploits capacities traditionally considered “private.” Success at work “is increasingly dependent on 
communicative and emotional capacities[;] ‘cognitive capitalism tends to prioritize extracting value from 
relational and emotional elements’” (Morini 2007, 40; quoted in Gill and Pratt 2008, 8). 
This value is extracted in most post-Fordist jobs. Ignoring the self-management category, Michael Hardt 
argues in The Affective Turn (Clough and Halley 2007), there are basically two “rather disparate” scholarly 
traditions for the study of affect, well-being as a result of “personal service” rendered, and feelings that 
energize and excite. We have already seen that Reich restricts affect-skills to the category of person-
al-service work, whereas Hardt and Negri (2000) insist that they are required in all information 
work—including symbolic analysis (a subset, they acknowledge, of the “immaterial labour” category). 
Stretching across another bridge, Hardt and Negri (2000, 30) contend that, although personal service work 
is “corporeal, somatic,” it is similar to what creative cultural and information workers do, because the 
“product” for each is “immaterial.” Both rely on “the affective labor of human contact and interaction…. 
Health services, for example, rely centrally on caring and affective labor, and the entertainment industry is 
likewise focused on the creation and manipulation of affect. This labor is immaterial, even if it is corporeal 
and affective, in the sense that its products are intangible, a feeling of ease, well-being, satisfaction, ex-
citement or passion” (Hardt and Negri 2000, 293). We see with this explanation that the definition of im-
material labour is so broad as to challenge its characterization as a category. It is ironic that Hardt and Negri 
have presented this theory as a way of defining a new potentially-revolutionary class, the multitude (Cruz 
2016). On the contrary, we might keep the concept in mind more as a tool to justify the de-differentiation of 
workers (particularly within the SA class) which is undertaken as a feature of post-Fordist work organiza-
tion, and which is more in the interest of managers than workers, as discussed above. 
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Nevertheless, with their elisions, Hardt and Negri pass into the territory of a generalized “enlivening en-
ergy,” supposedly prevalent as an outcome of expanded personal service and media activity. It is the 
supposedly exceptional potential of new media (versus the old analogue forms) to emotionally move users 
in a way that traditional media such as film and television cannot, combined with the proliferation of ser-
vices that also play on affect, which justifies the new idea of “affect.” Alternatively, if not in form, at least 
in degree, this generates a different experience than in the analogue era. This form of affect is claimed to 
causes multiple modes of excitement and impacts on recipients’ bodies as of a type of energy. “Atmos-
phere, mood, feelings, states of mind such as well-being, depression, disorder, harmony, have all been 
converted into information flows, stimulated and orchestrated by a team of experts that includes, doctors, 
psychologists, spiritual healers, design experts, marketing teams, product managers and consumers” 
(Seshadri 2007, 88). The density of pitches within everyday experience supposedly creates an intensity of 
engagement that discourages reflective activity (Clough 2007). 
As feminist scholars first theorized the “caring feminine service,” which generates comforting affects, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter, so did they also theorize the newer meaning of “affect work.” They im-
agined a different function for media than had communication scholars at the dawn of post-Fordism, that 
extended beyond mere signification or image creation. Rather, as noted, media create energetic flows and 
excitement. Analysts assert that “an image can have an effect that does not necessarily correspond to its 
meaning, or without meaning anything in particular to the viewing subject that it affects” (Wissinger 2007, 
237). The focus here is on the simple capacity of imagery to arrest and focus attention, regardless of its 
content. Media that effectively create such effects can be seen as offering a form of personal service similar 
to what is traditionally understood with this term, impacting the body in a way that is preconscious in na-
ture.  
Fashion modeling provides an example of this process. Instead of focussing on how fashion models rep-
resent beauty and cultural ideals, scholars stress the enlivening energy they instill in recipients of their 
work. Fashion’s impact is measured by how well it stimulates observers in some visceral way. 
[Fashion photography shows] less evidence of an effort to construct the 
fashion model as a particular cultural ideal, with a culturally assigned and 
subjectively interpretable meaning, and more evidence of effort… focused 
on the model’s capacity to constantly change appearance and personality, 
an effort aimed at modulating the affective flow to be activated by the 
model’s presence in persona, or by his or her virtual presence in photo-
graphs. [In other words,] the work of models is not so much aimed at the 
‘narrative construction of subject identities’ as it is oriented to ‘affecting 
bodies directly’ Wissinger (2007, 235). 
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As one of the modelling agents put it, “‘models are just conduits most of the time,’ [of the] unexpected, 
something extra or unplanned[; that] creat[es] an image that is unassimilable, that pushes beyond the bor-
ders of conventional interpretation” (Wissinger 2007, 243). Additionally, a model’s different images are 
layered upon each other for progressively greater impact the more she is seen. A model’s impact does not 
derive from the stability of her “image,” but its variety, and the intensity of its appearance in public spaces 
(Wissinger 2007, 239-240). 
Like a number of other scholars, Gill and Pratt (2008, 15-16) reject Wissinger’s implication that affect 
directly impacts the body without recourse to the mind and her definition of affect as enlivening energy, 
“conjured as a pre-subjective intensity, which exists outside signification.” They also criticize Hardt and 
Negri’s promotion of this idea, identifying the Autonomists’ support as a strategic contribution to their 
theory of the multitude as “the new revolutionary subject.” Hardt and Negri’s thesis is that affective im-
material labour, required throughout the population now, has radical consequences. They theorize this 
affect as “essentially transgressive,” and expect it to eventually overspill the boundaries of workplaces and 
turned against capitalists. But Gill and Pratt ask: “How can [this idea] be defended? [It ignores] the extent to 
which emotions are ‘put to work’ in post-Fordist capitalism” (2008, 15-16). 
The idea of affective impact not routed through “the mind” of the observer evades examining what might be 
the contents of the mind during an affective event such as a fashion show or other spectacles in the im-
material marketplace. Again, if a holistic worldview is generic throughout the post-Fordist population, as I 
would argue it is, there may be “a whole” providing the mental contents, even if subtly registered. This 
could be the sponsor of the event, routed through the brand that it projects. In relation to understanding 
cultural labour, the “enlivening energy” model is too abstract, and fails to scrutinize the ways that worker 
behaviour is conditioned by it. The concept “leaves us with no way of grappling with the role played by 
affect in generating consent (or even passion) for working lives that, without this emotional or symbolic 
sheen, might appear arduous, tiring and exploitative” (2008, 17).  
Criticism is also offered as part of the “demoralization thesis,” (Lynch 2007, 150-52). Scholars suggest the 
affect enjoined in workplaces expended in the course of SA labouring is not enlivening but the opposite. 
Their thesis is that work harnesses “dead, abstracted and artificial emotions,” which causes us to lose touch 
with our authentic feelings. Lynch agrees with Stjepan Mestrovic, “who sees emotions constructed and 
circulated [with a] purpose.” Sociologist Arlie Hochschild (2012) has written about the emotional labour 
that must go into many jobs. Especially because workers “voluntarily” put in long hours due to their “ex-
citement” over the work, Gill and Pratt (2008, 17), conclude that “Foucauldian-inflected accounts appear 
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more compelling in their ability to make sense of how pleasure itself may become a disciplinary technol-
ogy.” 
The complexity of interpersonal relations and technology, especially as they interact both in the domains of 
consumption and production, presents a challenge to personal capacities to manage feelings and social 
discourse that generally surpasses demands made in the Fordist past. Certainly, we can agree that the ability 
to manage emotions is an integral component of new production methods, broadly. The management of 
personal feeling is now fully acknowledged as a workplace skill, and capacity with it predicts competent 
team participation and leadership. This competency is tested as emotional intelligence (EI) before hirings 
and in other ways. This contrasts strongly with the Fordist model of production, i.e., Taylorist workplaces, 
in which no managers sought creative and energized employees or tried to enhance their social capacities 
beyond basic levels. Communications among line workers was a threat to productivity.  
Assessment of Affect Theory  
As indicated above, in the light of the concerns of this dissertation, of the three kinds of affect labour 
pinpointed in this chapter—simple caring, managerial caring, and euphoria or ecstasy—the first and the 
third are most relevant. As for the first, there is a strong emphasis on empathy in the neospiritual world. 
However, in the light of neospirituality’s emphasis on energetic transactions, the most intriguing is the 
production of affect as enlivening energy. For audiences or recipients, these flows of energy most strongly 
suggest “religious experience,” the spiritual euphoria experienced through appropriate spiritual practices, 
such as meditation. These experiences, claimed by neospirituals, are described in similar terms to the 
presumed, preconscious feeling, somewhat undifferentiated by cognitive contents, which is a product of, 
but also circulates within, post-Fordist workplaces.  
But what are the sources of these energetic flows at work? For religious holistic believers, generally, the 
source may be a guru, a divine presence, the living earth as Gaia, or others. For the more instrumental-
ly-inclined, certain practices, such as meditation, may be considered the source, or almost any other activity 
that profoundly absorbs the attention, such as running or rock-climbing, evokes this energy, considered 
either mysterious or coming from one’s own mind or body (Csikszentmihaly 2007). How, though, is this 
energy understood to appear in workplaces? The classic answer by corporate managers would be: “the 
individual passions of workers, focused by team culture.” The post-Fordist, flexible company requires a 
different type of worker, one who stirs co-workers, customers and audiences.  
A number of the features of post-Fordist workplaces are addressed to raising energy-levels. One is the 
representation of work as play. Play provokes excitement, which employees can carry over to their work. 
“Play” spaces (such as games rooms) are provided partly to allow for periods of rest between bouts of 
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intensive work. However, the presence of such spaces implies the similarity of work and play and suggests 
the subconscious idea that “work is play.” These spaces socialize the workspace. 
Energetic flows are honoured in companies in other ways. In Chapter Five I discussed the characterization 
by scholars, such as Peters and Waterman (1982), of companies as pure transmitters of information. More 
precisely, a company should be like “an optical fiber or superconducting wire designed for resistance-free 
flow of information…, free from the friction of matter” (Liu 2004, 43). We can also see this streamlining, 
flow-like energy as implicit in the concept of “pure business culture,” where work is to be free of the ob-
structing personal habits of workers mired down by parochial attitudes. “Idiosyncratic” affinities, residues 
of loyalty to ethnicity, race, or community, which might deflect from pure devotion to the circulation of 
global capital, are not admissible in the workplace. They are to be thoroughly routed out by team members 
(as Lui argued it), unless they can contribute to a cultural product or are contained within company “di-
versity” policies. 
However, the most direct source of this energy in workplaces is surely attributable to human effort therein, 
which spiritual practices may support. In any case, whatever the means for its activation, workers them-
selves are the only possible source of this energy. This is equally so, according to the ideology: only indi-
viduals can be “empowered.”  
However, as explained earlier, the “personal empowerment” ideal emerges from the human potential dis-
course, itself steeped in holism. Hence, it references a larger whole for its coherence (i.e., through claiming 
that realizing oneself is realizing a whole community). The argument for corporations as pytopia asserts 
that the corporation stands in for that community. The “universe,” that benefits from the unleashing of one’s 
potential is, in practice, the corporation (Nadesan 1998). 
From one point of view, the imaginative displacement of energetic source to the corporation itself, as the 
sole agent, is entirely valid. Under its auspices, the employer has compiled these sources of energy. 
However, conceding this point begs the question of the real nature of the “enlivening energy.” Does it 
come, viscerally, from workers, or does it merely motivate them? If the latter, this enlivening energy would 
have to be understood as the product of capitalization, or money (see Goodchild 2009, for exploration of 
this theme). Corporate capital enables, so the “energy” celebrated and considered the ultimate enabler of a 
project may well be capital. However, defining “pure desire” directly as the pursuit of wealth (worse, 
corporate wealth) might be a poor motivator of team members. Furthermore, it would countermand the 
requirement that they cooperate. Additionally, workers are prevented from deploying the capital at their 
own discretion. A basic capitalist principle is that workers are denied “control over the means of produc-
tion” (Marx 1990). Furthermore, only a tiny fraction of the profits from the labour of workers accrues to 
184 
 
them. Is it not more appealing to believe that the partaking of enlivening energy (whose source needs to 
remain mysterious) is the ultimate experience itself? Since energy clearly cannot be stored, there can be no 
question after the conclusion of the project as to where the store might reside.  
I am not necessarily arguing that money is the source of this energy. Certainly Marxian theory insists that 
only worker’s labour produces value (Brennan 2000). Despite debate as to whether “enlivening energy” is 
real or can be distinguished from emotion—self-conscious feeling—we must take the claims for its im-
portance in workplaces seriously. This is because the ability to evoke or project enlivening energy is a 
cherished capacity of neospiritual practitioners. Whether the excitement evoked in work and experienced in 
the course of immaterial production and consumption is of the same nature as this claimed capacity remains 
to be determined. The test would presumably gravitate around the idea of the ability to renew vitality, a 
characteristic neospiritual practitioners would attribute to their enlivening energy.  
This is the root, in my opinion, of the “experience economy.” Energy (including passion and excitement), 
whether for workers or consumers (essentially, including many young people, in these post-Fordist indus-
tries), is symbolic wealth in this economy, accepted as a substitute for “real” wealth. The “turn to the East,” 
etc. the preference for experience and “connection” (universalized by the “smart phone”) over things, is an 
unconscious accommodation to a projected life of relative poverty, either of the “organizational offspring” 
in rich northern nations or, more generally, populations in the global South. Especially with further pressure 
on resources as limits on carbon-capturing are reached (while a small class also hoards what is available), 
there is not enough “stuff” to go around, so better to be satisfied with “experience,” however ersatz.  
Further opportunities for understanding the operation of affect in workplaces open up when we review the 
history of organizational restructuring and development that has occurred over the course of post-Fordism’s 
establishment, changes in philosophies and programs of human resources development, including the ex-
plorations in spiritual awareness. This is the topic of the next chapter.  
The possibility that “energy” is a metaphor for exercised capital (i.e., power in operation), is a reminder of 
Albanese’s inflection of the New Age valorization of harmony, which is implicit in the holistic worldview 
(noted in Chapter Two). Albanese (1992, 73) claimed that for New Agers “acts of harmony are simulta-
neously acts of power.” In operation in workplaces, those who move smoothly within the parameters of 
their work obligations, are propelling instrumental transactions that circulate wealth (energy) and are also, 
in the process, aligning themselves with power (i.e., the corporation). 
As discussed above, the circulation of this energy, in the neospiritual domain as in companies, is conceived 
to emerge from, contribute to, or create a whole. Goldschmidt-Salamon argued that “the whole” that in-
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spires spiritual feelings is the supposed globe itself; but actually, this is only the section of the world that 
has been activated or embraced by global capital. “Wasting” or “wasted” spaces and populations are ex-
cluded. However, she attributes belief in this particular worldview specifically to those at the apex of 
corporations. In Chapter Eight, by contrast, I consider a holistic worldview based on the internet that was 
constructed by, and arguably for, the SA stratum of workers. The “network cosmology” imagines a most-
ly-disembodied whole, which, while dependent on technology, applies to the internet’s worldwide users, 
theorized as phenomenologically-situated outside the centres of global power. I will consider in Chapter 
Eight the validity of this implication as part of the question of the network cosmology’s inclusiveness. 
In the light of the reflections above, we might also return to the question: if spirituality exercises and dis-
course in workplaces inspire the feeling of enlivening energy, do these initiatives make work flow more 
smoothly for greater productivity, primarily to promote worker well-being, or are there any differences 
between these alternatives? Which of these is the major reason for managers’ emphasis on spiritual 
awareness in workplaces? In Chapter Four, I showed these questions as plaguing industry scholars of 
workplace spirituality. I introduced in the previous chapter, and will clarify in the following chapter that, to 
the extent that work has been reorganized to create more responsive and productive organizations in fluc-
tuating economic conditions, so also has the autonomous creative worker been pursued for the same rea-
sons. The justification for the flat organization is the same as that which argues for worker 
self-actualization, creativity and autonomy, that is, business effectiveness. Spirituality is supposed to help 
create this worker. Because of their common origins and purposes then (company profit and empowered 
workers) it would be difficult to answer which of these could take priority over the other. They are of a 
piece. Spirituality, the posthierarchical, team work form, with its presumed energy-flows, and the discourse 
of worker empowerment have never been well distinguished. Therefore, the question the industry analysts 
brood over may be moot. However, Lazarrato (1996) takes the position that energetic flow, which can only 
originate in workers’ efforts, benefits the company, “What modern management techniques are looking for 
is for ‘the worker's soul to become part of the factory;’ [i.e., the] worker's personality and subjectivity have 
to be made susceptible to organization and command.”  
Considering the range of phenomena in which affect labour is said to play a part, the explicitly different 
definitions of the latter, and debate over the reality of some forms and the roles they may play in work sites, 
I conclude that the reality, modes and implications of post-Fordist affect labour need more study. Conse-
quently, we are far from understanding if new work has invented (or utilizes) new feelings and how it ex-




In this chapter, using Robert Reich’s typology, I broke down post-Fordist workers into types, and proposed 
the relationships among them. I also provided contesting scholarly opinion as to how that breakdown 
should occur and pinpointed themes of particular significance within the debate on new work conditions in 
general. Additionally, I proposed and justified the choice of symbolic analysts as a particular segment of the 
workforce I consider most relevant, useful and appropriate for understanding the parallels between worker 
and NAS attitudes and behaviours that were listed in Chapter One, declaring them to be iconic post-Fordist 
workers. However, I noted that the additional blurring, nuancing, and even confounding of the SA category 
provided by the dissenting scholars should not be forgotten, as these differing assessments, especially the 
positing of the hegemony of immaterial labour, helps us understand how a belief system grounded in work 
practices could diffuse beyond workplace boundaries. To this possibility, I also added specific ways in 
which we can see the iconic workers, SAs, as the vanguard population of disseminators of neospirituality.  
I have put strong emphasis on affective labour in this chapter because it is a growing component of many 
skill-packages among new-economy-type workers, and because its reality and function in jobs and as part 
of the consumer experience, although ill-understood, appears to mark a significant difference between 
post-Fordist and Fordist work that is relevant to the recent move of corporations towards neospirituality’s 
promotion. The degree of equivalency of affect labour, particularly as the production of enlivening energy, 
and neospiritual practices whose outcomes are felt to be energetic connection and vitalization of practi-
tioners, is an important research question in the pursuit of understanding why post-Fordist managers and 
employees engage with neospirituality in workplaces.  
Accordingly, I included in this chapter an analysis and detailed discussion of the types of “affect” that are 
held to have a strong presence in new workplaces (as with their products). I considered how this affect, in 
operation, might impact the workplace experience and operation. I also suggested a high-level conclusion 
about affect, its relation to the “experience,” or “emotional” economy and the relevance of both to future 
employment and material conditions of succeeding generations of both consumers and producers. 
In the next two chapters, I reveal the associations, both personal and ideological, between early post-Fordist 
workers and New Age practitioners. I show that a belief in posthierarchy has influenced management 
theory in post-Fordist corporations since their beginnings—particularly through the vehicle of consultants 
who sought to create employee-empowered work sites. In Chapter Eight, I argue that concept of posthier-
archy was developed into a worldview by high-technology workers and their spokespeople. Their formu-
lation mirrors New Age holism. I also show an extensive history of the cultural interaction of these new 
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workers and New Age practitioners, to suggest that the openness of post-Fordist companies to spirituality, 
demonstrated in Chapter Four, may be a function of persisting loyalty to New Age values of this population.  
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Chapter Seven: Posthierarchical Paradigms and Practices  
Introduction 
Post-Fordist businesses and governments function in a global world that is often subject to crisis. Under 
these conditions of instability, as I argue below, certain precepts akin to core neospiritual values have 
emerged as a way to manage resources in the larger political, economic, and technological environment. 
These include holism, insight, and collectivity. I show that, applied to socio-technical systems, these pre-
cepts guide a philosophy of action for managers of institutions in a post-Fordist, globalized world. This 
philosophy has fluctuated in its popularity as globalization has advanced, but it has both influenced man-
agers and bureaucrats and been imposed on symbolic analysts in their daily business. In other words, these 
strategies are found both in the macrocosm of business and governmental management and in the micro-
cosm of post-Fordist workplaces.  
As parallels to the hallmark neospiritual values, the three approaches I show decision-makers using are: 
gaining a comprehensive or holistic vision of a situation through data-modelling and -analysis, consulting 
putative visionaries to identify key factors in complex conditions that managers can influence, and ex-
changing knowledge with those who share an experience for better understanding and therefore greater 
effectiveness in action. All of these approaches were used during the Fordist era. However, they gained 
greater urgency and effectiveness with post-Fordism. New sciences, the integration of the world through 
economic globalization, and novel technologies developed to manage this integration, have made these 
strategies more meaningful. These practices can be generally grouped under the popularized paradigm of 
posthierarchy, which was originally seen as a protest against all hierarchy during the social revolutions of 
the 1960s. However, I argue that these protests were supported if not undergirded by the responses to global 
interconnectivity advanced by the technocrats, engineers and decision-makers managing the new condi-
tions it brought about. I suggest below that governmental decision-makers and planners, computer scientists 
engaged in a variety of activities, and serious scholars of organization and business were major critics of the 
old, bureaucratic models of information-gathering and decision-making. Not only their changing ideas, but 
the social innovations that emerged from them, would have provided backdrops to the early emergence of 
New Age spirituality (which was later to become neospirituality) and new worker values. 
Accordingly, commitment to posthierarchy has also framed innovations in workplaces. As the normal 
structure of commercial organizations changed during the transition from Fordism, the precepts of holism, 
insight and collective consultation appeared to guide both these changes and new work patterns. Restruc-
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turing corporate operations to make business visions more holistic, rewarding insight and authorizing re-
sponsiveness and autonomy in workers were initiatives felt to be integral to making companies effective.  
In workplaces, quasi-managers (symbolic analysts) must create innovative products. To do this, they must 
gain “grass-roots” understanding of the universes of both consumer-goods and consumers as well as con-
tinually refamiliarize themselves with the changing ecology of technological and business services that they 
must build on with these new products. Intensive communication with fellow team-members, personal 
insight, continuous polling of the consumer landscape and constant technological upgrading together are 
hoped to create a holistic understanding of the “problems” of these terrains as well as paths to their solu-
tions. In other words, gaining a comprehensive vision of a situation (holism), synthesizing (through insight) 
the experiential knowledge of others, and consultation and data-collection (bottom-up understanding) have 
served as guiding principles to address uncertainty in commerce.  
Minimizing hierarchy has been the one underlying and common effort that organizational theorists have 
relied on as the basic modus operandus (or precondition) to creating these lauded conditions for companies.  
Having a cadre of employees who generally take on managerial functions and act autonomously is essential 
to this strategy. In short, above and beyond SA employees’ cultural histories and personal preferences, their 
“workplace empowerment” is an element of the post-Fordist corporation’s organizationa structure––
devoted to “sensing” and responding to the complex business environment. These corporations certainly 
sustain political processes, but these latter are not as explicitly structured and rule-oriented as they were in 
the classical Fordist corporations. 
Hence, although early neospirituals and counterculturalists advocated autonomous and non-alienating work 
on their own behalf, parallel discourses appeared amongst specialists and professionals promotingsimilar 
interests while they also argued that these were equally good for corporations. A coterie of “posthierarchy 
theorists”––including CEOs, management theorists, managers and organizational consultants, as well as a 
segment of post-Fordist economists–– sought to establish the practices and attitudes in workplaces that 
could allow the corporation to succeed in the new global, flexible business environment. These early or-
ganizational activists tried to make work more humane as they also promoted organizational effectiveness. 
In the process, employee empowerment and posthierarchy values found a secure (symbolic) home in 
business theory and practice.  
In short, the “posthierarchy” ethos and its accompanying practices have been consulted and promoted for 
both management and political purposes. Whereas the counterculture primarily advanced posthierarchy as 
an antidote to overwhelming domination by instrumental rationality, “the military-industrial complex,” and 
repressive working conditions, within the confines of business environments an aversion to hierarchy 
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probably always had mixed objectives. However, the managerial purpose generally won out, and the 
posthierarchy impulse eventually played out as a deep hostility to the Fordist bureaucratic structures, re-
garded as antiquated. Supported by sources cited in this chapter, I argue that the current interpretation of the 
posthierarchy ethos is managerial in nature. From the political point of view—i.e., the countercultural 
version—this may be seen as a subversion of a political agenda—a technologization of a social or political 
value. Moreover, due to posthierarchy’s historical association with political activism it has an additional 
function as an ideology for both managers and workers who have a pedigree of activism for worker em-
powerment. Despite many indicators that the realization of genuine worker-empowerment is unlikely under 
capitalism, belief that posthierarchical forms at work can help achieve it is widespread and sustained. These 
beliefs are core elements of the post-Fordist workplace ideology.  
In this chapter, I initially review the explorations of holism, insight and a consultatory mindset at the 
broader level of society as well as in the more confined environment of workplaces. At the societal level, I 
show these principles operating in particular moments and spaces. The purpose of this first discussion, of 
the societal level, is to tie together the three basic practices of the neospiritual value system as references to, 
and supports of, the strategies that secular decision-makers have employed to manage socio-technical 
systems under global conditions. This inevitably “relativizes” New Age values. 
In sum, this first part reviews elements of the social background to the theoretical establishment of the 
empowered employee in the posthierarchical organization, posthierarchy’s implementation in workplaces, 
divergences from the model there, and strategies and the implications of maintaining the ideology in 
workplaces despite its limited reality. I first highlight several epistemological movements that have affected 
the globalizing world in general--stemming, as I explained, from the requirement in many domains of 
human endeavor to integrate vast amounts and different kinds of knowledge to allow effective action in a 
changing and complex world. I characterize these movements in only a cursory way, however, as sketches 
of important cultural figures reaching a crossroads in their professional treatment of problems that have 
arisen as a result of the increasing complexity of a globalizing, technology-enabled world, and who reacted 
to new conditions by adopting either a holistic, inspiration-seeking, or grassroots-consulting behaviours to 
solve problems they encountered. They all bear a mark of reaching for understanding of life processes 
without resorting to Cartesian—putatively, top-down and strictly analytical—modes of knowing––
approaches we would identify as posthierarchical.I suggest that these developments form the backdrop to 
the emergence of the New Age as well as new worker values. These higher-level approaches are not dis-
engaged from capitalism. Directly or indirectly, they must have both structured post-Fordism as a system 
and been influenced by it. As I consider the manifestations of these three approaches to knowledge in the 
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larger milieu than either the neospiritual ethos or new work values, I also draw associations between these 
higher-level manifestations and both of the latter cultures.  
Then, the remainder (and the bulk) of this chapter traces the trajectory of the intellectual and practical 
innovations in workplaces. As part of this brief history of workplace innovation I also discuss these 
posthierarchical principles’ operation in the iconic post-Fordist workspaces. I show that a general hostility 
to formal bureaucracy and expressions of social hierarchy (rendering a belief in posthierarchy) has framed 
the ideology of post-Fordist work throughout its development. This conclusion will draw us into the next 
chapter, where I will discuss more directly the ideology of these workplaces, through which posthierarchy 
is valorized as a network cosmology. Through a review of the contents of particular media, such as Wired 
magazine, which speak for technology workers but are read well beyond this audience, I also suggest that 
the posthierarchy myth diffuses well beyond corporate managers and workers into the public arena.  
Mid-century Explorations of Posthierarchy 
The pursuits of organic holism, inspiration, and grass-roots participation, all bear the mark of reaching for 
understanding of life processes, so as to facilitate effective action and understanding in the complex world 
of mid-to-late-century globalization. I broadly refer to these as efforts to go beyond hierarchy. All of these 
movements are also reflected in New Age values and, ultimately in work process and beliefs. I will touch on 
particular manifestations of each of these in this section.  
Grass-Roots Participation 
The work of British economic thinker, statistician and economist, E.F. Schumacher (1973, 1977) is not 
strictly within the lineage of organizational development writing, but much of his commentary on tech-
nology was relevant to it. He had an early context for developing his views as Chief Economic Advisor to 
the UK National Coal Board for two decades (Wikipedia, EF Schumacher). An early book addressed to the 
public, Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered (1973), gained a broad popular audience. It was 
among the 100 most influential books published since World War II (The Times Literary Supplement, 6 
October 1995, 39). Most importantly, he embraced a politically-left position and did not give primacy to 
private corporations either in his theory or actions. Schumacher was interested in posthierarchy, but this 
interest was expressed more positively as the need to consult users in the design and use of technologies and 
public works. He could be considered an important cross-over figure between the counterculture and New 
Age, on the one hand, and left political activists and supporters of public resources, on the other. An im-
portant public figure during his career, Schumacher gained his following of New Age proponents as the 
author of Small is Beautiful (1973) (Lynch 2007; Heelas 1996, 87). He promoted an organic model of so-
ciety and argued vigorously for empowered work. A review of his major ideas shows the level of partici-
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pation (if mostly ideational) of the New Age in the development of new organizational forms as 
post-Fordism advanced. 
Perhaps Schumacher expressed the importance of bottom-up consultations for large technology projects 
better than anyone at the time. He and his editor and interpreter, Peter Gilligan (Schumacher and Gilligan, 
1979) did not swing towards the extremes of reifying technology as good or evil, a practice of which others 
at the time could be accused. Along with a few other critics of technology, such as the city planning theorist 
and activist, Jane Jacobs (1961), and scientist and technology and culture analyst, Ursula Franklin (1990), 
they expressed a more nuanced view of technology’s deficiencies and possibilities. Like Jacobs and 
Franklin, Schumacher argued that technological solutions should enhance public life. Communities can 
only remain vibrant and self-actualized when technological projects are kept modest in scale and tailored to 
community needs. In order to follow these principles, designed solutions should be arrived at through 
community consultation. Franklin theorized this conviction by distinguishing between what she calls “ho-
listic” and “prescriptive” technologies. The latter, comprehensively integrated with other technological 
solutions, sets up a somewhat strict way of life for people, so she calls them “social designs for compli-
ance.” By contrast, holistic technologies leave open spaces or “gaps” in the technological landscapes which 
people can creatively “fill in,” or through which they can intervene to adapt the technologies to their 
community needs. This approach accommodates citizen consultation and principled discussions about the 
nature of the communities in which people like to live. Prescriptive technologies follow a “production” 
model, where the holistic form favours “growth.” By using the “growth” concept, Franklin referred to 
natural processes, which exhibit rhythmic patterns and a resistance to unlimited expansion.  
Schumacher did not reject technology, including the old “industrial” technology (Gilligan 1977, 174-75). 
However, by the 1970s, he saw corporate and governmental operators as too reliant on technological so-
lutions to managing social interaction—i.e., the prescriptive approach. The scale of the typical technolog-
ical solution dwarfed human impulses to take responsibility for solving social problems collectively. The 
power to organize and activate knowledge in gargantuan projects led to “a strong, continuing trend towards 
large organizations and large technologies, and towards the orchestration of hitherto fragmented individual 
efforts within large corporate structures or systems” (Gilligan 1977, 177). 
Schumacher believed that beyond a certain level of complexity and scale, the technological solution to a 
problem would backfire. Such approaches would create unintended and often undesirable consequences, 
while also using too many resources. Implicitly criticising what Franklin would call “prescriptive” tech-
nological solutions, Gilligan claimed that “the great professional, technical and organizational juggernauts 
developed irresistible momentum. They have carried us into ever more complex, interdependent and im-
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perfectly understood sets of relationships. Only now[, he noted,] are we beginning to recognize the human 
and resource costs extracted by these behemoth dinosaur activities” (Gilligan 1977, 179). 
Schumacher and Gilligan’s proposed alternative was not to have more sophisticated programming of peo-
ple’s lives, but to integrate problem-definition and -solving into communities themselves. They suggested 
giving people a measure of authority over the design solutions. Solutions would trickle-up from the 
grass-roots if the scale of the problem-definitions were kept modest and the proper consultation processes 
carried out. In this way, people would learn to take responsibility for their own welfare. Such 
self-determination and popular cooperation as an approach to achieving social order naturally reduced the 
power of governmental technocrats. In Schumacher’s vision, the technical solutions should give way to 
social, democratic and participatory practices. 
Schumacher’s nuanced view of the technology-society relationship––as continuous consultation of par-
ticipants in the design and operation of a socio-technical system––makes sense, because human beings 
cannot be easily managed. They are innate sources of randomness and unpredictability. Seeking continuous 
inputs allows for “tinkering” with the social and technological infrastructures to make the best of human 
innovativeness and respond to their people’s perhaps-changing desires and habits. To state this in terms of 
ideas of machine intelligence that were also being explored at this time, constant consultation facilitates the 
system’s learning. Having built-in “feedback loops” constitute a system as “organic,” engaged in a holistic 
growth process. 
Schumacher saw the relationship between organic approaches to technology and the conditions of work 
these would allow. Like his intellectual contemporaries, as well as actual and potential assembly-line 
workers, he abhorred the “soul-destroying, meaningless, mechanical, monotonous, [and] moronic” nature 
of such work (Schumacher 1973, 35). He related his general critique of technology to the goal of achieving 
“good work” with the preferred form. He influenced the New Age discourse on work, arguing once again 
for decision-making from the bottom up (Gilligan 1977, 142; Schumacher 1979, 139).
 
 
Accordingly, Schumacher encouraged youth to resist repressive, Fordist work in addition to other mani-
festations of bureaucracy and power. He supported the emerging beliefs among countercultural youth that 
they could change their prospect of working as “faceless” and soul-destroyed white-collar workers or 
Fordist factory labourers. Schumacher insisted that people refuse bad work: “Meaningless work is an 
abomination…. Work should not be ‘meaningless, boring, stultifying, or nerve-wracking’” (Schumacher 
1979, 118-19). He also wrote: “It is interesting to note that the modern world takes a lot of care that the 
worker’s body should not accidently, or otherwise, be damaged…. But his soul? Or his spirit? If his work 
damages him, by reducing him to a robot—that is just too bad” (Schumacher 1979, 119-20). 
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In Gilligan’s voice, Schumacher may appear to express millennialist and human potentialist views: “There 
is an enormous slow upward heave in the mass of mankind measured by the numbers of people beginning to 
sense that they are capable of directing their own lives, of taking their own initiatives, of formulating roles 
or rules or operating procedures for themselves rather than having others do it for them, of making their 
own choices, of assuming increased responsibility for themselves and others as their sense of their own 
capacities develops” (Gilligan 1977, 173).
 
However, Schumacher’s expansive vision acknowledged more 
levels of human satisfaction or “being” than human potential language typically connotes. In speaking of 
the conundrum of oppressive technology, he urged looking at the “metaphysical or, if you like, the philo-
sophical or religious causes of this situation” (Schumacher 1979, 139). His recommendation: “To act as 
spiritual beings; [as] Man [is] a divine being[;] to act as neighbours; [as] Man [is] a social being[;] To act as 
persons; [as] Man [is] himself or herself” (Schumacher 1979, 116). 
Schumacher’s legacy persisted into the 1990s within a number of organizations, including a Schumacher 
College and Society, and institutes organized around such principles of “right livelihood,” “intermediate 
technology” and “alternate technology.” Contributors to these discussions have included New Age 
spokespeople, such as Marilyn Ferguson (1982) and Matthew Fox (1994), and scholars of religion such 
Rosabeth Kanter (1978) and Milton Yinger (1982) (Heelas 1996, 103). 
Insight-Seeking and Intensive Consultation 
The career of engineer Willis Harman illustrates someone frustrated with technology who eventually 
pursued direct insight as a way to understand his changing world. Eventually an important figure associated 
with the Esalen Institute, he initially struggled with computation to understand complexity, but eventually 
rejected calculation in toto as a solution. Harman’s career demonstrates a final concern for deepening in-
tuitive awareness as a way to confront change, which I call an alternative strategy with the same goal as 
certain mathematical approaches. Not surprisingly, the intuitive or non-rational ways of understanding 
phenomena he adopted became a religious commitment for him.  
In the early 1960s, he and his partner Oliver Markley were cast in the role of futurists by the US Office of 
Education. They were asked, “in the context of the Great Society agenda of the 1960s, to divine how people 
could be educated now to meet… the year 2000” (Kleiner 2008, 168). They explored the newly-emerging 
computational forecasting to understand societal trends. The Rand Corporations’ Herman Kahn, then 
writing his book The Year 2000 (Kleiner 2008, 169), assisted them. But they rejected the modelling method 
and, from Kahn, learned to use another innovation in predictive methods, the scenario approach. “Sce-
narios,” are images of some non-existent world and are generated by groups of knowledgeable people 
consulting each other about future prospects. The goal of this practice is “insight,” collectively generated.   
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The product Harman and Markley delivered to the Department of Education wasa classic vision of an or-
ganic, postindustrial society. Their “New Society” was notable for its “openness and adeptness.” They 
asserted that the cultural values of industrialization and consumption had to shift, while governments 
should “adopt an ecological ethic” (Kleiner 2008, 170-171).  
Harman and Markely’s model was not implemented. However, Harman carried his rejection of computa-
tion further, through involvement in the extrasensory perception (ESP) experiments conducted by the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). He rejected the “numbers” approach (i.e., calcula-
tive, rational analysis) as “a giant flaw in the existing rationalist mind-set.” He felt that “numbers” simply 
could not reproduce the complexities of real-world human situations. His conclusion was that “awareness 
must be cultivated, because the future cannot be predicted or planned in a mechanistic way” (Kleiner 2008, 
121). Harman began to believe that the old industrial mind would fall away, and people “would become 
aware of the most exciting prospect of the time, designing a postindustrial, participative society no longer 
hamstrung by the tired political debates or the fixation on economic growth of the industrial era” (Kleiner 
2008, 172). Harman turned away from high-level analysis and planning and actively exploring spiritual 
consciousness. He “played a key role in an alternative religious movement [and] another leading role in 
psychedelic drug and parapsychology research. [He] renounced the value of rationality. In the process, he 
engineered the beginning of the new age movement. [As such, he] was part of a long-standing tradition of 
visionary engineers” (Kleiner 2008, 157).  
Harman is a key figure in the story of the interconnection of “the establishment” and the New Age. Despite 
his “rejecting rationality,” he maintained the objective that motivated his early explorations in technolo-
gy-based planning. He wanted to live fully in an increasingly insecure and unpredictable world. If we see 
the search for of deeper insight, in which he was latterly engaged, as another way of learning to predict and 
manage the future under such circumstances, we can see his defection to the New Age as a further explo-
ration of the “living-with-complexity” problem. According to this logic, this association situates the general 
pursuit of New Age spirituality within domain of such problem-solving as well. 
Kahn, himself, developed his scenario method while playing war games of military strategy. He periodi-
cally “cloistered a half-dozen [fellow] RAND [Corporation] staff-members in a week-long meeting” to play 
“what-if” exercises of global prediction (Kleiner 2008, 129). Invitees to his Hudson Institute considered 
civilian rather than military scenarios through intensive, collaborative exchanges. Like Harman and Mar-
kley, Kahn was concerned to avert the worst possibilities feared for the planet at the time. In some cases, he 
challenged people to envision shocking futures, such a global nuclear war, in order to awaken deci-
sion-makers from their somnambulant progress towards such awful ends (Kleiner 2008, 128). 
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Eventually, Kahn had to turn the institute towards research for corporations to keep it solvent (Kleiner 
2008, 131). A company that responded eagerly to the forecasting capacity of this institute was Royal Dutch 
Shell (Kleiner 2008, 132-41). At the time, oil prices were fluctuating due to OPEC intervention, and oil 
companies urgently needed guidance to see what the future held. As explained in Chapter Five, the oil crisis 
brought on by OPEC’s actions are often marked as signalling the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism, 
and the beginning of a sped-up world-economy. Shell was a petrochemical company unique for its truly 
global character. It was additionally forward-looking in its hiring of prediction teams that used the human 
imagination and insight to address its problems, as it was at also at the forefront of embracing new organ-
izational structures and exploring New Age religiosity for its workers, as discussed in Chapter Four.
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Seeking the Organic Form 
In Cybernetic Systems 
Like New Age theology (Hanegraff 1996, Hammer 2001, 2004), organizational theory has tended to exhibit 
scientism. Contemporary ideas about how the non-human world is structured established templates for 
envisioning business enterprises. As different arms of science (progressively) delve into the realities of 
different modalities of nature (for examples, from gross processes such as the biological inheritance of traits 
through to the counter-intuitive dynamics of “black holes”), developing different models and tools for 
understanding these unique phenomena in the process (Bernstein 1983), people tend to understand their 
own affairs according to these models.  
Organizational theorists negatively judged the traditional managerial hierarchies of Fordism as depicting 
the relations of inert elements, which Newtonian physics describes. Alternatively, the model for the bu-
reaucratic organization is often a “tree, whose rooted and vertical unity has long made it the favourite map 




 Kahn later became a member the Club of Rome, a group of one hundred people––“business leaders, government 
ministers, and academics”––hand-selected in 1968, who were thought to have enough technical knowledge, political 
power and special insight to assess possible outcomes of common social problems and perhaps influence policies to 
mitigate them (Kleiner 2008, 168-71). The group’s most famous accomplishment was to look at the implications of 
population growth, including resource depletion, pollution, and other ecological issues, so as to predict its impact in 
the year 2000. It findings were published as the ground-breaking Limits to Growth report (Meadows et al. 1975) 
(Kleiner 2008, 181-82). Illustrating the parallel character of software modelling and insight (despite Harman’s claim), 
Club members commissioned the most illustrious computer modeler from among their membership, Jay Forrester, 




anti-Fordists reckoned the Fordist company to be a “dead entity.” For, as science flourished in the twentieth 
century, many alternatives visions to the mechanical form emerged. As different as they are, in contrast to 
Fordist business models, “posthierarchy” is a broad concept that references a number of new forms of 
scientific inquiry in the twentieth century. 
Business philosopher, Moid Siddiqui (2005, 24) summarizes this history of scientism in organizational 
modelling:  
Supervision and control—the buzzwords of an older generation of busi-
nessmen, drew their inspiration from the gravitational force theory that 
was propounded by Isaac Newton. Participation and involvement were the 
shibboleths of a later generation that had grown (sic) on Einstein’s theory 
of the cosmos. Today, the world has hitched its coattails to Steven 
Hawking’s ideas about the cosmos, where everything is inter-connected 
under the laws of the string theory. Suddenly, people in corporate board-
rooms have started talking about the “Big Picture,” a frame that since has 
been enlarged to cover the broad discourse over “eco-systems”. As 
knowledge grows, perceptions change. 
Nature or organicism provided a model for many mid-century endeavours (Stanley 1978) other than 
business structures. The emerging science of cybernetics addressed the need for greater sensitivity to 
complex environments and understanding of their processes. The career of Jay Forrester demonstrates 
cyberneticists’ transition to organic models to guide social forecasting and socio-technical system model-
ling with computers. Forrester turned to these tasks after having first become “one of the most accom-
plished engineers alive” (Kleiner 2008, 173). With wartime scientists, he had invented the random-access 
addressing system for digital computer memory. First trying the conventional approaches to social fore-
casting at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), under Douglas McGregor, Forrester decided that 
the prevailing methods of applying computation to human situations were ineffective. Needing to assimi-
late multidisciplinary data, as varied as “population, economic growth, technology and human aspiration” 
(Kleiner 2008, 157), he rejected the use of hierarchically-structured representations of the data and their 
relationships. “Forrester said he needed a ‘less mechanistic’ way of thinking about his problems. All of 
these various factors were related, and could not be considered apart from each other (Kleiner 2008, 157). 
Proper models must incorporate feedback. More properly, they needed to model “growth and resistance, 





such as Austrian theoretical biologist, Ludwig von Bertalanffy,
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 who sought to match the 
behaviour of biological entities in their designed socio-technical systems. They concluded that “in any 
system involving feedback (which includes all of nature and human activity), influence is cyclical. There is 
no single cause-and-effect; the effect always influenced the cause” (Kleiner 2008, 174). Forrester’s transi-
tion is another example of the use of organism as a metaphor for guiding action under conditions of com-
plexity in the early post-Fordist era. 
In Building 
Another thoughtful exploration of modelling human enterprise on the organic is seen in the work of 
American architect and scholar, Christopher Alexander (1977, 1979, 1980). He specifically objected to 
building being constructed of standardized units, following the industrial model (and the relatively new 
trend of modularization). He developed a popular following in the 1970s and 80s by theorizing and de-
veloping participatory, emergent (versus industrial) building methods. In The Timeless Way of Building 
(1979, 144-147), he explains the non-modular character of organic forms. “‘The character of nature’ is no 
mere poetic metaphor…. Nature is never modular. Nature is full of almost similar units (waves, raindrops, 
blades of grass)--but… no two are ever alike in detail.” In form, elements of the same type follow a few 
invariant patterns. The patterns repeat, but the elements manifesting them are always different, to ac-
commodate variations in their settings. Invariant patterns in always-different settings create the ultimate 
novelty of every element in nature. 
[The result is] a constant play or repetition and variety. [From this play], it 
follows that the overall geometry is always loose and fluid. There is an 
undefinable roughness, a looseness, a relaxedness, which nature always 
has: and this relaxed geometry comes directly from the balance of repeti-
tion and variety. [This relaxed quality is the mark of live entities and re-
veals that] the repetition of patterns is a very different thing from the 
repetition of parts (Alexander 1979, 148-150).  
Alexander attempted to realize these principles of natural growth in his buildings. He and his team identi-
fied and codified the “invariant patterns” of “beautiful” vernacular architecture, as gleaned from 




 Art Kleiner cites L. von Bertalanffy (1950) as an Austrian biologist commonly cited for reinterpreting biological 
processes for social and technical systems design. He developed general systems theory (GST), along with Anatol 
Rapoport, Jay Forrester, Kenneth E. Boulding, William Ross Ashby, Margaret Mead, Gregory Bateson, and others in 
the 1950's. Biological processes transposed into the theory include growth, homeostasis and evolution (Gregory 
Mitchell, 2005). A classic application of these principles in organizations is seen in D. Katz and R. L. Kahn (1966).  
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is that these buildings were built incrementally, in context, and using a small number of simple patterns to 
guide design rather than models, which have a different epistemological function. Many public buildings 
that his team built (such as the University of Oregon campus) were done so with intensive participation by 
future users. They published their research as “a pattern language” for buildings (Alexander, Ishikawa and 
Silverstein 1977) which included instructions for participatory building of structures that ‘grow’ rather than 
are planned. As true of these production methods, “buildings which are alive are fluid and relaxed in their 
geometry” (Alexander 1979, 152).  
In Workplaces 
As Alexander sought “buildings that are alive,” other innovators sought the same quality in workplaces. 
Post-Fordist theorists argued that the corporation is better seen as a live, or organic, entity. The move to flat 
structures, Toyotism and the “quality” movements that emerged from it (as discussed below), and mul-
ti-skilled, self-managing teams, was a way to “enliven” the company. These were responses to growing 
scientific understanding of how life forms grow, not through top-down modelling, but emerging in forms 
responsive to the environment, but from a “genetic code.” Workers were expected to be sensors of the 
corporate body and its environment. Exhortations by the organizational activists for team members to 
constantly monitor “quality” meant they were to reflect the way organisms worked. Rather than wait for the 
summary assessments, quantitative performance analyses performed by the “numbers men” at the ends of 
the shift, the week, or the year, etc., they were to respond on the spot to problems and inefficiencies they 
might identify during the course of their work. They were to act to restore homeostasis to the operation. A 
company should be continually processing information, both internally-derived and acquired through 
multiple points of contact with its environment. Indeed, as management theorists Peters and Waterman 
(1982) explained, the whole company is charged with being a sensing mechanism. 
The need for workers as sensors was one source of the workplace redesign and different hiring practices of 
the period. Although in the 1960s the wholesale “creative” work of “the information society” was only 
nascent, managers began to realize that they required a different kind of worker. In the emerging economy, 
the market face of a product was often more important than its substance. Buyers were now well-supplied 
with functional goods, but they still had to be encouraged to consume. However, whether they were sub-
stantial consumer goods or ideas, entertainment and culture, the essential product bought was the feeling of 
well-being. Many workers were needed for the job of honing consumer subjectivity. They needed to be 
comfortable with high levels of social engagement and imaginative discourse, rather than the technical 
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disciplines (Frank 1997, 26). Of course, the bureaucratic structure of Fordist companies was felt to stifle 
this kind of worker. William H. Whyte (1956) author of The Organization Man, warned that “the most 
deleterious effect of the ‘social ethic’ [of Fordism], was that it inhibited creativity.”
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The virtue of creativity and iconoclasm reached the general public as well. The changes in consumer ad-
vertising ostensibly reflected greater respect for audiences by applauding their independence of thought. 
Fordist advertising had basically touted the functionality of products or assumed consumer naivety in terms 
of the psychological motivators hidden in messages. Recognizing its limitations, managers agitated to 
change the Fordist status quo (Frank 1997, 25-28). However, the new material was doubly crafty, flattering 
consumers over their supposed awareness of the embedded “con” in traditional advertising. In the process, 
they merely inserted a different subliminal message. Marketing campaigns elevated iconoclasm to the 
status of personal virtue, and advertising became ironic. Avis Rent-a-Car’s “We’re number two!” campaign 
is an example. In this contrarian spirit, the CEO of this large corporation published Up the Organization: 
How to Stop the Corporation from Stifling People (Frank 1997, 22).  
In hiring practices, employers too appeared to act against their traditional interests. Reflecting new ideas on 
what was needed in a good worker, employers downgraded the importance of company loyalty and disci-
pline. Now, CEOs and managers wanted employees to reach beyond the boundaries of narrow company 
cultures and job descriptions. They supposedly wanted non-compliance. Managers, like advertisers, val-
orized the “quest after the new, [the] willingness to violate boundaries, and [the] hatred of the old and 
habitual” (Frank 1997, 19-20). In both of these domains of the corporation, we can see the incongruity, if 
not absurdity, of control structures (i.e., corporations, which largely dictate distribution of societal re-
sources) challenging their dependents to (at least symbolically) refuse them fealty. This seems like an effort 
to create bottom-up effervescence by fiat.  
Posthierachy at Work 
Theory Y 
As marketers sought to change attitudes, organizational activists and a small population of economists 
worked to change organizations. According to Vallas (1999), the posthierarchy economists (a subgroup of 
the post-Fordists) pressing for posthierarchical forms in the workplace, took their lead from the organiza-




 Cited in Frank 1997, 21-22 
201 
 
literature” of Douglas McGregor (1960) and Frederick Herzberg (1973) as well as “a dissident strand of 
organizational theory (Burns and Stalker 1962)” (Vallas 1999, 70). The early organizational activists saw 
reducing alienating and enhancing creativity and autonomy for workers as potential contributors to 
productivity. As the rest of this chapter shows, employee empowerment (at least for SAs) continues to be 
presented as a key reason for the teamwork arrangement, whereas at the same time there is also a strong 
argument that it is necessary for companies to profit.  
As we shall see, only some elements of a posthierarchical workplace (as ideally imagined) survive in 
companies, and certainly not the elements that would spell genuine employee power. Despite this, 
posthierarchy is cited by the vast majority of contemporary managers as the essential element of good 
organization. They often claim it to be fully implemented in their companies when this is far from the truth. 
That the posthierarchy thesis is insisted upon in the face of contradiction may imply that this process is still 
under development. However, scholars (Stone 2004) show that posthierarchy is claimed in the present 
against the facts. The idea has an important function in these new organizations, which will be analyzed 
more intensively in the next chapter. I complete this chapter, however, with an account of the implemen-
tation of workplace changes by various job redesigners, while also noting the association of its activists 
with NAS. This account relies heavily on the history by Art Kleiner (2008), who was close to both com-
munities as the restructuring proceeded, having been an editor of the New Age Whole Earth Catalogue 
before he moved more exclusively into examining technology and corporate organizational issues.  
In The Management of Innovation (1961), T. Burns and G.M. Stalker studied organizations systemically, 
thinking about how organizational norms and procedures could bring about specific outcomes. Like sys-
tems designers in general at the time, they consulted the organic models first developed in biology to un-
derstand organizational dynamics. They judged that “organic” models, as distinct from the “mechanical” 
models (i.e., hierarchically-structured bureaucracies), were the source of innovation. In the end, they de-
termined that good organizations exhibited low “hierarchical differentiation” (i.e., flatness), much 
low-level decision-making, high personal feedback to employees, low levels of control by plan and flexible 
production technologies (Hull and Hage 1982, 568). This list of features conforms to considerable degree to 
the characteristics of flat, team-structured workplaces outlined in previous chapters, and suggests a bio-
logical metaphor. High personal feedback makes employees good sensors. Low levels of control by plan 
suggests the use, perhaps, of patterns or rules of thumb, or adherence to scripts, as in genetics. A flexible 
production strategy hints of adaptation to environment, as natural entities grow.  
Of researchers who provided fundamental guidance for altering organizations—i.e., “organizational de-
velopment” (OD) consultants––among the most important are Kurt Lewin, Fred Emery and Eric Trist, who 
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defined “open systems” and practiced “sociotechnical design;” an organizational theorist and educator on 
“the learning organization,” Peter Senge (1994); and long-time consultant and scholar Chris Argyris (Ar-
gyris 1957,1964, 1985). Despite their own innovations, Senge (1994, 50, 237) and Argyris, like Vallas, 
considered the Douglas McGregor’s The Human Side of Enterprise (1960) to be seminal to the new vision 
for organizations. This is the same McGregor whose work on large-scale computer modelling Forrester had 
rejected as too mechanistic. However, McGregor’s lasting influence was in the area of managerial theory 
and training. Indeed, with his mentor in mind, Argyris famously claimed that all organizational develop-
ment was “but a footnote to McGregor.” It is appropriate, therefore, that we begin with his work. 
In the late 1950s, McGregor realized that changes in work organization demanded changes in management 
style  Although the sociotechnical position is that organizational structures influence how people behave, 
he also realized the personal change does not happen smoothly. McGregor believed that the contemporary 
radical innovations in technology should be met with equally radical innovations in human behaviour. 
However, people had to be trained to understand and accept the behaviours that new technologies de-
manded of them. This is why he famously claimed that there needed to be “developments… with respect to 
the human side of enterprise comparable to those that have occurred in technology” (McGregor 1960).  
Accordingly, McGregor sought to define the attitudes and behaviors managers should have in the new 
economy. He revealed that the old and new styles could be distinguished by their contrasting theories as to 
what motivates workers. “Theory X” stood for the old, and “Theory Y,” for the new. Theory X-type 
managers used rules and discipline to control behaviour, and “coerced, supervised, and directed by a hier-
archy of power” (Kleiner 2008, 36). New managers believed that workers were “motivated by progress 
towards an objective, rather than fear or punishment” (Frank 1997, 22). His theory was that employees 
working for the rewards of achievement pushed themselves in the process. Reflecting Maslow’s work, the 
participative strategies that emerged from Theory Y-type attitudes promised to “link improvement in 
managerial competence with the satisfaction of higher-level ego and self-actualization needs” (McGregor 
1985).
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 This approach assumed that employee and employer interests could be aligned, as does the psy-
topia model. 
The first real test of McGregor’s theory, in 1958 at a US Esso plant, is telling in several ways. His job was 
to prevent already-unionized employees from signing on with the much more militant and powerful 
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encing a softer management, workers then voted against joining with the Teamsters. Later, with a change 
back to “a more hard-edged rationalist manager who tried to show immediately how he could squeeze the 
union,” employees reversed direction once again and joined the Teamsters. The failure of the company to 
support the organizational innovation and to continue to training managers in Theory Y methods resulted in 
frustration and failure for McGregor. Similar situations are seen repeated over many decades of OD activity 
and illustrates of key element of the history (Kleiner 2008, 43-45).  
Toyotism 
An early template for work reorganization bears the moniker “Toyotism.” It is also called “Japanese 
management theory.” As defined above, Toyotism importantly emphasizes continuous monitoring of work 
processes by all employees so that “quality” is maintained, rather than relying on after-the-fact analysis by 
specialists.  
In the traditional accounting method of management, company processes were periodically monitored and 
mathematically-assessed against predefined benchmarks, providing abstract information about a health of 
the company. The lack of timeliness of this approach could obviously create risk in a highly-volatile 
business environment. Some Japanese companies, on the other hand, had a history of not aspiring to meet 
targets or benchmarks at all, but of more commonly training employees to look continuously and con-
temporaneously for opportunities to improve company operation, to report to managers or implement 
themselves. This approach was incorporated into Toyotism as the “continuous improvement” (Kleiner 
2008, 284-88) ethos or, as a Japanese expression, Kaizen. 
As a comprehensive program that bears its name, Toyotism was not chiefly the product of that company, 
but of the efforts of an American business consultant in consultation with it. As part of a post-war recon-
struction project, statistician and operations researcher, W. Edwards Deming, went to Japan in the 1950s. 
After watching wartime armies (dys)function, he had concluded in frustration that the “performances” 
metrics they used had nothing to do with effective performance. They would be even less effective in 
corporations after the onset of post-Fordism and its sped-up business demands.  
In Japan, Edwards Deming found the Toyota Corporation to be singularly receptive to his ideas. It had had 
a long history of innovation prior to contact with Edwards Deming. This former loom company had already 
secured worker cooperation with new methods of automobile production (also explored in Scandinavia) by 
offering continuous assured employment in return. All workers were entitled to stop the assembly-line (an 
authority strictly controlled in the US) at their station if they noticed defects or other evidence of dysfunc-
tion. Edwards Deming incorporated this practice as a general principle in his model of Toyotism: all em-
ployees are tasked with improving operations all of the time. He also noticed another practice that was not 
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systematized as part of his program, but infused into its spirit. Toyota engineers had been trained to observe 
operations very closely, quietly and even meditatively, to recognize irregularities that might have negative 
impacts at a later time if not corrected (Kleiner 2008, 287-290). This is an example of insight applied to the 
most industrial aspect of company operations. 
Eventually, other Japanese companies noticed and followed Toyota’s lead. Unfortunately for American car 
companies, it took them till the 1980s, only after the native car industry lost considerable market share to 
Japanese competition, to do so themselves. Then began a flurry of training sessions under Edwards 
Demings’ direction, until his death in 1993 (Voss 1995, 17). From 1981 to 1993, Edwards Deming gave 
250 seminars for US managers (http://www.fr-deming.org/whoised.html). Edwards Deming led the 
American “quality revolution,” with its many restatements and revisions, in programs taking such titles as 
“six sigma,” “planning as learning,” and “open-book management” (Kleiner 2008, 296). Edwards Dem-
ing’s legacy includes “leanness” and “just-in-time” production (an aspect of flatness that discouraged 
companies from holding inventory and encouraged seeking parts and materials only when needed), “con-
tinuous process improvement” and team-work to varying degrees and in a variety of forms. (Just-in-time 
production principles have now spread to the worker as resource. Precarious employment practices free 
managers from having idle human resources to support during periods of low demand.) Many of the general 
features associated with post-Fordist work are elements of the Toyotist package of innovations. However, 
the year of Edwards Deming’s death, 1993, marked the waning of interest in his innovations, “particularly 
in operational quality, excellence and developing people…. Chiefly, the numbers culture had reasserted 
itself” (Kleiner 2008, 297). Production metrics and after-the-fact quality-analysis were restored.  
Companies had been motivated to adopt Toyotism to improve their competitiveness. In its more ideal form, 
Toyotism offered this partly because it enlisted the engaged participation of workers. Because this partic-
ipation required the removal of barriers to such participation, by according certain types of authority to 
these workers, and challenging workers to cooperate in its administration, this feature of Toyotism is cor-
rectly understood as aimed at “employee empowerment.”  
Overall, Edwards Deming’s legacy was a focus on customer interests, workforce empowerment, and 
planning (Stone 2004, 104). In now-familiar language, Edwards Deming recommended “flattening of 
management positions and a shift to cross-functional work teams, widening jobs and instituting “horizontal 
management practices,” involving broadly defined tasks rather than narrowly defined departmental objec-
tives. Finally, he promoted giving ordinary workers more responsibility” (Stone 2004, 104). However, as 
noted, a basic element of Edwards Deming’s fourteen-point scheme [Kleiner 2008, 293], one he considered 
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essential (but never fully realized in any case), the promise of guaranteed employment, was quietly dropped 
from the agenda.  
In labour analyst Katherine Stone’s view, the most radical of his fourteen principals of work reorganization 
was the last: “Put everyone to work to accomplish the transformation” (Stone 2004, 106). This directive 
implies that workers could not be content to perform automatically in their own domains (pejoratively, as 
“bureaucratized” workers) without concerning themselves with the overall picture of company operations. 
They were expected to aid coworkers whenever possible. Accompanied by its necessary context, team-
work, this directive anticipates the devaluation of “professional” or “skilled-worker” status and expertise, 
normally marked by a defined purview or set of responsibilities in a company, beyond which the worker is 
not required to reach. This directive puts a premium on generalized worker engagement. As we have seen, 
these developments undercut worker’s power relative to management that Fordist era labour enjoyed. 
After Toyotist practices and principles moved from Japan to the shop floors of auto-plants and other fac-
tories of the West, they were extended into white-collar settings. Total Quality Management (TQM) is one 
among a range of new programs that follow similar principles to Toyotism and were widely adopted in 
American offices in the 1980s.
 
  
One such program first originated in England. It was promoted in the Tavistock Institute in London. 
Pre-war, this institute was home to post-Freudian psychological research.
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 In 1947, a postgraduate “action 
researcher” at the institute, Eric Trist, began studying teamwork in a British coal mine (Haighmoor) that 
was noted for its productivity and lack of accidents. The unique way of mining at this site was invented by 
the miners themselves, as their mine did not lend itself to the common, “assembly-line” format. With rel-
ative autonomy as they developed their unique method, they responded effectively to the real mining 
conditions they confronted, which is just what Alexander charges builders to do if they want to achieve 
vital, beautiful architecture.  
Exploring forms of organization, Trist also studied Norwegian resistance fighters in World War Two, who 
had practiced keeping hard boundaries around cell activity so as not to expose fighters from other cells if 
members of any one cell were interrogated (Kleiner 2008, 50-51). This is suggestive of contemporary team 




 Wilfrid Bion, who had studied under Melanie Klein, founded the Tavistock Institute, and research here laid the 
groundwork for object-relations psychology (Kleiner 2008, 40). 
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nalized the standard military practice of granting authority and responsibility to enact orders to officers 
close to the site of action without specifying exactly how to do so. This contradicts the understanding of 
military organization as hierarchically-ordered and bound by rules and procedures—which is true of its 
structure and in non-combat conditions. However, within the military model of authority in combat, re-
sponsible decision-making is expected of those tasked with a job.
76
 
From these studies, Trist came to understand the value of consulting and enabling “the grass-roots” when a 
job is to be done. Additionally, as we have seen, this idea also emerges from the organic models consulted 
by systems designers. Trist recognized that these principles are particularly critical when the environment 
in which people act changes often. From his studies, he concluded that “as a business’s environment be-
came more turbulent, top-down hierarchies would cease to be effective—just as they were ineffective amid 
the disorder of nature. [By contrast,] living systems coped with this turbulence by generating their own 
order from the bottom up” (Kleiner 2008, 51).  
Accordingly, Trist and company translated this principle into organizational functioning by having control 
rest with the people closest to the borders of the organization, those in contact with clients and customers. 
They were the last contact, as it were, with the product or service before it reached the customer. Since these 
people had greatest access to customer needs and responses, they should have some authority over how 
these meetings proceeded. This is another form of rationale for flat organization, or, to use earlier language, 
it leaves employees free to be ambassadors for the company enhanced the “sensing” capacity of the team 
and let information flow through it without obstruction. It also explains the rationale of the multi-skilled 
team. Each member is expected to be capable of fulfilling a number of functions if the situation around 
which they have considerable autonomy demands this. In addition, as we know, rendering responsibility 
like this changed what was expected of the managers of teams. Managers are expected to lead teams, not to 
instruct or discipline them, while “making sure the work teams had whatever they needed and coordinating 
information so everyone had a view of the organization as a whole” (Kleiner 2008, 52). 
Trist moved to America and was an important organizational change professional and scholar for many 




 This is simply called the “command tradition,” found in militaries in general. Edwards (1997, 106) explains: “To a 
casual observer military forces, with their strict hierarchies and authoritarian ethos, epitomize a rigid, rule-bound 
bureaucracy (and that is, unquestionably, a well-deserved reputation). Scrutinized more closely, however, traditional 
military hierarchies are anything but mechanical. At every level, individuals bear responsibilities, rather than perform 
functions. A field officer may be ordered to ‘take that hill,’ but the whole point of such an order is that how he carries 
it out is up to him.” 
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an Australian, Fred Emery. They explicitly declared themselves to be using an ecological model of or-
ganization, as they believed that “corporations were analogous to ecosystems” (Kleiner 2008, 51). They 
called their organizational innovations, variously, “industrial democracy,” “open systems,” and “soci-
otechnical systems.”  
Reminding us of the form of the Taylorist model, Kleiner (2008, 51-52) notes that at the time of Emery and 
Trist’s early innovations, “nearly all work was organized as if it were an elaborate machine. Work was 
broken up into disparate, specified tasks. Workers were programmed, through stringent rules and elaborate 
pay scales, to be specialized in those tasks. Expert engineers designed the jobs, set the pace, and inspected 
the products. Workers who followed the rule got pensions. Workers who faltered got disciplined.” The 
alternative vision Emery and Trist had of companies is “the factory as community” (Kleiner 2008, 52).  
National Training Labs 
Early consultants and ideas also emerged from the American east coast, at the National Training Lab 
(NTL), where the theories of Maslow and Fritz Perls
77
 were influential (Alexander 1992, 40). “Group 
dynamics” training sessions were developed by the scholars and trainers who met there. A basic precept of 
these workshops was that group processes helped forge an “authentic self” (Alexander 1992, 40). Unnec-
essary barriers of suspicion, and struggles for power between people could be eliminated. Participants who 
attended these workshops in the first decade (prior to the 1950s) were teachers, academics, social workers, 
and church group members (Kleiner 2008, 32). Through the experiments, these participants found that they 
learned more open patterns of communications over the course of the weeks-long, intensive sessions.  
When they originally set up their lab, researchers had intended to merely study small-group processes (i.e., 
social and communications patterns) by simulating group interactions with volunteering subjects. These 
were to be exercises in “action research,” as originally developed by the Tavistock Institute. As the subjects 
interacted, however, they were emotionally moved by their awareness of being studied. Subjects admitted 
feeling emotionally reborn by revealing themselves to others. Responding to this discovery, researchers 
changed the goal of the workshops. Subjects came to NTL workshops for a form of therapy. Self-revelation 




 Fritz Perls’ Gestalt therapy was also an important discipline there (as well as at the Esalen Institute). “Edwin Nevis 
(2000) described Gestalt therapy as ‘a conceptual and methodological base from which helping professionals can craft 
their practice.’ In the same volume, Joel Latner [Latner 2000] also stated that Gestalt therapy is built upon two central 
ideas: that the most helpful focus of psychotherapy is the experiential present moment, and that everyone is caught in 
webs of relationships; thus, it is only possible to know ourselves against the background of our relationship to the 
other.” “Overview: Gestalt Therapy,” in Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gestalt_therapy 
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a result of effort to maintain a level of status in a social hierarchy. They learned to be intimate with others 
and felt that through this processes they discovered their “true selves.” We see in this the pervasive repu-
diation of persona, of a public face, which is an important feature of the New Age ethos as well.  
NTL activity, such as “T-groups” (transaction-groups) or “encounter-groups,” resonated with the pervasive 
popular belief that psychological ill-health is the result of repression, understood as “keeping secrets.” 
Indeed, the institute, along with the psychology of Fritz Perls and other iconic experimenters of the era, was 
likely a major source of this popular belief. However, participants, many of them psychological profes-
sionals themselves, did not seek to shake off the effects of trauma so they could function “normally.” They 
wanted to overcome “normal” repression and raise the quality of their experience with others to the “vital” 
level.  
The dysfunction they sought to redress was normality itself, i.e., relying on social roles and status positions 
to facilitate social engagement. Accordingly, NTL workshop participants called their activities “therapy for 
normals.”
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 As a result of the workshops, participants found they had gained more fluid and intimate rela-
tions with others. Changes were particularly dramatic amongst people formerly alienated by class, race, or 
roles in bureaucracies. In the process of responding to researchers’ provocations to seek greater intimacy, 
participants discovered that intimate interactions made them feel more personally alive and “real.”  
The project that NTL happened upon seems appropriate in the context of swift social change, where social 
hierarchies were, de facto, being shaken up. Insisting on markers of prestige that have become irrelevant 
due to social change certainly would lead to dysfunctions such as loneliness and depression. The relief of 
throwing off these irrelevancies could understandably bring about a powerful sense of unburdening for 
those doing so. However, there was an important anti-racist thrust to NTL programs and similar initiatives. 




 Wexler (2000, 96-97) puts this orientation in its religious context: “Christianity had assumed that all individuals 
experienced an on-going struggle between body and soul and sought to encourage everyone to suppress the 
promptings of the former in the long-term interests of the latter. Even those secular systems of thought that succeeded 
Christianity had not really departed far from this basic framework of thought, effectively replacing “soul” with “mind” 
and thus also endorsing an ethic of personal self-control and discipline. However, once these systems of belief lost 
their credibility, not only did asceticism lose its rationale, but also constraint and restraint necessarily took on the 
character of repressive and alienating forces. It is in this context that antinomian and anarchist impulses become 
justified as about the ego and social forms become [read] as hindrances to happiness and fulfillment. It is this that 




In another development, motivated by a funding crunch, NTL therapists became facilitators of workplace 
relations. From about 1956, negotiation- and communications skills-teaching came to the fore (Kleiner 
2008, 32-34). The lab was now following the path established by the work-process consultants. In fact, they 
trained many of the latter. The lab’s acolytes were entirely sympathetic with McGregor’s promotion of 
Theory Y personality types as managers for new, reorganized workplaces. Logically, if companies wanted 
to change, they had to alter the basic paradigm, even to the personality type of their managers. The or-
ganizational development consultants who emerged from NTL and eventually spread throughout North 
American industrial regions were skilled “group dynamics” leaders. Managers of companies, now more 
dependent on creativity and innovation for success, sought their services. Consistent with Theory Y values, 
these consultants tried to teach managers new approaches to supervision (to become softer and more par-
ticipatory “leaders”) while they also helped restructure workplaces along the post-Fordist model.  
Cases 
The above are some of the people and principles that prepared the climate for company experiments in 
reorganization for post-Fordism. Several examples of projects, taken from Kleiner and provided below, 
trace typical trajectories of such experiments, while they also indicate the involvement with New Age 
spirituality of some of the key organizational innovators.  
In a review of the change processes that organizational developers enacted in corporation, the most radical 
of them were carried out under the engaged direction of innovative company managers. Several examples 
of plant-wide experiments show how American companies retooled for post-Fordism (and well as how they 
retrenched). The story of a number of plants owned by the personal and household care conglomerate, 
Proctor and Gamble (P&G), is unique in that these plants’ founders invented new organizational forms and 
practices internally (with the initial assistance of Douglas McGregor, and later under the leadership of 
Charles Krone). They implemented them in their new factories, such as in Augusta, Georgia, and Lima, 
Ohio, (in 1963 and 1966, respectively) and kept these practices secret even from the upper managers of the 
multinational, as well as all other potentially-interested parties (Kleiner 2008, 55-60). Low costs, high 
wages and quick responsiveness to market changes continued to characterize P&G’s operations for many 
years after their innovations were implemented. However, despite continuing efforts at renewal over sub-
sequent decades, the company eventually “regressed to the mean” and allowed the most innovative prac-
tices to be abandoned. This tendency is seen again in further examples. 
Charles Krone was one of the first P&G employees to attend NTL workshops (Kleiner 2008, 56). He was 
also a follower of the modern Sufi mystic Gurdjieff, who lived and worked with his acolytes in Paris from 
1920 till his death in 1957. Groups in his worldwide following “practiced and studied self-observation, 
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group mirroring, and reflective dances” (Kleiner 2008, 56). In an anti-Fordist strategy, Krone was noted in 
his work for ignoring rules and schedules. With his innovations, he sought to instill in workers what he had 
acquired in these practices, i.e, that they “give up knee-jerk reactions [to situations,] eliminate the automatic 
learned behaviour or ego-driven responses, [and so discover] their true selves” (Kleiner 2008, 57). 
The social activism of these experimenters is evident. For example, the first of the innovative P&G factories 
was set in Augusta because it was at the centre of American race conflict at the time. Planners hoped new 
team practices could improve race relations, and there is evidence that it did so (Kleiner 2008, 58-60). At 
Augusta, team workers were universally called “technicians,” and spent four hours per week training and 
two hours discussing production problems together. The goal was to increase the scope of everyone’s re-
sponsibilities--learning, for example, marketing, machine design, and point-of-sale issues. No one was to 
be dependent on specialists (Kleiner 2008, 55-59). At Lima, pay rates were determined by how many skills 
a worker had acquired. They were paid enough that they were not tempted to work on their weekends, a 
principled position now actively abandoned by employers. Leadership on a particular project was deter-
mined by whoever was most committed to it (Kleiner 2008, 59-60). 
Before Krone’s influence in the company waned, he had shared his spiritual interests with other corporate 
innovators and their wives. They became “a tightly-knit group of friends during the 1970s, a kind of 
Midwestern Bloomsbury” (Kleiner 2008, 60-61). Along with Gurdjieff’s teachings, they also studied Ti-
betan mysticism and Robert Owen’s transcendentalist New Harmony community. Krone left the company 
when opinion turned against his innovations. He moved to California and spent a number of years con-
sulting and leading NTL-like workshops on both coasts (Kleiner 2008, 58, 81). 
Another plant that stood out was a Gaines dog food plant, a subsidiary of General Foods, in Topeka, 
Kansas. This was “the first major showplace of the postindustrial era” (Kleiner 2008, 68). Plant process 
designers used similar methods to Augusta and Lima, with the result that, through the 1970s and 1980s, 
Topeka was the most productive plant in the General Foods system (Kleiner 2008, 79). Despite this, in 
2001, after this plant changed hands several times, the program was shut down (Kleiner 2008, 81). One of 
the developers, Robert Ketchum had long-since been sidelined into an organizational development de-
partment in the company. His response illustrates how far away such departments were from the possibil-
ities initially imagined. “Its purpose was to help factory managers learn to communicate better. [However,] 
under my system, there wouldn’t be a traditional factory” (Kleiner 2008, 80).  
A final biography I include here is that of Pierre Wack, at Royal Dutch Shell. When the formation of OPEC 
created uncertainty in the refining industry (1973), the company sought Wack’s help. Along with Krone, he 
had a history of experience with Gurdjieff’s practices, and had lived in the principle retreat outside of Paris. 
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He adopted “a lifelong preoccupation with the art of what he called ‘seeing.’ To see [according to Wack, 
which contrasted with analytically observing] meant not merely being aware of an element of your envi-
ronment, but seeing through it, with full consciousness. Wack continued his spiritual explorations in Japan, 
Burma, and Thailand, and studied Japanese garden design” (Kleiner 2008, 134-35). 
To help the company anticipate future conditions, Wack sought out and consulted those he referred to as 
“remarkable people,” generally found outside the company.
79
 Wack’s strategy is an early instance of what 
we see commonly in post-Fordist companies—mythologizing certain consultants or company executives as 
having special insight. (I explained earlier that, if a psytopia is to be made of a company, the corporation 
must somehow be identified as a mystified whole that warrants superior effort on the part of the worker. 
The company CEO, as guru, enhances this myth, or stands in for the corporation.) However, many (un-
heralded) company managers resented Wack’s practices, as, by inference, they themselves were “not re-
markable.” Seeking out “remarkable people” was an affront to Fordist values. “The idea contradicted the 
unwritten axiom of postwar management: that any manager would be ‘remarkable’ enough to step into any 
role” (Kleiner 2008, 141). 
Like Edwards Deming, Wack had found in Japan that companies there did not plan, but worked towards 
“visions” of their futures. An Indian Swami had told him that through insight he could “understand the 
forces behind the vast number-crunching for futures” (Kleiner 2008, 136-138). Certainly, Shell’s managers 
had any amount of the data-analysis available to them. However, Wack found that in the face of new de-
mands from oil-source countries, they could not grasp the nature of the new conditions. “They lacked the 
necessary gut feel for the new world that Mack and Newland were trying to describe. They did not clearly 
see its geopolitics, changing markets and inconstant cultures. And without that gut feel, they could not act” 
(Kleiner 2008, 140-41). Clearly, “gut feel” refers to having an overall vision of a situation—a whole pic-
ture, gained partly from intuition, but also a great deal of knowledge of situations—which would again be 
necessary if the metrics that the company typically relied on had become irrelevant. Wack’s position was 
that if company insiders could not generate that special insight (gut feel), he must find those who could.  
These principles of relying on experience and special insight, whilst downplaying “orthodox” knowledge, 
now frame discussions and justifications for the team format and flat organizational forms, discussed in the 




 This is reminiscent of G. I. Gurdjieff’s title for his second volume of the All and Everything (1950) trilogy, 
“Meetings with Remarkable Men.” 
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ligion, and the reduction of the transformation from society-level to personal level as the new form of its 
millenailism, the nature of the insight demanded is more modest than that of Wack. Now, the understanding 
sought by insight is about “the next big thing,” a development team should pursue. These are often digital 
products that operationalize very basic, even trivial activities, such as a phone “app” that counts the number 
of steps a person walks during the day as a representation of “fitness.” (This is an example is, of course, of 
“mathesizing” one’s own activities so as to better measure oneself.) The ideal of “remarkable men,” which 
may have been more meaningful and potent in Wack’s formulation, is trivialized for team operations.  
Superficially, “valorizing insight” would seem to be incongruously related to the high amounts of da-
ta-collection and processing that Harvey insists is the ultimate determinant of company power. However, as 
I have shown, the former was conceived as a method of proceeding past metrics and information systems 
that may not have been very sophisticated in early post-Fordism, making them uninformative. (The re-
quirement to include hard assumptions in scenario-modelling, such as that the price of oil always hovers 
around a certain value, or rises only slowly, a common presumption before 1973, is an example of a limi-
tation of the predictive technology of the time.) “Computers that learn” is, of course, a way to correct the 
flaw of wrong assumptions. In the next chapter, I review the transition to this forecasting approach.  
Even today, only a subset of companies can afford the highest quality data-analysis. Many may still find 
that the personal insight of gurus is their best chance at understanding their business environment. Kleiner’s 
(2008, 301) observation about this issue supports the assumption. He distinguishes companies that have 
created “sensing” cultures from those that primarily have “numbers” cultures to manage their operations. 
However, as I have argued, these are not dichotomous methods. Rather, they are both devoted to unearthing 
the contents of trends that, because of their opaqueness and complexity under post-Fordist conditions of 
continual transformation, require innovative approaches to identify and understand.   
Posthierarchy Fails   
Kleiner documents decades of effort by a succession of apostles to establish workplace institutions that put 
employees first, by affording them significant authority. However, the products of their painstaking in-
terventions were repeatedly degraded by the actions of, variously, managers and CEOs, apparently stem-
ming from incomprehension, disinterest or hostility to the new practices. Often, but not always, union 
representatives and some workers opposed them, but they protested even more the cases where managers 
overrode workers’ authorized decisions, which they often did (Kleiner 2008, 74). 
Kleiner makes clear that the reason for the constant recapitulation of the same themes by a generation of 
organizational consultants is that most of the efforts of these post-hierarchical activists failed. One of the 
most persistent crusaders, Eric Trist “was mournfully aware [at the end of his career] that the prevailing 
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institutions of his world did not live up to the great destiny he saw for them” (Kleiner 2008, 49). As Ed-
wards Deming had conceived the Toyotist philosophy, it also failed to flourish once translated from Japan 
to North American and other global contexts. This is chiefly through evasion of Edwards Deming’s 
“number-one” precondition for its effectiveness: the assurance of permanent employment for participants. 
Recall that, even before Edwards Deming’s arrival in Japan, Toyota offered secure work as a trade-off to 
encourage employees’ active participation in teamwork. During his practice, Trist also negotiated job 
guarantees, eventually overturned as well (Kleiner 2008, 53). These innovators knew that employee em-
powerment, or genuine engagement, could not be secured without them.  
However, as explained in Chapter Five, responding to the unpredictable economy through flexibility was 
the original impetus behind teamwork and the other features. As post-Fordism advanced, converting 
workers’ tenure in companies from permanent to temporary was yet another strategy to meet the goal of 
flexibility, which followed on the heels of the earlier strategies. Consequently, these early promises of 
security had no material grounding. Moreover, they even contradicted the purposes of the other conditions 
that were to accompany that security.  
According to Kleiner, managers rejected Wack’s methods for lack of nerve (Kleiner 2008, 301). However, 
when such psychological explanations for innovative failure are repeated throughout Kleiner’s text, as they 
are, one assumes he ignores important political-economic realities, such as my suggestion, above, that 
worker insecurity is a structural feature of this economy. In his writing, Kleiner frequently poses dramas 
between innovators and the superiors who suppress their work or ideas. For example, taking P&G’s re-
versal of methods, even in the face of its successes along the parameters of efficiency and productivity, 
Kleiner does not ask whether these parameters are really (or are now) the goals of the corporation. Kleiner’s 
is in fact the narrative form of many organizational textbooks attempting to get “old-school” managerial 
types, who clearly still exist, to respond to post-Fordist requirement for organization and supervision. His 
narrative form (as his title suggests) chronicles the struggles of the renegade hero, whose efforts are con-
tinually rebuffed by the power structure. Because Kleiner does not deeply scrutinize the systemic forces 
that might repeatedly incline managers to revert to traditional organizational structures and management 
styles, his text falls short. It can be grouped with others that agitate for the “true,” as-yet-not-realized, or-
ganizational form, in the many guises revealed earlier. 
Kleiner himself is a proselytizer for posthierarchy in corporations, without taking a hard look at its capitalist 
context. (He was also an early developer of The Whole Earth Catalog, along with Brandt, who we discuss in 
the next chapter, which gives us an idea of his posthierarchical credentials.) Nevertheless, granting these 
limitations, his detailed accounts show that many organizational innovators subordinated corporate objec-
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tives to the goal of liberating workers from oppressive and uninspiring conditions. His account also makes 
clear that much was tried and little succeeded. 
I conclude that, as originally developed to support worker engagement and self-fulfillment, the posthier-
archy catechism might have been coherent with the assurance of job-security backing it. However, 
posthierarchy policies, though attractive, were not convincing to managers as ways to confront business 
unpredictability. Furthermore, to the extent that employee empowerment found its place in their priorities, 
this was only as far as it supported this objective. Even for workers in the heart of a limited posthierarchy 
success story (SAs in still-lucrative work sites) worker empowerment has been a double-edged sword, as 
discussed in Chapters Five and Six. The evidence points to a wavering embrace of posthierarchy practices 
in workplaces, even at the iconic centres of post-Fordist work. Regardless, many workplaces never really 
saw these reforms, and many that did had advances rolled back over time. The short list of sustained in-
novations, below, is a summary of conditions across the American workforce. Despite a long history of 
post-Fordist organizational theorization and experimentation, a “Survey of Employer Provided Training” 
by the US Bureau of Statistics in 1993 (Stone 2004, 114) revealed that a limited number of “work-
er-engagement” practices had survived:  
 Worker teams 
 Total Quality Management 
 Quality circles  
 Employee involvement in technology purchase decisions 
 Job rotation 
 Significant investments in worker training  
This study was followed up five years later, and showed that all (save one) of the practices had doubled its 
rate of implementation over that period (from 1992 to 1997), resting at 55% and 60% rates of use. However, 
team organization (stable at 40%) had not expanded. Stone attributes this to the investment required to 
establish well-functioning teams, including “training in cooperation and teamwork skills.” Since the team 
format carries with it the principle of short-term employment, implying the transience of team members 
after a project has been concluded, employers who developed a compatible team would regard its dis-
memberment as a distinct loss. This suggests a contradiction between two of the signal features of new 
organizations, insecure employment and teamwork. Stone notes that “teams only work when team members 
trust each other—a process that requires multiple repeat interactions between team members. Teams thus 
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rely on the very feature that the new workplace repudiates--long-term attachment of the employee to the 
firm” (Stone 2004, 202).  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I provided a review of the essential theories and practices of changing workplaces, as North 
America moved towards post-Fordism. I provided examples of how these were enabled and enacted. As I 
explained, SAs working in teams in a flat workplace is an organizational form designed to maintain im-
material production that responds to quickly-changing market needs. All significant work innovations, 
including employee self-actualization or empowerment, should be seen, at least partially, as subordinate to 
the purpose of dealing with the uncertainty of the unpredictable economy. The more concrete demands of 
managing businesses under uncertain conditions has led managers and organizational experimenters to-
wards three basic strategies, encouraging insight and seeing the “the big picture,” intensively collecting and 
analyzing environmental data to create holistic visions, and enabling employees to provide to 
on-the-ground input, tacit or experiential knowledge and empowering them to take responsibility with it.  
The last is one reason for the flat organizational form. However, in a complication to post-Fordist ortho-
doxy (following Harvey) I showed that Vallas took issue with the idea that this flat form (i.e., iconic SA 
teamwork model which I described in previous chapters) really is necessarily more efficient and productive. 
Harvey contradicts this when he calls the new economy flexible; he means that many different forms in-
termingle. I showed that, despite post-Fordism’s value as a body of economic thought, scholars debate the 
degree to which post-Fordist macro-economic structures require, for effective engagement in the economy, 
that organizations be posthierarchical. Vallas and Harvey criticize the strict posthierarchy advocates as 
technological determinists, who are, in their analysis, neglectful of social and culture determinants of work 
organization. 
This proviso might suggest that posthierarchy is an ideal but not necessarily effective business strategy for 
many types of businesses. If so, one might ask why. More in accordance with the arguments I have made in 
general in this dissertation—that there is an iconic form of labour that hosts a certain ideology that, in turn, 
spills beyond its boundaries––a major “purpose” of the more properly “posthierarchical” workplaces may 
be to disseminate certain values across all workplaces. Ideals that are drawn from the posthierarchical 
discourse are the possibility of ecstatic labour and the prior necessity of short-term work engagements for 
that ecstacy to be possible. As we have seen, experiences of ecstacy, or at least fun, may be important for 
motivating SAs, but they are not necessary for many other kinds of workers, and assuredly a faint hope for 
them. However, should these workers identify with SAs, they too might internalize the necessity of insecure 
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labour for the (elusive) tradeoff of passion at work. If, through these processes, precarious work lives be-
come normalized, then it is easier to distribute across all forms of work.  
As Harvey argues, and we have seen, the flat form, with teamwork, is far from universally found in com-
panies. Kleiner`s and Stone`s contributions verify this analysis. Though posthierarchy is more ostensive 
than real in post-Fordist companies, it is not normally questioned as an organizational goal. This valoriza-
tion without validation (i.e., enactment) suggests an important ideological function for the posthierarchy 
ethos. Despite managers’ faithlessness in actually implementing (and/or maintaining) these innovations, 
managers nevertheless quote chapter and verse of the posthierarchy catechism when asked. Managers may 
believe what they have been told by organizational theorists and HR professionals, but often resist fully-flat 
work-teams. On the other hand, pure posthierarchy may not in fact be an effective business strategy in many 
cases. Whichever is true, we know that the idea of posthierarchy is highly persistent within managerial 
circles despite its sketchy implementation.  
One such function appears to be that this organizational form is considered essential for employee em-
powerment. The two factors have been tied together at the outset. Indeed, one may stand in for the other in 
the corporate imagination. The association of posthierarchy with employee-empowerment motivated or-
ganizational activists, from Burns and Stalker, through Edwards Deming, McGregor, Argyris and the rest to 
pursue the former for the sake of the latter. They either tacitly assumed or argued for the intertwined nature 
of posthierarchical organizational forms and employee empowerment. This assumption of the intertwined 
nature of the two terms seems also to explain the difficulty that industry literature has over identifying the 
purposes of spirituality in workplaces—as to whether this is for the employees’ or the company’s benefit 
(which we saw in Chapter Four). 
The post-Fordist organizational innovations explained above took place at the same time as the New Age 
emerged. Many of the basic pursuits of the organizational developers are similar to those of New Agers, 
including principally, creating organic models of social relations, where power rests at the grass-roots 
levels of associations, and creating a holistic vision of one`s personal situation. The goal of personal em-
powerment is basic to the NAS culture as well. The New Age movement and organizational innovators 
were also co-located, with a concentration on the California coast. In fact, there was overlap in their ide-
ological sources, particularly the human potential movement and transpersonal practices. This further 
supports the argument that the counterculture and New Agers consciously supported the thinking of in-
novators in high-tech organizational structures. That they did so is confirmed (at least) by their engagement 
with the philosophy and work of Schumacher.  
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In the next chapter, I illustrate a convergence similar to the way that managers associate flat organization 
with empowerment, but generally broadened to the level of social organization. The network cosmology I 
consider is more appropriately seen as a worldview than an organizational principle. Yet we can see the 
latter (the organizational form) relying on the former (the cosmology) for its imaginative sense. The net-
work cosmology is a generalization to the level of society of the drive to posthierachy in organizations, 
which itself is more amorphous and yet more narrowly grounded. The ideologists of net culture essentially 
propose that society itself should be organized in a network form, obviating the need for people to be 
governed as members of groups.  
The community of focus in this next chapter is the melange of New Agers, counterculturalists, computer 
hackers, neopagans, and the SA employees of the Southern California coastal industries, in the Silicon 
Valley high-technology and Hollywood global film industries. I explained in the last chapter the potential 
for SAs to influence broadly, and the next chapter shows how this is an actuality. The Silicon Valley SAs 
are globally powerful, and they took the lead in defining SA culture in general. They developed an ideology 
for the Net Age. As the cosmology extends beyond their immediate community, it promotes the industries 
that employ them and advances their own wealth. Although it is a technologically-defined cosmology it has 
features very similar to the neospiritual worldview, as illustrated in the tables in Chapter One.   
According to this worldview, governments are stodgy, wasteful and authoritarian. (So are regressive, 
Fordist corporations.) Governments are held to be deficient partially because they function through hier-
archical or bureaucratic structures. They are presented as the oppressors from which a network society 
would liberate us. In reality, governments are also tax-collectors. California SAs, with their generally high 
salaries, have good reason to fear that function. In implicitly denigrating the activities of governments 
through their network cosmology, they also advance their own wealth and power, along with those of their 
employers. These ideas come to us in the form of the Californian ideology (Barbrook and Cameron 1997), 
another characterization of SA culture that I discuss in the next chapter. This construct adds nuance to the 
network cosmology vision. Its theoreticians show that reviling governments and their hierarchical struc-
tures serves to resolve the central contradiction of post-Fordist SA consciousness: they emerged from an 
anti-capitalist counterculture yet are completely dependent on the market because of the nature of 
post-Fordist industries in which they prosper and at whose worldwide centre they essentially reside. War-
iness of governments (stemming from two completely different sentiments) is the ideological common 
ground that unites both the right and left-leaning political impulses that California-based SAs must harbour 
and continuously reconcile if they are to function in their work milieu. If we can get at the heart of how it 




The outcomes of the campaigns to restructure workplaces and recondition workers (and managers), shows 
that the ideal of posthierarchy at work, implemented in the form of flat organizations, has been accompa-
nied with a number of degradations of the quality of workers’ lives, which include job insecurity and greater 
intensity of work. Now, worker empowerment is firmly married to insecure employment policies and 
high-pressure work that creates “burnout,” which sometimes forces employees to quit in order to recover. 
As we recall, these insecure conditions contrast sharply with what was proposed in the original posthier-
archy model developed in Japan with the help of Edwards Deming. Edwards Deming insisted upon em-
ployment security for workers as a precondition for his program, which evolved into Toyotism. 
Workers now lack the original Fordist rewards of security, increasing remuneration and a career path. In-
tensity and precarity tend to mitigate the quality of employee autonomy or empowerment that the ideal of 
flatness promotes and indeed implements to a degree for particular workers. Hence, the claim to empower 
workers via flat organizational structure is dubious or, at best, qualified and equivocal. I have explained that 
empowerment is not real for employees who are chronically threatened with loss of employment. However, 
the “flat” employment structure institutes this threat for workers.The discourse around flat organizations 
claims it promote employee power, but the organizational form provides little of its substance because the 
discourse does not look beyond the confines of the workplace.  
In this situation, requiring commitment without the reciprocal loyalty of the company that Edwards Deming 
demanded creates a problem for employers trying to secure worker engagement. This dilemma points 
squarely at the need for considerable employee indoctrination to secure participation, and the pervasive 
ideology of posthierarchy (erroneously equated with democracy) in companies (either that it already exists 
in workplaces or is just around the corner) is an element of this indoctrination. I have already reviewed 
aspects of this indoctrination at work, especially as it applies to transforming corporation into psytopias, 
and will consider the issue further in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Eight: The Net Age 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I consider the value-system of new-economy workers as an inheritance of their cultural 
forebears––American West Coast software and media producers of early post-Fordism who intermingled 
with New Agers and other members of the local counter-culture. Especially the software workers were 
incubated within a heady mix of New Agers, alternate communards, technology enthusiasts, celebrators of 
alternate consciousness (including through drug use) and aspirants to “interesting work.” At the heart of the 
digital “new economy” as they were, they were also shaped by the signal events and cultural Geist in which 
their lives were embedded. Over time, the participants within this milieu who mastered the new tools be-
came the workers of post-Fordist high-technology capitalism, as well as its consummate expression. Im-
mediately below, I explore this interaction of populations from the work and technology milieu and the 
New Age. I show that many new workers in the vanguard post-Fordist jobs, Silicon-Valley high-tech 
workers, had New Age beliefs and engaged in New Age practices, as they also embraced a network cos-
mology and the digital world in general. These compound loyalties continued. I consult Erik Davis’s, 
Techgnosis, to show that beliefs in posthierarchy, holism and self-actualization are fundamental not only to 
the early neospiritual’s worldview, but also to those of the workers and managers who matured along with 
them.  
I show in this chapter that the commitment to posthierarchy in workplaces now appears in a technological 
guise, with social relations modeled on the network. Since network dynamics are considered to be intrin-
sically “levelling,” they work out the posthierarchical society. They are seen as an instrumentalization of 
the democratic process. They not only reduce the social need for the traditional electoral apparatus, but even 
for governmental activity per se. Therefore, those living their lives through network relations can pursue 
their personal interests without concern for their former commitments to political activism. 
This identification of network relations with the automatic emergence of a just social order creates the basis 
for mythologizing both the Internet itself and net-related work. I will discuss this mythologization, below, 
in the forms of a “hacker ethic” (Pekka Himanen 2010), a “network cosmology” (Fisher’s 2010), “dataism” 
(Hariri 2015) and “the Californian ideology” (Barbrook and Cameron 1995). As worldviews, each of these 
describes similar dynamics of identity construction, in the face of a commonly-defined contradiction ex-
perienced by workers engaged in iconic post-Fordist industries. They all define collective relations as a 
product of network dynamics, using slightly-different characterizations of the problem, and solutions.  
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These versions of the culture of SA workers are ingredients to the mode of regulation of post-Fordism. To 
remind the reader, a mode of regulation is the “ideas and bodies of knowledge, everyday life experiences, 
and the conceptions of the individual in a social era” (Fisher 2010, 20–21) that complement the specific 
structure of an economy therein. The social habits, institutions and conventions work to support economies; 
practical, social and cultural life behaviours are institutionally integrated, and they in turn support the way a 
society provides itself with material goods. That way, the economy, is referred to as the regime of accu-
mulation. Hence, following regulation theory, we can assert that the worldviews I reveal here somehow 
support the post-Fordist regime of accumulation. In the earlier discussion about the mutual determination of 
the material and ideal ingredients in a social order, I discussed the debates over which of the culture or 
economic factorsl dominates in historical change processes, leaving the question unanswered at the con-
clusion of that section (as in this dissertation). Nevertheless, regulation theory posits a correspondence. 
Accordingly, the representations of worker cosmologies I present in this chapter are models of an ideology 
of SA workers but, as they were created by individuals they emphasize different aspects of the worker 
ideology. On the other hand, especially with the interpretation I put on them to show their similities, these 
models roughly conform to each other in terms of certain principles. In the same way, I have argued that 
neospirituality, which has a strong presence in these worksites, exhibits belief-structures similar to them. I 
have hypothesized that neospirituality is, equally, a component the post-Fordist mode of regulation. A 
purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the explicit ideas about the nature of the world that engage iconic 
post-Fordist workers, SAs. This allows me to complete the comparison of the explicit SA worldview and 
show their parallel character to neospiritual views of the world.  
Counterculture and New Agers Adopt the Digital 
Nearly all characterizations of the post-Fordist worker that have risen to prominence in the last generation, 
regardless of the particular sector they address, emphasize mastery of new technologies for work. Prior to 
this period, Fordist industrial technologies were also celebrated. However, they produced marvels of 
mass-production and dramatic achievements such as sending rockets to the moon, nuclear power, inter-
continental transportation, common utilities, and other massively-funded and often government-directed 
endeavors. Because they are centred on the digital, post-Fordist technologies are different, or so it is 
claimed. Models of socializing, working, society and economy based on the computer network have be-
come ubiquitous, globally. The digital has excited interest and involvement well beyond the ranks of its true 
adepts, becoming part of popular culture. It has excited such adulation that it can be said ICTs (information 
and communication technologies) have become profoundly mythologized (Mosco 2004). 
However, this contemporary love of technology occurred only over a period of time and through several 
steps. In the earliest days of the counterculture, “technology” generally referred to the large-scale enter-
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prises described above. It was understood as integral to the Fordist power structure, and provoked consid-
erable hostility. Similarly, all workplaces were identified with the bureaucratized global corporations or 
heavy-industry’s assembly-lines. Criticism of the Fordist stifling of human creativity was widespread, as 
we have seen. However, having been guided since the early 1960s by the founders of humanistic psy-
chology, Rogers and Maslow (Carrette 2007, 165), many thought that work (and machines used for it, if 
any) should serve the self-actualization needs of individuals. Technology, and the bureaucracy that orga-
nized it, were felt to inhibit the free exploration of the self through work and to mean subordinating oneself 
to “the machine.” The paradigmatic Fordist forms of labour were, in the managerial office, “the organiza-
tion man” and, on the factory assembly line, “the mass worker.” The critique of instrumental rationality 
(considered the mode of operation of both bureaucracies and “industrial society”), was popularly trans-
mitted through Herbert Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man (1964) and levelled at many different situations 
in contemporary life, including work. Work represses the human spirit, so must be eliminated or changed 
(Campbell 2007, 291-98). 
More generally, critics of Fordism included scholarly and political Marxists, members of the “New Left,” 
New Age activists, humanists, and posthierarchy advocates, to describe some of the constituent groups of 
the counterculture. Some of these we considered in the preceding chapter. Activists articulated the public’s 
offence at being transformed from citizens into “statistics,” through its integration into the grand post-war 
infrastructure and social-management schemes, which were also the target of E.F. Schumacher (1973, 1977 
and 1979). Consistent with this were the organizational activists’ attempts to redirect managers towards 
quality work-design and away from the running of corporations “by the numbers”—the periodic quantita-
tive assessments and other statistical practices we discussed in the previous chapter. In the context of 
Schumacher’s (1973) “small is beautiful” critique, and new insight on ecological issues, particularly from 
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962), the impacts of industrial technology on the natural world added to 
concerns. Additionally, wide attention to the Club of Rome’s The Limits to Growth (Meadows, et al 1972) 
transmitted a new fear of global overpopulation if the industrial model persisted. 
Opponents of the status quo raised their voices, but they also formed “alternate” communities. These were 
organizational and social experiments, often with ecological concerns prioritized. Some were entirely 
secular, whereas others featured religious practices derived from foreign or native, and sometimes Chris-
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tian, religious traditions. Communes and retreats organized around new religious ideas and practices were 
not highly distinguishable from those formed around the other types of alternate practices.
80
  
As technology was broadly considered the vehicle for perpetrating many social ills, those seeking “alternate 
lifestyles” usually experimented with technologies, in their newly-designed lives. Terms such as “alternate 
technology,” and “appropriate technology” named what emerged. Often, tools from another era were 
re-adopted. Alternatively new ones were invented. As a basic standard, they were hoped to be solutions that 
could be built, disseminated and used independent of market systems. Technology theorist, Ursula Franklin 
(1990), calls these “holistic” technologies. They were to be free of the industrial model in their production, 
so they did not reinforce industrial structures (Hull 1992, 137).
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However, despite the counterculture’s endemic suspicion of “technology,” from the earliest days of per-
sonal computers (PCs), large swaths of its technologically-adept users have believed in the general eman-
cipatory power of these devices. Even prior to the PC’s invention, those who could gain access to university 
resources had explored computerized interconnectivity using the mainframe computers on campuses.
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Users marveled at the new “bottom-up,” “organic,” and reciprocal communications patterns enabled, as 
well as the evidence that circumventing authority structures was possible through them. This was rather 
ironic, since corporations and the military had developed the computer and the embryonic Internet they 
were using.
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 Even with this knowledge, however, users believed that computation could be wrested from 
the grasp of the military-industrial complex (as provisional evidence, indeed, suggested). Although the idea 
that any technology could function separate from capitalism was contested, high hopes were held for digital 




 One way that ecological issues were associated with religion was through the revival of interest in and 
re-mythologization of historical Christian figures believed to have represented the connection of God to nature. An 
example is the 12
th
-century abbess Hildegard of Bingen, who “saw the Earth as vibrantly alive with God. The Holy 
Spirit to her was greening power and Christ was greenness incarnate”
 
(Hull 1992, 128). Early and iconic examples of 
intermingling religious and ecological (and other) concerns are Stephen Gaskin’s The Farm, in the United States, and 
in Scotland, the Findhorn community. The latter has been called, along with Esalen, a Mother Church of the New Age
 
(Hull 1992, 127). Other such centers are discussed in Pike (2004, 81, 152) and York (1995, 35).  
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 For a Canadian example, see the Canadian Renewable Energy News, published from 1975 to 1979, in Ottawa, 
Ontario. 
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 They took advantage of the time-shared computer, introduced by JCR Licklider at the US military’s Advanced 
Research Project Agency (ARPA) to develop the internet (Edwards 1997, 260). 
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 “The IBM corporation only built the first programmable digital computer after it was requested to do so by the US 
Defense Department during the Korean War…  For the first twenty years of its existence, the Net’s development was 
almost completely dependent on the much reviled American federal government. Whether via the US military or 
through the universities, large amounts of tax payers’ dollars went into building the Net infrastructure and subsidizing 
the cost of using its services”  (Barbrook and Cameron 1995, 7-8). 
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Both the communal experiments and exploration of digital technologies aimed at securing ways to work 
around traditional social and political structures. Initially, highly-motivated individuals (“hobbyists” or 
“hackers”) built personal computers and learned to program them. Using them as communications devices, 
i.e., connecting them up via telecommunications, was always part of the project. For the first time in his-
tory, so it was believed, networking with computers would enable individuals to communicate with each 
other (and build communities) with the assistance of technology but without the intermediation of a cor-
porate entity, be it the state or a corporation. (Indeed, the Internet is the quintessential work-around tech-
nology. After all, the US military had designed its precursor, the Arpanet, to allow for alternative com-
munications routes if main communications lines were cut by enemies.) Because of their radical novelty 
and the demonstrated fact that small groups and individuals could powerfully shape their capabilities, 
computers offered a more substantial or valid scaffolding for these hopes than had traditional tools. With 
public imagination primed to believe in the right tools, there was little to hold back those involved from 
mythologizing the digital technologies they mastered, by exaggerating their contrast to the heavy industrial 
technologies and projects of Fordism. 
Barbrook and Cameron (1995, 9) offer an underlying reason for resorting to these experiments with al-
ternate communes and technology that differs from the motives stated. Like many other scholars, they think 
that “the workaround ethos” is a compromise offered to a failed political movement; a failure “of renewal in 
the USA during the late ‘60s and early 70’s[, because] the hippies and their allies in the black civil rights 
movement were… crushed by a combination of state repression and cultural co-option.” This idea is dis-
cussed further below. 
In his From Counterculture to Cyberculture: Stewart Brand, the Whole Earth Network, and the Rise of 
Digital Utopianism (2006), Fred Turner argues that counterculture and cyberculture were at origin insep-
arable, and that the latter grew from the former. Turner’s account revolves around the figure of Stewart 
Brand, creator of the iconic countercultural document, The Whole Earth Catalog (published from 
1968-1972), which became the bible for hippie communes, back-to-the-landers, organic gardeners, and 
do-it-yourself, millennialist survivalists. It became an integral part of a broadly defined “New Age 
movement.” Soon after publishing The Last Whole Earth Catalog, Brand started to write about the com-
puter scene, and helped create the The Whole Earth Software Catalog. In 1985, he became a founder of “the 
WELL” — The Whole Earth ’Lectronic Link — a pioneering online community, which John Perry Barlow 
(1990) (a former lyricist for the Grateful Dead), called “the latest thing in frontier villages.” The WELL 
proved to be a forerunner of the hip digerati culture that would soon cluster around Wired, whose most 
famous editor, Kevin Kelly, had also worked on the Whole Earth Catalogue. We will discuss his critical 
involvement in more detail below.  
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Marking himself as a crossover figure in many ways, Brand moved on again, to become a pri-
vate-conference organizer. In 1988, he co-founded the Global Business Network (GBN) for corporate 
futurists and strategists. GBN is a “New Age think tank…, underwritten by major companies like AT&T, 
Volvo, Nissan and Inland Steel” (Carette and King 2005, 133). Brand’s trajectory can be taken as para-
digmatic of the gradual integration of baby-boom counterculturalists into the social system they had re-
jected in their youth.  
However, if Turner hangs his study on Brand’s career, it is underpinned by a broader analysis. He suggests 
that although the countercultural movements of the 1960s initially rejected computers as instruments of the 
militarist and corporate society they sought to transform, the scientific discourse around computers sparked 
their interest and initiated a turnaround in their anti-technological stance. Activists felt an affinity with 
some computer theorists based on apparent commonalities of worldview. As I have noted, the cybernetics 
thought of early computer scientists, such as Norbert Wiener, had profound similarities with the organic 
holism—“everything is connected,” “it’s all one”—that characterized New Age counterculturalism. Many 
developers of cybernetics or systems theory (seminally, Ludwig von Bertalanffy [1950]) took guidance 
from the principles of organic wholeness emerging from biology at the time. Gregory Bateson (2000), who 
developed a brand of systems/information theory based on biology, was an iconic countercultural figure.  
As Turner points out, cyberneticists proposed that humans and machines alike could be seen as entities 
through which information flowed in interconnected systems. Although cyberneticists might start from the 
technological side of these interconnected systems and counterculturalists from the organic, they could 
meet in the concept of systemic cosmos in which natural and human worlds flowed in and out of each other, 
and from which new possibilities and entities could emerge. This cybernetic-holism is conceived of as more 
or less ontologically horizontal or “flat,” a system of interconnected fluidity. Although cybernetic (and 
biological) models recognize different registers or levels (spiralling up to higher-level organisms with more 
power and complexity), signals at the borders are absorbed by the larger whole, and have major or minor 
implications at other levels, depending on whether, as Bateson (2000) states it, applying information theory 
to biological processes, they are “differences that make a difference.”  
Early developers of the nascent internet latched onto this idea of modelling social life on these cybernet-
ic-biological models. The models served as a basis for their theories of network relations as holistic pro-
cesses, through which they argued that a number of spontaneous, low-level interventions (i.e., participa-
tion) of many users could somehow create order, or “a polity.” This idea compares well to neospiritual 
holism: like organic system dynamics, participation in a number of different esoteric pursuits by a number 
of individuals creates a strengthened whole that is more than the sum of its parts (as well as, somehow, an 
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authentic representation of the parts). Once Brand had interpreted network relations as supports for coun-
tercultural values, such as organic participation and personal self-actualization, he surprised many Whole 
Earth Catalogue readers with his enthusiastic embrace of the personal computer. It was not, however, as 
anomalous a choice as they supposed. Rather, he was following a coherent intellectual trajectory that fused 
countercultural and cybernetic thought into a posthierarchical vision. 
Following from these similarities, the early experiments with networks and new communications tech-
nologies were widely informed by countercultural values, and in some quarters, mystical beliefs. The 
world’s population was imagined as a “global village” (McLuhan, 1966). The World Symposium on Hu-
manity, simultaneously convened in Toronto, Los Angeles and London, U.K. from April 7-14,
 
1979, was an 
early experiment with this principle in mind. At the event, keynote speakers, Canadian communications 
theorist Marshall McLuhan, American visionary designer Buckminster Fuller, and a third figure from 
London, convened a global conference from their native cities, via satellites used for perhaps the first time 
in this way. The schedule of presenters over the three-day event was a “who’s who” of important social 
critics, artists and countercultural and New Age figures. R.D. Liang, Carl Rogers, Dick Gregory, John 
Denver, Ralph Nader, Joseph Campbell, Michio Kushi, Elizabeth Kubler-Ross, and Marcel Marceau pre-
sented on the first day alone. Participants also had opportunities in each city to explore religiously-tinged 
(New Age and paganistic) rituals and practices with, for example, a session of “Rajneesh Meditation” and a 
“Living Earth Seminar” on the agenda in Toronto.
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Throughout the weekend, the imperfectly-functioning satellite technology nevertheless enabled real-time 
shared meetings across three global cities.  Among other novelties, this event was an innovative explora-
tion of networking culture. Presciently anticipating online “social media,” conference organizers enlisted 
volunteers in many cities to promote the event in advance, through informal means. Small groups studied 
conference themes and expanded their reach through a conscious-raising format; they followed a “viral” 
communications model. In the end, the symposium seemed to be a milestone in igniting a burgeoning, 





 See advertisment: Yoga Journal, Sept/Oct 1978; See partial event program at  
www.curezone.org/blogs/fm.asp?i=1260067; See review of event at Notre Dame University Student Press, 1979; See 
25
th
 Anniversary notice at www.worldtrans.org/index.html.   
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Humanistic Critique Supersedes Social Critique 
Increasingly, computer-communications devices were seen as “appropriate technologies.” They began to 
preoccupy those who hoped to transform society.
85
 New technologies offered hope for a non-violent (i.e., 
evolutionary, not revolutionary) way of changing society. At least since the Kent State University killing of 
four students protesting American involvement in Vietnam by the American National Guard (May 4, 1970), 
many American youth saw confrontational politics as ineffectual (and dangerous). They chose instead to 
step aside from direct conflict with authorities and build new forms of action and other innovative structures 
for positive change. They experimented with “non-materially dependent life-styles, consensus deci-
sion-making, nonhierarchical forms of leadership, self-responsible health care, economic cooperatives, and 
a variety of efforts in both rural and urban settings to heal the environment by emphasizing the importance 
of organic gardening, urban permaculture, the protection of regional biosystems and ‘living lightly,’ all 
with a mandate to ‘think globally, and act locally’” (Hull 1992, 123). As I noted, instead of confronting 
authority, they wanted to “work around’ it (Barbrook and Cameron 1995, 3-4; Pike 2004, 77). 
Coming as they did out of the politically-active counterculture, the proselytizers for a net-based social order 
had begun their crusades strongly opposed to capitalism per se. After being incorporated into capitalist 
operations, their self-definition as renegades became more problematic. “Hackers” have mostly curtailed 
their earlier activity of vilifying capitalizers of computer and network technologies, as they formerly had; 
an example target is Microsoft founder and iconic former hacker, Bill Gates, in the early stages of com-
modification of their industry. They have had to acknowledge that the engine behind technological de-
velopment is capitalism. In slightly cloaked language, in The Hacker Ethic, definer of hacker culture 
Himanen (2010) laments the difference between what many of the hackers, including Kelly, had hoped for, 
and what they settled on. The values of the hacker ethic according to Himanen are, now, passion for a 
project and the freedom to pursue it; the subordination of profit-seeking to the social worth of a project and 
its openness, defined as that which “helps” and impresses their peers; caring, defined as “complete freedom 
of expression in action;” privacy, to protect the creation of an individual lifestyle; a rejection of passive 
receptiveness in favor of active pursuit of one’s passion; and creativity (Himanen 2010, 139-141). Note that 




 Belief communities reach beyond the thinking of technophiles, postindustrialists, and alternate society activists as 
sources, to include also many postmodern communications theorists. They “uphold the emancipatory potential of this 
information transformation: liberation from grand narrative, from essentialist and authoritarian bodies of knowledge 
about the world” (Fisher 2010, 16). 
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Although his entire treatise can be seen as a rationalization of an abandoned political project, Himanen 
particularly stumbles over one element of hacker culture as he discusses it––that of profit- and copy-
right-seeking. His awkward discussion reflects hackers’ lack of resolution of this issue. He notes that 
formerly-unpaid hackers are now accepting money for, patenting, and even getting very rich from their 
work. Now, the word “free” in the expression “free software” is not to be understood as meaning “without 
charge.” Himanen (2010, 59) explains that now, when Richard Stallman, “‘the spiritual father’ of 
open-source companies, uses the word ‘free,’ it is in the sense of ‘free speech,’ not ‘free beer.’” 
I attribute Himanen’s ambivalence to the fact that hackers have actually abandoned their original, critical 
stance against capitalism and the privatization of information. Since hackers’ skills continue to drive 
economies, making them highly employable, they cannot insist upon their anti-privatization message. 
However, their self-identity depends on seeing themselves as dissident or anti-authoritarian. Accordingly, 
out of deference to this cultural heritage, they must continue some kind of critical posture, once substan-
tially honed against capitalism in general. As a substitute, hostility has been deflected to something ancil-
lary to capitalism itself, which are the Fordist modes of technology, organization and work. We saw in the 
last chapter that vitriol against Taylorism, a signal of the posthierarchy ethos, is shared by corporate 
managers far and wide. However, what we saw there as a management ideology also applies to software 
workers and their familiars. Hackers have taken up the posthierarchy ethos, too. It is not actually a politi-
cally dissident position, at least in the manifestations discussed in this dissertation, despite the pretensions 
of hackers to be so. 
The practical common target that emerges from this discourse is distrust of government, which qualifies it 
as a pure neoliberal (although often presented as “anarchic”) code. Governmental surveillance and da-
ta-gathering are considered the chief threat. At the same time, the vast amounts of data collected and sold to 
advertisers by online companies are strategically elided from the discussion (Diebert, 2013). Yet, the as-
pirations of these companies are well-known. Mark Zuckerberg, the CEO of Facebook, which towers in 
size over any competitor, is on record as pressing for Facebook to become the internet for most users 
worldwide (which would give him complete control over the market data generated). It is awareness of this 
project of completely commodifying the Internet that lead the Indian government to refuse Facebook’s 
offer of free “starter Internet” services for the entire nation, since they had to be set within Facebook. Indian 
activists who recognized the threat to an open Internet successfully blocked the deal. Meanwhile, world-
wide, Google aspires to replace governmental programs almost entirely with cheap, computer-based private 
services, collectively known as the “sharing economy,” that bear only the marginal costs of keeping them 
running. (The losers are the ill-paid entrepreneurs who mount them and public infrastructure and service 
maintenance.) Branches of the Uber ride-sharing operation that Google sponsors regularly flout municipal 
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regulations whose purposes include city revenue and the protection of taxi-services. (Interview, Ira Basin, 
The Current, Feb 16, 2016, CBC Radio One). 
It is typical for outsider groups to redefine themselves when they become insiders and to soften the ideo-
logical elements of their self-presentation that are most likely to offend. I argue here that hackers did this 
when they shifted their critical censure from the capitalist commodification of knowledge to Fordist bu-
reaucratic structures. I do not suggest that Himanen is entirely reconciled to the dependency of software 
development on capitalist enterprise. For one, he includes a strong plea that employed hackers be allowed 
more choice over which products they develop, and such a concession (as unlikely at it is to be granted) 
could be considered a victory against their dictation by the dollar. Overall, however, the purpose of his 
treatise seems like an attempt to gain a more secure professional status for ITC workers. We can see this by 
virtue of his comparison of their work with university professors, agitating for their working conditions, 
such as peer reviews of their work and tenure in their jobs. A theme of this book is greater autonomy for 
these developers. 
The early community of net activists exploring new digital communications tools shared the posthierar-
chical aspirations with the alternate communities and commonly participated in projects directed that way. 
The hacker community not only engaged in new alternate lifestyles and religious experiments, but used 
their skills to contribute to these lifestyles. As noted, they certainly agreed with the counterculture’s 
judgement that prevailing industrial forms were unproductive. And “productivity,” in a broad sense, has 
always been an interest of appropriate technologists. As much as peace (in relation to the Vietnam War, for 
example) this is what these experimenters sought. They believed that people who lived the Fordist lifestyle 
were unproductive, not only at their work, but in their lives in general. This unproductivity was thought to 
be an outcome of hierarchical decision-making processes in organizations. 
As the “normal” computer changed from the mainframe housed in the corporate headquarters to the more 
accessible PC, and as more and more people sought creative and fulfilling jobs, computers promised to 
offer help in achieving these conditions. Although people continued to agree that industrial technology 
(though, less often, its capitalist use) was alienating, they hoped that the new technology might be other-
wise. Therefore, a domesticated political activism intermingled with ideas of workplace transformation in 
early hacking communities (Pike 2004, 75-78).  
Throughout these developments, as I have argued, the new digital worker community continued to refer 
back to the New Age and countercultural milieus it emerged from, responding to the idea of posthierarchy 
as a touchstone. Digital experimentation and development provided practical efficacy to the ideas of the 
counterculture, and New Age. Although over time some differentiation of these communities occurred, I 
229 
 
argue that it was not complete. We will see below that, in addition to the historical intermixing of New Age, 
new technology and work ideas, there are communities in which these influences are little distinguished, 
even after the formation of the software industries and the commodification of the personal computer and 
the Internet. 
New Age and the Digital as the New Edge 
The intermixture of psychedelic, New Age and new technology cultures did not end with the early days of 
Silicon-Valley industries. In Techgnosis: Myth, Magic and Mysticism in the Age of Information (1998), 
Erik Davis sees the mythologizing of digital technologies as an element in the pursuit of techgnosis, an 
integration of new technology and a new religiosity, which he calls “gnostic,” a process that occurred as 
counterculturalists made the transition from the strong condemnation of technology in its industrial form to 
celebration of the digital. Michael York (1995, 102, 322) would support Davis that the New Age sensibility 
is essentially “gnostic,” based on its belief in an individual spiritual self who exists prior to social institu-
tions, organized religion, and, indeed, “creation.” As explained in Chapter Two, Hanegraaff (1996) would 
disagree with this assessment of the New Age as gnostic because, in its weak, this-worldly mysticism, the 
New Age values a level of societal engagement. However, even though Davis and York might have ex-
aggerated its world-rejection, if we see the world they reject as the Fordist one, where social status and 
formal roles are very important (which is what they reject), the application of the gnostic label may be 
reasonably appropriate.  
Davis explores the popular and religious versions of changing visions of technology, from its Fordist 
presentation as oppressive to its digital form, which is celebrated. In language reflecting the Romantic and 
de-materializing aspirations for this technology, he claims the change to be a fusion of the “Gnostic flight 
from the heaviness and torpor of the material earth [and] a transition from the laboring body into the symbol 
possessing mind” (Davis 1998, 115). He claims that digitized technology has left the dull earth and trans-
formed into enlivening energy.  
Davis tracks several paths in the intertwining of networked technologies and the New Age spirituality. He 
suggests that as the 1960s passed into the 1970s, the utopian imagination that had informed and provi-
sionally united counterculturalisms of various kinds fragmented into a variety of disparate spheres, while 
retaining unlikely associations. Given its earlier beliefs, Davis expresses astonishment that the counter-
culture had picked up on computers, “Of all the cultural zones that wound up hosting lingering freak 
dreams, undoubtedly the most unexpected was the world of digital code, a world tucked inside miniaturized 
versions of the very machines that once epitomized blue-suited technocracy and military command and 
control” (Davis 1998, 164). However, Davis should have remembered that the New Age emerges from the 
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esoteric traditions that had interest in technical skills and processes (as, for example, in Freemasonry, which 
emerged from the sequestered knowledge of the masons who built cathedrals, but supported a mystical 
interest in transforming base metals into gold; it then became a privileged businessmen’s club). Esotericism 
is embedded in a craft culture. Therefore, when computers married to telecommunications gave evidence 
that they could be “holistic,” to use Franklin’s term––that they could be primarily shaped by their users’ 
values––their countercultural adoption is unsurprising. 
The conjoining of these two cultures persists. Davis cites Marc Dery’s 1997 account of a Northern Cali-
fornian “cyberdalia”—“ravers, technopagan programmers and high tech hedonists who attempt to reconcile 
‘the transcendental impulses of sixties counterculture with the infomania of the nineties’” (Dery, in Davis 
1998, 164). Generally, the prescriptive character of Fordist technology has not been read into the new 
tool-set. More accurately, with their digital incarnations machines lost their automatic association with 
hierarchy and identities as devices for the powerful. Tellingly, personally “acting like a machine” (surely a 
Fordist machine, in this reference) was explicitly condemned earlier last century in some esoteric religions, 
such as Gurdjieffianism. However, recent forms that emerged alongside the human potential movement, 
such as est and Scientology, use the computer as a model for desirable forms of consciousness. Davis also 
reviews how key American countercultural thinkers of the 1950s and 60s, such as Bateson (2000), John 
Lilly (1972) and Timothy Leary (1994) explored cybernetics to describe and analyze thought and learning, 
again indicating a new adoption of technology as a model. Their work has been interpreted to suggest that, 
instead of pursuing the Gurdjeiffian aspiration to wake up from automatism, one should instead make 
oneself a better, more efficient automaton or “spiritual cyborg,” capable of self-reprogramming. 
Davis (1998, 180) devotes considerable attention to the relation of computers to paganism, where 
high-technology is a new variant of lore to be mastered––in the famous words of Arthur C. Clarke, “in-
distinguishable from magic.” Davis points out that two major accounts of New Age Paganism, Margot 
Adler’s Drawing Down the Moon (1986), a history of American Paganism, and T.M. Luhrrman’s 1989 
study of modern witchcraft in England, Persuasion of the Witch’s Craft, both find a high number of par-
ticipants working in technical fields and the computer industry. Adler (1986, 385) claimed that “a striking 
number of Neo-Pagans work in scientific and technical fields” and notes that Gordon Melton found in 1980 
that Neo-Pagans are “white-collar, middle-class professionals.” In 1985, based on 195 questionnaires re-
turned from the 400 she issued to Neo-Pagan participants “16 percent [of respondents] were either pro-
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grammers, technical writers or scientists” (Adler 1986, 446-47).
 86
 Davis (1998, 181) identifies another 
“meeting ground [for] computer culture and the occult fringe [as] science fiction and fantasy fandom.” He 
also mentions key crossover figures such as Mark Pesce, a pioneer of “virtual reality” technologies and a 
practicing technopagan, who brought his spiritual and digital knowledge together in creating the graphic 
environment of on-line occult rituals.  
Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron (1997, 58) suggest why Silicon Valley SAs are interested in ne-
ospirituality, a point I pursue in more detail below: 
According to some visionaries, the search for the perfection of mind, body 
and spirit will inevitably lead to the emergence of the “post-human”: a 
bio-technological manifestation of the social privileges of the “virtual 
class.” While the hippies saw self-development as part of social liberation, 
the hi-tech artisans of contemporary California are more likely to seek 
individual self-fulfillment through therapy, spiritualism, exercise or other 
narcissistic pursuits. Their desire to escape into the gated suburb of the 
hyper-real is only one aspect of this deep self-obsession.  
Reflecting this characterization of these SA neospiritual practitioners as self-obsessed, Davis (1998, 155) 
observes with disappointment that “New Age logic slides with unsettling ease into corporate management 
jargon and business success seminars [so that] New Agers often aim for goals barely distinguishable from 
the dominant logic of success that drives commercial culture, goals like efficiency, satisfaction, produc-
tivity, performance, and control, not to mention the prosperity gospel that holds the self is actualized 
through money.” He also points out that many information entrepreneurs, from Steve Jobs to Mitch Kapor, 
came to their fortunes after shorter or longer flirtations with New Age countercultures. As a consequence, 
and confirming the contents of the last chapter, Davis (1998, 169) notes that, “by taking controlled sips of 
California’s creative anarchy, its “go with the flow” Beat Taoism, the computer industry discovered new 
philosophies of management and productivity that were appropriate to the increasingly chaotic global 
market their products were helping to produce.” He clarifies that such management philosophies were “by 
no means limited to the computer industry.” 
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86 Twenty-one were “computer programmers, system’s analysts or software developers.” This was followed by 
“student,” 16; “secretary,” 12; “psychotherapist or counsellor,” 10; “teacher, professor instructor,” 9, “writer,” 8 and 
“housewife,” 7; and so on. Most of the rest were a mix of professionals, and various kinds of service workers, low and 
high-skilled. There were a few “workers.” 
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Other authors have also tracked this transformation. A comprehensive account of the complex interactions 
between psychedelics, radical politics and computer culture around Stanford University, the key institu-
tional incubator of Silicon Valley, where Brand first encountered hacker communities, can be found in John 
Markoff’s What the Dormouse Said: How the Sixties Counterculture Shaped the Personal Computer In-
dustry (2005).
 
Indicating that the counterculture had “moved on,” Mark Dery in his Escape Velocity: Cy-
berculture at the End of the Century (1997) argues that the personal computer revolution could well be 
called “Counterculture 2.0.” In many ways he anticipates Turner’s thesis when he cites Brand’s retrospec-
tive assessment that, “As it turned out… , psychedelic drugs, communes, and Buckminster Fuller domes 
were a dead end, but computers were an avenue to realms beyond our dreams” (Dery 1997, 27). 
Hanegraaff (1996 11, 105) mentioned the term “New Edge” to indicate this cultural crossover, which he 
borrowed from the avant-garde cyber-culture journal Mondo 2000 (Zandbergen 2010, 180-82). Though he 
did not elaborate on this category, Dorien Zandbergen fills in the details for us. In her account of the New 
Edge, Zandbergen (2010, 170) also sees Brand as of central importance to its emergence, and notes that at 
its origin, the Whole Earth Catalogue had a strong flavor of New Age spirituality. It contained regular 
sections on such topics as “meditation, trance dance, psychedelic drugs and self-hypnosis as techniques for 
dealing with social brainwashing and getting back in touch with the self.”  
However, other countercultural luminaries followed the same path. In his account of the “Evolution of a 
Counterculture,” Timothy Leary distinguished the “anti-high tech” hippies of 1965-75 from a “super 
high-tech New Breed” that appeared in the 1990s, and declared that this transformation could be explained 
by the “inherent spiritual characteristics of digital technology” (Leary 1994, 81).
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 Zandbergen maps out a 
number of the other key sites besides Brand’s enterprise where the New Edge was forged: the blend of 
psychedelic spirituality and technological experimentation of Ken Kesey’s Merry Pranksters in the 1960s; 
early virtual reality ventures by cyber-scientists such as Jaron Lanier, who promoted digital technology as 
“the first medium that doesn’t narrow the human spirit, [and which would] elevate people to a new plane of 
reality” (Zandbergen 2010, 171); and the bohemian blend of drugs, sex, art and hacking championed in the 
journal Mondo 2000, founded in the late 1980s by Ken Goffman (aka “R.U. Sirius”), and the source of the 
term “New Edge.” Goffman also introduced the slogan “hack your own reality.” Ultimately, Davis argues, 
this trajectory puts certain strains of New Age thought on an intersection with Extropian or Transhumanist 




 Cited in Zandbergen 2010, 162 
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“Transhumanism” is a cultural and intellectual movement whose participants believe that human biological 
norms, meaning our physical, intellectual, and psychological capabilities, should be expanded through 
integration with advanced technologies. One of its core concepts is life extension, including through genetic 
engineering, nanotech, cloning, and other emerging technologies. 
https://www.extremetech.com/extreme/152240-what-is-transhumanism-or-what-does-it-mean-to-be-huma
n). The philosophy of “extropy” has sparked multidisciplinary discussions about future technologies in 
terms of life extension and their social context. It is an “evolving framework of values and standards for 
continuously improving the human condition” through inquiry into the sciences and technologies of human 
enhancement. The term contrasts with “entropy,” and implies a challenge to the diffusion of powers that 
accompanies biological weakening and death. It is a “philosophy of the future” formally initiated in 1990 
with the establishment of the Extropy Institute in California (which has since closed down, judging that its 
mission to initiate this discussion has been achieved). An organization that currently hosts discussions of 
these topics, Humanity+, was originally born as the World Transhumanist Association (WTA) in 1998, 
which rebranded itself as Humanity+ in 2008. (https://lifeboat.com/ex/the.principles.of.extropy)  
While the Extropians reject the “pastel visions of the New Age,” both movements embrace similar 
“‘technologies of transformation:’ brain machines and visualizations, meditation regimes and cognitive 
enhancement drugs, computer networks and Neuro-Linguistic-programming” (Davis 1998, 120). This 
trend culminated in a vision of machinic liberation of mind from flesh, a technified version of perennial 
gnostic aspiration. We will see more of these themes below, but in the less dramatic, but more invasive form 
of Dataism. 
The Digital Mystique at Work 
However, fascinating as such destinations are, they are probably less significant than the rarified domains 
believed to be achievable simply by doing post-Fordist work, which associates it, through a similar 
worldview, with the New Age vision. To consider this, I turn to Eran Fisher’s (2010) discussion of what he 
terms “the network cosmology.” Influenced by their millenarian New Age associations, cybercultural ac-
tivists expected that with their new tools they could transform the world. However, as is typical in Amer-
ican cultural history, too much emphasis is put on the technology, and not enough on the nature of the 
society deploying it. Eran Fisher (2010) has termed the attribution of grandiose socially and economically 
transformative powers to digital technologies, the creation of a “network cosmology,” a cosmology that 
ironically, ultimately, supports the neoliberal ideology of contemporary capitalism.  




 In the discourse of networks, individuals are construed as autonomous nodes and defined by their 
connections to other nodes in the network…  
 The discourse embodies a new conception of the individual as network and cyborg. The blurring of 
the boundaries between humans and network technology allows for a more meaningful emancipatory and 
natural interaction of humans with the technology and unleashes the emancipatory potential of humans: 
their intellectual, psychological, and communicative abilities….  
 Contrary to the Fordist human characterized by spatial and temporal bodily presence and physi-
cality, the post-Fordist human is characterized by virtuality and disembodiment. The post-Fordist hu-
man--her body, mind and identity--are informational, hence flexible and multiple….  
 The social is seen as a flat, decentralized sphere of ever-flowing, multiple, and ad hoc assemblages. 
This is a stark contrast to the Fordist conception of the social sphere as consisting of a hierarchized, stable, 
and category-defined arena….  
 In the same vein, the central mode of social action in the discourse on networks is that of cooper-
ation rather than struggle or competition, which characterizes the discourse on class…. 
 While the discourse of class stresses structural power relations, the discourse of networks is devoid 
of such forms of power (except, admittedly, the lack of power that results from being cut off from the 
network; i.e., on the dark side of the digital divide) and instead associates power with the characteristics of 
autonomous nodes (i.e., power resulting from ingenuity and entrepreneurship)…  
 Network technology ... renders work--the work process, work relations, and the workplace--more 
humane and more liberating for the worker….  
 Work is reconceptualized as an eroticized, playful activity of production and consumption, in-
volving creativity, deep engagement, interactivity, and interpersonal communication.... a cooperative, 
agreeable, and inherently-inclusive model of networks (at least in the long run, once the digital divide is 
bridged) (Fisher 2010, 212-216). 
Although the making of this cosmology draws on a wide variety of sources, Fisher identifies as a symp-
tomatic figure Kevin Kelly, the Executive Editor of Wired from 1992 to 1999. In the late 1980s and 1990s, 
Wired became an important organ for diffusing digital enthusiasm throughout North American popular 
culture. As Turner confirms, its writers and editors had emerged from countercultural backgrounds into the 
astronomically-more profitable world of the computer business in the 1990s. They believed (or at least 
declared) that they were enacting a digitally-empowered version of their earlier radical beliefs: “they would 
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tear down hierarchies, undermine the sorts of corporations and governments that had spawned them” and 
replace them with a “peer-to peer ad-hocracy, a levelled marketplace and a more authentic self” (Turner 
2006, 3). Cyberculture was to be the fulfillment of counterculture. It was also a turn from the overtly po-
litical to the “personal is political” ethos, following the lead of other social movements of the time, chiefly 
feminism. These maintained in common a turn away from political activity as the exclusive way to effect 
social change.  
At its highest level, as Fisher presents it, the network cosmology is “a new tradeoff between personal 
emancipation and social emancipation” (Fisher 2010, 11). The dilemma is posed by the difficulty of re-
solving the desire for maximum personal freedom, with the somewhat inconsistent aspiration to work to-
wards social justice (Fisher 2010, 225). This dilemma was first defined by French sociologists of labour, 
Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello (2005), as basic to the ethos of the young political activists in the 1960s as 
they moved into mainstream social positions (in France, the focus of the sociologists’ work). These new 
workers often found management positions, as many of them were children of the French bourgeoisie.  
Reproducing the same trade-off that neospirituals also exercise as consumers (as Lau described; i.e., be-
tween individual and collective interests), the French youth, as young Western workers in general, opt for 
personal freedom, while imaginatively defining social justice as its outcome. They accepted the belief that 
their actions and engagement, as filtered through the operation of some holistic process (according to 
Fraser, network relations), could only bring about a better society.  
We have seen that post-Fordist businesses are structured as networks. Therefore, the social impact of 
networks, as employed or realized in the post-Fordist world, includes how these networks act on the world 
in which they operate. Hence, taking into consideration post-Fordism’s tendency to advance structural 
unemployment and insecure working conditions, the network organizational form must be acknowledged 
as implicated in these deleterious social outcomes. The network form in workplaces degrades worker sol-
idarity traditionally maintained through unions. Workers are required to negotiate and renegotiate as indi-
viduals for both their work and their working conditions in perpetual competition with others and under 
conditions of endemic insecurity. In other words, networked business operation in the context of the re-
duced governmental oversight that could countervail these tendencies provokes the social injustice intrinsic 
to post-Fordism. On their face, networks do not challenge these tendencies. While workers are employed 
they may receive a number of social goods, such as prestige, income, security and opportunities for soci-
ality. However, if and when this ends, usually against their own will, these goods are withdrawn. Precarious 
workers are entitled to “a life” only at the will of the employer. 
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Taking the whole terrain of post-Fordist work into consideration, freedom and justice are at cross-purposes 
in the post-Fordist workplace. In this context, networks do not makes the world a more democratic and 
collaborative place. With this dynamic in mind, Fisher challenges the equation of networks and social 
justice that proponents of a network cosmology assert. At best, social justice in the world of network rela-
tions is ignored if not actively frustrated. On the other hand, if justice if forgone (i.e., the personal longterm 
well-being and the fates of fellow workers are ignored) a certain freedom can be attained. However, the 
pursuit of this definition of personal freedom is perfectly fused with the system needs of capitalism (Fisher 
2010, 7, 143). As the story goes, workers must embrace “the promise of the spirit of networks” if they are to 
achieve “increased individual emancipation and dealienation.” They gain this only through “the reorgani-
zation of social practices and social relations in accordance with networks…. Simply put, emancipation is 
constructed as demanding the further flexibilization and privatization of work” (Fisher 2010, 225).  
Neural Nets as Society 
Kelly and collaborators, such as writer Howard Rheingold (2003) were inspired by the open system model 
of artificial intelligence (AI) (premising that computers could learn) that regained scientific (and govern-
mental) acceptance after the Cold War with the USSR dissolved. The closed-world system, “symbolic AI” 
(which was enlisted to create the American “Star Wars” military defence scenario of creating surveillance 
barriers in space, against advancing Soviet missiles), was at that time replaced by the concept of “neural 
nets.” According to the principles of symbolic AI, the “Star Wars” developers had to codify all potential 
threats in advance of meeting them, before the scheme could be expected to work.
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 They “first tried to 
formalize knowledge of the world, which could then be fed into computers predefined and predigested. Its 
operations would be based in processing that knowledge. [It was eventually judged as a flawed approach], 
because logic [i.e., predefined scenarios], not experience, defined the operations” (Edwards 1997, 255-56). 
The “top-down” approach to AI involved anticipating conditions, planning for particular outcomes, and 




 Symbolic AI was understood as a “closed-world” system (Edwards 1997). Its “Star Wars” system was designed to 
respond to the Cold War vision of the US and its allies, to protect them from potential Soviet nuclear missile attack. 
The protection relied on the demarcation of a hard cordon between the two enemy camps, supported by an AI system 
that recognized and responded to violations of the geographical space of these countries. The Star Wars scenario 
culminated in a model of protection and intelligence whereby attacking missiles were to be met in the air by native 
fire-power well in advance of their reaching their targets. “The central metaphor of ‘containment’ combined the 
closures of cold war ideology and military global reach with computerized systems for total central defense” (Edwards 
1997, 272). As noted, this closed approach to AI required that the protective systems be programmed for all 
eventualities, each of which could only be derived through analysis of empirical data. Since, by this process, the 
unanticipated threat could not, in theory, be met, this approach had to hold the assumption that all eventualities could 
be anticipated, and the challenge was to program responses to these in advance.  
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By contrast, neural nets “could recognize patterns and solve certain kinds of problems without explicitly 
encoded knowledge or procedures” (Edwards 1997, 356). Modelling software according to neural nets 
avoided the need to design solutions to all problems in advance. Neural nets were based on the idea that 
computers could learn.
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 The computer was seen as embodied, more a brain than a mind. “The brain-model 
approach relied intrinsically on interaction with the world; repeated experience, not formal analysis, was 
supposed to shape the weighted connections of neural elements into a functional system” (Edwards 1997, 
255-56). Our brains create meaning and functionality in an ongoing and open-ended way as they integrate 
sensory data (the signals passing crossroads or “dumb nodes”) in application to situations. In sketchy terms, 
neurons (dumb nodes) are simply crossroads altered by signals whose very basic operations add up, in the 
aggregate, through their great number and complex patterning, to high-level transformations, or intelli-
gence. In essence, network processes create complexity from a number of simple decisions made at every 
crossroad or node. More nodes interacting constitute greater density of exchanges within the system. 
Greater density of exchanges is equivalent to greater complexity, or “intelligence.” In short, as the number 
of transactions across nodes proliferates, “the system” as a whole (i.e., society) becomes more intelligent. 
The embrace of open cybernetics systems provoked reflection on topics other than computer intelligence. 
The comparison of computers to organic brains inspired Kelly (1994) to make a different comparison, 
between “neural nets” and society. In his own jibe at the cold authoritarianism of the American mili-




 Supporters of the containment approach had already discredited the preferred model of AI put forth by prestigious 
computer scientists Claude Shannon (1948), and AI researcher Marvin Minsky (1985) in the 1970s. Shannon’s 
information theory implied that, since computers could learn, every potential future event need not be anticipated 
beforehand for the computer to be effectively prepared for it (Edwards 1997, 255). Pushed aside during the cold war 
‘closed world’ era, however, this early organic cybernetic theory was revived later, as the internet (shaped by “hacker 
values”) was being developed. Computers were newly seen as tools for people instead of monolithic control 
mechanisms (whose effectiveness was in any case questionable). Computers should not be expected to function 
autonomously and purely ‘symbolically,’ i.e., analytically, but must be designed to learn from experience (Edwards 
1997, 268-69). 
Symbolic AI was understood as a “closed-world” system (Edwards 1997). Its “Star Wars” system was designed to 
respond to the Cold War vision of the US and its allies, to protect them from potential Soviet nuclear missile attack. 
The protection relied on the demarcation of a hard cordon between the two enemy camps, supported by an AI system 
that recognized and responded to violations of the geographical space of these countries. The Star Wars scenario 
culminated in a model of protection and intelligence whereby attacking missiles were to be met in the air by native 
fire-power well in advance of their reaching their targets. “The central metaphor of ‘containment’ combined the 
closures of cold war ideology and military global reach with computerized systems for total central defense” (Edwards 
1997, 272). As noted, this closed approach to AI required that the protective systems be programmed for all 
eventualities, each of which could only be derived through analysis of empirical data. Since, by this process, the 
unanticipated threat could not, in theory, be met, this approach had to hold the assumption that all eventualities could 
be anticipated, and the challenge was to program responses to these in advance.  
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symbolic AI) as oppressive and hierarchical too. In his view, symbolic AI was one more indication of the 
old-guard’s bureaucratic top-down “interference” in creative work and autonomous living. He wanted a 
society without these. As he edited a publication for the software industry, he easily adopted the network as 
the model for ideal social interactions as well as a good way for computer-users and workers to com-
municate and do business.  
Because the cybernetic theory of learning implies that interaction is the source of intelligence, he encour-
aged engagement in network dynamics. Reinforcing the reasoning of post-Fordist CEOs, who value net-
working (or “density of flows”) because they think well-informed workers and a dynamic company result, 
Kelly’s theorized that the “simple” participation of many people (i.e., as “dumb nodes”) in network rela-
tions creates “social intelligence.” In society, as with the corporation, the fact of its interaction rather than 
the quality of any one exchange is valued. We will review this idea in a more advanced condition, below, as 
“dataism.” 
Fisher argues that Kelly’s confidence that robust social network use is necessarily good veers towards the 
utopian. “In such a history, network technology is seen as the teleological climax not simply of the history 
of technology but also of the history of the universe” (Fisher 2010, 185). Barbrook and Cameron (1997, 50) 
concur; they argue that, through networks, “existing social, political and legal power structures will wither 
away to be replaced by unfettered interactions between autonomous individuals and their software.” The 
political agenda behind this model is, once again, neoliberal repression of government. Kelly and his col-
laborators, “recycled McLuhanites[,] vigorously argue that big government should stay off the backs of 
resourceful entrepreneurs, who are the only people cool and courageous enough to take risks” (Barbrook & 
Cameron 1997, 51). Social and business life should become a pure series of spontaneous relationships, 
more akin to how “nature” functions, reflecting “flexibility, self-regulation, individualization, communi-
cation, spontaneous order, and so forth…: a return to the very essence of nature and the universe. This is 
portrayed in stark contrast to industrial technology, which represents a breaking away from nature” (Fisher 
2010, 9).
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 Barbrook and Cameron (1997, 52) agree with Fisher that, “according to [Kelly], the ‘invisible 




 This thinking is akin to that of the Jesuit mystic, Teilhard de Chardin [1966], generally associated with New Age 
theology, who theorized that a greater amount of human knowledge solidified a “noosphere,” like a level of 
atmosphere surrounding the world, whose “solidification,” surpassing of a critical mass, not only transforms human 
intelligence but the substance of the earth. Gaia becomes sentient. 
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In the above we can see similarities to Swedenborgianism––the integration of a cyclical world with a linear, 
historical one––and sense the same negative implication: a closed world. Kelly’s critics argue that his is yet 
another teleology of technology—a particular technological determinist worldview for the post-Fordist era. 
With an apocalyptic tone, this worldview suggests “that technology offers a form of transcendence almost 
spiritual in nature” (Fisher 2010, 185). Kelly and others expect that this new form can extinguish the We-
berian period of industry during which the “iron cage” of rationality disenchants the world. For Kelly, the 
“increased digitalization and networking of social life… does not entail a process of disenchantment (the 
hallmark of rationalization during industrial technology), but rather offers a road to transcendence” (Fisher 
2010, 185).  
As far as it applies to corporations, Fisher (2010, 4; following Boltanski and Chiapello 2005) labels it “the 
humanistic critique of organizations.” The humanistic critique “extols the value of technology in the name 
of individual authenticity and liberation as a private and apolitical (or postpolitical) enterprise.” Of course, 
Fisher is not arguing that all philosophical discourses on freedom are intrinsically anti-social, but that this 
particular one lays such ground. For, “not all types of critique are created equal[, but differ in terms of] the 
political space they allow” (Fisher 2010, 22). Harvey (2000, 223) also agrees that “the core of the human-
istic critique is in conflict with the demand for equality and solidarity—the social critique.”  
However, Fisher notes some ambiguity in Kelly’s supposed orientation to humanism. Recall that Carrette 
and King asserted a second privatization of religion, wherein the “self-realization” capacity of the New Age 
was transposed from individuals to corporations. In the same vein, Kelly’s writing includes suggestions that 
the partnership between people and technology is not equal. “Technology [becomes] the protagonist, 
[while] humans [must] recede to the background and occupy a supporting role” (Fisher 2010, 185). 
Schumacher’s and Franklin’s concerns over Fordist “prescriptive” technologies––representing human loss 
of control over their tools––is now manifest in a post-Fordist form. However, the critique is more easily 
nullified in this current regime because, as a recent rendition of a “network cosmology” illustrates, lack of 
human control over post-Fordist technologies is now felt to be their virtue. Whereas Kelly’s writing may 
have tentatively supported the technological domination, apologists for “dataism” positively celebrate this 
relationship.  
Yuval Noa Harari, author of panoramic accounts of humanity’s past and future, writes in Homo Deus 
(2015) that the majority of the world’s scientists see algorithmic processes as fundamental to their objects 
of study, and so subscribe to a “dataprocessing” worldview that nullifies humanism. Algorithms are 
step-by-step procedures that, as has been discovered, describe change processes universally. Computer 
programs, too, follow algorithms, in many software languages. Algorithmic processes were first recognized 
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in the life sciences, as noted in the previous chapter, and they provided the first effective paradigms for 
computer science. As a result, “computer science and biology” became “the mother disciplines” of dataism 
(Harari 2015, 368). Now, the fact that the subject matter of many different kinds of science display algo-
rithmic functioning leads many, including scientists, to think they are the fundamental “stuff” of life. In 
other words, everything is data-processing, including––as far as anyone can tell––human beings. On this 
basis, Harari concludes that scientists already practice a “data religion.” They understand human feelings as 
the outcomes of algorithmic processes of assessing risk and advantage, which then guide action. However, 
human risks cannot now be assessed by individuals because of environmental complexity. Harari explains 
that dataists recommend we let computers know us intimately so they can guide us––an idea roughly con-
sistent with Kelly’s arguments for networks as a social model. Both Kelly and dataists would say: “The 
greatest sin is to block the data flow” (Harari 2015, 382). 
Harari (2015, 392) asserts that dataist contemporary scientists no longer see a need for human subjectivity 
(including its reflexive moment, which reaches for self-understanding and personal dignity). With this 
supposedly sacred capacity of human beings rendered obsolete, remaining distinctions of the human 
(presumed, anyway, in relation to animals) may be many, but their data processing abilities do not distin-
guish them from machines. Au contraire! Harari predicts the emergence of dataism as a replacement for the 
humanism that has inflected collective values since the Enlightenment. Naturally, human beings will lose 
their special place in the cosmos as they are increasingly fit into the global data-processing matrix.  
Of course, Hariri (2015, 394) advances the obligatory caution at the end of his reflection on humanity’s 
future: “A critical examination of the Dataist dogma is likely to be… the twenty-first century[‘s] most 
urgent political and economic project. Scholars in the life sciences and social sciences should ask them-
selves whether we miss anything when we understand life as data-processing and decision-making. Is there 
perhaps something in the universe that cannot be reduced to data?” (394). I will pick up this reflection later 
as it relates to themes of this dissertation. 
Autonomist Franco Berardi (2009) would also see consistencies between Kelly’s project and the worldview 
Hariri describes decades later. First, like dataists, Kelly follows the living organisms model to represent the 
society formed via a high integration of online-networking, where “horizontal integration tends to replace 
hierarchical” decision-making (Berardi 2009, 193). Kelly, like the dataists, envisions a “global mind.” 
Furthermore, Kelly argues that networks should perform algorithmic decision-making to replace traditional 
political processes because Fordist social and political organization based on its “sequential model of 
mechanics and of rational and voluntary activity”––i.e., its mechanical metaphor ––cannot keep up with the 
speed of change and so is “irreparably obsolete” (Berardi 2009, 193). Harari’s explanation (2015, 373-377) 
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of dataism with respect to these institutions is very similar. Also Harari (2015, 386) describes the dataist 
world in terms similar to Kelly’s maxims, such as “Humans want to merge with the data flow.”  
Berardi finds problems with the network cosmology and would, like Harari, find them with dataism. He 
regards the social “data-processed” world not as a “natural,” product of myriad human beings communi-
cating with relatively equal capacities to do so, but as following the imperatives and interests of capital. As 
the computer industry and technology in general is captured by corporations, the “social data algorithm” is 
a highly “distorted” representation of the collective population of users. Of Kelly’s “bioinformatics model,” 
Berardi opines that there is, indeed, a “soul in this new machine,” but it is not the combined hearts of cit-
izens. The global mind “organizes and directs energies in the most functional way… through automatic 
mechanisms of global interactive decision-making. These mechanisms are basically economic in nature” 
(Berardi 2000, 194). This “soul” is made up of the continually-changing algorithms (i.e., online user pro-
files) constructed on the basis of myriad individual decisions shaped for ulterior objectives––i.e. corporate 
economic interests––only indirectly related to user or collective interests, preferences or needs. As has been 
explained, the profiling feedback mechanisms refine tastes to create a number of qualified and individu-
alized consumers. Although there may be many human feelings dictating inputs into this system, they are 
shaped through feedback processes to be integrated into the economic calculus. They become irrelevant 
when only behaviour is measured. Following the implications of his argument, Berardi (2000, 194) avers, 
“The multitude can speak hundreds of thousands of languages, but the language that allows it to function as 
an integrated whole is that of the economic automisms embodied in technology.” Waxing poetic, Berardi 
declares: “The multitudes manifests its dark side and follows automisms that turn wealth into misery, its 
power into anguish, and its creativity into dependency.”  
One might hear an echo of the Swedenborgian “death of nature” as pure commodity culture is instigated. 
Given the “restrictive language” that commodities speak, and that culture is now highly commodified, it is 
no surprise to find economic language dominating social situations. Dataism’s dispensing with humanism 
suggests that Kelly may have bitten off more than he could chew with his network cosmology vision. To 
determine whether or not Kelly would welcome dataism as an outcome of his speculative work requires 
further research. Nonetheless, humanism is a strong element of his vision. However, Carette and King 
(2005, 44-45) argue that since “cultural forms [became] commodities… economics has begun to dictate the 
terms of expression for the rest of the social world[;] to take over the processes of socialization (such as the 
cultivation and disciplining of individual appetites) that have been traditionally carried out by religious and 
state institutions.” Once social and cultural institutions have been integrated into the market, they must 
meet the standards and language of the market. To these factors, this dissertation adds the contribution of 
the cultural shaping and influence of iconic post-Fordist workers.  
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Politics of Network Relations 
The adoption of a networking ethos has effects not only in discourse and ideals, but in practice, as well. The 
hacker culture, stemming as it did from the politically-dissident counterculture, could not escape the po-
litical conundrums that accompanied the gradual abandonment of its early ideals. In different language than 
Fisher’s and Himanen’s, and with a more precise focus on particular workers, Barbrook and Cameron 
(1997) provide their own version of the freedom/social justice reconciliation. Silicon Valley SAs make their 
“trade-off between personal emancipation and social emancipation” (Fisher 2010, 11) through “an uneasy 
resolution of New Left and New Right values” (Barbrook and Cameron 1997, 58) grounded in a pointed 
excoriation of governmental activity and, more generally, anything that operates as a bureaucracy. By 
analyzing the world-view of the “loose alliance of writers, hackers, capitalists and artists from the West 
Coast [who defined] a heterogenous orthodoxy for the coming information age[, an ideology that] pro-
miscuously combines the free-wheeling spirit of the hippies and the entrepreneurial zeal of the yuppies” 
Barbrook and Cameron (1997, 44) developed a worldview they call “the Californian ideology.”   
This Silicon Valley political climate continues to expand globally from this site. It was established in the 
1980s, with Reaganite neoliberal policies of corporate deregulation and privatization. These were wel-
comed within the west-coast culture of California, along with notions of horizontal systems, digital net-
working, and self-actualizing entrepreneurs. Barbrook and Cameron concur with Fisher, that these ingre-
dients combine, as the “lived reality… of high-tech artisans,” in a very contradictory way. “On the one 
hand, these core workers are a privileged part of the labour force. On the other hand, they are the heirs of the 
radical ideas of the community media activists” (1997, 58). 
Spawned as young Americans turned against the Vietnam War and the American “military-industrial 
complex,” the New Left uneasily maintains that (new) technologies can help elude dominating forces, with 
ex-hippies harbouring the idea that data can be “freed;” (i.e., information exchanged without cost). 
Spokesperson for this position, Howard Rheingold (2003, 55), hopes that, at some future time, “community 
activists will be able to use hypermedia to replace corporate capitalism and big government with a hi-tech 
‘gift economy.’” Alternatively, the New Right follows neoliberalism in anticipating a return to the “free 
market.” This means that the left component of “West Coast ideologues have embraced the laissez faire 
ideology of their erstwhile conservative enemy” (Barbrook & Cameron 1997, 50). With this slippage, the 
left and right sentiments are clumsily conjoined, while neither is abandoned.  
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Despite the rightist component of the Californian ideology, Evgeny Morosov, author of many articles in the 
Western intellectual press,
 91
 shows that the Silicon Valley vision of “creating socialism” is far from 
abandoned. “Digital socialism,” is, however, highly idiosyncratic––a purely consumerist model. Suppos-
edly, by making its products and services cost next to nothing, the region can counter income inequality by 
offering consumption equality. Software and media products are such that, after a certain number of copies 
has been produced, the marginal cost of providing one more copy is effectively zero. This means that, in 
theory, almost everyone can have almost anything (hence, consumption equality). This would render un-




Obvious problems with this thinking include that it ignores that resources, such as land and much organic 
material, are finite. Their increasing scarcity raises their prices, which ultimately determines that only rich 
people can have access to them (with “free” but insignificant, or ersatz, goods the options for the others—if 
those). Even more important, it ignores that consumer goods serve as social markers, and an important 
purpose of consumption in general is to establish social position. By definition, then, that which everyone 
has, or can have, has no value for this purpose. Arguably, these items will mark one as someone without. 
Overall, the digital socialism idea or fact does nothing to counter social inequality. Arguably, it exacerbates 
it by encouraging relatively-impoverished citizens to waste their (often debt) money while they also refrain 
from politically demanding a fairer world. 
To top off these specific objections, the Californian ideology’s celebration of free markets while deni-
grating public services contradicts itself because  
… the West Coast itself is a creation of a mixed economy. Government 
dollars were used to build the irrigation systems, highways, schools, 
universities and other infrastructural projects which make the good life 
possible in California. On top of these public subsidies, the West Coast 
hi-tech industrial complex has been feasting off the fattest pork barrel in 
history for decades. The US government has poured billions of tax dollars 




 Such as: “SiliconValley likes to promise ‘digital socialism,’ but it is selling a fairy tale.” The Guardian, March 1, 
2015, and other articles appearing in the New York Times and the New Left Review 
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 Similarly, when elected governments should wither away (as hoped for), democracy in vestigial form, as “direct 
democracy,” is expected to persist. This again follows the consumerist model, and is seen in nascent form as ballot 
questions, during elections, through which voters can make their specific policy preferences known and bind 
governments to their enactment. The State of California is an iconic user of these polls, reflecting the ideology that 
frames political attitudes there, strongly influenced by the culture we have been discussing.   
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fornian companies…; Americans have always had state planning; only, 
they call it the defence budget (Barbrook and Cameron 1997, 53).  
As shown in Chapter Six, the key post-Fordist workers are not only software workers. SAs include a wide 
variety of communicators, analysts and developers. The California coast itself hosts two important and 
representative components of the entire SA population in the form of its media as well as hi-tech produc-
tion. Therefore, in addition to the technical and analytical workers--engineers, computer and cognitive 
scientists--this community includes computer-based media producers and its historical population of par-
ticipants in the (Hollywood) television and film industries (Barbrook and Cameron 1997, 46). These 
workers have similar conditions of employment and social status, as discussed in earlier chapters, and so are 
equally participants in the ideology that “simultaneously reflects the disciplines of market economics and 
the freedoms of hippie artisanship” (Barbrook and Cameron 1997, 49-50).  
Barbrook and Cameron (1997, 50) claim that a technologically-determinist understanding of society is the 
only way for these people to reconcile the left- and right-wing components of their belief-system, which the 
authors call a “bizarre hybrid” ideology (Barbrook and Cameron 1997, 50). If this resolves the central 
conundrum of a life for the rich SAs of Hollywood and Silicon Valley, then we should pay particular at-
tention to this resolution, on the assumption that their engagement with neospirituality has a similar func-
tion. Technological determinism as a belief system includes the conviction that technologies evolve au-
tonomously, according to their own logic. An essential companion belief is that unhampered technological 
innovation progressively lays the groundwork for a better society. The logic is that, since innovation has its 
own spirit, and SAs believe that their model of work allows them to realize that spirit, the actualization of 
the good society can only be achieved through the release of their own creative spirit in the performance of 
their work, in their immersion in spirit of technology. In sum, the social good emerges as long as the con-
scientious digital craftsperson is left free to creatively explore.
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As noted in particular reference to the Californian infrastructure, these beliefs beg the question of the un-
deniable and deliberate technological shaping at sites of power. In general, technologies have been de-
veloped by government subsidy. Corporations often directly use this money to advance technologies that 
will offer them market advantages, with effectively no direct concern for public welfare. The computer 




 Himanen (2001, 55) claims that, for many, “being a hacker consists primarily of passionate action and the freedom 
to organize one’s time and that as long as this work ethic is realized there is no problem with making money 
permanently through traditional capitalism.” 
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are contradicted by the actual history of hypermedia” (Barbrook and Cameron 1997, 52). Furthermore, the 
software and media industries are tolerant of “market distortions” based on governmental funding when 
they are its recipients. Subsidies and corporate control of certain markets do, however, solidify “distor-
tions.” The computer industry and the network relations through which it functions has a tendency to 
support the formation of monopolistic corporate power, as we have seen in Harvey’s, Liu’s, Stone’s and 
Rossiters’ analyses. 
As noted above, Barbrook and Cameron (1997, 54) claim that technologically-determinist beliefs, coupled 
with the suppression of government, underlie the ease with which workers assimilate contradictory com-
mitments; one from their cultural origins as counter to “the mainstream,” reinforced by their insecure status 
as contractors, and the other from their heightened social status and privileges. Hence: “Living within a 
contract culture…, they cannot challenge the primacy of the marketplace over their lives. On the other 
hand, they resent attempts by those in authority to encroach on their individual autonomy.” The organiza-
tion of their work facilitates believing that the market, which is the vehicle for emancipatory technology, is 
benign in its direction of theirs and others lives. The reality is simply that its direction is not overt, as are the 
hated instructions of a Fordist manager.  
The neat conclusion is that, with the “schizophrenic” Californian Ideology, Barbrook and Cameron show 
that both the left’s and the right’s different dilemmas are resolved with the same solution: Get rid of gov-
ernment. For the left-sympathizers, governments represent militaristic activity and domination, i.e., the 
posthierarchy prejudice; for those from the right, it represents intrusion in the natural order of meritocracy 
based on competency, the free-market prejudice. The left and right integration in the persons of these 
Californian SAs reveals the posthierarchy ethos to be a feature of neoliberal ideology. Barbrook and 
Cameron (1997, 69) assert that, “crucially, anti-statism provides the means to reconcile radical and reac-
tionary ideas about technological progress.” The summary result is that “the hi-tech and media industries 
are a key element of the New Right electoral coalition” (Barbrook and Cameron 1997, 61), keeping taxes 
low and social services reduced to a minimum in California “for nearly a generation.” California is a hotbed 
of “racism, poverty and environmental degradation” (Barbrook and Cameron 1997, 46). After all, “white 
people in California remain dependent on their darker-skinned fellow humans to work in their factories, 
pick their crops, look after their children and tend their gardens” (Barbrook and Cameron 1997, 57). 
However, maintaining a retinue of personal servants is inconsistent with viewing oneself as a proponent of 
posthierarchy. This contradiction may well motivate the SA adoption of wellness technologies and ne-
ospirituality. These allow some of the support functions that personal service workers might provide to be 
allocated to an impersonal facility—i.e.a technique or tool. With this interpretation, Barbrook and Cameron 
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compare the Californian workers’ dilemma to that of Thomas Jefferson’s, who wrote the American Dec-
laration of Independence and “championed the rights of American peasants and artisans to determine their 
own destinies” while he, himself, owned slaves (Barbrook and Cameron 1997, 56). As part of his duties as 
Secretary of State from 1790 to 1793, Jefferson oversaw the US Patent Office. One application presented 
for his review was Eli Whitney’s cotton ginny. It removed the seeds from the cotton, overriding the need to 
do this manually––a job for slaves at the time. Writing to Whitney, Jefferson called this dependency on 
slaves for this job “one of our greatest embarrassments” (Giordani 118, 2012). Additionally, Jefferson did 
not patent his own invention, the Moldboard Plough, and designed it to be easy-to-build on any plantation. 
He clearly wanted such inventions broadly distributed, so they could alleviate the need for slave labour on 
his and others plantations (Barbrook and Cameron 1997, 57). (As the Whitney invention made cot-
ton-growing more profitable, it had the opposite effect.) Jefferson hoped that “slavery would eliminate 
itself” (Giordani 118, 2012).  
Barbrook and Cameron liken the “virtual” class’s engagement with “mind, body and spirit” (i.e., neospir-
itual) technologies as similarly motivated. The SA class wants to substitute for servants a technological 
solution to well-being.
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 Barbrook and Cameron (1997, 57) additionally judge that differential access to 
these technolologies “reinforce[s] the difference between the masters and the slaves.” This second reason 
perhaps slightly contradicts the first, however. For, one aspect of the substitution would be to effectively 
minimize the public difference between master and servant by banishing the servant from the master’s 
immediate company. However, the first “Jeffersonian substitution” reason is particularly meaningful if we 
see SAs’ personal service workers as providing physical comforts, emotional validation and human con-
nection while their recipients incur unwanted moral obligations to, and establish odious dependencies on, 
their servants. As substitutes for the services, neospiritual practices provide the former goods without the 
latter costs. This substitution is the raison d’etre for commodities in general according to political phi-
losopher Teresa Brennan (2004), which makes “well-being technologies” their purest form. Validating 
Barbrook and Cameron’s second reason, it is also true that in the context of very unequal Silicon Valley 
social order, the privileged access these SAs have to such commodities marks them as socially superior 
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94 Political philosopher, Teresa Brennan (2000) analyses how commodities mask dynamics of dependency through 
how they function. She explains why consumer relations reduce conflict and streamline personal relations in society, 
although at some cost. Her discussion applies equally well to how privatized religion also accomplishes this condition. 
Although living a commodified lifestyle forces a sacrifice of influence over how social and economic resources are 
distributed, consumers are, nonetheless, relieved of direct conflict with each other where consumption prevails. In 
buying the satisfaction of their needs and desires, they neither directly contend with, nor rely on, each other for this 
satisfaction. They pass by each other in their self-absorbed, consumerist pursuits. 
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while shielding them from the need to perform blatant demonstration of power that having personal serv-
ants would require of them. 
As noted above, the marriage of cybernetic and neospiritual visions has been widely discussed in religious 
studies scholarship. Zanbergen (2010, 163) claimed that by the 1990s cyberspace had become for many the 
“‘Platonic new home for the mind and the heart,’ (Heim 1993), a ‘New Jerusalem,’ (Benedikt 1992) or a 
‘paradise’ (Stenger 1992).” However, as she points out, with such an abstract approach, there is a danger of 
reifying the Internet and essentializing the religious activity: Minus a sociological analysis of the use of the 
internet for religious purposes––relativizing that use by grounding it in social processes––the religious form 
inevitably collapses into the internet. This form of analysis is equivalent to the historical essentialization of 
religious traditions by identifying them with their texts and formal religious practices (McCutcheon 2003). 
“Being based on the assumption that digital technology and spirituality are mirrored into each other, such 
explanations don’t take up the question as to why certain people in certain socio-cultural contexts came to 
take this New Edge idea seriously” (Zanbergen 2010, 163). The arguments of Fisher and Himanen, Bar-
brook and Cameron, above, filtered through the Jeffersonian example, show that it helps the iconic repre-
sentatives of this culture to reconcile themselves to market forces, neoliberalism and inequality in the 
context of an underlying cultural tradition of opposition to vested interests––a reconciliation they need to 
perform to function as high technology workers.  
It is a complicated reconciliation to be sure, labelled differently by various scholars. Nevertheless, the 
Californian ideology, the hacker ethic, and the network cosmology, as I have shown, confront the same 
basic conundrum at their roots—the need to deny of the fact of social inequality while accommodating and 
even exploitating this condition. Others support this position. Cruz (2016, 61-62) notes that “Slavoj Zizek 
(2001) has observed how the Western appropriation of Buddhism has served to legitimize the competitive 
logic of capitalism.” “Mindfulness” is another luxury item that permits the few to ignore the impact of their 
behavior on the many (Cruz 2016, 62). I have also argued that even those who are not directly saddled with 
the need to resolve these contradictions may experience its pressures too. As SAs are influential (and for 
other reasons I described), their values and rationalization strategies (and some of their solutions, such as 
mindfulness meditation practices), may well be adopted by non-SA workers.
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 For various well-known reasons, even strong victims of a social regime may vehemently support it––in the current 
situation, a neoliberal order advancing inequality while maintaining a discourse on democracy, equality and justice. 
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The tone-deafness of corporate neospirituality practitioners to inconvenient calls for social responsibility is 
illustrated by an incident at an annual promotion of neospiritual and wellness practices to this population–
–billed simply as a “Wisdom” fair. While Chade-Menge Tan was lecturing about Google’s mindfulness 
program, at “Wisdom 2.0,” Buddhist-led activists interrupted him to draw attention to San Francisco “Bay 
Area evictions linked to tech industry gentrification” (Cruz 2016, 72). After unfurling a banner and passing 
out pamphlets, they were removed. The audience and presenters reflected on how they should respond. The 
response was deemed completed when Google Well Being Manager Bill Duane departed from script for a 
small meditation that entailed not judging the intervenors, but reflecting on conflict. A participant reported 
that “what had felt like an emotionally jarring interruption was transformed into a moment of awareness and 
peace” (“Google Handles Protesters with Mindfulness and Compassion,” 2014). There could not be a better 
expression of social insulation––if not squeamishness––in the face of need. “The conference presents an 
evolution in consciousness of the wealthiest among us as the antidote to suffering rather than the redistri-
bution of wealth and power” summarizes Ream (2014).
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Conclusion 
In Chapter Seven, I had traced the experimentation with posthierarchy by organizational consultants 
through many stages of the establishment of the post-Fordist workplace. This chapter completed the ar-
gument, in that it moved the discussion from specific efforts to institute posthierarchy in workplaces in the 
hope of promoting worker empowerment and a certain mode of collectivity, to a larger, and to some extent, 
prior, context. This context consisted of the communities responsible for the gestation and broader pursuit 
of these values. I also sketched out the specific form of the ideas and ideologies entertained by these 
workers as post-Fordism coalesced. This illustrated the positive imagery that inspires, guides, and promotes 
SA culture. I presented the most important features of this culture, i.e., network-related ethic, holism, or-
ganicism, teleology and technicism, as a more precise and technologized realization of the posthierarchical 
worldview. 
In this chapter I provided a high-level history of the American counterculture, particularly centred on the 
West Coast, and its experiments with new technologies and new religious convictions beginning in the 
1960s, revealing overlapping populations of new workers and New Age practitioners. I argued that the 
population of workers and would-be workers in the new industries, whose experiments with new tech-




 Cited in Cruz 2016, 73 
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they carried into their new jobs and further developed there. This heritage of what were to become iconic 
post-Fordist workers––neospirituality intertwined with fantastic hopes for a computer-based society––
seems to continue to influence the SA workforce, suggesting they have an elective affinity with neospir-
ituality based on that history alone. Since then, the neospiritual ethos has been processed through SA 
conditions of work and social standing, particularly with respect the importance placed on technology. 
Some workers have combined their New Age and computer-hacker identities to advance related esoteric 
pursuits, such as Neopaganism and posthumanism. In general, many of them appear to be receptive to the 
evolved forms of New Age, which I call neospirituality, including practices such as mindfulness medita-
tion, performed at the workplace.  
To represent broad features of post-Fordist worker ideology, I analysed three representations of the 
worldview of this key SA-worker population. I claimed that each of these worldviews resolves a basic 
contradiction in these workers’ day-to-day lives, which emerges from the discordance between the original 
anti-capitalist values of their cohort and their experiences and income as free-market workers. Each of these 
worldviews, in its own way, reflects this discordance and a common resolution in the idea that individual 
and collective interests can be collapsed, thereby leaving the worker free to pursue his or her self-interest 
(and career) while still feeling socially responsible. We saw that confidence in this position has led them to 
propagate their worldview, powerfully in the case of the network cosmology, beyond the confines of their 
workplaces. 
In terms of the network cosmology, the greater good is achieved through a high rate of freely-chosen, 
technologically-aided connections or transactions between people (which happens to be a generalization of 
SA professional responsibilities). The hacker ethic promotes worker disinterest in personal profit, re-
sistance to corporate direction by ignoring or (supposedly) circumventing it, while pursuing the free exer-
cise of creativity. According to the ethic, “the good life” can be available to all through very cheap products. 
The Californian ideology proposes licence for technology companies to evolve without discipline or hin-
drance by taxes, regulations, and other governmental interventions, as a way of reconciling left and right 
political positions.  
In total, these worldviews valorize or rely on the same process, technological innovation spearheaded by 
creative workers freely following the possibilities of the technology. The “moral good” they assume for 
their activities are based on the conviction that this particular technological development (or even tech-
nology in general) is an intrinsically socially integrating and will basicly distribute “goods” broadly. Ig-
nored in their formulations are the selection processes by owner of companies and the inevitable shaping of 
social life that market activity imposes. Additionally, as we have seen, while enjoying their exciting and 
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sometimes lucrative jobs, proponents of these creeds have had to overlook deleterious impacts on other 
workers, locally or globally. These include a pervasive debt culture; the extreme polarization of wealth; and 
the requirement to do dangerous, stultifying and poorly-paid industrial labour. Even within the SA class, 
rewards are distributed unevenly, work is insecure, and technology continues to eliminate jobs. Barbrook 
and Cameron revealed the contradictions the SA class endures are particularly acute amongst the elite 
software workers based in Silicon Valley. 
Because Barbrook and Cameron’s account goes beyond abstraction to locate the heart of the SA experience, 
they provide considerable insight as to the conundrum of SAs in general. There is a very specific dilemma 
that challenges Silicon Valley SAs (i.e., whether to support state taxes) as well as a specific way that in-
congruency between cultural heritage and social status can be resolved intellectually—as a rejection of 
government. The necessary completion of this emerges as a posthierarchical worldview. Barbrook and 
Cameron’s explanation also guides us to understanding an important reason why this population (besides 
their cultural history) are avid users of wellness (i.e., neospiritual) technologies: as a way to deny de-
pendency while also signalling superiority. 
I introduced an update on the network cosmology, too. Dataism appears to extend the network cosmology 
to its logical conclusion of rejecting humanism. Harari makes a persuasive case for the dataist model of a 
world, where everything is reduced to data processing. In this world, human beings would be better to step 
back from their putative primary position on the planet and allow machines (i.e., algorithms) to assist them 
in making decisions, since the number of factors we now have to consider, and their interrelation, is simply 
beyond our current intelligence and sensing capacity. This judgment suggests the likelihood of a common 
adoption of transhumanism in the future.
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In my discussions of the rationalization of knowledge systems and the second privatization of religion, in 




 This raises obvious questions for scholars of religion. Are neospiritual practices consonant with dataism? It is most 
pertinent to understand what neospirituals––and perhaps particularly those in workplaces––accomplish by their 
activities in relation to the translation of all human activity as inputs to data-processing algorithms. For example, do all 
forms of meditation accomplish the same thing (considering, for example, that there are at least two basic approaches 
to it, the concentrative and receptive styles [Sarbacker 2005, Austin 2011])? Has there been a general selection 
amongst Western publics towards a form that meshes better with “data flow” than the other, if the differences in 




human beings if dataism (discussed as mathecization, streamlining, rationalization, and to an extent gov-
ernance) were to become the religion Hariri claims is forming. However, neither my own consideration of 
these issues, nor Harari’s short review of dataism, engages with the many questions enough to provide 
adequate answers.  
Consideration of these and related issues seen in earlier chapters and above, strongly suggest that a global 
universe of data processing will ever be substantially controlled and shaped by capitalism and that, with 
algorithmic identities based on our consumption patterns etc., elements of religion as we know it, such as 
mystery and incongruity to mention a few, will be repressed. However, these arguments may not tell the 
whole story, and subsequent research must explore this. The global dataist world may actually be larger 
than the economy. Despite its current capture by concentrated capitalist power, its reach and complexity 
may create dynamics that ultimately transcend or confound the economic domain. It is important to spec-
ulate as to how randomness is introduced into the system if, as Carrette and King, Berardi, Fisher and many 





In this chapter I tie together the many ideas I developed over the course of this dissertation. The work as-
serts that there are important parallels between new worker and neospiritual cultures and then speculates on 
the reasons for and significance of these parallels by looking at neospirituality’s prevalence in post-Fordist 
workplaces. In other words, in addition to establishing that there is an elective affinity between key 
post-Fordist worker culture and neospirituality, I examined how this affinity emerged and how these 
compatible value systems were brought together in post-Fordist work sites. My conclusion was that, as part 
of the new workplace culture, neospirituality is an integral element of the mode of regulation of 
post-Fordist capitalism. 
In this dissertation, I established a set of correspondences between post-Fordist, symbolic-analytic worker 
and neospiritual cultures, in terms of both their contents and structures, to suggest that these workers have 
an elective affinity with neospirituality. I established affinities at the ideological level by comparing the 
conceptual structure of neospiritual and workplace cultures, by showing their shared cosmology, and by 
matching their values and beliefs. I revealed the similarity of practices by comparing the practical contents 
of neospirituality and workplace culture, and by identifying similarities in organizational and communica-
tions patterns as well as in attitudes towards and use of skills and knowledge. 
Moreover, I endeavoured to explain the transition of a minor popular-cultural ethos into the centres of 
global power by speculating about what the root of these parallels may be, i.e., about what brought work 
culture and neospirituality into this alignment. Towards this objective, I outlined reasons why, and the 
processes by which, neospiritual discourse and practices have been instituted and accepted in global cor-
porations. I identified the common cultural heritage of neospirituals and SA workers (the transformation of 
the 60s-70s countercultural movements in the face of the ascendency of neo-liberalism). I traced the ma-
terial influences and genealogy of the introduction and securing of neospirituality as part of workplace 
culture. I also analysed how neospiritual beliefs, practices, values and institutional forms (such as they are) 
function in society in general and in SA workplaces in particular. 
Finally I speculated on reasons for the value placed by both workers and managers in key post-Fordist 
workplaces on neospirituality in workplace culture, trying to explain why neospirituality persists and has a 
relatively prominent place there. As the result of the textual explorations of workplace culture and ne-
ospirituality documented in this dissertation, I conclude that any one of five such reasons may be in oper-




1. Neospirituality’s posthierarchical premise supports an anti-government sentiment, and so reinforces a 
common alliance of workers and management; 2. Neospirituality’s holism mutes a historical conflict be-
tween workers and management by accentuating cooperation and the idea that “all are working towards the 
same objectives;” 3. Use of neospiritual well-being commodities helps iconic workers, steeped in an ethos 
of egalitarianism, to avoid thinking about their relationship to the servant class and their superior class 
status; 4. As the mechanisms of spiritual prosumption (i.e., neospirituality), suggest that neospiritual prac-
titioners are themselves the products of their spiritual efforts, so may workers influenced by this ethos more 
easily see their work efforts as accruing personal value above and beyond the extrinsic rewards of an in-
come and social engagement; i.e., to themselves as “worker commodities;” and 5. The dematerializing 
thrust of neospirituality mirrors that of post-Fordism and the experience of its workers, as per post-Fordist 
industry’s privileging of immaterial products, its celebration of virtual relations, its dissolution of organi-
zations into ephemeral modules temporarily addressed to projects, and its streamlining of information to 
support the power of consolidated global capital (among other forms of dematerialization). This thrust also 
denies the reality of an unequal society because immaterial values are felt to rival, be superior to, or be 
substitutable for the material, and access to the immaterial is theoretically “equally-available.” In other 
words, a dematerializing ethos downplays material needs and so justifies contemporary conditions (in 
general and of work) which substitute non-material for material rewards. I further clarify these explanations 
below. 
I begin the body of this chapter by recapping the table from Chapter One that outlines affinities between 
new worker and neospiritual cultures in order to clarify several of the major terms of the comparison de-
veloped over the course of previous chapters, particularly the common streamlining or dematerialization 
seen in both post-Fordist economic and and neospiritual cultures, and the posthierarchy and holism they 
both espouse. Then, I synthesize the theoretical material around these themes and explain how they help 
constitute organizations as psytopias (i.e., products of the second privatization of religion)––the formula-
tion of which I posit is neospirituality’s ultimate contribution to new workplaces. From this synthesis I 
repeat and elaborate on the material directly above––the five reasons why we should expect neospirituality 
to be welcomed in post-Fordist workplaces. Following this, I assess the contribution of this dissertation 
relative to research in the field, consider the limitations of my analysis, and suggest future directions for 
study. I also consider where this dissertation falls short, both in terms of the goals set for it, and by other 
standards. The latter includes qualifications of my argument touched on but not thoroughly elaborated upon 
in this dissertation, as well as the lack of fieldwork to test its basic arguments. 
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The Elective Affinity of Workers for Neospirituality 
Here, for the sake of reminding the reader, I restore, somewhat refined, one of the comparison tables pro-
vided in Chapter One, that reveals the similarity of SA worker and NAS beliefs. The concepts in this table 
have been developed over the course of this dissertation.  
Table 4: Neospiritual vs. Post-Fordist workers beliefs  
Neospiritual Beliefs  Post-Fordist Workers/SA Beliefs 
Make your authentic self through spiritual 
practices; 
Make your authentic self through work experi-
ence 
The public self is false; only the essential self 
(as spirit or energy) is real and should guide 
us; roles- and rules-based (i.e., bureaucratic) 
action is stifling and inefficient to the point of 
being immoral 
Not the rule- and status-oriented, but the pas-
sionate self is the true self. Thus, work choices 
and performance should be propelled by per-
sonal passion; roles- and rules-based (i.e., bu-
reaucratic) action is stifling and inefficient to 
the point of being immoral 
Your beliefs may change; it is the journey that 
counts 
The career is not a vertical climb but a collection 
of experiences; Every element in your em-
ployment biography should say something im-
portant about you, make you more employable, 
and give you choices 
Conventionally-framed religious thought is 
oppressive and keeps people in spiritual 
straight-jackets; go beyond these boundaries 
Formal education is overrated and may even 
limit insight; experience of the world is often 
better than book learning 
God does not dominate; is more of a internal 
force that inspires passion for life  
Leaders should inspire and not oppress workers; 
special qualities, such as insight or charisma, 
not formal education or particular skills, make a 
good leader 
Human beings can range in their insight and 
spiritual awareness from low to very high, 
putting some, in the extreme cases, in com-
pany with God or the divine  
The contribution of one worker over another, 
regardless of similar training, years of work, 
etc., can be great, which justifies very differen-
tial remuneration between them 
Spiritual growth is one’s own responsibility Career-success is one’s own responsibility; do 
not expect sustained mentorship or support at 
work 
Teach and learn from fellow seekers, what-
ever their, or your, credentials 
Expect to learn from, instruct and help fel-
low-workers. Credentials do not screen you 
from any kind of work. 
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Neospiritual Beliefs  Post-Fordist Workers/SA Beliefs 
Making contacts with others provides new 
directions for finding the self 
New contacts/contracts render experience that 
adds to identity and enhances work contents and 
future prospects; always be open to new con-
tacts 
Participating in spiritual practices with others 
enhances one’s own experience; spiritual en-
ergy crosses over amongst seekers 
The synergy of the group is a source of creativ-
ity; individual passions energize all coworkers 
Different religious paths are good, but within 
limits; seek common ground with others when 
together; respect their choices, and make them 
respect yours  
Proper group behaviour requires suppressing 
inessential differences (such as “foreign” or 
parochial values or habits) unless they offer 
something needed by the team 
Social disorientation and change create stress 
requiring continuous healing practices that 
involve spiritual energizing and guidance 
Pressured work and constant organizational 
change require continuous therapy to restore 
energy and personal emotional balance  
I should profit from my efforts. Through be-
ing spiritually advanced I can embody profit. 
I should profit from my efforts. Through being 
deeply skilled, I can embody profit. 
The universe also profits from my efforts; the 
“divine consciousness” recognizes my good 
intentions and transmits them broadly. My 
personal healing heals the world. 
The world also profits from my efforts; better 
technology advances general well-being. My 
pursuit of power and wealth benefits all. 
 
Overview of Arguments 
Through a series of interrelated arguments, I have shown that neospirituality is consistent with the culture 
of post-Fordist workplaces. I have provided reasons why many new workers might accept, and managers 
and employers advance, neospirituality as an element in work culture. I suggested therefore that the re-
sponsiveness to neospirituality of these workers can be substantially accounted for on the basis of the 
personal qualities, beliefs and skills required of iconic workers in the contemporary, post-Fordist economy. 
Moreover, I established that there are specific parallels in terms of beliefs, habits and skills between ne-
ospiritual practitioners and iconic post-Fordist workers—symbolic analysts producing immaterial goods 
for a global economy. The parallels are broached initially in Chapter One, as Tables 1, 2, and 3. Tables 1 
and 2 revealed the parallels between religious institutions and practices and business institutions and 
practices in the Fordist and post-Fordist eras respectively. Table 4, above, is a reorganization of and elab-
oration of Table 3 (again, from Chapter One), the beliefs of neospirituality practitioners as compared to 
those post-Fordist symbolic analysts. 
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Beyond establishing the relationships documented in the tables, in this dissertation I provided an account of 
how Western economies changed from the Fordist to post-Fordist model and contrasted work patterns in 
the two eras. I showed that, in response to the loss of profits attendant upon increasing scarcity and costs of 
resources as well as the saturation of the American consumer market, companies began to globalize, re-
structure, and automate their operations. I recounted how these globalizing corporations took advantage of 
new technologies and their increasing power over governments to force reductions in regulatory oversight 
and labour protection, to minimize their own bureaucratic organizational structures, and to create flexible 
workers more adapted to precarious work and constantly changing employment conditions.   
As manufacturing was transferred overseas, Western economies refocussed on finance, information, cul-
tural products and services as the primary outputs. In this process, vanguard managers, advertisers and 
organizational consultants mirrored or preceded the New Age and countercultural reactions against the 
rigidity of blue-collar assembly line work and the unions that supported them as well as the organiza-
tion-man mentality of office workers created by strict rule-orientation and hierarchies of authority. Van-
guard corporate representatives realized that in the future they would need employees who could: a) think 
creatively, since novelty or uniqueness is an essential feature of cultural products; b) motivate themselves 
and support and discipline fellow employees, since managers who had done this in the past were to be 
dispensed with; c) learn to continuously upgrade knowledge of information technologies to compensate for 
the lack of organizational support staff, to satisfy personal data-processing needs and to perform more 
intensive and complex communications with fellow workers, clients and customers; d) be entrepreneurial in 
attitude, continually seeking more business opportunities for the company and work opportunities for 
themselves; e) be adventuresome in knowledge and skill-seeking, considering their formal training and 
education as only a beginning point of lifelong personal learning; and f) be flexible with regard to personal 
attachments––whether vocation, community or family-based––and adaptable in managing these non-work 
obligations or commitments. 
In this dissertation, I suggested that neospirituality is a liberal religion pushed to its extremity under the 
humanistic critique of Fordist society—the basic component of the 1960s counterculture at a time when 
capital was initiating these major changes to its functioning. Along with the counterculture, New Age 
practitioners supported the humanist backlash against the regimentation of Fordism that vanguard organi-
zational analysts also mounted. As Fordism wound down, many experienced a sense of oppression by 
large-scale technological projects, and distaste for hierarchy, bureaucracy and the reign of the expert. For 
new workers as well as New Agers, a rule-oriented, explicitly stratified, social order had no appeal. Nor 
could the newly-expanded capacities and aspirations of prospective post-Fordist workers be exercised 
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within these old working conditions. Additionally, as large pay-packets and security began to dwindle for 
assembly-line workers, they also found cause to object to the repressive nature of their work.  
Initially, along with the countercultural and political activists they joined with, New Agers expressed an-
tipathy towards capitalism per se. Over time, however, they became less involved in active political en-
gagement in favour of more passive embrace of “alternate” lifestyles. Among New Agers were a significant 
number of young experimenters with technology. I contend that once this cohort, composed of these dif-
ferent populations of youth, acquired jobs in the new economy that satisfied some of their aspirations for 
creative work, their opposition to capitalism’s military-industrial complex and desires for democratic 
workplaces were transmuted into a posthierarchical worldview, which excoriated an ancillary aspect of 
capitalism––its Fordist bureaucratic organizational form. This is a view that now grounds the ideology of 
the post-Fordist corporation in many of its echelons. In other words, the radical impulse was coopted as 
material for a managerial reform of capitalism, intended to increase productivity.  
An examination of the worldviews these workers expressed through their spokespeople as well as more 
specific practices and beliefs showed that effective work in a global world connected by these technologies 
requires a cosmology akin to that of neospirituality. In particular, neospiritual holism adduces to a teleo-
logical worldview that compares favourably to the network cosmology espoused explicitly in workplaces, 
while both validate the ethos of contemporary, post-Fordist, global capitalism.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that spirituality practices and language are particularly promoted in the 
workplaces of a broad category of post-Fordist workers, symbolic analysts. SAs most commonly experi-
ence the innovative structures of the new working conditions. They provide information products and ser-
vices. Although their material conditions vary considerably based on the continually-changing fortunes and 
foci of the enterprises in which they are typically precariously employed, as well as the progressive auto-
mation of their jobs, they represent, in general, the more successful arm of the Western middle class, even 
while the fortunes of the middle class have fallen in the half-century since post-Fordism began. Their skill 
with technology ensures their enduring value to corporations.  
Although succeeding in any work setting normally requires adopting certain attitudes and a particular 
worldview, such attitudes and vision tend to be adopted unconsciously by workers. As with any ideology, 
whatever element of this belief-structure that comes to consciousness is construed by its believers not en-
tirely as a pragmatic orientation that helps them succeed materially, but as embodying values of intrinsic 
merit. In other words, from within even the most constrained social situations, people endeavour to clear a 
small space which they deem to be “free” of discipline and endow choices within these spaces as virtuous. 
Therefore, to the extent that it is consciously entertained, a workplace ideology would not be understood by 
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its believers simply as derived from the necessities of one’s work life but to have been more-or-less freely 
chosen because of its intrinsic value––as a set of good beliefs and commitments. And because they are 
good, one wants to promote them to others. Therefore, like any other worker who believes they have some 
choice in what they do, SAs would tend to cast the necessities of their lives with an aura of virtue. In their 
case, they have the capacity to propagate their belief structure beyond the boundaries of their workplaces. I 
speculated that they did this to a considerable degree through promoting a network cosmology. 
Despite the concentration of neospiritual discourses and programs in SA workplaces, many scholarly 
models of workplace culture that I explored neglect the spiritual component of workers’ subjective expe-
rience. Worker worldviews in this literature tend to orient around workers’ skill and identification with 
technology. However, as defined by Fisher, the network cosmology steps beyond a purely secular repre-
sentation and suggests that workers have spiritual aspirations. Fisher demonstrated that in the1990s, Kevin 
Kelly, the former editor of the world’s most prestigious high-tech and cultural journal at the time, Wired, 
took on the task of idealizing network relations as a paradigm for the good society. Kelly argued that within 
the net-cultural worldview a society operated through computer-based networks could take on a mystical 
character. Through their belief in a network cosmology, SA workers have developed a vision of life that 
integrates spiritual beliefs and technological enablement, a vision with structural similarities to the ne-
ospiritual—or New Age sensu lato—worldview. 
Furthermore, supported by corporate advertising for their industries, SAs continue to disseminate this 
worldview with some degree of success. SA jobs are highly communications-oriented, so these workers are 
in a natural position to idealize and promulgate the values that they find advantageous to help them do their 
work, promote their industry and reconcile themselves to their social status. With little effort or intention, 
SAs serve as mouthpieces for the values they hold and refine in their own interests. 
The public responds to these suggestions. Essentially by valorizing internet participation and romanticizing 
the software-worker’s life, popular culture engenders in those at a considerable remove from the centres of 
software production, an increasingly enthusiastic embrace of the network model of society––of the 
worldview that Kelly promoted. The ability of those (well) outside the SA employment pool to personally 
identify with SAs is posited as based on product advertising, on the impact of the mythologizing efforts of 
industry spokespeople such as Kelly, and on the similarity of skills non-SAs develop via prosumption 
processes ––rendering experiences of immaterial labour as consumers, if not producers. I have argued that 
along with this technology-embracing ethos, the neospiritual impulse intertwined with it has also been 
spread broadly by SAs. 
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Throughout this text, I scrutinized features of both neospirituality beliefs and practices, and those associ-
ated with post-Fordist work, to find their underlying parallels and possible relations to each other. For 
example, for the work-culture terms, I raised and reflected on a number of elements of work contents and 
organization. I explored and interpreted the significance of affect labour, the integration of analysis and 
intuition in the skill-set of the SA, and team organization as a construction for euphoric engagement, a 
rationalizer of personal difference, and a structure to eliminate collective bargaining of workers, to name 
some of the themes.  
I also argued that believers in posthierarchy (though with different configurations of the belief structure) 
reject a dualistic vision of social life. New Agers express their holism by celebrating a unitive conscious-
ness, by rejecting overt structures of authority, by denying the distinction between the private and public 
self, and opposing the dualisms they consider intrinsic to “mainstream” culture. Neospirituality marks a 
move “from materialistic dualism to metaphysical monism” (Campbell 2007, 327). As a result, its adher-
ents also have an exaggerated belief in their autonomy as individuals, while underrating the potential power 
they have as citizens within a polity. Correspondingly, on the basis of the worker worldview defined by 
their spokespeople, we can infer that SA workers deny that they exercise their skills at the sole behest of 
their employers. Research suggests they experience a high degree of belief in their autonomy in, and pas-
sion for, their work. These workers report that they are working for pleasure and their own convictions, not 
merely for their own and the company’s profit.  
New workers and neospirituals are very strongly tied together through their common belief in the super-
session of social class and their convictions that “government” (read “bureaucracy,” and “formal power 
structure”) is obsolete while in the “network social order,” one’s “true self” can emerge––obviating the 
need for a persona. Effectively this exhibits a tendency to believe that the Fordist social order has been 
replaced by “no social order,” since any social order requires public selves or personae different from 
private selves. Acknowledging both a public and private self requires making a dualistic distinction, 
something both new workers and neospirituals avoid. Of course, since post-Fordism is indeed a social 
order, the dynamics of the “roles” or “faces” that people must present to the world (in the New Age par-
lance, their “false selves”) may operate differently, but they are not eliminated. The Regulation School 
theory that a mode of regulation develops in order to support a particular regime of accumulation specifi-
cally indicates that (at least) one particular type of sociality or social persona matches every form of social 
order––in the case considered here, of post-Fordism. Appropriately, scholarly analysis of new work culture 
in this regime, both in the disciplines of economics and labour analysis as well as religious studies, provide 
evidence and argument that new forms of sociality have developed and that workplaces discipline workers 
to behave in particular ways.  
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New workers and neospirituals oppose explicit markers of hierarchy in society and at work. Instead, power 
and influence are believed to be fluid and achieved through “horizontal interactions.” This belief is re-
flected in the characteristics of each cosmology. On the neospiritual side, the holistic worldview–– sup-
ported by a vision of deity so impersonal as often to be seen as pure “energy”––leads to the belief that 
individuals can influence the world body psychically or mystically, as it were––and vice versa. There is no 
need, they contend, to specifically organize into mundane human communities consulting the crude or-
ganizational paraphernalia of yesteryear in the process. One’s own desire and energy, supported by actions 
that may superficially appear to be weak gestures towards a specific social objective might spark a meme in 
the larger human community (like triggering a virus) and bring about the objective through a subtle process. 
In the work milieu, on the other hand, several organizational structures are expected to “automatically” 
strengthen equal relations among people and countervail the traditional power structures of corporations. 
These are, as noted, the network patterns of worker interactions, both within and between companies, the 
norm of working in cooperative teams, the allocation of certain managerial responsibilities (such as eval-
uating the work of colleagues) and managerial privileges (such as a degree of autonomy over work patterns) 
to these non-managers and, finally, the blurring of worker responsibilities across “professional identities” to 
equalize all (team) workers.  
I have argued that the posthierarchy ethos shared both by neospirituality practitioners and new workers 
(rendering worker rejection of overt authority structures in favour of submerged forms of supervision) plays 
into post-Fordist capitalism’s rationalization of life, information, and work-patterns. Post-Fordism works 
towards a monoculture by subjecting all domains of social life to market forces. I have recounted many 
instances in which the dynamics of this system tends to streamline or rationalize complex personal, soci-
ological and epistemological dynamics. I systematize these instances below under the theme of “demate-
rialization.” I also discussed the tendency towards a monoculture in neospirituality that is related to its 
precursor form, the New Age’s basic rejection of science and history in favour of a teleological and 
mythopoeic view of reality.  
Post-Fordist workplaces are sites of an evolving monoculture, which the neospiritual worldview supports 
on the basis of its non-dualistic, imaginative structure. In short, I assert that, on this basis if no other, ne-
ospiritual values and behaviours reflect the ideal culture within post-Fordist global companies. Addition-
ally, I considered together a number of models of workplace culture that illustrated a similar holism in their 
outlook, although with different emphases. I have argued that major elements of the network cosmology, 
the most complete of the worker cultural representations I reviewed, correlate well with basic neospiritual 
beliefs and practices.  
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To put these observations of affinities into perspective, I provided analyses by Carette and King and others 
of the evolution of New Age spirituality’s values and practices in relation to capitalist consumer and pro-
ducer operations. The thesis of the second privatization of religion appears to account for the affinities that 
these workers and New Agers exhibit, both as the two groups established themselves and up to contem-
porary times. That global corporations may be sites for psytopiae, a thesis I also explore, lends greater 
specificity and more credibility to the second privatization theory. 
In short, the arguments I made in this dissertation are that New Age spirituality, and especially, now ne-
ospirituality, is an important theme of corporate training and pursuit for company culture, particularly in the 
post-Fordist information industries. Furthermore, there are good reasons why this relationship should exist, 
related to the new immaterial products and to the nature of corporate organization to produce them. The 
population of workers in these industries is drawn from the cohort, initially, and from the class, that also 
embraced and continues to embrace New Age spirituality and its subsequent forms. The work they do and 
their social status allows them to disseminate their values. SA work practices and organizational structures 
parallel neospiritual practices and organizational structures. Different representations of the workplace 
worldview, following the general spirit of posthierarchy, such as the network cosmology, tend to reproduce 
the holism of neospirituality in their structures. For all of them their main function, as far as they are ide-
ological, appears to be to resolve both the inconsistency of a privileged workforce having populist political 
leanings as well as the contradiction of extreme individualists honing to company directives. As they appear 
to support these resolutions, neospirituality discourses and practices seem to validate the theses of the 
second privatization of religion and characterization of workplaces as psytopiae. 
However, these workplace worldviews as well as neospirituality depend on a broader culture geist––the 
reverence for the “immaterial” in contrast to impure, crude materiality. This reverence is obviously an 
endorsement, no doubt mostly unconscious, of post-Fordism’s economic engine––the production of im-
material goods over the material. I would also propose it to be a rebuff or expression of disdain for the 
Fordist working class, which, as with all of the lower classes throughout history, had to grapple with the 
stubborn resistance of the tightly-bonded atoms of material “stuff” in their day-to-day lives. Such broad 
social disdain for material and the class who worked it no doubt helps to exonerate governments, political 
parties and corporations who conspired to destroy the labour unions that supported the class.  
Dematerialization is underlain by “financialization,” which is the real trajectory of the immaterial economy. 
A financialized economy downplays the production of goods, as capitalists’ profits are increasingly made 
via their manipulation of money, an abstraction. Indeed, the ultimate immaterial product is money, and, 
even beyond the software and electronic devices that an “immaterial economy” is understood to rely on as 
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its chief driver, the production of money is increasingly the engine of the economy.
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 Typically, the con-
sultant-directed corporate “mergers and acquisitions” frenzy of the 1980s aimed at running up, or deflating, 
the stock prices of the involved companies so that corporate CEOs and high-level investors could benefit 
through their strategic investments. In addition to these practices, “financial instruments”––i.e., derivatives, 
options etc.––were devised as investment strategies directed to helping money make money without re-
quiring the inconvenient and unpredictable detour of providing goods of any kind for the consuming public. 
Dematerialization, Holism and the Creation of the Psytopia  
In this section, I synthesize the material on two broad themes that have appeared throughout this disserta-
tion and that strongly unite neospirituality and new work environments. These are the process of demate-
rialization and the idea of holism. I then connect these to the concept of psytopia, showing its relation to the 
other themes and implications for the goals of this dissertation. I argue that testing the validity of the psy-
topia construct is the proper direction for future research.  
I have discussed holism at considerable length so far in this dissertation. However, although specific de-
materializing processes have been explored in many places in this dissertation––sometimes called 
“streamlining,” “mathecization,” and “rationalization”––I have not explicitly drawn together these analyses 
under the underlying theme of dematerialization, as I do below. An important reason that I call neospirit-
uality an appropriate ethos for SA workers is on the basis of the many forms of dematerialization seen in the 
economic structure and workplaces. This process is also recognizable in broader cultural processes. Below, 
I list and recap these modalities of dematerialization, including of work, of the corporation, of society, of 
information, of history etc. I show that dematerialization has occurred in the economy, in culture, and in 
religion (i.e., as neospirituality). 
I argue that all of these forms have the effect of sacralising the ephemeral and abstract, resulting in a popular 
ideology that professes the relative unimportance of material structures and supports to quality of life. This 
disregard for such structures and supports extends to discounting the modalities and realities of materiality–
––history and geography––which recount and retain the integrity of discrete times and places respectively. 
However, in terms of popular culture and the culture of work, I concentrate on the effects of demateriali-





52c1b; and http://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/novdec-2014/frenzied-financialization/ 
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the immaterial, and so effectively underplays the impact of human material deprivation, as it also fails to 
censure material glut––as if there were no limit to the material supports an individual human body can 
accommodate. Because of their trade in immaterial commodities and services, and because consolidated 
global corporate power can only be sustained virtually through data-processing and communications 
technologies, agents of the global information and communications industries––SAs, their managers, and 
corporate CEOs––celebrate if not sacralise the dematerialization process which, integrated with a holistic 
worldview, allows them to turn a blind eye to the ever-growing material inequality that the global he-
gemony of consolidated corporate capital is imposing on the world. 
In addition to providing an account of SA work’s value that makes these workers complicit in this system, 
the celebration of dematerialization, interpreted through holism, also turns the tables on the workers 
themselves, by deflating their potential demands for better (as in more stable) and, possibly, more remu-
nerative work. When immaterial rewards (e.g., in particular, the joy of creative accomplishment) are held in 
high regard, an SA’s possible demand for better material rewards or more opportunities for rest and rec-
reation may appear to be trivial. Hence a dematerialization ethos enhances the likelihood of worker ex-
ploitation, as workers dutifully ignore that their mobile and precarious employment means they lack the 
material markers of a settled life that has historically been a prerequisite for a happy and enriched life––
even a spiritually-enriched life. In essence, in terms of the worker, the dematerialization ideology has the 
effects of conditioning workers to low material rewards or, in the case of workers who are overcompensated 
materially, to ignore the deprivation of their would-be colleagues.  
Furthermore, it would seem that a company can only become a psytopia, which transfers worker spiritual 
growth to the corporate entity, if the value of dematerialization is added to those of holism and posthier-
archy in company ideology. They all contribute to an understanding of the corporation not as a social group 
but as an amalgam of people with psyches—precondition for the psytopia. Posthierarchy beliefs reject the 
signs and symbols of hierarchy, specialization, and class status. This is equivalent to rejecting that human 
groups are made up of social beings with different roles and degrees of influence. Rather than accept the 
corollary that groups are composed of essentially similar units, interchangeable in any position, neospir-
ituals must posit that people are distinguishable on different grounds, which can only be personal. Without 
status or position markers, distinctions can only be made about individuals on psychological grounds. This 
leads to asking how psyches without society interact. The dematerialistic celebration of emotive, psychic 
and energetic effects allows for the hypothesis the people relate through sympathy and identification. If we 
then ask how these mutually-sympathetic people can work together (without individual responsibilities or 
rules of interaction) the holistic ethos can be consulted. This leads to the idea that unity emerges organi-
cally, informally, or mysteriously. Finally, in terms of post-Fordist workplaces, as Leinberger and Tucker 
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argue, under their special history and conditions, one identity concentrates and becomes the repository of 
the others’ subjectivity––the corporation. Hence, posthierarchy, holism and dematerialization are aspects of 
the same phenomenon. They interrelate and, together, enable psytopias.
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Below, I gather the material appearing in various chapters throughout the dissertation on the themes of 
dematerialization, holism and psytopia. I begin with the dematerialization theme. I describe the various 
forms of dematerialization that the post-Fordist regime of accumulation creates, which manifest in the 
larger world as well as workplaces, as I also itemize the tendencies towards dematerialization seen in the 
neospirituality ethos. All told, the many forms of dematerialization I list extend to the economic, the cul-
tural and the spiritual spheres of life.  
Dematerialization   
Dematerialization is seen in post-Fordist worker culture, and the post-Fordist regime at large. Other terms 
for dematerialization, used in various places in the text, are streamlining, mathecization, and rationaliza-
tion. As we have seen, dematerialization is a key element of the neospirituality ethos. Forms of demateri-
alization are discussed below, beginning with neospirituality as religious dematerialization. 
Religious Dematerialization 
Traditional religious communities are physical communities, attached to localities. Furthermore, in their 
weightly presence––as the material bases of their traditions––churches, synagogues, mosques, etc., impose 
on communities. Physical buildings symbolize the community’s religious obligations and delineate part of 
community space as not fully universally deployable, but sacred. They reflect the distinctions between 
different kinds of space common to traditional communities. By contrast, the material culture of neospir-
ituality is very lightly worn. Religion as spirituality is partly dematerialized through its decoupling from the 
purpose-built physical structures of the traditions. By eschewing these imposing physical manifestations, 
neospirituals show that they do not respect the parochial prejudices, convention or encrustations of tradi-





 Close scrutiny of these connections offers a more expanded definition of psytopias than has heretofore been 
suggested, because the analysis shows that psytopias now exist beyond the confines of workplaces, such as, crucially, 
social media feeds––they represent any social structure subsumed by a corporate identity in which action amongst 
participants (transactions), although ostensively simply purposeful, in the process necessarily pay honour or tithe to 
the hosting entity, identified by the corporate brand. Essential to this definition is that identity-development within the 
psytopia is a motivating element of the action of participants and contained by that psytopia. 
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As Vincent Miller (2005) makes clear, religious traditions embody at some basic level, precisely, histories 
and geographies of groups of people. The particular circumstances of the production and use of religious 
ideas, symbols, or structure, help compose them. Therefore, neospirituality’s selection of elements from 
different religious traditions for redeployment destroys their relation to those particular circumstances, with 
a partial loss of significance. The elements are streamlined because they become cellular and can be re-
composed in relation to any other elements. With the loss of their historical and geographical references, as 
they are redeployed or recomposed, they also lose their imposing character. From a narrative point of view, 
they become, effectively, interchangeable. When traditional religious symbols are deployed as “floating, 
shallow, post-modern signifiers unrelated to one another or to particular communities and practices, in-
terpretation and syntheses, [they] will have little practical impact…. [and] no cultural friction” (Miller 
2005, 66). The weight of their cultural accretion is alleviated in the streamlined flow of neospirituality.  
Even traditional church congregations now mirror the practices of businesses which formerly sought to own 
much of their material infrastructure, but have since sold much of it. Struggling with costs, congregations 
have divested themselves of their buildings and land, to share spaces with other, different traditions or to 
move into more anonymous structures (if the communities still exist). From the point of view of “sunk 
costs” of a community grounded in its investments, even traditional religious institutions have been 
ephemeralized. 
In terms of neospirituality, this thrust has manifested in the rejection of the church institution and its rituals 
and authority structures, which are felt to impose a “deadening potential” on one’s religious growth. Indi-
vidualistic seeking for a personal religious reality, the emphasis on feeling to identify it, and the pragmatism 
inherent in the seeking process all stem from the rejection of external authority as a source of religious 
direction. This anti-institutional conviction continues to play out and is quite dispersed throughout the 
North American and European populations––who regularly admit that they are “spiritual but not religious.”  
Networked relations, the largely ephemeral relationships we found in the post-Fordist workplace, are an-
other sign of dematerialization, and networking is also the most prevalent form of neospiritual social rela-
tions. Through networks neospirituals realize their continuing pursuit of training courses, events, and 
techniques that might further establish or re-establish the connection to the (inner) self. The flat social 
world of networks, which produces a “decentralized sphere of ever-flowing, multiple, and ad hoc assem-
blages” (Fisher 2010) seems like a perfect expression of the “client and audience cults” of neospirituality 
(L. Dawson 2006). Along with workers, neospiritual practitioners are “autonomous nodes” and defined by 
their connections to other nodes in the network" (Fisher 2010, 212). 
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Dematerialization is also seen in neospirituality's emphasis on the interchangeability of matter and energy, 
its demands for energetic effects from its practices, and its tendency to describe the world and people in 
terms of energy. Interest in the transhuman who, as explained earlier, is integral to the technolo-
gy-celebrating culture of SAs, converges with neospiritual values with respect to the latter’s denigration of 
the material in contrast to the energetic form. Indeed, belief in energetic connection is the ground for ne-
ospirituality's holism. All is interconnected, so that what the individual does, and wills, influences the wider 
world, whilst the latter also affects individuals at the subtle level.  
It follows that consciousness must be conceived as not discrete and separated, but rather as blending, to 
varying degrees and unevenly, into an environmental entity of some sort. A network model is a formulation 
of a “whole” structure, and one of the unresolved questions of this dissertation is about the degree to which 
these two models cohere. However, the network model of sociality complements well the "weak, this 
worldly-mystical” belief-structure of neospirituality. Weak-this-worldly mysticism also suggests a dema-
terializing tendency. New Agers are ambivalent about the value of material existence. They want to commit 
neither to full engagement in the self-evidently-material world, as Pagans do (York 1995), nor to the un-
seen, discrete and coherent world of transcendentalism.  
The emphasis on transactions or relationships is another aspect of dematerialization. In a world of energetic 
flows, fluid identities, and weak loyalties, the moments of transaction with others offer tentative identities. 
Where identity is continually forming and dissolving, staving off the worst effects of anomie is achieved by 
“being in the game.” In this world, to “move,” to invoke and revoke connection, helps maintain meaning. In 
his definition of spiritual prosumption, A. Dawson” (2013, 138) features the “transition” as an essential 
dynamic of the neospiritual ethos. According to his thesis, the spiritual good is “obtained as the outcome 
(product) of a transitional process through which the individual has moved from point a to point b. Whereas 
the self is the producer and consumer, the product of spiritual prosumption is, in his model, the transition 
itself.  
Post-Fordist Dematerialization 
In this dissertation, I showed many ways in which post-Fordism dematerializes. In many contexts, corpo-
rations appropriate and streamline the lifeways of embodied humanity by enabling, with and through this 
dematerialization, a continuous stream of exchange. I have also used the concept of streamlining in the text 
to describe these processes. Some authors—following Weber (1978)—would call it “rationalization.” In 
the immaterial economy, the dead weight of matter is replaced by the vivacity of energy and information. 
Indeed, as per the financialization of the economy through post-Fordism discussed above, the most fluid or 
“vivacious” form is that of money itself. In the transnational, insecure, project-driven work-world, preju-
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dices and habits, the comfort of familiar space and aesthetics, and earth-bound ties to communities and 
histories are given up. The rhythmic character of life based in organic realities, the diurnal and secular 
patterns, and the slow building up and clearing away that are features of heavy, Fordist materiality, be-
comes muted. Through dematerialization, differences are abstracted and trivialized.  
Because it moves to close off possibilities of human life that cannot be monetized, capitalism has been 
opposed, to some degree or another, throughout its history. Post-Fordism has accelerated this process of 
closing off possibilities that cannot be monetized or may activate opposition to capitalism. The demateri-
alizing elements of neospirituality suggest that it, too, is tied up in this process. Indeed, Carrette and King 
(2005, 135) relate spirituality to capitalism, as “an extension of the economic rationality of the marketplace 
into the realm of fundamental human beliefs.” 
I have shown examples of capitalist dematerialization or rationalization throughout the disserta-
tion—particularly, of course, in workplaces. These include:  
 promotion of the therapeutic self, which depends on an identity defined by a personal 
discourse with limited choices of narrative structures;  
 commodification of information that threatens to degrade scholarly autonomy and the 
incommensurate nature of scholarly standards for different disciplines—as well as close 
off the “public” nature of the internet;  
 “pure business culture” demanded in corporate teams, which suppresses the expressions of 
diversity of members unless their non-universal values and habits can contribute towards 
products;  
 recent neoliberal suppression of governmental authority formerly found in a negotiated 
relationships with economic interests (as part of traditional Fordism, which had enabled 
dynamic tension between different modalities of social decision-making through demo-
cratically-structured discourses);  
 reduction of modes of apprehension and thought, to a supposed binary of only two mutu-
ally-exclusive alternatives, rationality and irrationality (precluding judgement, which in-
tegrates the two). “Irrationality” appears as desire (to consume), and the “rational” as the 
cost-benefit analysis exerted in the process of executing consumption acts; 
 increasing provision of social goods through markets and accompanying exclusion of 
non-commodifiable options;  
 interpretation of the workplace as the home by supplying its typical amenities, coupled 
with intensive work schedules that have employees “living” at workplaces––thereby sub-
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ordinating to the point of extinction personal lives that focus on interests and objectives 
other than work lives. In other words: the degradation of boundaries between work-life and 
non-work-life forced on workers, ruling out retention of time and energy for genuinely 
personal development and social connection; 
 capitalism’s reduction of citizens to either producers, consumers, or managed outsiders 
with no essential authority in the world community;  
 and, finally, through exclusion, the attack on selves who seek to protect a private self or an 
identity not defined in terms of productivity.  
Below, I organize these points into various types of dematerializations.   
Of the self. Integrated into networks, the post-Fordist self is virtual and disembodied. Furthermore, human 
consciousness is conceived not as discrete and separated from that of others but, through the technology of 
networks, as blending into a collective brain. Persons see themselves as partly absorbed into networks. 
Identity is therefore ephemeral, and achieved only tenuously and temporarily by forging connections and 
advancing intellectual and affective flows. By these standards, existence can be snuffed out, once connec-
tion to the network is lost, making existence itself precarious. 
Of products. Dematerialization of products is clearly the thrust of the emphasis on services, information, 
and cultural products as the main drivers of the economy. Above I clarified that this pushed to its extreme is 
financialization, which is a major thrust to the contemporary economy. The transformation of rec-
ord-keeping and communications technologies to digital formats is another aspect of this process.   
Of businesses. Post-Fordist business processes also aim at dematerializing the corporation itself. The ideal 
corporation is represented as a pure transmitter of information. Vertical disintegration of formerly-Fordist 
companies in favour of small, self-employed units continuously serving each other in network relations on 
a just-in-time basis (but overseen by and dominated by corporate near-monopolies) all increase the speed of 
circulation of commodities, and reduce “bottle-necks.” Another bottleneck of the past, which obstructed 
easy “flow” in business relations, was the Fordist-era tripartite agreement between corporations, govern-
ments and unions to maintain healthy communities and a generally equal and high standard of living (as 
discussed in Chapter Five). Under this rubric, corporations were subjected to more laws and regulations in 
their operations, as well as informal standards, which forced them to meet other criteria in their operations 
besides the purely economic and also restrained them from monopolization and price-fixing, which are not 
in the public interest. As noted, eliminating these restrictions was a paramount goal of the emerging 
post-Fordist global corporations, achieved with Thatcherism and Reaganism.  
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Of the work process. The suppression of cultural differences within “pure business culture” is a form of 
dematerialization. Except for those that can provide content for products or serve to increase productivity, 
suppressed differences include habitual loyalties to ethnicity, locality, and family, rooted in geography and 
history. The flat organizational form is also another way to streamline operations. For example, the 
“broadbanding” of job descriptions and consequent diversity of skills and practices expected of 
team-players reduces the inefficiency of employing underutilized specialists. Reliance on temporary labour 
forces and the team work structure allows organizations to dispense with forms of costly and cumbersome 
managerial oversight. For example, the regulatory structure of formal employee performance reviews is 
weakened. Instead, employee supervision and evaluation become part of the production process. As much 
as possible, regulation is avoided and “decisions” are made automatically. Worker surveillance is knitted 
into the work process by such means as managerial insistence on peer reviewing, and programming worker 
productivity analysis into the workplace tools of employees. Alternatively (or additionally), team leaders 
may make informal judgements of a team-member’s performance, which may impact whether he or she is 
given the all-important referral to future work (the “employability card”). Such decisions can prevail 
without the right of challenge or rebuttal.  
The emphasis on transactions as the basic structure of SA business relations is another aspect of demate-
rialization, also seen in neospirituality. In the business world, a highly-interactive work style is lauded as 
creative, ingenious and/or entrepreneurial. 
Of information. The commodification of knowledge into a massive, rationalized set of databases (by no 
means completed) provides the richest corporations with unassailable positions of dominance within all 
contests that require that knowledge for success. Harvey (1989) made clear that, since wealth and political 
power are the definitive criteria for gaining access to data, powerful global corporations have undisputable 
control of “big data” and provide themselves with the best economic and political opportunities as a result. 
Additionally, post-Fordist authorities have also been eager to eliminate materially-encoded information 
(i.e., paper documentation) as it has a certain weight and limitation on accessibility and assimilability that 
thwarts global capital`s control over its contents. This materially-encoded information also maintains 
legacy connections to social subgroups, such as self-managing professional groups, whose power also 
threatens global capital. Associated with its material encodement, and either by chance or design—i.e., due 
to complexity, specialized language, or gatekeeping functions, as well as lack of reproducibility—access to 
knowledge has been generally restricted in the past (Innis 1971). 
Also, traditional knowledge bases have different standards of validity and different discursive languages, an 
understanding of which is required for intelligibility. In an environment of commodification of knowledge 
270 
 
these are “bottlenecks” that have to be “cleared up” by the digitization of knowledge. Reducing the dif-
ferences within mutually-incongruent discourses makes its various components more easily priced and 
traded. Lui (2004, 6-7) argues that this has been achieved: 
Networked IT crossed a threshold of scale in the mid-1990s beyond 
which… competitive models of knowledge work, once rooted 
semi-autonomously in academic, business, media, health-industry, gov-
ernment, and other sectors, suddenly seemed to fuse into a single, parsi-
monious continuum—so-called, worldwide—able to afford just one 
global understanding of understanding.  
Carrette and King reiterate this concern for the narrowing of diversity in the study of human beings that is 
based on the growing elimination of discordant or incommensurable discourses through the suppression of 
the humanities and social sciences, the hegemony of economic discourse, and the subjugation of da-
ta-collection in general to security concerns (Diebert 2013). Because of narrowing objectives, these models 
are “established through an ever-reducing horizon for framing the individual and an increase in forms of 
measurement” Carrette (2007, 55).  
Furthermore, traditional knowledge is often embodied in the activities of craftspeople, guild-members, 
homemakers––all kinds of locally-connected and engaged citizens. Therefore, the computerization of 
skill—its conversion to a digital format—is, correspondingly, a “knowledge streamlining” strategy. Before 
work can be automated, the conventional ways of doing it must be explicated through interviews and 
work-study. “Useless,” idiosyncratic or local methods are dropped and the traditional ways are reformu-
lated or rationalized, as procedures to be automated. This process results in the elimination of local novelty 
as well as workers’ private skill-sets (Huws 2003). 
Of society. Relocating the power to define social needs from public institutions to the market is a form of 
dematerialization of society, as far as possible eliminating the inefficiency of accommodating a debating, 
deciding and voting citizenry. The general satisfaction of needs through markets, instead of through public 
institutions developed, guided and funded by governments, eliminates the resource-depleting slowness of 
the public debate often required before decisions can be made. With the market the primary mode of social 
interaction, debates about the form and models of delivery of a particular social good can be cut short. 
Providing opportunities for the public’s reflection and consensus-building, which participatory institutions 
require, is circumvented.  
Although obligations now assigned to the market that were once governmental responsibilities (for exam-
ple, highways) are assuredly related to materiality, when these are privatized, the discourses about ways to 
provide for such social needs are reduced or eliminated. Commercialized services tend to build on what 
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exists (such as by charging tolls on already existing, but privatized, highways). Significant changes in 
direction (such as, say, developing more elaborate rail services and reducing road service), are generally 
only undertaken by governmental bodies that have attained a degree of public endorsement on the basis of 
political debates. Such debates get preempted by commodification. As I have noted, Teresa Brennan 
(2000), shows us that a major function of commodities is precisely to avoid debate and have things and 
services appear to us “impersonally” or “automatically,” as it were. Because markets are assumed to ef-
fectively satisfy social goods, such as equality (or rather, equal access), they circumvent reflection on the 
value of such goods. Therefore, commercialization connotes a streamlining of debate about the provision of 
services (and the nature of the social goods they confer). The viewpoints on such issues by the institutions 
of religion, government, and the judiciary have been increasingly appropriated by finance capital itself  
(Carette and King 2005, 29).
100
 In short, the parochial, the sources of meaning developed through confer-
ring community members expressing their interests, is suppressed (Sandel 2012). These are circumventions 
of discourse grounded in political localities that I call the “dematerialization of discourse.” 
Neoliberal governmentality, as discussed in Chapter Three, perhaps represents the ultimate dematerializa-
tion of society. If neither society in general, nor the subgroups that compose it are considered the source of 
good or goods, but rather, the individual must procure all goods for him/herself, both “social value” and 
social capacity are theoretically condensed into the qualities and capacities of individuals. According to this 
model, society changes organically as individuals autonomously enter and depart the flurry of activity 
organized as networks (i.e., the neoliberal collectivity). This is streamlining because it refuses to recognize 
affinity groups with boundary conditions, and the fact that governments can support (or suppress) indi-
viduals indirectly, through support (or suppression) of such groups. Instead, they operate through “the 
institutionalization of individuality” (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). If no “collectives” or demographic 




 Meanwhile, and especially over time, the restriction of possible alternative ways to satisfy a social need, instituted 
through consumerism, is not readily apparent to consumers as they consume, and so is not raised to the level of 
reflection. Within the domain of the market, obligations stemming from different affiliations are allowed to lapse and 
be forgotten, leaving only the hidden obligation to market standards. Social dynamics are embedded, but hidden, 
within the commodity, as Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism (1985) explains. Chiefly, workplace conflicts 
endemic to production are not revealed in the product. Altogether, the hegemony over social life claimed by neoliberal 





complications and public costs of social management that have to do with balancing interests––a traditional 
role of (at least) Fordist governments.   
Of history. Our discussions of teleological worldviews, especially as expressed by the network cosmology, 
show that in post-Fordism, history is “rationalized” by being effectively eliminated. I reiterate Fisher’s 
argument: “According to the digital discourse, network technology constitutes the teleological climax of 
the history of not only technological progress but also information, binarism, and indeed the universe. 
[These processes] represent a technological (and, in turn, social) revolution in the original sense of the 
word: a return to the very essence of nature and the universe” (Fisher 2010, 216).  
The network cosmology mirrors the neoliberal worldview in terms of this dynamic. The neoliberal ethos, 
which undergirds post-Fordism, proffers that a perfect world is on the horizon, but achievable only when 
certain obstructive forces (such as "socialist" governments, labour unions, and other market distortions) 
have been vanquished. The nature of the perfect world is assumed. Debates about the good of society and 
actions to intervene to actively bring about novel outcomes that are deemed desirable based on those de-
bates only get in the way of the “natural” process of evolution towards a market society. Hence, citizens are 
not required to act historically (i.e., to develop new ways to create the common good as their potential is 
made apparent over time and as unpredicted new conditions arise). On the contrary, citizens should just be 
foot-soldiers in the struggle to oppose such debates and actions––except as far as they free the market. That 
history is evolutionary and a “pure spirit” works through it is the historicist viewpoint. Although “change” 
can be recognized, its ultimate trajectory is known. Given this, one’s proper actions are also fore-ordained–
–to press in the predictable direction.  
Hence, neoliberalism and neospirituality pattern history and humanity’s relation to it in the same way––all 
we can do, and what we must do, is assist the Universal Spirit in realizing itself. Neoliberalism’s proponents 
insist that the inevitable must nevertheless be pursued and so conflate the “is” and “ought” in the same way 
as do believers in neospiritual holism. At the same time, neoliberal conviction that good outcomes are 
embedded in present realities––except that the requisite ingredients have not been added or that the nec-
essary evolution has not yet occurred––displays the magical thinking also found in the holistic worldview. 
Purportedly, there is a reality “more true” than present conditions (no matter how brutish may be the 
life-conditions of the average citizen, now) rendering these conditions illusory. As the economy wends its 
way to perfect freedom there may, in fact, have to be casualties. So, present outcomes are justified and in a 
sense as good as the projected perfect future because they mark the desired progress. 
With this way of thinking, any accounting for the quality of the neoliberal model is continually deferred. 
Because its free play is always struggling to emerge in the context of perverse restraints (i.e., the market 
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distortions, i.e., citizen-activists and governments trying to gain some control over capital) the failure to 
witness perfect conditions in the present is endlessly attributable to these negative intrusions or lapses 
(parallel to how magicians explain magic’s failures). Since it projects the realization of a perfect system 
with no anomalous elements, this perfect future is a prophecy with no more reliability than one claiming 
“God will appear in his (sic) fully glory” at such and such a time or under certain conditions, a millenialist 
prediction of many traditional religions in one form or another. Universal perfection is endlessly deferred; 
in the meantime we should all have faith and accept our suffering as the cost of that future paradise, when 
certain "internal" or systemic principles are allowed to operate freely. In neoliberal language this is the 
market. In that of the network cosmology, it is unimpeded network transactions—which only the free 
market allows. In neospiritual language, this is submission to the evolving (but determined) “whole.” 
Holism: Resolving the Individual-Group Contradiction   
I described New Age holism in Chapter Two. While holistic beliefs construe a strong connection between 
oneself and one’s environment, this connection is essentially an energetic one. Neospirituality rejects the 
idea of the enlightened autonomous individual whose actions are directed purely by rational judgements. 
Feeling is considered at least as valid as reason as a guide for action or an indicator of truth. The influence 
of the individual and the whole is mutual. Because it is signals from the environment, registered as ener-
getic effects and feeling, that influence popular understanding and actions, so also do personal feelings and 
actions have a subtle effect on the world beyond the immediate purview of the person. Following a systemic 
model, neospiritual believers contend that apparently small interactions with others can, by mysterious 
processes, have powerful effects on the whole social order.  
In neospirituality, the notion of vested power, supported by class structures that dictate greater impact from 
some sources over others, is played down. Granted, it is understood that some human actions have greater 
impact than others, but this difference is not definable in advance by any rationally-developed conceptual 
structure, such as class analysis. The nature and degree of influence of individual acts (including commu-
nications acts) depend on a variety of unknowable factors. In any case, neospirituality adopts the idea that 
one is unavoidably connected with the whole, such that even small actions may have strong impacts on the 
whole universe. In fact, one’s very existence influences the course of history in unpredictable ways. With 
good intentions, everyone can be a participant in a creative (i.e., positive) evolution of the universe. This 
belief alludes to the millenarianism of New Age spirituality. 
Holistic worldviews basically minimize power and social-structural contradictions. Such worldviews also 
seem to ignore that actions can be intentionally and strategically chosen to have large impacts based on an 
understanding of power dynamics. In short, the holistic model precludes political analysis and strategies 
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designed to intentionally muster public support and pressure to shape the management of common re-
sources in certain ways, i.e., to influence public policy. Holistic believers prefer to overlook the fact that 
self-conscious and delineated collectivities can act to resist change or press for genuine disruptions.  
The emphasis on the corporation as a setting for information flows discussed earlier in this chapter is one of 
the key indicators that post-Fordist workplaces are seen as holistic operations. The teamwork structure 
found in them is another. Recognizing the specifics of the cosmologies of new workplaces, as defined in 
this and the preceding chapter, allows us to sharpen our focus on this topic. In Chapter Seven, we discussed 
the importance and pervasiveness of the concept of posthierarchy. In Chapter Eight, I highlighted three 
inter-related models of worker worldviews that display varying degrees of holism. These were the network 
cosmology, the hacker ethic, and the Californian Ideology. 
In Chapter Seven, we saw that the concept of posthierarchy was not only a guiding principle of job rede-
signers motivated to empower employees in flat organizations during the 1970s and 80s, but a value still 
espoused by managers and workers in post-Fordist corporations today. This is chiefly seen in the pervasive 
criticism in management literature and workplaces of its supposed alternative, the hierarchical, bureaucratic 
organizational form of Fordist corporations and governmental structures. Critics deride classical bureau-
cratic organizational charts, which delineate levels of authority and responsibilities, as following a mech-
anistic model. Such models are typically associated with old sciences such a Newtonian physics or Linnean 
taxonomies. In Fordist companies, with their hierarchical organizational structures, managers with greater 
power dictate to lower-level employees, while no recursion allows the reverse. Lines of authority define 
who gives instructions to whom.  
The three positive expressions of worker worldviews have significant similarities to one another. The 
analysis in this dissertation has shown that the major contradiction of the post-Fordist economy today is 
radical inequality, seen first and foremost in the astronomical elevation of CEO, high-level management, 
and corporate-owner profits, but also with the different life-prospects of an elevated segment of the former 
middle class as compared to a larger proportion of its members subjected to structural unemployment and 
economic marginalization. Awareness of this inequality is naturally suppressed in a class-organized social 
structure with democratic pretensions––and those who benefit by it naturally facilitate this suppression. 
Having an affinity with the excluded through prosumption processes, the successful high-tech and other SA 
workers can be efficient agents of this suppression. I have argued that the three SA worldviews highlighted 
appear to be trying to denythat structural inequality grounds SA social privilege. Each worldview evinces 
different concerns on the surface. The Californian ideology compares the importance of Fordist (Keynes-
ian) governmental economic intervention with market direction. The hacker ethic deliberates over whether 
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software workers are social visionaries with an unprecedented emancipatory tool at their disposal or simply 
workers with valuable skills to sell. The network cosmology addresses the proper priority in social life of 
personal freedom as compared to social justice. 
As these worldviews posit an organic connection between the individual and the whole (and pass over the 
class-structure and inequality narratives), they can be called holistic. The latter point is particularly true of 
the network cosmology. It is also the most comprehensive of the three worldviews. The network cosmology 
draws from the image of the open, learning, AI system, itself a cybernetic model influenced by the theory of 
biological processes. Networks are understood to realize collective preferences for social organization by 
way of an unintentional, systemic summation or synthesis of all of the interactions of their myriad partic-
ipants. Density of transactions creates social intelligence, which creates a good society. Almost mystically, 
network dynamics create a world of freedom and a measure of social justice. The network cosmology ap-
pears to mirror the New Age holistic model most strongly.  
Although each of the cosmologies is limited by its own terms, these cosmologies are, indeed, descriptions 
of the same world, the SA workplace. It is presumed that some loose combination or synthesis of them 
contributes towards an SA worker worldview, if, together, they do not fully define it.  
In general, these cosmologies point at a concern for the collective good in the context of personal interests. 
Post-Fordism certainly did not create this dilemma. Grappling with this fundamental conflict of interest 
underscores all socioethical discourse. In the case of privileged members of society, the debate gains sa-
lience. Indeed, the progenitors of these workers, early hackers and counterculturalists, as well as New 
Agers, pursued a vision of the greater good, in the vein of post-millenarianism. Accordingly, I argue that an 
idealistic worldview was an inheritance of early post-Fordist worker culture from the beginning. I have 
further argued that privileged high-tech workers have adapted the culture from which they emerged, the 
culture of equality and inclusion. They must now reconcile themselves to the unequal society from by 
which they benefit. They must rationalize individual self-interest as a contribution to collective good. Since 
they reject the idea of collective bargaining or any other form of collective behaviour, they accomplish this 
by believing in some form of a holistic worldview.  
The Psytopic Resolution 
According to the characteristics of the religious holism that neospirituality inherited from New Age spir-
ituality, it also follows that the neospiritual belief system is also concerned to resolve the individual- versus 
group-interest contradiction. However, as I have argued, holistic worldviews largely resolve the debate by 
dismissing it. Those in privileged positions collapse the contradiction by arguing that their own good con-
stitutes or serves the good of others. Adopting the concept of “trickle-down economics,” which describes a 
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basic trope of neoliberalism (i.e., that even those at the economic bottom of a free-market regime benefit by 
the wealth of those at the top), these workers adapt their cosmologies to neoliberalism and, hence, 
post-Fordism. Finally, on the same bases, neospirituality itself is highly congruent with the post-Fordist 
order. As an ingredient of culture and so an element of the post-Fordist mode of regulation, it supports the 
post-Fordist regime of accumulation. 
If, however, those workplace cosmologies, such as the network cosmology, have ideals embedded in them, 
why is the additional layer of spiritual meaning required in workplaces? If these ideologies are so effective, 
why is neospirituality a common element of workplace culture? Can there be other contradictions in 
workplaces that these worldviews do not address, or does neospirituality simply reinforces the other cos-
mologies by helping mystify them and so make them more effective, by covering up their contradictions in 
a vague but reassuring discourse? Alternatively stated, neospirituality must have a different role than re-
solving the contradictions that the other three worldviews address, or it must do so in a different and more 
meaningful way. Or, it may address a different workplace contradiction entirely. 
In the following section I argue that neospirituality does indeed help mystify the collapse of the distinction 
between the collective and individual interests, but it does this primarily for a different collapse than the 
workplace cosmologies address. Shifting focus to this different collapse foregrounds a deep irony in the 
experience of SAs––that the collapse of interests that neospirituality glosses over or masks is that between 
the corporation and the worker—as both the theories of the second privatization of religion and corporate 
psytopiae suggest. These two theses” explain different aspects of the dynamics of the transfer of agency 
from the worker to the corporation wherein the corporation comes to be seen less as a social world and more 
of a collective “soul,” allegiance to which must be managed through elaborate mystification of the indi-
vidual worker psyches, so that this translation of agency is hidden.  
The theories of the second privatization of religion and corporate psytopiae, which I elaborated upon in 
Chapter Three, address the processes of the collapse of individual worker and corporate interests in the 
latter’s favour as well as the dedication of worker effort and subjectivity to “the corporation’s soul.” Ac-
cording to Leinberger and Tucker (2010), a psytopia is an organizational culture that results from the 
elaborate process that encourages the assimilation of personal goals to company goals, while still main-
taining a mystique of employee autonomy. It is a hybrid of the humanism introduced into organizational 
ideology in the early post-Fordist period and traditional HR strategies, as they support accountancy or 
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management “by the numbers.”
101
 The psytopia’s resolution of worker and company goals is achieved by 
converting worker interest in self-actualization into the desire to make the employing company a living, 
soulful agent. In a psytopia, striving to reach deep repositories of personal energy and self-understanding to 
achieve spiritual and objective goals has become essential for vitalizing the corporation. A holistic way of 
thinking is necessary for this transposition to work. “Holistic, in this place, means a complete cam-
paign—not just body and mind, but feeling too, to get compliance” (Leinberger and Tucker 2010, 189). 
Contemporary workplaces become psytopiae to address the contradiction between work as self-actualizing 
and work as devoted to the corporation’s bottom line. The solution is to upload and encapsulate the sup-
posed personal objectives of workers, and redefine them according to a broader goal—the self-realization 
of the corporation. In a sense, we could call this the “return of the repressed.” In pre-modern societies in-
dividual self-actualization was subsumed to the actualization of the group (e.g., family, clan, tribe, com-
munity, or church). Now, the collective identity is provided by the corporation. Individual self-actualization 
is realized under the more general term of the corporation.
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Descriptions of this process have used other language. I have reviewed commentary by Driver, Lazzarato, 
Berardi and Goldschmidt-Salamon, among others. It amounts to the well-established charge that the capi-
talist company drains the worker of their life-force. One way or another, all powerful assertions, these 
authors argue that the worker’s interest gets assimilated to that of the corporation in this era. However, the 
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101 Managing by economic objectives has been the standard in companies in one form of another throughout 
capitalism’s history. It was interrupted briefly and incompletely by the philosophy of managing by “quality” 
standards, during which the ethos of employee self-actualization through work (emerging from humanism) was given 
particular attention. Some practices that emerged at this time persist, and ground—arguably to an exaggerated 
degree—the belief in corporate posthierarchy, a basic trope of post-Fordist ideology.  
102 Crucially, then, one of the highest levels of the dematerialization (or streamlining) of post-Fordism–– neoliberal 
governance––supports the development of psytopias, because neoliberal governance construes society as an 
association of individuals (Margaret Thatcher: “There is no such thing as ‘society.’”) Those individuals “belong” to 
some “social entity” only by virtue of active membership––of their transactions within it. At the same time, they can 
abandon membership by simple disassociation. They are therefore constituted as “social” by virtue of marginal 
inclusion in entities larger than themselves which neither demand much of them nor change their shape due to the 
individual’s membership. The social self is then an amalgam of changing associations, and the form of relation is 
identification (literally and emotionally) with a corporate persona. Recall that a psytopia operates in corporations 
when the latter is seen not as a sociological entity, but as a psyche—an identity that all members construct. With this 
analysis, we can see how individuals can become very minor if not anonymous contributors to the general energy of 
“the whole,” not only through their personal expenditures of energy but also by identifying with it at the same time: 
hence a psytopia. By this reckoning, then, we see that psytopias are potentially set up not only within corporations, but 
also through the large number of platforms for emphemeral associations in virtual communications networks, such as 




psytopia concept provides an account of the specifics of the process and how and why this process can 
occur. It also suggests why the spirituality discourse in corporations could be important. If so, it offers us a 
profound insight into the current nature of neospirituality and its future development. This thesis also 
strongly supports Carette and King’s conviction that religion has undergone a second privatization. Ac-
cording to them, whereas religion was first privatized by promising the individual’s self-actualization, the 
focus has now been redirected, in a second privatization, to the corporation’s self-actualization.  
I interpreted the network cosmology, the hacker ethic, and the Californian ideology as different ruminations 
on the relationship of the individual (i.e., the SA worker) and the collective (i.e., non-SAs who, in most 
cases, are not rewarded as well as are SAs by their work, or are entirely excluded from work). The common 
concern of all three was that SAs lives had obvious privilege, whereas their efforts were not necessarily 
directed towards the good of society. These reflections commonly justify SAs’ strong focus on their per-
sonal work (and rewards) to the exclusion of much else by concluding that SA work is intrinsically so-
cially-valuable––i.e., that it is “good work”––by proposing worldviews wherein this is the case. However, 
as I move in my account from considering these three worldviews to the models of the second privatization 
and the psytopia, I point out that a different individual/collective opposition is under consideration: that 
between the individual within the corporation and the corporation as the collective. However, if the “second 
privatization” and “psytopia” formulations are valid, in their case, a holistic merging of individual and 
collective interests seems also to be operating, but with individual in a weaker, not a stronger position 
relative to the collective. Hence, rather than soul-searching on their contributions to the larger society, 
perhaps SAs’ greater preoccupation should be whether they indeed have the degree of autonomy they as-
sume for themselves. They should ask: “Are even my interests (as a privileged post-Fordist worker) being 
realized through this particular workplace arrangement? Given that my managers seek to empower me even 
to the extent of indulging my spiritual aspirations and well-being by hosting various body-mind-spirit 
workshops and training programs, by funding my creativity, and by supporting my relations with 
co-workers (and pays me too), is my job working for me?”  
We have heard Carette and King’s (2005, 45) answer to this question: “With the emergence of capitalist 
spirituality, the freedom of the individual to express their inner natures through spirituality becomes sub-
ordinated to the demands of business culture and the needs of a flexible and competitive economy.” Ac-
cording to these scholars, spirituality resolves the individual/collective contradiction in the collective’s 
favour, and masks that resolution in the process. However, as noted, the collective referred to here is not the 
broader community in which the workplace is set, whose imagined interests the other cosmologies struggle 
over, but the corporation itself. The argument is that once religion is lodged in the individual psyche, as a 
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personal spirituality, corporations can become the beneficiaries of the “spiritual” commitment, both as a 
brand they can adopt, and as a source of worker motivation and discipline.  
This suggests that “spirituality for workers” is an interim term whose discourse, once commonplace in 
corporate worksites, helps to construct the psytopia, the holistic world in which the corporation is tacitly 
acknowledged as the spiritual entity. Under the proper ideological conditions, workers may believe they are 
self-realizing when in fact their own wellbeing is being sacrificed for the corporation. They may believe 
that the energy they are expending is for their own emancipation, even though it is being systematically 
redirected to the company, so that their own subjectivity is not being merely compromised, but actually 
sacrificed to this goal. This is the thrust of Leinberger and Tucker’s (1991) and Nadeson’s (1999) analyses. 
Their collective work explaining the creation of a psytopia elaborates on Carrette and King’s (2005) second 
privatization thesis. However, they have articulated the dynamic through which the ideology functions. As 
we have seen, theorists of the psytopia claim that, through it, the corporation is “endowed with a psyche.” In 
this vision, the corporation’s “life force” derives “from its entrepreneurial-like employees…. A critical 
reading of this discourse reveals a tendency for individuals to be seen as ‘soft,’ ‘corporate assets…,’ ready 
to be engineered to enhance ‘corporate soul’” (Nadesan 1999, 17). 
In the three worker cosmologies discussed above, workers are active participants in the debates that shape 
them. To varying degrees, and with their somewhat different emphases, each is also part of the 
self-understanding of these workers. The hacker ethic and the network cosmology have been, after all, 
consciously presented to workers themselves. Elements of the Californian ideology, such as the idea of 
“digital socialism” (see Chapter Eight) are rationalizations offered by Silicon Valley workers themselves to 
explain their privilege. However, the psytopia is an analytical construct posed by scholars, and it is not 
widely known. Like all ideologies, a psytopia as workplace culture has value to a company partly to the 
extent that its dynamics are not fully understood by those who sustain its existence. This could include all 
HR professionals, consultants, workers and managers. Indeed, that managers and industry analysts may 
largely be unaware of the psytopic dynamics is indicated by their evident soul-searching over whether the 
worker or the corporation itself primarily benefits from the propogation of in-house spirituality. Many 
observers doubt that we can separate the interest of workers from that of the corporation. With an under-
standing of the psytopia’s construction, this doubt seems to be valid, given that, according to the psytopic 
model, the purpose of spirituality is to marry the interests of the two constituencies. 
Neospiritual Resolutions 
In the above I have outlined two basic contradictions in self-understanding to which post-Fordist SA 
workers are subjected as they perform their work and situate themselves socially. These are the contradic-
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tions of worker and community interests and worker and corporate interests. I have explained in detail how 
elements of neospirituality help resolve these.I have shown that the worker cosmologies manifest holistic 
worldviews, and that these posit the interests of the group and the larger collective—society––as aligned. I 
then explained that the impact of holistic ways of thinking has more significance for the worker in terms of 
encouraging a tendency to collapse individual interests into that of the corporate collectivity. However, to 
be effective, the second privatization of religion and psytopiae require that the participants, the workers, are 
unconscious of the psychic dynamic in which they participate. I suggest that neospirituality practices may 
function to shroud these dynamics from worker consciousness––that neospirituality helps provide a su-
perficial resolution of the tension between worker interests and identities and corporate demands and goals. 
I suggest below five ways that this may occur. 
As I have argued, SAs struggle under an existential contradiction (or political conundrum)––their history of 
dissidence and anti-capitalist collectivism, stemming from their historical emergence from the counter-, 
left-liberal and computer-hacker cultures––creates cognitive dissonance when placed against their current 
social positions of relative prominence and privilege, positions they hold as long as they preserve their 
relationship with their corporate employers. Related to this reconciliation, and equally important, they must 
maintain a balance between contradictory corporate demands on them: to work autonomously and inde-
pendently, based on the company’s need for creativity at low cost (which their past history and ethical 
legacy also supports) while also repressing action beyond the boundaries of corporation’s objectives and 
interests (which their past history and ethical legacy does not support).  
To summarize the material and conclude this section, I propose five ways in which neospirituality facili-
tates these resolutions ––five ways its practices and belief-structure helps workers gloss over the contra-
dictions of worker and community interests and worker and corporate interests, both of which, as I have 
argued, assail SA workers. Together these arguments construct a persuasive account of why neospirituality 
is an integral part of contemporary post-Fordist (particularly SA) workplace cultures. 
1. The posthierarchical spirit of neospirituality bridges neoliberal corporate managerial and worker 
ideologies in the form of a common alliance against government, regulation, and bureaucracy. Managers 
seek the flat, posthierarchical organization because it reduces the need for labour and facilitates 
“just-in-time” access to it. As for workers, “posthierarchy” suggests that power structures are obsolete, 
allowing workers to acknowledge an alliance with management while denying its possible basis in similar 
class status––by positing a third term, which both oppose, but which has no reference to class. Equally, 
workers can deny their submission to labour market forces through the pretension that their form of work 
(in flat organizational structures) intrinsically opposes authority, as per the Californian ideology. Any social 
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obligations to respond to the concentrations of power within the industries in which they work, increasing 
structural unemployment due to automation, and other forms of inequality in which their industry has a 
hand can be overlooked because the posthierarchical managerial style is held to be intrinsicallydemocra-
tizing. Supposedly, SAs working with their maximum effort and skills to advance technological products 
and innovations, unimpeded by supervisors, rules, procedures and other limitations that only bureaucracies 
(especially governments) impose, creates a responsive (i.e., “democratic”) society (as per the network 
cosmology) and “consumer-equal” (i.e., commonly-wealthy) social order (as per the hacker ethic).  
2. Neospirituality defines the holistic collapse of the individual and collective that neoliberalism 
relies on for its sense and that SA-employing corporations require for their operation. The holism of ne-
ospirituality imaginatively collapses the modernist self/other distinction into a unitary world where such a 
distinction is illusory—where apparent responses of the self to the self or others are only moments in the 
overall ebb-and-flow of the one cosmos in which all participate, willingly or otherwise. As we have seen, 
the holism allows workers to suppress their awareness of the contradictory position they hold with respect 
to the wider and less advantaged society––when placed against their egalitarian cultural heritage. Addi-
tionally, in an ironic twist, the holism also helps mask the very real challenge to the personal autonomy and 
self-actualization in which they are indoctrinated for instrumental reasons in their workplaces. This chal-
lenge comes from SAs’ subordination to the market and company goals, by virtue of their insecure work 
patterns in the first place, and the operation of psytopia in the second. The holism of neospirituality assists 
in an imaginative transposition of spiritual subjecthood from their own selves to the corporation––the 
psytopic resolution. As important as the individual-society resolution, under the conditions of post-Fordist 
labour, the identification of the “whole” in the holism is also transposed from the cosmos to the corporation, 
resulting in the conviction that performance in the corporation’s interest is also in one’s own. 
3. Iconic workers’ use of neospiritual well-being commodities allows them to reduce dependency on 
broad community relations as well as on direct service by other classes––i.e., the service worker class that 
indeed forms around symbolic analysts. As the West-coast American software- production area epitomizes, 
symbolic analysts and marked social inequality coincide. However, symbolic analysts do not welcome 
awareness of their superior class status because they are steeped in an ethos of egalitarianism. The reality of 
this class relation may be partially evaded by symbolic analysts through their resort to neospiritual practices 
instead of the direct personal service of others or community support. Symbolic analysts use neospiritual 
“technical solutions” to what might be judged as social needs (such as by seeking meditative solace in 
favour of the comfort of personal relations or the ministrations of servants). This helps mask the inegali-
tarian social order they benefit by, and their superior class status;  
282 
 
4. Through its character as spiritual prosumption, neospirituality encourages the idea that workforce 
participation offers more than direct material and social rewards––something “on the side,” as it were. This 
idea, which derives from spiritual prosumption’s view that value can be embedded in the self, can enhance 
allegiance to employers. Although practically speaking, due to further “experience” and skill-development, 
what labour offers is more labour (enhanced employability). However, according to the spiritual 
prosumption model, meeting the challenges of work accrues as intrinsic value to the worker (which can also 
be traded in for profit at a future date). As neospirituals are enriched as they seek, hard work in “creative” 
work environments also enriches the worker (at least in terms of deferred reward).  
Since SAs have little control over their working conditions, and even rewarded with stock options do not 
significantly own the means of their production, they are largely excluded from the power-broker status that 
is a necessary component of the autonomy that crucially defines their identity. Spiritual prosumption 
changes this equation slightly, as it posits the self as resource as well as the labour to work it. In these terms, 
workers do own some of the means of production—themselves. This interpretation can of course only apply 
in contexts of predominantly immaterial production, since the feelings, cultural memes, values and “in-
sights” that are its inputs are “stored” and must always be “sourced” in individual memories and psyches–
–i.e., those of SAs.  
According to this theory, as symbolic analysts work for the company, they also exploit their relationship to 
it––symbiotically, as it were–– as they operate their own “factory”—the factory of the self—to which all 
profits accrue. Furthermore, they never need “stop the line,” even when they are at home, because personal 
or life experiences in almost any circumstances can go into the store for later reference. This is why “ex-
perience” per se has high value for this group. Similarly, the dedication to “learning” as the near-sacred 
pursuit of SAs seems to be rooted in this rationalization and adjudication of company and personal interests. 
5. The dematerializing thrust of neospirituality mirrors that of post-Fordism and the experience of its 
workers, as per post-Fordist industry’s privileging of immaterial products, its celebration of virtual rela-
tions, its dissolution of organizations into ephemeral modules temporarily addressed to projects, and its 
streamlining of information to support the power of consolidated global capital. Since the neospiritual ethos 
devalues materiality (for example, by privileging the energetic moment of matter-energy dichotomy), the 
entire post-Fordist dematerializing thrust becomes valorized. This can only be very effective in validating 
the SA work form as well as the globalized monopoly-capital industrial structure that hosts it. This de-
valuation must also have a major role to play in validating SAs’ superior social status, as discussed above, 
relative to the members of the vestigial middle class and the deposed working class (some of whom are new 
service workers)—i.e., emiserated workers and citizens in general, those around them or at a distance who 
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are either directly materially-deprived or, more commonly, live their lives with ersatz goods, including 
food, that fail to meet the needs they are posed to satisfy. In short, the privileged status of SA workers is 
mystified through the denial of the importance of the material.  
More profoundly, deemphasizing the material’s importance allows the elite to downplay the significance of 
material deprivation in general. The immaterial economy reifies this dismissal by positing that immaterial 
goods are as or more valuable than, or can substitute, for material goods. 
By valorizing “energy,” the ephemeral or “spiritual,” personal psychic “growth,” etc., neospirituality urges 
rich and poor alike to focus on personal experience and goals, emotions, feelings, and subjective devel-
opment rather than on conditions of justice and material development (ie, what people need to live a decent 
life). It translates the concept of “rewards” and “value” from the material to the spiritual realm (“work 
should first be spiritually rewarding, don’t think too much about remuneration”), and it hides economic 
power and privilege because everyone has the (allegedly equal) power and opportunity to develop them-
selves, experience life deeply, practice mindfulness, and generally just be as awesome as they were meant 
to be. In sum, neospirituality in the workplace encourages people to focus on themselves and their inward 
experience, ignore conditions of material inequality and injustice, accept subjective rewards in the place of 
fair material compensation, and believe that the workplace is egalitarian because everyone can access the 
rewards of spirituality equally. It thus reconciles workers, marginal or otherwise, to the post-Fordist 
workplace and allows them to ignore the conflict between their interests and that of the corporation.  
Concluding Remarks 
Limitations of Study  
Throughout this dissertation, I have shown different ways in which the beliefs and practices of neospiritu-
alty and SA workers mirror, and possibly even reproduce, each other. Also in this dissertation, I performed 
more abstract or higher-level comparisons between the two cultures, showing that at the level of 
worldviews they shared holistic, dematerializing and posthierarchical orientations. I argued that 
post-Fordist workplaces are sites of an evolving monoculture, which neospirituality supports by promoting 
a worldview that encourages workers to ignore material conditions of justice and development, inequality 
in social status and opportunity, become hostile to government-sponsored programs of regulation and 
wealth-redistribution, and focus mostly on themselves and their subjective development. In short, I assert 
that, on this basis, neospiritual values and skills reflect the desirable culture within post-Fordist global 
companies, which is why corporations are so dedicated to promoting them.  
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That being said, many of the connections I have tried to make in this dissertation require further collabo-
ration. An important argument that needs more scrutiny is the claim that neospirituality in workplaces does 
not serve to liberate workers. For many industry insiders and supporters of workplace spirituality, ne-
ospirituality frees workers to be authentically themselves and humanizes the work experience by un-
leashing creativity, energy, and personal satisfaction. I have argued that neospirituality, in fact, accom-
modates workers to their sometimes exploitative work environment, an environment that includes them 
only in as much as they can contribute the the corporations goals. I observe that there is little evidence in the 
literature that neospirituality in workplaces promotes a dissident or “disruptive” orientation to the power 
relations therein. However, Bell, suggests that that Critical Management Studies (CMS) scholars look for 
evidence of this culture of resistance and cited “historical workplace interventions by Marxist work-
er-priests, who emerged from the prophetic and ‘liberation-theological’ traditions of Christianity” (122) as 
models for CMS scholars to consider. More recently Edwin Ng (2016, 139) pointed out that the defenders 
of Mindfulness argue for a form of “Trojan Horse” agitation. They contend that, once subtly embedded in 
workplace culture, mindfulness can disrupt normal exploitative workplace practices. Like Ng, I do not find 
this argument credible. While corporate mindfulness practices have multiplied in recent decades, work-
places have not seen a concomitant rise in political or labour activism.  
While many of these limitations on the side of theory are real, my purpose has been to develop theory that 
can be tested in field research. If I have overstated my case in places, it is because I believe that a strong but 
nuanced thesis provides the best basis for powerful empirical work. To this end, I have, in this dissertation, 
addressed a large number of issues relative to neospirituality and work and integrated the most salient into a 
thesis to be tested. I have additionally explored anomalous or alternative points of view. Although I have 
drawn tentative conclusions after these explorations, I have nevertheless left a number of threads of rela-
tively unintegrated theory that an attentive reader can recognize and explore to challenge the main con-
clusions of this thesis.  
Normally, the proper context for resolving theoretical debates is field study. Theoretical assessment is an 
important ingredient in identifying what might be the case in a certain situation, but it can never verify what 
is the case. Theory is a necessary but not sufficient ingredient to understanding. The grounded research that 
could bring confident, rather than speculative, answers to many questions posed in this dissertation remains 
to be completed. Stated frankly, the debate around the issue of the relationship of neospirituality to human 
agency and self-realization needs further pursuit through more extensive empirical research. This disser-
tation outlines possible relationships and connections between neospirituality, the culture of iconic 
post-Fordist workers, and the conditions of labour in the new economy. While grounded in extensive 
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scholarly research, many of the conclusions I make are suggestive. My goal was to provide a robust theory 
that could subject to empirical study in the future.  
For example, through field study, I could test the adequacy of the worker category of symbolic analysts as 
the population that has most fulsomely adopted neospiritual practices in workplaces. The types of answers 
missing are twofold. One is the lack of data on which workers in particular (e.g., SAs versus, for example, 
workers in Fordist-style manufacturing or service in a post-Fordist economy) are offered and follow ne-
ospiritual practices within workplaces. We should also find out what kinds of companies, especially among 
global corporations, are most likely to promote neospiritual practices. Much of the argumentation in this 
dissertation assumes on the basis of anecdotal evidence that the iconic global purveyors of immaterial 
products (i.e., the large internet and information and communications technology service companies like 
Google, Apple and Amazon) lead other more traditional companies in integrating neospirituality. For this 
dissertation to assume its full potential in defining the roles of neospirituality in corporations and sug-
gesting future directions of this relationship, these lacunae in knowledge must be addressed.  
Neospirituality, Social Change, and the Culture of the Post-Fordist Workplace 
In this dissertation, I showed there to be important parallels between the basic beliefs and practices of the 
neospiritual practitioners and the culture, skill-set and worldview of a particular segment of the post-Fordist 
workforce, the symbolic analysts in immaterial production sites. I also showed how neospiritual beliefs, 
practices, values and institutional forms function in symbolic analyst workplaces and society in general. 
In speculating on possible reasons for neospirituality’s presence in the post-Fordist workplace and ne-
ospirituality’s parallels to its culture, I presented several histories from the earliest to more contemporary 
stages of post-Fordism––of changes in workplace design philosophy, in relation to problematics that 
concerned the larger society which emerged from capitalist globalization and computerization, and of ideas 
about society, organization and ethics explored by popular-cultural spokespeople as post-Fordist globali-
zation advanced, including those proponents of a network-technology-based model of society. Addition-
ally, I connected theoretical work on changing social and work structures contingent on post-Fordism’s 
advance that had implications for culture (particularly work culture) from a variety of scholarly disciplines. 
The most important of these were critical economic analyses in the Marxian and Foucauldian traditions as 
well as the work of selected scholars of religion who write about neospirituality in relation to both con-
sumption and production. 
Through the interrelation of these ideas and in company with detailed analysis of the work processes of 
those post-Fordist workers I claimed to be iconic for post-Fordist work in general (i.e., symbolic analysts), 
I outlined various ways in which neospirituality appears to significantly contribute to and help make sense 
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of “post-Fordist work culture.” The critical scholars of religion I consulted raise the spectre that neospir-
ituality is being shaped most definitively by global corporations––especially those that concentrate on 
immaterial production––as neospirituality gains a more assured place in the panoply of human resource 
practices in these companies. This development supports Carrette and King’s argument that religion is 
being privatized a second time to serve corporate needs.  
Neoliberal entrepreneurship of the self is the basis of both symbolic analytic and neospiritual identities. 
These two identities can easily be found in single individuals because of their common practices and be-
liefs. I argued that although this entrepreneurship of the self is not restricted to workers in general or to 
symbolic analysts in particular, it is in the context of immaterial labour in global corporations that this form 
of subjectivity makes the most sense or is best realized.  
According to theorists, entrepreneurs of the self—a category that includes neospirituals or spiritual 
prosumers––are most broadly constituted via the neoliberal governance of post-Fordism. Neospirituality 
follows the model of dematerialization or streamlining, which I showed is a fundamental feature of ne-
oliberal culture. In the neoliberal world, where governance now eclipses government, “society” as a con-
cept, and its articulated character based on its composition by social types with differing levels of power 
emerging from the functionally-differentiated spheres of social management of liberal modernity along 
with their specialized languages, becomes anathematic. By endorsing a holistic worldview, neospirituality 
both mirrors and supports this reduction of complex and incompatible discourses into a unitary language as 
well as the reduction of public identities to individual self-articulation. Expressing an eagerness to embrace 
the entire collectivity as part of the self by discursively reducing difference and opposition, neospiritual 
holism sidesteps the entire modernist project, which privileges language and analytical contestation in order 
to ferret out truths, however provisionally. As “spiritual prosumption” or “the entrepreneurship of the self,” 
neospirituality seems to support the neoliberal reduction of society to a mass of contesting individuals 
because it recognizes in its universe only the individuals and the mass (the globe, the divine, energy, Gaia, 





103 As it turns out, internet technology, which is the host and motif of contemporary popular culture, at least 
moderately supports this sidestepping in favour, theoretically, of the development of identities through multifacetted 
connection with others and layered identities based on those connections. This is a theoretical model, however, which 
overlooks the advancing commoditized nature of these interactions, whose operation potentially suggests a form of 
balkanization of all individuals––each his own separate “country”––as profiling operations direct individuals into 
niches that may in the end simply constitute isolation from other, essentially-incompatible voices. 
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From all of these observations, I must draw the tentative conclusion that although neospirituality might be 
considered an ethos that is only contingently found in worksites and contributes to their cultures only by 
happenstance, the better part of logic and evidence suggests it is being shaped by post-Fordist capitalism so 
as to make that contribution. All told, the parallel character of the working conditions and culture of the 
symbolic analysts and of neospirituals, added to evidence of neospirituality’s embrace by the managers 
within these sites, considering also the generic similarity of workplace cosmologies and that of neospirit-
uality, supported by a range of theoretical material that points in this direction, contributes to the argument 
that through their patronage, these corporate managers have already and will continue in the future to shape 
neospirituality to bolster the culture, and justify the conditions, of new workplaces.   
By providing this complex hypothesis as to why neospirituality practices are welcomed into corporate 
worksites––particularly of global corporations––I believe I have presented a challenge to scholars who 
assert that the connection between neospirituality and corporations is only apparent, marginal, unfortu-
nately corrupting, or accidental.  
Finally, I have substantially reproduced Weber’s project of suggesting a relationship between a religious 
ethos and an economic system––but in a different era, in relation to a different form of capitalism, and with 
respect to a different class. I have done this by arguing that an important, if not iconic, institutional site for 
the perpetuation of neospiritual culture is the workplace of post-Fordist immaterial production and its key 
carriers, symbolic analysts. Weber argued that the Protestant ethic is a form of rationality, bridging religion 
and economics, found amongst the expanding bourgeoisie in key European nations, as capitalism emerged. 
In his particular representation of the relation of religious culture and an economic form, members of a 
specific social stratum of society promoted a worldview that reinforced their own abilities to cope with, and 
flourish within, the material conditions they were faced with based on their particular class position. In the 
process, and because they were successful economically, they propagated a specific form of “rationality,” 
one embedded in Calvinist Protestantism, as a norm beyond the boundaries of their class. 
In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1985), Weber contended that the Calvinists were 
pursuing a strictly religious agenda and set of motivations, that then accidently aligned with certain 
changing social and economic conditions (establishing the "elective affinity") which fostered the motiva-
tion for capitalism (i.e., the ascetic ethic of vocation and drive to re-invest, and not spend, profits). This 
interpretation tends to stress the mere alignment of a fully-formed religious commitment with a particular 
class position within an emerging economic structure; when they became embodied in the persons of cap-
italists, both flourished. For my account to be an exact parallel to Weber’s account in this text, symbolic 
analysts would have to be driven by aspirations and goals that are extrinsic to their professional or eco-
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nomic activity that just happen to have significant reinforcing or legitimating effect on a new state of 
economic/working conditions. To the extent that I have tried to account for the parallel character of the 
neospiritual religious attitude and the SA class ethos, I have generally presented both as evolving together–
–making the relationship I proffer somewhat different from what Weber proposes in that text. However, a 
key aspect of Weber's argument in his later work, such as the essay “The Social-Psychology of the World 
Religions” (1967), is the emphasis on the role of social strata that act as carriers of “practical ethics” that are 
often reflective of specific religious orientations. This emphasis can be explored while leaving somewhat 
moot the question of how this relationship developed (i.e., how the social strata became the carrier of the 
“practical ethics”). As such, this view of the religious-class relations very strongly mirrors the arguments of 
my dissertation. Hence, I hope that, by following a strategy that is a close analogy to Weber’s approach, this 
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